This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

NYPL RESEARCH LIBRARIES
3 3433 06912993 4

THE

UNIVERSALIST QUARTERLY

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

VOLUME II.

BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY A. TOMPKINS.
1845.

438041B

WM. A. HALL & CO., PRINTERS.
141 Washington street.

CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I.—Geology.—Its Facts, and its Inferences,	5
II.—The Blind Girl,	22
III.—Historical Sketch of Painting,	23
IV.—The Effect of our present Conduct on our future State,	39
V.—Fourierism, and similar Schemes,	52
VI.—The Existence and Office of the Religious Element in Man,	76
VII.—The seared Conscience,	90
VIII.—Sonnets,	100
IX.—Literary Notices,	101
X.—Religion and the Fine Arts,	113
XI.—Αἰώνιος, as used by Philo Judæus,	133
XII.—The Idea of a Social Reform,	136
XIII.—The Minstrel's Curse,	147
XIV.—The fifteenth Chapter of 1 Corinthians, with Notes,	149
XV.—Frederica Bremer,	168
XVI.—Illustrative Imagery,	175
XVII.—Life and Immortality,	189
XVIII.—Another Chapter from Carlyle the Younger,	214
XIX.—Literary Notices,	218
XX.—Philosophy and Theology,	221
XXI.—Infidelity and Religion,	249
XXII.—The Effect of our present Character on our future State,	251

438044B

WM. A. HALL & CO., PRINTERS.
141 Washington street.

CONTENTS.

ARTICLE	PAGE
I.—Geology.—Its Facts, and its Inferences,	5
II.—The Blind Girl,	22
III.—Historical Sketch of Painting,	23
IV.—The Effect of our present Conduct on our future State,	39
V.—Fourierism, and similar Schemes,	52
VI.—The Existence and Office of the Religious Element in Man,	76
VII.—The seared Conscience,	90
VIII.—Sonnets,	100
IX.—Literary Notices,	101
X.—Religion and the Fine Arts,	113
XI.—Αἰώνιος, as used by Philo Judæus,	133
XII.—The Idea of a Social Reform,	136
XIII.—The Minstrel's Curse,	147
XIV.—The fifteenth Chapter of 1 Corinthians, with Notes,	149
XV.—Frederica Bremer,	168
XVI.—Illustrative Imagery,	175
XVII.—Life and Immortality,	189
XVIII.—Another Chapter from Carlyle the Younger,	214
XIX.—Literary Notices,	218
XX.—Philosophy and Theology,	221
XXI.—Infidelity and Religion,	249
XXII.—The Effect of our present Character on our future State,	251

ARTICLE PAGE
XXIII.—Sir Philip Sydney,..... 291
XXIV.—Relation of our present Character to the Future,..... 312
XXV.—Literary Notices,..... 320
XXVI.—Thom's Divine Inversion,..... 329
XXVII.—"Whosoever liveth, and believeth on me, shall never die,"..... 339
XXVIII.—Forgiveness, ... 341
XXIX.—Geology and Scripture,..... 349
XXX.—Festus,..... 385
XXXI.—The Flesh, Body, &c., as the Cause of Sin,..... 411
XXXII.—The seventh Chapter of Romans, with Notes,..... 424
XXXIII.—Literary Notices, ... 429

ERRATA.

Page 69, line 7 from the top, for "inconsistency," read "inconstancy."

Page 107, line 4 from the top, for "with a spiritual," read "into a spiritual."

Page 112, line 6 from bottom, for "travelling," read "trading."

UNIVERSALIST QUARTERLY

AND

GENERAL REVIEW.

Article I.

Geology.—Its Facts and its Inferences.

Geology is perhaps second to no other science in the extent of its researches, both in time and space; in the grandeur and utility of its developements; and in the accuracy with which its facts are unfolded. In *space*, it accompanies the telescope as it sweeps the heavens, and fixes its corner-stone on the sublimest revelation in Astronomy. In *time*, it stretches its vision far into ancient periods, and brings those wonderful phenomena to view, which, until a recent era, were impenetrably sealed up in the crust of the earth.

In order to present its facts clearly, Geology calls to its aid, not only the light afforded by the higher branches of Physics, but also the knowledge derived from those splendid discoveries which form the admirable sciences of Mineralogy, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, and comparative Anatomy. Furnished with these guides, it penetrates the solid strata of the earth; separates the rocks into their simple elements; and establishes the position, that there was a period when those elements had no combination. Revealing truth more strange than the tales of Arabian fiction, it shows that the fossil coal which burns in our grates once formed the trees and plants of dense and luxu-

rious forests; and that the valuable mineral which enters so largely into the comforts of civilized society, once existed as ferruginous mud, borne along and deposited by water at the bottom of its various basins, where chemical action consolidated it into iron-stone. It developes the astonishing fact, that large proportions of some of the strata of the earth have been derived from the organic remains of various species and classes of innumerable animals, who lived and died, and were changed into solid rocks, parts of which form the lofty temple, or add beauty to the drawing-room, in the shape of marble ornaments. Thus, equally connected with the highest branches of knowledge and with many of the common comforts of life, Geology presents a field of sublime and exciting study, and opens that volume of nature, whose Author has impressed its language on the everlasting rocks. But notwithstanding the glory and utility of Geology, it is a source of deep regret that so many of its teachers have pursued a course which has established a perpetual warfare between some of its supposed facts and certain historical records found in the Bible. And so far has this spirit of opposition influenced some of the leading geological teachers, that any system which accords with the Mosaic account of the creation and of the deluge, is treated by them as unworthy of serious attention. They cherish a fixed skepticism in regard to the references made to Geology by the Scriptures. And their writings have affected numbers of individuals with a latent, lurking unbelief, that often needs but a spark to kindle it into the flame which consumes all confidence in divine revelation. This fact is proved by certain past incidents, which are recorded in history, wherein a new geological discovery, accompanied by certain inferences deduced from it, has thrilled men like an electric shock, overturned the faith of many, and caused that of others to reel like a ship struck by a sudden tornado. Thus an unwarranted antagonism is kept up between Geology and the Bible, and the rule is too often adopted, that Geology must destroy the validity of the Scriptures. "No sooner," says the Rev. Mr. Conybeare, "has any new discovery, whatever might have been its subject, occurred, (whether it was a fragment of Indian chronology, or an Egyptian zodiac, or the mechanism of the universe,

or that of living bodies, or, lastly, some new fact relating to the structure of the earth,) than the first aspect under which some minds have seemed anxious to view it, has been, whether it would not furnish some new weapon against revelation."

But in the midst of this war, one fact should be well considered, though it is generally kept out of sight. Geology is yet a progressive science,—a science which still has vast discoveries to make, and whose system, certainly so far as undoubted deductions from established facts are concerned, remains to be completed. The history of Geology presents a long array of theories, which have had their brief day, and were successively exploded by fresh discoveries in the science.[1] The physical facts seen on the surface of the earth are indeed always the same, but in deducing principles from these facts, geologists differ as much from each other as men differ on other subjects; a position which is clearly seen even in the most eminent works relating to the science. Cuvier, after alluding to many varying and contradictory systems, declares that "much diversity of opinion and contradiction has arisen," even among the most cautious geologists.[2] Among these opinions are some, which, at the time of their establishment, were considered clear refutations of the Mosaic record. Yet, while they have been exploded by later discoveries, the Bible remains unchanged, like an ancient temple, which, though it has withstood centuries of desolating storms, is still as fresh as when it received the finishing touch of the architect. Nor is it a less significant truth, that some of the ablest geologists have not only made no discoveries in the sublime field of their research which militate with revelation, but have recognised on the everlasting rocks the writing of the same finger which makes the pages of inspiration glow with the living fire of divine truth.

One great cause of this warfare is the want of care on the part of many geologists, not to deduce any conclusions from discovered facts, save those which are perfectly obvious. This important truth is developed in the following

[1] For a compend of this history, see Lyell's Principles of Geology, vol. i., the first four chapters.

[2] Revolutions on the Surface of the Globe, p. 31.

quotation: "But the testimony of geological monuments possesses, at least, the advantage of being free from all suspicion of misrepresentation. *We may be deceived in the inferences* which we draw, in the same manner as we often mistake the nature and import of phenomena observed in the daily course of nature; but our *liability to err is confined to the interpretation*, and if this be correct, our information is certain."[3] This is the precise difficulty — the interpretation of geological monuments has too often been erroneous. The history of geology proves that multitudes of unwarranted and contradictory conclusions have been deduced from the unquestionable facts of the science. Geological priests frequently give wrong explanations of their texts. And from the want of knowledge to enable them to detect the fallacy of such explanations, many people confound them with geological facts themselves, and then yield their confidence in the Scriptures to the influence of errors thus embraced.

The following instance illustrates this position: An individual discovered near mount Ætna a stratum of lava which, according to his supposition, flowed during an eruption that occurred about two thousand years since. On sinking a pit, he remarks that seven distinct strata of lava were found, on each of which about two feet of soil is deposited. Assuming that two thousand years are required to decompose lava so as to form soil, and applying this assumption to the seven strata, he concluded that the lowest stratum must have flowed full fourteen thousand years since. This conclusion was esteemed an undeniable fact; and as Moses did not make the world half so old, it was considered by many persons to be completely destructive of his testimony, which they rejected as unworthy of confidence.[4] Now the whole difficulty, in this instance, exists in confounding inferences with facts. That the strata of lava and soil really exist, is undeniable; but the time assumed for their deposition is an unfounded inference. And this inference was annihilated by the discovery of six strata of lava and soil over Herculaneum, which were deposited in less than eighteen centuries. Mr.

[3] Lyell's Principles of Geology, vol. i. p. 19.
[4] Comstock's Geology, p. 369, and onward.

Lyell shows conclusively, that this city was enveloped at first, not with lava, but with tuff, consisting "of comminuted volcanic ashes, mixed with pumice," and that a large part of the lava and soil lying over the tuff, could not have been deposited until nearly one thousand years after the destruction of the city.[5] Even in this case, no undoubted conclusion could be obtained, if the time occupied in the deposition of these strata, had to be determined by the geological facts alone. For if history were silent concerning the period when Herculaneum was destroyed, no one could have told that the event occurred less than eighteen centuries since. And, taking the supposed case in regard to the strata of lava near Ætna, it might have been said that it was destroyed twelve thousand years since. But while Geology speaks of the existence of the strata of lava and soil, history defines the time when their deposition commenced.

I have said that among even the leading geological teachers, theories are cherished of the most contradictory character, each of which is supposed to be founded on undeniable facts. This position will now be demonstrated by reference to a few of these theories, beginning with a point of comparatively less importance and proceeding to one of the grandest manifestations of the science.

We refer first to volcanoes. Geology shows us the existence of volcanoes, developes the effects of their awful power, and accurately describes the changes on the surface of the earth, of which they have been the efficient instruments. These are facts impressed in legible language on physical nature, and there can be no controversy in regard to them. But if we examine the theories which relate to the origin and cause of volcanoes, it is seen that geologists widely differ from each other. Dr. Buckland assumes the position, though with some doubt, that the central parts of the earth consist of a mass of melted materials, and that, steam being generated by the access of water to these materials, earthquakes must be the result when this steam finds no vent, and eruptions must be the consequence at those places where the pressure of steam can eject lava through volcanic craters.[6] Bakewell is inclined to the

[5] Lyell's Principles of Geology, vol. i. p. 326.
[6] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. pp. 41, 45–47.

same opinion, and thinks that the generation of steam under the surface of the earth would force passages through its crust, and eject lava and fragments of rocks.[7] Lyell, however, takes determinate ground against the notion, that the strata of the earth rests upon an internal melted mass of matter, and supposes that sufficient heat may be generated by chemical action to melt the surrounding rocks, which may be thrown out in the form of lava, by the pressure of gases in their endeavor to escape.[8] Sir H. Davy supposed at one time, that "the metallic bases of the earths and alkalies might abound in an unoxidized state in the subterranean regions to which water must occasionally penetrate. Whenever this happened, gaseous matter would be set free, the metals would combine with the oxygen of the water, and sufficient heat might be evolved to melt the surrounding rocks."[9] This opinion, though once generally prevalent, was afterwards rejected by its author, and is now nearly if not quite obsolete. It would be easy to extend the number of conflicting theories on this subject. But it is sufficient to remark, that "the pages of our scientific journals and works on volcanoes, are crowded with new theories of volcanic action, all of which have found some defenders."[10] The reason for the existence of these conflicting opinions, is, that there is no access to facts by which the subject can be placed beyond the reach of mere speculation. Yet we discover that geologists have their various theories on this point, that each of these various theories has had its supporters, and that, in the absence of demonstrative facts, we cannot decide which is correct and which is incorrect.

The like difference exists among geologists in regard to the primary, granitic rocks, which compose the foundation of the crust of the earth. For the theory which some geologists present to account for *the order of time* when granite was created, others unequivocally deny, and offer a contrary theory. Yet both opinions are invested with such an aspect of truth, as to deceive the casual reader with the

[7] Bakewell's Geology; third American edition, p. 337.
[8] Lyell, vol. i. chaps. 17, 18.
[9] Quoted in Lyell, vol. i. pp. 460, 461.
[10] The Physical Condition of the Earth. Family Library, No. 78, p. 314.

fallacy that they are established facts in Geology. Dr. Buckland affirms that the primary granite was formed previous to the creation of any animal or vegetable life. He rests this opinion upon the obvious truth, that no remains of organic life have been discovered in the primary rocks, and that the intense igneous action to which those rocks have evidently been subjected, precludes the possibility of life in any shape until a period subsequent to their establishment.[11] Yet Dr. Mantell dissents from this view, and affirms that there is no proof of granite being "the primeval solid framework of the globe," formed anterior to all organic life. He supposes that granite may be composed of sedimentary deposits mixed with animal remains, and that subsequent igneous action has given it its present structure, and obliterated all traces of its sedimentary origin.[12] Now though the opinion of Dr. Buckland appears to be a necessary and rational inference from facts presented by sacred history and Geology, yet there is here all the difference between two leading geologists, that there is between the theories that primary granite *was* formed, and was *not* formed, prior to the existence of organized beings.

Equal discrepancy of opinion exists in geological schools, in regard to the *mode* of the creation of the primary granite. Dr. Buckland contends for "the original fluidity of the entire materials of the earth, caused by the presence of intense heat. From this fluid mass of metals and metalloid bases of the earths, and alkalies, the first granitic crust appears to have been formed by oxydation of these bases."[13] Dr. Mantell, however, takes an opposite theory, and argues thus: "The transmutation, by heat, of chalk into crystalline marble; of loose sand into compact limestone; of argillaceous slate into porcelain jasper; of coal into anthracite; of anthracite into shale and slate; of slate into micaceous schist; of micaceous schist into gneiss and granite; of the latter into trap, &c., together with the characters presented by the mineral products of existing volcanoes, prepare the mind to receive without surprise the theory of an eminent geologist and chemist, M. Fournet,

[11] Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. chap. 6.
[12] Mantell's Wonders of Geology, vol. ii. p. 786.
[13] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 48.

that all the primary rocks are simply sedimentary deposits metamorphosed by igneous action."[14] He also remarks, "we are warranted in concluding that granite and its associated rocks are nothing more than sedimentary deposits altered by igneous action."[15] There is a great difference between the theories of these two eminent men. Dr. Buckland believes that the primary granite rocks are igneous in their origin, because no signs of stratification have been discovered in them. But Dr. Mantell believes, from another class of facts, that they are sedimentary deposits, subsequently altered by intense heat. Now, all that geologists can determine on this question, is, that primary granite has been subjected to intense heat. But whether it is the product of intense heat, or of sedimentary deposits afterwards altered by the action of fire, they cannot determine. Yet eminent geologists take opposite sides of the question. If this disagreement results from geologists having mistaken the nature of a certain class of physical facts, then their opinions should be cautiously received; but if their theories are conjectural, then they are without the authority of demonstrated truth. Still, it is easy for ordinary readers to confound these theories with facts, when scientific men confidently advance them.

We venture to affirm, from the foregoing considerations, that there is equal room for geologists to offer unfounded theories in regard to the *age* of the primary formations. The inference which most geologists deduce from established facts, is, that the primary formations were gradually produced in the lapse of vast periods of time. This position is measurably true, when applied to the rest of the formations which compose the crust of the earth. That considerable time elapsed during their deposition, though not to the extent for which many contend, is evident from the fact, that the traces of sedimentary origin which they present, together with the abundant fossil remains which they contain, prove that their materials were deposited by water. Still, the supposition that the primary rocks and soils were gradually produced by fixed laws, is a mere inference founded on uncertain analogy. For, if it be said that the particles of which the primary rocks are composed,

[14] Mantell's Wonders of Geology, vol. ii. pp. 759, 760.
[15] Ibid, vol. ii. p. 768.

were deposited by water during a series of ages, the question presents itself, How did those particles originate? This places the subject only a step farther back, and applies our reasoning to crude matter; for of that matter, we propose the inquiry, Whence came it? Was it gradually created by the operation of fixed laws? Or did God create it immediately? and if so, what prevents the conclusion, that he at once created it in the form of primary rocks and soils?

Many geologists seem to avoid all systems which involve the intervention of any miraculous power in the creation of the crust of the earth, and to cling to the position that all the formations are the result of the gradual operation of uniform laws. Hence they commence this gradual operation with rude, unfinished matter; regardless of the fact, that it is as much a miracle to create unfashioned matter, as to create it at once in chemical combination as the primary rocks, soils, and water, and that uniform laws may not have operated upon it until after it made its appearance in such combination. Can reasons be offered which prove this view to be fact, and which show the progressive system to be mere inference when applied to first formations?

All geologists allow that matter was created by Deity, and that there was a time when it did not exist. Dr. Buckland says, "That the matter of the universe is not eternal and self-existent, but was originally created by the power of the Almighty."[16] Professor Bakewell says, "The only proper answer to the question, *how was the world made?* is briefly this: by the almighty power of its Creator."[17] Professor Silliman remarks, that "the world was, therefore, made *in time* by the omnipotent Creator."[18] These statements are only echoes of the declaration, "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth."[19] This fact being admitted, what reason is there for supposing that this matter was not created at once in chemical combination, and in the form of primary granite, soils, and water? No reason, save that founded on analogy. And

[16] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 25. See also Mantell, vol. i. pp. 28, 29, and Lyell, vol. ii. pp. 506, 507.

[17] Bakewell's Geology, p. 2.

[18] Appendix to Bakewell's Geology, p. 539.

[19] Genesis i. 1.

that this analogy will not sustain the supposition, is evident from the fact that it is stronger against than for it. We shall endeavor to sustain this position.

Geologists affirm that there was a period in the history of the earth, when there was no organic life, and that the signs of its commencement are inscribed in legible language on physical nature. Professor Lyell remarks: "Man had a beginning; and therefore the present state of the organic world has not gone on from eternity;" and adds, that "he finds established, by purely physical phenomena and proofs, the declaration of revelation, that in the first time man had no existence."[20] He farther declares, that "the low antiquity of our species . . . . . is not controverted by any experienced geologist."[21] Dr. Buckland remarks: "In these most ancient conditions, both of land and water, Geology refers us to a state of things incompatible with the existence of animal and vegetable life; and thus on the evidence of natural phenomena, establishes the important fact that we find a starting-point, on this side of which, all forms, both of animal and vegetable beings, must have had a beginning."[22] Dr. Mantell affirms: "The creation of man, and the establishment of the existing order of things; which we are taught both by revelation and *natural records*, took place but a few thousand years ago; are events beyond the speculation of philosophy."[23] The statement thus made, is not founded on conjecture; but is sustained by undoubted geological facts. At one period, then, in the formation of the earth, neither animal nor vegetable life existed. Consequently the first animals and the first forms of vegetable life could not have been produced by the laws which now govern their continuation in their successors; for these laws of generation could not act until the first forms of organic life had been created to be subject to their power. Hence geologists are compelled to admit, that God not only created the matter which composed the first animals and vegetables, but that he immediately

[20] Lectures delivered in New York, p. 25.
[21] Lyell's Geology, vol. i. p. 159.
[22] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 50.
[23] Wonders of Geology, vol. ii. p. 785. See also Hitchcock's Geology, and Cuvier's Revolutions on the Surface of the Globe.

created it in the form of the first animals and vegetables, and not by progressive laws, which, in this case, could not have had practical existence until the first forms had been created for them to act upon. The substance of this position appears in all the geological writings which have come within my observation. Yet, if a geologist could find a bone of the first man, or the trunk, or a leaf of the first tree, imbedded in rock, he would say that they were progressively formed by the laws of generation; and this conclusion he would base on the analogy derived from the operation of those laws at the present day. It is evident, that while this analogy will hold good up to the first forms of organic life, yet there it completely fails; for it cannot account for the creation of those first forms, as it accounts for those which have succeeded them. And geologists admit that failure, when they affirm that these first forms were created by the immediate power of God, as sacred history also declares in distinct terms. It being conceded and proved, that God did immediately create certain portions of matter in such forms and character, as constituted them the first animals and vegetables of future organic life, why not apply this fact to the creation of primary rocks, soils, and water? Where is the necessity of inferring that the primary formations were created only in a long course of ages, when there is as much reason for believing them the results of immediate creation, as the first animals and the first forms of the vegetable kingdom.[24] It is true, that the formations which rest on the primary rocks, present unequivocal proofs of progressive growth; but it does not follow that the primary rocks were the result of progressive action, any more than that the first man was created by the ordinary laws of generation.

But it will be said: "To what cause, then, are we to ascribe the regular successive *strata* in all *primitive* mineral formations, previous to the disturbances of which they bear the evidence?" "I ask, in reply: to *what cause* are we to ascribe the regular successive *laminæ* in the shell of the *first tortoise*, or the regular successive *folds* in the wood of the *first tree?*" It will be inquired: "To *what cause*

[24] This argument is ably presented in a work entitled "A Comparative Estimate of the Mineral and Mosaical Geologies," by Granville Penn, Esq.,—a work which ought to be republished in this country.

are we to ascribe the primitive characteristical diversities of granite, gneiss, mica-slate, porphyry, serpentine, &c.?" —"I again reply, by asking: to *what cause* are we to ascribe the characteristical diversity, of the *ivory* of the *first elephant* and the *horn* of the *first elk;* of the *wool* of the *first sheep* and the *fur* of the *first ermine;* of the *whiteness* of the *first swan*, the *blackness* of the *first raven*, and the *diversified colors* of the *first peacock?* Those were *first formations then*, as the *granite*, the *gneiss*, and the *mica-slate*, continue to be first formations now."[25] The diversities presented in the primary rocks, soils, and water, no more prove that they were not at once created with their distinctive characteristics, than the diversities of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, prove that the first man and tree were not at once created with their distinctive characteristics. The true philosophical rule by which the origin of all first formations should be decided, is presented by Sir Isaac Newton. "It seems probable to me, that God, in the beginning, formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in such proportions to space, as most conduced to the end for which he formed them.—All material things seem to have been composed of the hard and solid particles above mentioned, variously associated in the first creation by the counsels of an Intelligent Agent. For, it became Him who created them, to set them in order; and, if He did so, it is unphilosophical to seek for any other origin of this world, or to pretend that it might rise out of a chaos by the mere laws of nature; though, being once formed, it may continue by those laws for many ages."[26] The careful observer cannot fail to discover the complete agreement between this just conclusion and the teachings of Scripture.

Yet, though geologists admit that all first forms of organic life were created by the immediate power of God, they seem to shrink from the conclusion that the first formations of the crust of the earth were created in the same manner. Professor Silliman remarks: "The creation of the planet was no doubt instantaneous, as regards the materials, but the arrangement, at least of the crust,

[25] Comparative Estimate, vol. i. pp. 137, 138.
[26] Quoted in the "Comparative Estimate," vol. i. p. 33.

was gradual."[27] But if the materials were created instantaneously, what prevents the belief that they were created, not gradually, but instantaneously, in the shape of the primary rocks, soils, and water?—since we derive a strong analogy for the belief, from the fact that first animals and trees were created at once and in perfection. Geologists are apt to blind themselves, by carrying the operation of uniform laws to an extent which facts will not warrant; an extent, which leads them to contradict some of their own positions. An instance is before us. Dr. Buckland remarks: "That the ultimate atoms of the material elements, *through whatever channel they may have passed*, are, and *ever have been*, governed by laws, as regular and uniform, as those which hold the planets in their course."[28] This position is decidedly taken by most geologists. Another position which they have almost uniformly adopted, is, that "certain races of living beings, suitable to peculiar conditions of the earth, appear to have been created; and when those states became no longer favorable for the continuation of such types of organization, according to the natural laws by which the conditions of their existence were determined, the races disappeared, and were probably succeeded by new forms."[29] They advance this statement, not only in regard to the animal, but also with regard to the vegetable kingdom; and declare that peculiar races in both, have lived, and afterwards became extinct, to be followed by the creation of successive and different species. The question naturally occurs, in what manner do geologists account for the first individuals of each of these peculiar races? Their distinct answer is, that they must be referred to the action of the immediate power of God as the origin of their existence. They reason in the following manner: "It is demonstrable from Geology, that there was a period when no organic beings had existence; these organic beings must therefore have had a beginning subsequently to this period; and where is that beginning to be found but in the will and fiat of an intelligent and all-wise Creator?"[30] If then the first forms

[27] Appendix to Bakewell's Geology, p. 539.
[28] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 20.
[29] Wonders of Geology, vol. i. pp. 115, 116.
[30] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 54.

of all animal and vegetable races were created at once and in perfection by the power of God, it follows that the matter which composed them at the time of their creation, was not governed by fixed and uniform laws; for there are no fixed laws which could mould matter into the *first forms* of a race of organized beings. They could only govern the generation and production of the successive individuals of that race, after the first parents had been created by what we truly and properly denominate a *miraculous* exertion of the power of God. This fact proves that all matter has not been governed in all past time by uniform laws. And in view of this truth, it appears somewhat extraordinary, that geologists should refer the origin of the primary granite to the action of long ages, instead of referring it, as they do all the first forms of organic life, to the immediate power of God.

From the considerations, then, that geologists utter so many theories founded on mere inferences, and that their reasoning is so fallacious in regard to the primary formations, the thought is worthy of attentive observation, whether we do not reject the truth in regard to the creation, in the proportion that we depart from the literal import of the Mosaic narrative. Though we do not dogmatically affirm that the following view can be fully sustained, yet we venture to advance the position embraced in this query, whether the sketch we now offer does not agree with all geological facts when they are disconnected from mere theories. 1. "In the beginning" God immediately created the earth in the form which he designed, the crust of which was the primary rocks and soils, though they then were covered with water. These rocks, soils, and water, he created, not by what are now termed the laws of nature, but by an act of his power without the intervention of secondary causes, notwithstanding they have since been subjected to those laws. 2. The six days were devoted to the creation of light; to the production of the atmosphere; to the rending of the crust of the earth for the formation of sea-beds, and to the creation of the first forms of the vegetable kingdom; to the arrangement of the solar system as sources of light to each of its planets; to the creation of the tribes of all animal life; while the entire work was finished by the production of man. 3. From this period

to the event of the deluge, an interval of sixteen centuries more or less, we think that there was time enough for the deposition and stratification of the materials which compose the transition formations. 4. Then came the deluge, which was caused by precipitation of all the vapors in the atmosphere to the earth in the form of rain; by the gradual sinking of the ancient lands and the upheaval of the primary sea-beds. The rushing water, with awful power, must have swept away the soils and forests of the ancient lands, torn up vast masses of the primary rocks, which, together with the remains of the animal kingdom, afforded ample materials for the carboniferous, secondary, and tertiary formations. These materials must have been deposited with extraordinary rapidity during the prevalence of the waters. 5. There must of course be taken into this plan, the vast and wide-spread effects of volcanic action and the changes produced by running water; which secondary causes must have been in operation since the morning of creation.

We do not pretend to affirm that this outline, in the present state of geological science, can be so filled up, as that in every particular it will completely coincide with all those things which are said to be geological facts. But we venture to predict this statement, though with all deference to the eminent men who lead in Geology, that the time is coming, when all antagonism will cease between Scripture and Geology, and the most obvious and literal import of the Mosaic narrative will be found to agree with every established geological fact.

An additional reason why we should be careful how we depart from the Mosaic account, is, that geologists have given no rational and uniform system of interpretation which has the sanction of settled authority. The writings of geologists show, that their modes of explaining the Mosaic narrative are not only various, but that they contradict each other, though they are professedly based on geological facts. As an illustration of this position, the following instance is offered. Professor Silliman interprets the days of Moses as synonymous with a succession of long ages, during which the crust of the earth received its arrangement. He thinks it necessary thus to interpret those days, in order to make the sacred narrative coincide

with geological phenomena.[31] He does not pretend to decide how long those periods were; though one other geologist, at least, defines them to be periods of six thousand years each. Dr. Buckland, who is equally eminent with Professor Silliman, dissents from this interpretation. He says, when speaking of the theory of indefinite periods: "It has been asserted that the order of succession of the organic remains of a former world, accords with the order of creation recorded in Genesis. This assertion, though to a certain degree, apparently correct, is not entirely supported by geological facts; since it appears that the most ancient marine animals occur in the same division of the lowest transition strata with the earliest remains of vegetables; so that the evidence of organic remains, as far as it goes, shows the origin of plants and animals to have been cotemporaneous."[32] This fact is fatal to the theory of successive periods of long duration; for, according to that theory, instead of plants and animals being cotemporaneous, it should be made to appear from Geology, that no animals of the sea were created until the fifth, nor animals of the land until the sixth period. Accordingly, the theory of Dr. Buckland is far different from that of Professor Silliman. He thinks that between the creation spoken of in the first verse of the Mosaic narrative, and the present arrangement of the earth's surface, long and indefinite ages elapsed; during which the various strata were formed, and the various races of animal life whose remains are imbedded in those strata, lived, died, and became extinct; and that the surface of the earth was reärranged after these events, in six literal days, for its present forms of organic existence. Now, to say nothing of those theories which differ from these two—to say nothing of the fact that some geologists think it impossible to reconcile Geology and Scripture—we inquire, though we have heretofore expressed confidence in the theory of Dr. Buckland,[33] *Which* of the systems of interpretation presented by these eminent men, shall we adopt? Both profess to be based on geological facts, and yet both cannot be true. If geologists offered one uniform system of interpretation, the subject would have a very different aspect from what

[31] Appendix to Bakewell's Geology, p. 539, and onward.
[32] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. pp. 24, 25.
[33] See Universalist Expositor, vol. iv., New Series, pp. 6–11.

it now wears. But as their theories are various and contradictory, is it not better to adhere to the literal import of the Mosaic narrative, than to be continually fluctuating in opinion with every new hypothesis of geologists? Especially when Dr. Buckland has frankly stated: "It must be candidly admitted, that the season has not yet arrived, when a perfect theory of the whole earth can be fixedly and finally established, since we have not yet before us all the facts on which such a theory may eventually be founded." [34]

We have now finished what we intended to say of this subject. Our principal object in writing, is not dogmatically to affirm any particular system of scriptural interpretation, so much as to convince the reader, that while geological theories are as various and contradictory as those concerning other subjects, it is unsafe to make any geological hypothesis the rule of interpreting the Scriptures; for though that hypothesis may professedly be founded on facts, yet it may finally be resolved into a mere inference, which strict scrutiny will show to be unsustained by the very facts upon which it leans for support.

We remark, in conclusion, that the foregoing considerations will be misunderstood, if the reader shall suppose that we entertain even a remote hostility against Geology as a science. We cherish profound reverence for it; for we feel completely satisfied that all its facts are of great importance, not only to the welfare and progress of society, but in their perfect agreement with revealed truth. And though we have learned to distrust the speculations of geologists, yet in the facts which they have gathered to form the noble science itself, we discover overwhelming exhibitions of the wisdom, power, and goodness of God. "The earth from her deep foundations unites with the celestial orbs that roll through boundless space, to declare the glory and show forth the praise of their common Author and Preserver; and the voice of natural religion accords harmoniously with the testimonies of revelation, in ascribing the origin of the universe to the will of one eternal and dominant Intelligence, the Almighty Lord, and supreme first cause of all things that subsist." [35] G. W. M.

[34] Buckland's Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 20. [35] Ibid, vol. i. p. 443.

Art. II.

The Blind Girl.

Crown her with garlands! mid her sunny hair
  Twine the rich blossoms of the laughing May,
The lily, snow-drop, and the violet fair,
  And queenly rose that blossoms for a day.
Haste, maidens, haste! the hour brooks no delay—
  The bridal veil of soft transparence bring;
And, as ye wreathe the gleaming locks away,
  O'er their rich wealth its folds of beauty fling,—
                She *seeth* now!

Bring forth the lyre of sweet and solemn sound,
  Let its rich music be no longer still;
Wake its full chords, till, sweetly floating round,
  Its thrilling echoes all our spirits fill.
Joy for the lovely! that her lips no more
  To notes of sorrow tune their trembling breath;
Joy for the young! whose starless course is o'er,—
  Iō! sing pæans for the Bride of Death!
                She seeth now!

She has been dark; through all the weary years,
  Since first her spirit into being woke,
Through those dim orbs, that ever swam in tears,
  No ray of sunlight ever yet hath broke.
Silent and dark! herself the sweetest flower
  That ever blossomed in an earthly home,
Unuttered yearnings ever were her dower,
  And voiceless prayers that light at length might come.
                She seeth now!

A lonely lot! yet oftentimes a sad
  And mournful pleasure filled her heart and brain,
And beamed in smiles,—e'er sweet, but never glad,—
  As sorrow smiles, when morning winds complain.
Nature's great voice had ever, for her soul,
  A thrilling power the sightless only know;
While deeper yearnings, through her being stole,
  For light to gild that being's darkened flow.
                She seeth *now!*

Strike the soft harp, then! for the cloud hath passed,
  With all its darkness, from her sight away;
Beauty hath met her waiting eyes at last,
  And light is hers within the land of day.
'Neath the cool shadows of the tree of life,
  Where bright the fount of youth immortal springs,
Far from this earth, with all its weary strife,
  Her pale brow fanned by shining seraph's wings,
                She seeth now!

Ah, yes, she seeth! through yon misty veil,
  Methinks even now her angel-eyes look down,
While round me falls a light all soft and pale,—
  The moonlight lustre of her starry crown,—
And to my heart, as earthly sounds retire,
  Come the low echoes of celestial words,
Like sudden music from some haunted lyre,
  That strangely swells when none awake its chords.
But, hush! 't is past; the light, the sound, are o'er,—
  Joy for the taken! she is dark no more!
                She seeth now!

C. M. S.

Art. III.

Historical Sketch of Painting.

Painting is not merely an imitative art. It has higher claims to our notice than the satisfaction of a vulgar fancy, of a curiosity which is pleased alike at every novelty; equally delighted with a feat upon the tight rope, a wonderful achievement of the Chinese juggler Yangtsi, or the astonishing likeness of the late celebrated General Thomson.

We repeat, that Painting has a higher merit than the mere servile imitation of nature, beautiful though that nature be when looked upon with the eye of taste and feeling. To the true artist, the forms of being, animate and inanimate, are but the medium through which he searches to reach that inner spirit which pervades all things around, above, and below. The charm which clothes the glowing landscape will never be caught by him who sees nought but skies and forests, fields and hills and floods, though the former be bright as Italy's own, the latter varied and beautiful as the Elysium of the poet's fiction. There is a soul within their boundaries which he can neither feel nor perceive, and amidst the labor of his pencil, the spirit which animated the whole has vanished from his presence. The brow adorned with intellect will never by him be shadowed forth on canvass with counterfeit presentment, for he has no power to call forth reason and imagination to light up the tabernacle of the soul. He may give forth,

indeed, the features and outward shell of life, but within their compass is neither thought nor language.

And yet, notwithstanding what we have said, (and people, perchance, will readily enough allow it to be true,) there are but too many, whose talent and taste in other matters are undoubted, who seem to regard the painter merely as an artisan, though of a higher order; the chief merit of whose productions is to consist in a waxen finish and a glaring resemblance. Place before the eyes of these connoisseurs a sketch by Raphael, and they turn with rapture to a well-finished broom-stick by Gerard Douw; point them to a picture of deep and mighty thought, whose very design precludes the idea of a finical nicety, and they seize the next moment to descant admiringly upon the perfect deception of a stone jar which protrudes from the near corner of a flaunting kitchen interior. Yet these men, perhaps, will take in their hands a volume of Milton or Shakspeare, nor value its verse the less because they miss somewhat of the musical cadence of Moore, or the elaborate finish of Gray. They know that the end to be attained is greater than the means by which it is to be produced, and think not so much of the verse, as of the loftiness and sublimity therein exposed. Not such is their judgment of the painter. To them he is a *copyist*, and a copyist only. They perceive not that it is his to select, combine, reject, as the object in view may demand; and that he must often deny a minor grace of style for the sake of the lesson or the feeling which he would wish to inspire.

Painting and poetry have similar aims. The one makes use of forms and colors; the other of all the various imagery of language. But the spirit which actuates them is the same. They contain alike the epic and the lyric, the pastoral and the heroic. They have alike the power to gladden the heart, and to unlock the fountains of human sympathy. 'T is theirs alike to call the dead to life, and reanimate the history of the past. The servants of each, it is true, may abuse the powers which Heaven has bestowed, but those powers are not the less designed for the happiness and best interests of mankind. If the labors of the poet are needed in the service of religion and humanity, surely a like demand e sts for the painter's hand, and a like improvement should be made of his capabilities

But as the limit of a few pages leaves us short space to speak of these things, we shall bring our preface to a close, and come at once to the primary object in view, namely, a brief sketch of the history of Painting, from its commencement down to the present period. If the sketch be deemed at times somewhat hurried and disproportionate, we can only plead the necessity of the case as our excuse.

The first knowledge we obtain of a definite school of art, is among the ancient Egyptians. The art may indeed have had earlier date among the more eastern nations, such as those of China, India, and Persia; but this point we have now no means of determining with certainty. Whatever the case may be, Egypt has, among these, by general consent, been awarded the palm of priority as well as of excellence. Its rulers had cultivated the arts, for ages unknown, before the Christian era; and there are paintings now in existence whose date is referred to the reign of Osortesen I., before the time of Joseph. Such was the consideration in which the profession of the artist was held, that a particular class was set aside as sacred to its employment in the service of history and religion.

Yet, notwithstanding these favorable circumstances, Painting made comparatively little progress during long ages of servitude. It was trammelled by laws and customs as unalterable as those of the Medes and Persians. Lines and colors and positions were determined by arbitrary and conventual regulations. Little scope was allowed for the taste or the invention of the artist. The personages represented were always delineated in profile, the outline being filled up with simple, unbroken colors. Different hues were appropriated to different ranks of beings. Men were red; gods were blue; and goddesses were distinguished by yellow. The above remarks, however, must be considered as applying more especially to religious and historical pictures. When private tombs and mansions were to be adorned, less strictness was observed, and somewhat greater scope was allowed to freedom of attitude and design.

The traveller is often filled with admiration at the spirited effect of these performances, whose hues remain as fresh and vivid as when first spread upon the rock of the sepulchre, or the grave-clothes of the mummy which lies

extended at his feet. In a painting of the latter description, opened a few years since at Knightsbridge, England, even the varnish appeared so glossy and transparent as to deceive some of the spectators into the belief that it had been but recently applied, and had not yet become dry. Much speculation has been aroused, and very naturally, too, concerning the cause of the peculiar durability of the Egyptian paintings; but it seems to be sufficiently explained by the simplicity and excellence of the colors employed, their freedom from mixture, and, consequently, from liability to inward chemical alteration, and last, but not least, the extreme purity of the climate in which the before-mentioned productions have been so long preserved. With regard to the process used in drawing the figures upon the tombs, temples, and other monuments, we are informed that they were first outlined with red ochre, and then corrected with black; finally, they were completed by being cut in the rock and painted; or otherwise, the chiselling being omitted, color only was applied. Certain writers have considered a great part of these works, from their being cut in rock and slightly relieved, as belonging to the department of sculpture; but as their effect consists mostly in the outlines and in the colors with which these outlines are filled up, we shall adhere to our present classification.

These remains of art which have come down to us, are of the highest value as regards the light they throw upon the habits of Egyptian life. "Not even the treasures of Pompeii," says Signor Rossellini, "give so perfect a knowledge of its inhabitants, as do the Egyptian pictures of the manners and customs of the people they commemorate." Dress, occupation, amusement, every thing pertaining to domestic economy, is laid out before us with a minuteness which might satisfy the most untiring antiquary.

We next trace the art in Southeastern Europe, where the practice of painting is thought to have been introduced by a colony of Egyptians who emigrated thither. It was, however, probably practised among the Grecians (and perhaps among the Italians) before that period, though it may have become somewhat improved by the skill of their new visitors. Be this as it may, art here found a con-

genial soil where she might flourish untrammelled by the obstacles which had so long retarded her progress. Here the genius of Painting brought its forms nearer and nearer towards the standard of perfection, till, as a natural consequence, the hand was led at length to attempt a more truthful system of color.

Bularchus, about 700 B. C., is, according to our present knowledge, the first great name among the Grecian artists. About his time seems to have been introduced the use of various and commingling pigments. His Battle of the Magnetes is said to have been purchased by Bandaules, king of Lydia, for its weight in gold.

We next pass in review the names of Polygnotus and Apollodorus, Zeuxis, Parrhasius and Timanthes. The latter three cotemporaries are especially known to modern times, and several interesting anecdotes concerning them are extant.

We would here take occasion to say that the popular belief (founded on a passage in Pliny,) that the palette of the ancient Grecian painters down to Apelles inclusive, bore only four separate colors, namely, white, yellow, red, and black, has been clearly proved to be erroneous. Certain indisputable arguments show that a more extended scale of pigments was in use among them long before the time of Apelles. We know that in other countries, and at a much more ancient period, greens, blues, and purples, were employed; and why might not the earlier Greek painters have used them for draperies and other purposes? Apelles might indeed have tinted *his flesh* with the above-mentioned four colors only, but there is no reason to doubt that his palette held a greater number of pigments. It may be needless to remark that water, strengthened by gums, glues, and other adjuncts, was the common *medium* in use among the ancient painters, and also among the modern, until about the time of Van Eyck.

With Apelles, born about 328 B. C., rose the golden age of ancient art. It is difficult now to estimate precisely the merits of the painters of Grecian antiquity. Their works have vanished from the earth; while the monuments of the sculptor yet remain to testify to his proud preëminence. Still we can gather from history and comparison, enough to assure us of a wonderful mastery over the highest points

of art; of the possession of accurate design, and a noble conception. The old anecdote of Apelles and Protogenes, would seem to infer great taste and precision in linear drawing. The story is, that Apelles, incited by the fame of Protogenes, who resided at Rhodes, left Athens to visit him and his works. On his arrival, Protogenes being absent, the servant demanded the name of the stranger, who, taking up a tablet, drew thereon a single line, placed it in her hands, and departed. On the return of Protogenes the tablet was shown to him. "It is Apelles," said he, "for none but he is capable of this; but nevertheless I will surpass him;" which he did—placing by the side of the former outline another of superior excellence. Apelles once more presented himself, and drew a line of such surpassing delicacy that Protogenes, embracing him, gave up the contest, declaring himself worthily vanquished. To the Rhodian artist this visit was productive of the greatest benefit; for though formerly poor, and neglected even by his own fellow-citizens, through the exertions of his generous rival he emerged at once into the sunshine of honor and prosperity. Apelles appears to have been a man of noble character, and high personal attainments. His merits recommended him to Alexander the Great, who treated him more like a friend than a subject. As with this artist ancient painting rose to its culminating point, so from his time may be dated its gradual though sometimes interrupted decline, till Greece herself, with her arts and literature, became the property of her conquerors, the less civilized Romans.

The Romans possessed few native painters whose names have descended to us stamped with the impress of greatness or a worthy originality. As far as we know, the nation appears indebted to the conquered Grecians for its greatest achievements in art. Its rulers monopolised, as far as possible, whatever works of merit were to be found among the conquered cities; yet these magisterial collectors were not always influenced by either taste or intelligence. When, for instance, the consul Mummius plundered Corinth of her treasures, 146 B. C., a large sum was offered for the restoration of a picture of Bacchus, which had been converted by the soldiers into a table. "The Roman general immediately suspected the picture to con-

tain gold, from the value placed upon it, and delivered it to a messenger, ordering him to convey it safely to Rome, on penalty of being obliged to paint one equally good."

With the degradation of Rome and its people in after times, sank also the spirit of art and literature; till, with the destruction of the Western Empire in the fifth century, they fell alike into irremediable decay.

During the long ages of darkness which succeeded, some faint glimmerings of art were kept alive by the religion, or the superstition, which demanded its offerings in the shape of rude altar-pieces or uncouth images, for adorning the shrine of some patron saint. The illuminated missals and other illustrated manuscripts present specimens of Painting such as it existed among the artists of the time. Very many of these illustrations are beautifully colored, though uncouth in design and execution. As civilization, however, again advanced, we find evidence of an improved state of things as well in the manuscript-drawings as in the details of more ambitious performances.

With Cimabue, about 1250 A. D., the revival of Painting may be considered to have commenced. It was further continued by Giotto, Mantegna, and others. The works of the time, as might be expected, were comparatively rude and expressionless; void of proper coloring and composition.

The first distinct knowledge we have of the use of oil, as the painter's medium, is toward the close of the fourteenth century, about the time of John Van Eyck, who is generally supposed to have been its inventor, though he is thought by some to have been only the improver. However this may be, the new medium was destined to effect an entire revolution in the history of art, and ere many years, oil-painting attained the complete ascendency. From the time of Van Eyck commences the triumph of Modern Painting. Art gained new life and vigor in the hands of Leonardo da Vinci, till, with Michael Angelo and Raffaello d'Urbino, the full effulgence of its grandeur and beauty dawned upon the European world.

In these two great rivals were seen characteristics almost entirely opposite, yet challenging the student's admiration with almost equal force. Angelo's mind was stern and grand; he delighted in the awful and the terrible. His

men, as it has been aptly said, seem cast in the mould of heroes; his sages are clothed with all the intellect of eld; but from these excellencies, to what he affected to consider the minor graces of beauty and sentiment, he could not descend. Raphael, on the contrary, naturally of a mild and amiable disposition, imparted to the canvass his own distinguishing characteristics. His works are full of calm dignity, of captivating sweetness, of deep and unobtrusive thought. The grouping of the various personages — the developement of the history wherein they act — is clear and most effective. His chief excellence, be it remembered, was in expression, in a vivid feeling of the loftiness and beauty wherewith he dealt, and in the clear translation of that feeling, through the deeds and the passions which his pencil created.

But we must not leave the name of Leonardo da Vinci without further mention. This celebrated painter, whose death took place in 1520, the same year with that of Raphael, was one of the most remarkable men that modern Europe ever produced. There was hardly a branch of literature or the arts with which he was not acquainted, or in which his single attainments would not have rendered him eminent. Hallam, in his history of European literature, speaks of his name as being the prominent one of the fifteenth century. Like Michael Angelo, his great cotemporary, his genius was too universal to rest contented within the limits of one particular pursuit; and he therefore varied his devotion to painting, with the practice of sculpture, architecture, music, poetry, mathematics, chemistry, and engineering. Yet unlike the mass of miscalled universal geniuses, who have the reputation of *doing* every thing merely because they will not stop to execute *any thing* well, Leonardo was slow in completing his pictures. He consumed much time in thought, and more in execution, and was nevertheless but seldom satisfied with his productions. It was sixteen years from the commencement to the completion of his celebrated picture, the "Lord's Supper." As an instance of the labor which he spent on this his crowning work, we learn that for years it was his custom to go daily into the market-place of Milan, and stand watching the countenances and expressions of the passers-by, in order to gather materials therefrom for

his different characters. The noble fresco, just mentioned, was painted for the walls of the convent of Sta. Maria delle Grazie, whose prior has received an unenviable immortality from the hands of Leonardo. The former, it seems, irritated and out of patience with the delay of the painter, made repeated complaints to their common patron, the Duke of Milan. Leonardo was summoned into the sovereign's presence. Said Vinci, in reply to the accusations of the monk, "I must acknowledge, sire, that my delay has indeed been long, but it has been entirely owing to the difficulty of finding a visage whose lineaments should sufficiently express the treachery and malignity of Judas. I know of none that would answer the purpose, save that of my lord prior, whose features I naturally hesitated to appropriate to such a purpose. But this scruple shall delay me no longer. The picture shall be finished." It *was* finished; but in it the meddling monk found himself condemned to an everlasting though nameless immolation.

Titian, born 1447, is distinguished as the master colorist of modern times. His carnations, or flesh-tints, have never been equalled. Attempts have often been made by more recent masters to discover the supposed secrets of his management of color, but generally without success. He has been termed the prince of portrait-painters, on account of his superior coloring and the intellectual air with which he invests his heads. Among pictures of various eminent personages, he painted the portrait of the Emperor Charles V., by whom he was loaded with honors so abundant as to excite the jealousy of the nobles of his court. The monarch took occasion to rebuke their envy. One day, as Titian was painting, he happened to let fall a pencil. The princely sitter took it up and restored it. "Titian," said he to the courtiers, "is worthy to be served by the hand of an emperor."

Corregio, born 1494, is chiefly renowned for his exquisite *chiar' oscuro*, or harmony of light and shade. The sweetness and beauty which pervade his pictures are almost inimitable. His residence was at Parma. The history of this painter is remarkable though somewhat obscure. Born in poverty, without the aid of the master-pieces of art, almost without instruction, he forced his way neverthe-

less to the proudest heights of excellence. It is related of him that, in early life, after having executed some of his best works, while yet unacquainted with the works of other masters, he visited Rome in order to behold the works of Raphael. On viewing them, he stood long and in silence. At last, "*Anch' io sono pittore!*" he exclaimed, with a noble enthusiasm, — "And I, too, am a Painter!" Popular tradition has assigned to the life of this gentle artist a most melancholy termination. It is said that, having received the paltry sum of sixty crowns for one of his paintings, he was so overjoyed at this accession to his scanty purse that he set out on foot for his residence with the bag of copper quadrinos (in which coin he was paid) upon his back, and having reached home, heated and fatigued, was taken sick with the pleurisy of which he died at the age of thirty-nine. We have the satisfaction, however, of being able to contradict the common version. The story of his poverty and of his mournful death has been proved to be erroneous, while it has at the same time been the subject of some touching fictions.

This, the time of Vinci, and Raphael, and Angelo, was the culminating era in the history of modern art; and from this period we may date its subsequent decline. Its fall was, however, arrested by the establishment, near the close of the sixteenth century, of the Bolognese Academy, under the direction of the three Caracci, Ludovic, Augustin, and Annibal. From the school of these celebrated men, came Domenichino and Guido (who rank among the best Italian masters,) Albani, Guercino, Caravaggio; and the works of these artists, together with those of their former teachers, made a new period in Italian art. Of the names just mentioned, those of Domenichino and Guido especially deserve attention. Domenichino, though much inferior to Raphael in composition, often equals that great master in his representations of the passions. The pictures of Guido, though frequently somewhat defective in design, have, notwithstanding, a noble air, and a gracefulness which will always render them enchanting.

After this partial restoration, Painting declined more rapidly than ever. The French Poussin attempted to purify the taste of his time, but his influence was of short duration; and with Carlo Dolci and Salvator Rosa closed the golden age of Italy.

The history of Painting now becomes somewhat divided among the various coexistent schools. At the head of the German school, stands Albert Durer, born 1471, justly celebrated not only for his merit as a painter, but also for the impulse he gave to the art of engraving in copper and wood. Rubens, first in excellence among the Flemish painters, is famed for the luxuriance and splendor of his coloring, his freedom and animation of conception. Sir Joshua Reynolds deems him the greatest master of the *mechanical* part of his art, who ever lived. Vandyke, the most celebrated of his pupils, and who ranks in excellence little below his master, is chiefly known by his portraits. He had a perfect command of *chiar' oscuro*, and gave to his portraits a wonderful dignity and grace. The two Teniers, father and son, especially the latter, are well known as painters of the rustic scenes of their country, the fair, the cattle-market, the village sports, and the boorish carousals. Rembrandt is celebrated for the vigor of his coloring, and the daring effect of his light and shadow. His works, however, have no dignity of taste or expression. The pictures of Gerard Douw, representing generally domestic scenes, are remarkable for their minuteness and high finish. One of Douw's acquaintances admired the accurate delineation of a broom which appeared in one of his pictures. "Ah," said the painter, "that is not nearly finished; it will take three days more to complete that." So minute was the delicacy of his smaller pieces that a magnifying-glass was necessary in order fully to discern their details. "We may admire his correctness; but there is little in his works to please the fancy, or elevate the imagination."

Among Spanish painters, Velasquez, born 1594, and Murillo, born 1613, are chiefly eminent. The former excelled in history and portrait. "His compositions are remarkable for their strong expression, freedom of pencil, and admirable tone of coloring." The latter, of extraordinary merit in historical works, was also excellent in landscape and flower-painting.

We now come to the French painters. Poussin, born 1594, the painter of history and classic landscape, we have already mentioned. He belongs to Italy, rather than France, the land of his birth. Le Brun had great merit as

an historical painter, and held a high position at the French court. His artistical writings are valuable. Claude Lorraine stands unrivalled in landscape. He revels in its softer scenery. He approaches perfection itself in the delineation of nature in her various aspects; in the dewy morn, the glowing sunset, the moonlight calm; in the fleecy expanse of cloud, or the sunbeams struggling through the misty distance. His Italian cotemporary and opposite —the dashing Salvator Rosa—on the contrary, delighted in scenes of savage wildness, filled with rude banditti, and torn by the tempest and the torrent. He loved to picture the lonely ambush, or the robber's cavern illuminated by the glare of the red fire-light. Vernet the elder, is chiefly excellent in sea-pieces. He painted the appearance of the ocean as displayed in the calm, or the tempest, with a wonderful truth. It is related that a voyage to Rome, at the age of eighteen, first turned his attention to this particular department. During the passage, a terrific storm arose, and so absorbed was the youthful artist in the awful grandeur of the scene, that he got himself lashed to the mast, and looked on in rapture, while the captain and crew were trembling with affright. It must be said in abatement of his merit, that he has fallen into a fault too frequently characteristic of French painters, namely, an artificiality of coloring. David, born 1750, famous as an historical painter, is almost as infamous for the part he enacted in the bloody scenes of the French revolution.

We now turn to the British school.—In England, previous to Henry VIII., art was indeed at a low ebb. Pictures were bargained for by the square yard; statues and carvings at so much a foot, or so much an hundred weight. The artist was often carpenter, carver, upholsterer, mason, saddler, and, more than all, a tailor! Cunningham, in his Lives of British Painters and Sculptors, a work of which we shall further avail ourselves, gives us the following curious morsel: "Memorandum: That Master Cumings hath delivered, the 4th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1470, to Mr. Nicholas Bettes, Vicar of Radcliffe, Moses Couteryn, Philip Bartholomew, and John Brown, Procurators of Radcliffe before said, a new sepulchre, well gilt, and cover thereto; an image of (the Father) rising out of the said sepulchre, with all the ordinance that longeth

thereto:—*Item.* A lath made of timber, and iron-work thereto. *Item.* Thereto longeth heaven, made of timber and stained cloth. *Item.* Hell, made of timber and iron-work, with devils, in number thirteen. *Item.* Four knights, armed, keeping the sepulchre, with their weapons in their hands, that is to say, two axes and two spears. *Item.* Three pair of angels' wings; four angels, made of timber, and well painted. *Item.* The Father, the crown and visage; the ball, with a cross upon it, well gilt with fine gold. *Item.* The Holy Ghost coming out of heaven into the sepulchre. *Item.* Longeth to the angels, four chevelers." We may presume the above to be a fair specimen of the absurdities perpetrated under the general name of "works of art;" for surely such a daring and ludicrous conglomeration could claim title neither from painting, sculpture, nor architecture.

In 1526, the seventeenth year of Henry VIII., Holbein arrived in England. His native place was the city of Basle, in Switzerland. The portraits of this celebrated painter, the works by which he is chiefly known, merit much praise for their truth to nature, though possessing considerable of the Gothic stiffness of manner.

The next succeeding reigns produced few artists of great merit; and the fortune of art would have been poor indeed, had not its princely patrons possessed more taste than fell to the share of Queen Elizabeth. With characteristic imperiousness, "good Queen Bess" directs that her portrait be painted "with the light coming neither from the left nor the right, without shadows, in an open garden light." Her ideas of painting would seem to have corresponded somewhat with those of the Persian court of Shah Abbas, who, having received from the English ambassador a portrait of his royal master, by Sir Thomas Lawrence, were horrified at certain spots of dirt, as they deemed the shadows about the nostrils and cheeks, and placed the picture forthwith in the hands of some of their own artists to have the matter rectified. It would appear from Raleigh's account, that although not interested in general art, the queen was not wholly careless when it touched upon herself. At one time we find her ordering that all pictures painted of herself by unskilful artists be collected and burnt; at another, issuing proclamation,

"forbidding all except especial cunning painters to draw her likeness." We will not pursue the story of her vanity to her quarrel with the looking-glasses. She had noble qualities which much more than compensated for her lesser vagaries.

The reign of Charles I. gave a new impulse to English art. Charles had a true taste for the fine arts, and did much for their advancement, not only by his princely collections, but also by the munificent patronage afforded to artists of merit, both native and foreign. Several of the latter were invited over by the king, not always with success. In 1629, however, Rubens, on a political commission from the Infanta of Spain, visited England, where he remained about a year, painting, in the mean time, several pictures. Two years after his departure, Vandyke was induced to visit the island, where he remained during the rest of his life. Under Charles II. the most prominent painters were Sir Peter Lely and Sir Godfrey Kneller; the latter known almost as much for his superb vanity as for the excellence of his pencil.

But it was not till the eighteenth century that England could claim a galaxy of merit properly her own, in the names of Hogarth, Reynolds, Barry, Lawrence, and their cotemporaries. Hogarth is well known for the pungent satire and striking moral afforded by the various scenes of "Marriage à la Mode," "Morning, Noon, and Night in London," and other pictures of the same half comic, half serious character. But it must be owned, notwithstanding all the apologies that have been offered, that there is too much grossness in many of his productions. The life of Wilson, the masterly painter of classic landscape, is a sad instance of the uncertain fate of genius. He lived in want, and died broken-hearted, notwithstanding the late relentings of fortune. While artists who, compared with him, were but daubers, sipped their wines with full pockets, Wilson sold one of his pictures—the Ceyx and Alcyone—for "a pot of beer and the remains of a Stilton cheese!" Of Sir Joshua Reynolds, and Sir Thomas Lawrence his successor, the masters of the properly so called English school of portraiture, we need say little, their works are so universally known. The former possessed more, perhaps, of manly breadth and dignity; the

latter — excelling particularly in the representation of female beauty — more of delicacy and gracefulness. Sir Joshua experimented largely in coloring, and to his pictures the consequence has been most disastrous; for while in some of them his flesh-tints retain all their pristine loveliness, in others they have faded into utter and premature decay. Gainsborough delighted in wooded landscapes, where the story of some rustic figure or cottage group excites the interest of the spectator. His were emphatically home-scenes. He was also excellent in portrait. Barry, as an historical painter, had great merit. Enthusiastic, eccentric, and irritable, his temper became soured by disappointment and neglect; a sorry fortune, with which the historical painter of latter days is but too often and too intimately acquainted. We must take rather a disproportionate space for Blake, the water-color painter, who affords a curious instance of an imagination too strong for the government of a less exercised judgment. An exuberant fancy, vivid and enthusiastic, led him often to fields of beauty and poetry, and as often into flights, at sight of which soberer people held up their hands in amazement. It could not be said of him that he was wanting in that wherein greater artists have been sadly deficient, namely, the power of seeing his subjects "in the mind's eye;" for so overmastering was the faculty, that it often became to him the reality itself. He had imaginary sitters, who attended him with a patience not always vouchsafed by the living. Sometimes, however, an impudent spirit thrust itself before the sitter, and could not be satisfied until its likeness was painted, when it generally withdrew with the utmost quietness. These ghostly visitors, too, were of all times and shapes, from the ancient Job, and the lawgiver Moses, down even to the "spiritualized ghost of a flea!" Fuseli, the historical painter, while possessing great energy and animation of conception, was often rather wild and flighty; yet compared with the visionary Blake, he was somewhat like other men. He was full of a restless sarcasm, which he flung, right or left, as the humor dictated. One of his biting sallies has no doubt formed a model for many a one-sided critic of the day. Northcote asked Fuseli's opinion of his (Northcote's) picture of the Judgment of Solomon. "I like it much," said Fuseli;

"the action suits the word. Solomon holds out his fingers like a pair of open scissors at the child, and says, *Cut it.* I like it much!"

The biography of the American West belongs, for the most part, to the history of English art; for in England he passed the greater part of his life, and there he wrought his greatest works. These are characterized by correct design and great experience in the mechanical knowledge of art, and are often energetic and impressive, as well as harmonious and academically accurate. Too frequently, however, they want that life-like spirit which animated the works of the "Old Masters." During his life, West stood first among English historical painters.

With some remarks on American art, we shall now bring our brief sketch to its close. The names of some of our best artists, West, Leslie, Newton, and others, belong quite as much to England as to ourselves, since *there* they studied and acquired their fame. Gilbert Stuart stands at the head of American portraiture. Possessing extraordinary colloquial powers, unequalled, probably, by any man the country ever produced, he employed them to the greatest advantage in calling forth the character and expression of his sitter; a faculty wherein he particularly excelled. He was a man of great wit and eccentricity; somewhat proud, too, and wayward of mood. He died in 1828. Trumbull, the battle-painter, has recently deceased; and in the death of Washington Allston, we have sustained an irreparable loss; yet in Painting, and in Sculpture, her sister art, we have a few bright names. While we have much to congratulate ourselves upon, we have much yet to hope for. Let the American artist study nature and its works, as spread around him, while he waits upon art and its ideal; let him think, too, for himself, while he listens to the dictates of the masters who have gone before; then indeed shall his course be onward, and his fame shall follow close upon his desert. G. H. B.

Art. IV.

The Effect of our present Conduct on our future State.

When one is sensible that he is about to write on a subject of infinite importance, relative to the divine economy in regard to mankind, and that the ground which he intends to occupy, and the positions he is about to state and endeavor to defend, are not among the views of Christians generally, it is reasonable that he should feel no little concern for fear he may not discern the best method by which to bring his subject within the clear vision of his readers, and arrange his arguments in the best manner to ensure success.

Whether the best or not, the method we propose, for our present purpose, is to assume as true a few positions which we feel confident will be admitted by all who acknowledge the Christian theology in any form; and by keeping these admitted positions clearly in sight, endeavor, by their assistance, to arrive at the final conclusions we have in view.

1. We assume that the Creator had a design, in his infinite mind, which reached to the final destiny of all the human family. 2. That one important attribute of this design of the Creator is impartial goodness. And, 3. That all events in time, which have any influence in determining the final state of men, are under the control and direction of that wisdom and power which designed and executed the work of creation, and must contribute to the accomplishment of the divine purpose.

It is possible that some, who profess the Christian theology, looking at the three assumed positions in the connection in which they are here placed, may apprehend that they necessarily lead to conclusions which conflict with some of the tenets of their faith. But we would ask such, if such there be, whether they can feel justified in denying either of the above positions, when candidly considered by itself? Now if these positions are true when considered separately, they must be equally true when viewed conjointly. Look at the first. Can any

reasonable believer in the existence of that Creator, which divine revelation presents us, doubt that, in the creation of man, he had a design in his infinite mind, which reached to the final destiny of all the human family? None will deny that the divine knowledge extended thus far; or pretend that his purpose came short of what he knew. Look at the second. Can any one suppose, on any plausible ground, that impartial goodness is not, necessarily, an attribute of this divine purpose? If we exclude this attribute from this purpose of the Creator, we, of course, give him a character the most unlovely and revolting. We might deny all the other attributes of the Creator, as to their infinity, and limit them as our caprice might lead us; and yet if we should allow him the attribute of impartial goodness, we should have still an object to love and adore. Look at the third. Respecting this, all which is necessary to say, in this place, is to request the reader to examine it carefully in regard to its agreement with the two others. If the other two be acknowledged, and this be found in agreement with them, of course, it needs no other support.

Depending on the truth of these positions, and on the truth of all deductions which may be legitimately drawn from them, we shall proceed to comprise the subject to which this article is devoted in the following

Question: What effect will the conduct of men, in this mortal state, produce in relation to their portion of enjoyment, in their final, immortal state?

However various and conflicting may have been the opinions of Christian doctors on this question, they have generally agreed in using about the same language in reference to it; and have been quite uniform in their application of certain passages of Scripture as divine authority on this momentous subject. But although our clergy, who believe in the doctrine of particular election and reprobation, hold the same language, in reference to man's final state, as do those of the Arminian school, and apply the same Scriptures to that subject as do the last mentioned, it seems utterly impossible to reconcile either their manner of speaking, or their Scripture quotations equally and rationally to their widely different sentiments. The doctors of the first mentioned class believe, and profess to believe, that the final, eternal destiny of all men was fixed

and decreed, in the counsels of divine wisdom from all eternity, without any reference to faith or good works. But the last-mentioned doctors contend that man's final state depends on the condition of faith in Christ, and obedience to his precepts. Yet have these schools of doctors made the same use of 2 Cor. v. 10, where the apostle says, "For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad." If we could find any way to reconcile this declaration of the apostle with the meaning which the Arminian attaches to it, is there any possible way to understand how that meaning agrees with the sentiment of the predestinarian? That this passage agrees, in substance, with all those numerous passages which speak of rewarding men according to their works, perhaps will not be doubted by any.

It is, unquestionably, a fact, that neither of the beforementioned classes of divines understandingly believe either the passage in 2 Cor. v. 10, or any of those like passages, which evidently belong to the same general subject. What they all believe and teach concerning this subject of rewards and punishments in the immortal state, amounts simply to this, namely, Some men will be eternally rewarded for their good deeds, but not punished for their deeds which are evil; and some men will be endlessly punished for their evil deeds, but receive no reward for their good deeds. To understand the Scriptures thus, and so to explain them, is, evidently, to do them great injustice; and to modify the moral government of God, by the wisdom of man, contrary to man's sense of moral justice. All which is written in the volume of divine inspiration on the subject of rewards and punishments is, unquestionably, in agreement with Eccl. xii. 13, 14: "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter; fear God and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good, or whether it be evil."

Our Creator has given us no evidence for believing that some of his moral beings are so privileged, that their transgressions will yield them no bitterness; and that others are not entitled to the happy effects of obedience to his parental

requirements. Nor does such doctrine find any support in the experience of man. "He that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong he hath done, and there is no respect of persons with God."

In relation to our remarks thus far, there appears no danger of meeting with any opposition.

We come, then, to another important query, and that is, Are the rewards and punishments, of which we have assurance in the divine word, administered in this mortal state, or are they to be experienced in the future, immortal state? In the old schools, as we have seen, these rewards and punishments have been carried into the immortal world; though so managed that some are there to receive an infinite reward for their good deeds, but no retribution for their deeds which are evil; while others are to be forever punished for every evil work, but are to meet with no reward for doing well. But as we are compelled to reject this theory, on account of its utter and manifest impropriety, we may ask whether all men will not be rewarded and punished in the immortal state according to their good and evil deeds in this mortal life? If we take the affirmative of this question, meaning thereby that all rewards and punishments are to be administered in the immortal state, and that no such administration is known in this state, then surely we throw away all proof from man's experience here, that there is, in the divine government, any such thing as rewards and punishments. One might conjecture, that as there are no rewards nor punishments in this world, there must be in the future. So another may surmise, that as God does not, in this world, render to men according to their works, we may reasonably suppose he will not in the world to come. And this surmise, to say the least, is as plausible as that conjecture.

But is it said that we are not left to our speculations in regard to this weighty subject, and that God's written word must decide the matter? To this we shall not demur. We are in favor of using this rule, and no other. If it be asked whether our experience should not be allowed to bear testimony in the case, the right answer is, our experience can be of no authority in the matter only as it obtains its force from the divine word. That for which we here contend is made clear by the following Scripture,

Gen. xv. 13, 14: "And he said unto Abram, Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years; and also that nation whom they shall serve, will I judge; and afterward shall they come out with great substance." Here we learn that God judged that nation which afflicted the seed of Abram, before he brought them out of their bondage. Now if the Scriptures had informed us that God brought the oppressed Hebrews out of Egypt, and had given no account of any judgments having been sent on their oppressors, then, in this instance, human experience would not have borne witness. But look at Exodus ix. 13, 14: "And the Lord said unto Moses, Rise up early in the morning, and stand before Pharaoh, and say unto him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, Let my people go, that they may serve me. For I will at this time send all my plagues upon thy heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people: that thou mayest know that there is none like me in all the earth." By following the Scripture account, we find that all God's plagues were sent on Pharaoh and his people in judgment; and afterward the oppressed were delivered. If the Scriptures nowhere give us any account that Pharaoh and his people are to be judged and punished in the immortal state, do we render them that deference which is due to their authority by contending that the divine retribution on Pharaoh and his people, was not administered in this mortal state, but is in reserve for the immortal? We have an instance of divine retribution recorded in the 9th chapter of Judges, which we may consider as another example of Scripture doctrine on our subject. See verses 56, 57: "Thus God rendered the wickedness of Abimelech, which he did unto his father, in slaying his seventy brethren; and all the evil of the men of Shechem did God render upon their heads; and upon them came the curse of Jotham, the son of Jerubbaal." In agreement with these examples we find the doctrine of rewards and punishments laid down in Lev. xxvi. and Deut. xxviii., in which account we are certified that justice should be duly administered, both in relation to obedience and disobedience. But in all these specified rewards and punishments we find all to relate to good and evil in this

requirements. Nor does such doctrine find any support in the experience of man. "He that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong he hath done, and there is no respect of persons with God."

In relation to our remarks thus far, there appears no danger of meeting with any opposition.

We come, then, to another important query, and that is, Are the rewards and punishments, of which we have assurance in the divine word, administered in this mortal state, or are they to be experienced in the future, immortal state? In the old schools, as we have seen, these rewards and punishments have been carried into the immortal world; though so managed that some are there to receive an infinite reward for their good deeds, but no retribution for their deeds which are evil; while others are to be forever punished for every evil work, but are to meet with no reward for doing well. But as we are compelled to reject this theory, on account of its utter and manifest impropriety, we may ask whether all men will not be rewarded and punished in the immortal state according to their good and evil deeds in this mortal life? If we take the affirmative of this question, meaning thereby that all rewards and punishments are to be administered in the immortal state, and that no such administration is known in this state, then surely we throw away all proof from man's experience here, that there is, in the divine government, any such thing as rewards and punishments. One might conjecture, that as there are no rewards nor punishments in this world, there must be in the future. So another may surmise, that as God does not, in this world, render to men according to their works, we may reasonably suppose he will not in the world to come. And this surmise, to say the least, is as plausible as that conjecture.

But is it said that we are not left to our speculations in regard to this weighty subject, and that God's written word must decide the matter? To this we shall not demur. We are in favor of using this rule, and no other. If it be asked whether our experience should not be allowed to bear testimony in the case, the right answer is, our experience can be of no authority in the matter only as it obtains its force from the divine word. That for which we here contend is made clear by the following Scripture,

Gen. xv. 13, 14: "And he said unto Abram, Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall afflict them four hundred years; and also that nation whom they shall serve, will I judge; and afterward shall they come out with great substance." Here we learn that God judged that nation which afflicted the seed of Abram, before he brought them out of their bondage. Now if the Scriptures had informed us that God brought the oppressed Hebrews out of Egypt, and had given no account of any judgments having been sent on their oppressors, then, in this instance, human experience would not have borne witness. But look at Exodus ix. 13, 14: "And the Lord said unto Moses, Rise up early in the morning, and stand before Pharaoh, and say unto him, Thus saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, Let my people go, that they may serve me. For I will at this time send all my plagues upon thy heart, and upon thy servants, and upon thy people: that thou mayest know that there is none like me in all the earth." By following the Scripture account, we find that all God's plagues were sent on Pharaoh and his people in judgment; and afterward the oppressed were delivered. If the Scriptures nowhere give us any account that Pharaoh and his people are to be judged and punished in the immortal state, do we render them that deference which is due to their authority by contending that the divine retribution on Pharaoh and his people, was not administered in this mortal state, but is in reserve for the immortal? We have an instance of divine retribution recorded in the 9th chapter of Judges, which we may consider as another example of Scripture doctrine on our subject. See verses 56, 57: "Thus God rendered the wickedness of Abimelech, which he did unto his father, in slaying his seventy brethren; and all the evil of the men of Shechem did God render upon their heads; and upon them came the curse of Jotham, the son of Jerubbaal." In agreement with these examples we find the doctrine of rewards and punishments laid down in Lev. xxvi. and Deut. xxviii., in which account we are certified that justice should be duly administered, both in relation to obedience and disobedience. But in all these specified rewards and punishments we find all to relate to good and evil in this

mortal state; and no allusion to the future. St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Hebrews, when endeavoring to guard Christians against a neglect of the duties of their vocation, says, chap. ii. 1–3, "Therefore we ought to give the more earnest heed to the things which we have heard, lest at any time we should let them slip. For if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation." The apostle here assures us that, as under the former dispensation the people were justly punished for every fault, so would it be under the gospel dispensation; but neither Paul, nor any other inspired writer, has furnished authority for carrying the divine rewards and punishments under the gospel dispensation into the immortal state, any more than such rewards and punishments were carried into that state by the law of Moses. When Jesus, to whom all judgment was committed, set up and established his kingdom in this world, his judgment-seat was erected, before which, as St. Paul says, all must appear, that every one may receive according to his deeds, whether good or bad.

As a sample of prophecy on this subject, see Isaiah xlii. 1–4: "Behold my servant, whom I uphold; mine elect in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my spirit upon him; he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles. He shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. A bruised reed shall he not break, and the smoking flax he shall not quench; he shall bring forth judgment unto truth. He shall not fail nor be discouraged, till he have set judgment in the earth; and the isles shall wait for his law." It seems proper here to remark, that there appears to be no prediction, in all the prophets, which gives any account of the Messiah's reign over mankind in the immortal state, or of his judging or rewarding man in that state. Corresponding with the testimony of all the prophets, on this subject, we find the words of Jesus recorded in Matt. xvi. 27, 28: "For the Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels; and then shall he reward every man according to his works. Verily I say unto you, there be some standing here which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom." In relation to the declarations of Jesus, on

this subject, we remark as we did in relation to those of the prophets, that Jesus never spoke of his reigning over mankind in the immortal state, or of his judging and rewarding men in that state. Nothing appears plainer than that the reign of Christ, and his judging and rewarding men according to their works, commenced with the gospel dispensation, and that it will continue until the accomplishment of the design of the same, in the reconciliation of the world to God. It is as wonderful as it is true, that our learned divines have made so great a mistake as to defer the judicial administration of Christ to the close of his reign, when, according to St. Paul, he will deliver up the kingdom to the Father.

But in all we have said, what have we done in relation to our question? Perhaps it will be said we have done but a very little. And yet this little may be of even important service while we attend to further discussion; as we are instructed by it not to look to the Scriptures for any information respecting rewards and punishments in the immortal world.

What are we now to do? We are to try to settle the question, What effect will the conduct of men, in this mortal state, produce in relation to their portion of enjoyment in the immortal state? But by what rule, and by what means are we to arrive at the solution sought? Is it said that we must reason from analogy? It is true many learned divines strenuously contend for this; and are confident that by this mode of reasoning they correctly arrive at the conclusion, that the virtuous in this world will be rewarded in the future state; and that the vicious here will be punished there. But such a conclusion is no honor to their learning, nor is it any evidence of their extraordinary powers of reasoning. All we have seen on this subject strongly indicates the fact, that these divines assume, without any proper process of reasoning from analogy, that some of the human family will be happy hereafter, and that some will be miserable; and as they have no Scripture proofs in the premises, they say that analogy sustains them in their conclusion. What is meant by analogy? Analogy is a resemblance between things with regard to some circumstance or effects. If this reasoning from analogy on our present subject be fully

authorized, what difference shall we find between this mortal state and the immortal? We are brought to a full stop at our first setting out. This state of our existence is mortal; and all who live here must see death. What follows from analogy? The next state of man's existence will be mortal; and all who live in that state must see death. Immortality is now out of the question; and our subject changes its aspect, having lost one of its principal elements.

As we are now entirely free from all authority but analogy, we have just as wide a field in which to range as we please to make it. We will then take the assumption, that virtue in this state is to be rewarded in the next, and that vice here is to be punished there, for granted, and then reason from analogy. This will bring us to the conclusion, that retribution will forever be one state of man's existence in arrear, and if men suffer for sin in this present state, or here enjoy in consequence of virtue, both this sin and this virtue belonged to a former state. Again, our analogical reasoning brings us to the wise conclusion, that as we have here no recollection of having existed in a former state, we shall, in the future world, have no recollection of this. Keeping to our analogy, we may be satisfied that in the future world some will die in infancy, some in youth, some in middle age, and some in old age; all will sin and come short in duty; some will be more virtuous than others; the most virtuous will endure great afflictions, be persecuted by bigots, and, in short, all things there will analogically agree with all things here.

It is true that Jesus told the Sadducees, that "the children of this world marry and are given in marriage; but that in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." But our analogical reasoning requires that we disregard such testimony, and contend that, as in this world people marry and multiply, so will they do in the future state. Moreover, as there are here many grades in society, some very rich, others miserably poor; some in medium circumstances, some in alms-houses, some in prisons for crimes, and some for debts, so will it be in the future world. In this world,

there are despots, who sorely oppress their subjects; some hold their fellow-men in slavery, and cruelly treat them; and something analogous to all this we may expect hereafter, according to this assumed mode of reasoning. In this world we find a great variety of moral virtues, and a corresponding variety of contrary vices; so will it be in the immortal state, according to analogy. In this world, some are religious, others profane; some are sincerely pious, others are hypocrites. All this we may expect to find in the immortal state, if this analogy hold good. Here the Christian community are divided into a great variety of contending sects, who oppose each other with immoderate zeal. The like of this we may expect hereafter, if this mode of reasoning be allowed. In this world we see many who, in youth, are pious and virtuous, who adorn a Christian profession for many years, with well-ordered lives; but, in old age, become vicious, and a disgrace to their profession, and a scandal to their families, and a grief to their friends. Must we expect the like hereafter?

Perhaps we shall be told that we carry this analogy too far, and make it too particular; and that by so doing we wrong our wise and learned divines. Well, this we have no disposition or wish to do. Will they inform us just how far they would extend this mode of reasoning? They have never done it. No doubt the extent to which they are willing to go must be determined by their own imaginations, each carefully accommodating his own particular views. Let them do so, and there are not more points in the wide heavens around us, than there will be of their widely different and conflicting opinions.

Some may say, we believe in the doctrine of immortality, as it is brought to light through the gospel; and do not admit that the imperfections of this mortal state will exist in that, but are strongly inclined to the opinion that our conduct in this world will be attended with good and evil consequences hereafter, and will render us more or less happy, according to its moral character; and we wish to have the question duly considered on these admitted premises. Well, we will do all we can. But before we begin, we want to be furnished with some acknowledged authority. Are the Scriptures to direct our inquiry, and decide the question? If so, what shall we do if, on ex-

amination, we find them silent on the subject? We do not remember that Moses, or the prophets, or Jesus, or any of his disciples have given us any information concerning what effect our conduct in this world will produce, affecting our enjoyments in the immortal state. It is true that Jesus taught his disciples, in the parable of the laborers in the vineyard, that some murmured because they received no more wages than others, who had not labored so long as they had; and that the first should be last and the last should be first; but we have no authority for applying this parable to the immortal state. And it would by no means well agree with the opinion that the most virtuous here will receive more happiness in the immortal world than those who come short; for, according to the parable, those who bore the burden and heat of the day, and those who wrought but one hour, received alike. If this parable be allowed to establish a principle, it would seem that our inquiry is at an end; and that the amount of happiness allotted to the children of our heavenly Father is determined by his own gracious will, and not by the amount of their good works. To whatever this parable specially belongs, one thing is obvious, and that is, if those who bore the burden and heat of the day had loved those who wrought but one hour as they loved themselves, there would have been no murmuring.

If it be said, even allowing that the Scriptures are silent, in regard to our question, reason teaches that our conduct in this world must affect our enjoyments in the immortal state, or we must lose our recollection of what we here do, we reply: When we undertake to determine important questions, relating to the immortal state, by our reason, without the aid of God's word, we imply thereby that He has not revealed so much of the future state as is necessary for us; and that it becomes us to make the best shift we can to supply the deficiency. It is true that the blessed Jesus told the Sadducees that in the resurrection men will be equal unto the angels, and shall die no more; and St. Paul informs us, that as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive; but this is not enough to satisfy our curiosity. We want — what do we want? We want to know who are to be *greatest* in the immortal world! Well, who are they who shall be greatest there? Of

course, WE who are the greatest, the wisest, and the best here on earth. If reason does not teach this, our pride and our vanity are all put to confusion, and our marvellous attainments are of no value! This, to be sure, is intolerable. It must not be so. Let us go to work now in earnest, and make reasonable calculations. But as it is not modest to be talking about ourselves, we will make our calculations in regard to others, having ourselves in mind all the time. Which will enjoy the most happiness in the immortal state, St. Peter, or Ananias? The latter lied to the Holy Ghost, and then died; the former denied Jesus, and cursed and swore that he knew not the man, and was rebuked by his Master, and by him called Satan; and was withstood to his face by St. Paul, for his dissimulation. Will not Peter remember, in the immortal world, his base conduct here? and will not Ananias remember his foul lie? Well, if they both remember these things, will not such recollection render them both less blessed than they would have been had they never done those things? If this be granted, it does not determine which of the two will enjoy the most. Let us try another case. Take those wicked enemies of Jesus, who maliciously procured his crucifixion, and his disciples who preached his gospel, and suffered death for his cause. Which of these classes will enjoy the most in the immortal state? Is it said, that reason, without a moment's pause, answers, the disciples will enjoy far the most happiness in that state? If this be said, we have some important queries to suggest. 1. Does reason, enlightened by the Scriptures, allow that divine wisdom had no design in the crucifixion of Jesus? 2. If it be allowed that God designed this event, does not reason teach us that he also designed all the means by which it was accomplished? If our reason will not consent to this, it is of no use to us, and the less we have to do with it the better. But the fact is, reason, enlightened by the Scriptures, does fully assent to the fact. However humiliating it may be to allow this, allow it we must. 3. Did God design the crucifixion of Jesus, and design that the enemies of Jesus should do this act, and did he design all this for good? Reason, now having got into the divine light, answers in the affirmative. Now suppose, that in the eternal, immortal state, it should please

the Father of the spirits of all flesh, to open this whole plan to the clear vision of all concerned in it, what does reason say will be the effect on those who were the enemies of Jesus? Will such a discovery, if such be ever made, cause those who crucified the Son of God to hide their faces with shame, and forever to lament the deed? or will it cause them to be sensible of their entire dependence on God, and to be wholly swallowed up in the bright glory of divine wisdom, and the ocean of God's mercy?

Should such a scene as above suggested be exhibited in the immortal state, does reason lead us to suppose that the enjoyments of those who crucified Jesus will be less on account of their having done this deed? Will they, to all eternity, enjoy less than they would have enjoyed had they not done it? Will those disciples of Jesus, who published his gospel, and suffered in his cause, feel that they are entitled to more enjoyment than those who persecuted them? How are we to dispose of this subject? These disciples love those who were, in this world, their enemies; and they love them as they love themselves; yet claim for themselves more than they are willing those whom they love as themselves should enjoy. O, not so. This would be open hypocrisy. No, these disciples must be sincere; they must love those who persecuted them as they love themselves, and, of course, must wish them as much happiness as they themselves enjoy. This is the right spirit; this is the very image of Jesus. In the light of this spirit of love we see that, if what the enemies of Jesus did in this world affects them in the immortal state to their disadvantage, it will equally affect the disciples, to their disadvantage. There is no way to avoid this argument, but by ridding ourselves of this spirit of love and meekness. Once get rid of this, and nothing remains to obstruct our onward course. We may be loud and even clamorous about distinctions in the immortal state, and therewith nourish that vanity and pride which now love to feed on such air. And we may build our highest hopes of heaven hereafter, on that which shuts us out of heaven here.

But it is time to draw to a conclusion. But first let us take one general survey of the whole subject. Does Christianity teach us that all men, who have sinned and come short of the glory of God, will be, on account of sin, less

happy in the immortal state, than they would have been if sin had never existed? Here we have the whole subject before us. If we answer the question in the affirmative, we impeach both the wisdom and goodness of God. If we answer the question, as we ought, in the negative, we, necessarily, repudiate the belief that sin committed in this mortal state will lessen the enjoyment of the immortal.

Now, candid reader, be careful to compare the foregoing reasoning, and the result at which we have arrived, with the three positions, consistently with which we have endeavored to keep, in all the arguments here presented; and decide whether there be any want of consistency in the whole. If the Creator had a design, in his infinite mind, when he created mankind, which reached to the final destiny of all the human family; and if in that design impartial goodness was a prominent attribute; and if all the events in time, which have any influence in determining the final state of men, are under the control and direction of that wisdom and power which designed and executed the work of creation, and if all must contribute to the accomplishment of the divine purpose, is it possible to disprove the result here presented?

Farther to assist us to a correct view of the whole subject, let us suppose that the final state of our whole race is reached. Now can we suppose, that our Creator, in view of all past time and events, and with a perfect knowledge of the condition of every man, sees any one in a condition less favorable than infinite, impartial goodness desires? Or can we reasonably believe that he sees how events might have been varied to the advantage of any? Moreover, let us ask if we have reason to suppose, that in this state, there are any who regret that their condition is not like that of others? To the understanding of the Christian, who loves his fellow-creatures as he loves himself, can any thing be clearer than the fact, that when he sees a want of enjoyment in others, he feels a corresponding want in himself?

If any one should be so short-sighted, and so hasty as to say, that if the moral evil, existing in this mortal state, will not lessen the enjoyments of man's final condition, we have nothing to restrain us from indulging in sin; he

may be required to solve us the question, why he does not eagerly pursue means to bring on himself all the bodily pain he possibly can, if he does not believe that the pains which the body suffers in this life will lessen his enjoyments in his final, immortal state. H. B.

Art. V.

Fourierism, and similar Schemes.

A Popular View of the Doctrines of Charles Fourier. By Parke Godwin, &c. &c. New York: J. S. Redfield, Clinton Hall, corner of Nassau and Beekman streets, &c. 1844. 8vo. pp. 120.

A concise Exposition of the Doctrine of Association, or Plan for a Reorganization of Society, which will secure to the Human Race, individually and collectively, their happiness and exaltation. (Based on Fourier's Theory of Domestic and Industrial Association.) By Albert Brisbane, &c &c. Fourth edition. New York: J. S. Redfield, Clinton Hall, &c. 1843. 8vo. pp. 80.

We do not mention these two pamphlets with the design of reviewing them, or of entering into a strictly critical analysis of their doctrine. For such an undertaking we acknowledge that we are not prepared, either by adequate information, or by sufficient maturity of thought, on the subject. Still, we have some general views, which we wish to present, in relation to Fourierism and other plans of the same sort for reorganizing society.

That the social arrangements of the civilized world may be greatly improved in the future, as they have been in the past, is, we trust, too reasonable a proposition to be doubted; and that some useful suggestions towards the work may be found in these new theories, as well as elsewhere, is not at all improbable. But in considering the merits of Fourierism and of the kindred schemes, we ought never to forget that such mere improvement is not their object. This fact should be clearly understood at the outset, and kept in mind throughout the examination. We may see, in our existing relations, many evils to be rectified; we may sigh for a better state of things; but all this does not imply any leaning whatsoever towards the hypotheses of

which we speak. They stand on separate ground, on ground peculiar to themselves. What they propose, is, not to improve our present system of society, but to abolish it entirely, and to construct a new one in its stead. One of the mottos on the title-page of Mr. Brisbane's pamphlet, is the following sentence from Fourier: "The error of reformers is to condemn this or that abuse of society; whereas, they should condemn the whole system of society itself, which is a circle of abuses and defects throughout. We must extricate ourselves from this social abyss." It will be found that our authors mean, deliberately and systematically mean, all that this motto expresses. What the doctrine of total depravity, in its worst form, is with respect to individuals, these doctrines are with respect to society. According to them, it is a complication of abuses and defects only; it is not to be reformed; it is to be overthrown, and then made up anew, from its very first elements. They who do not go to this length, have no part nor lot in the new doctrines; they are merely old-fashioned reformers, on very different principles. Society, which, one might think, must have grown up out of the social wants of human nature, though, of course, with all the imperfections of human nature, has unaccountably happened to grow up in thorough contravention of those wants,—directly against the very demands that gave it birth and form. It came up wrong-end-foremost, like the beans in the famous abstractionist's garden.

It is proposed, therefore, to supersede this inverted state of things, by bringing mankind together into a new kind of Associations. Fourierism lays down the following plan, which, in general, answers well enough for a specimen of all the plans proposed. Each Association shall consist, say, of 400 families, (a smaller number might suffice for a *partial* experiment,) or about 1800 persons, on a sufficient tract of choice land for agriculture, a domain perhaps three miles square; in the centre of which, a vast and elegant edifice shall be built, with suitable apartments to accommodate them in the best manner, and with workshops around for carrying on all the mechanical trades, as well as with halls, temples, &c., for amusement and instruction. Into this Association every member brings his property, and receives a certificate which secures to him a

proportionate income, — and secures the principal, also, should he ever choose to withdraw it; and whatever labor he performs is appraised and accredited to him. By such a combination, the outlay for buildings, fuel, implements, &c., will be greatly diminished to each family; the purchases may be made in very large quantities, at wholesale prices; and all the expensive household operations, such as washing, cooking, taking care of children, of the sick, &c., may be done in common, so as to save much time and cost. Meanwhile, by judicious provisions, labor may be rendered far more productive, as it will be performed in companies or groups, and on a very large scale. These are the pecuniary advantages over the present method; from which it will result, that the members, in general, will have better clothing, better food, more rest, and more leisure for improvement in science, and for mental culture.

Then, by a complicated system of arrangements, the occupations are to be so distributed, and varied, and adapted to the inclination of each individual, that they will be spontaneously pursued as a pleasure. Persons of similar tastes and habits are to be formed into groups, which will always be open to change, to withdrawal, and to new accessions. No labor will be regarded as degrading or ungenteel; for all will labor in one department or another, — that is, all who are disposed to do so, for there must be no compulsion, nor even requisition. Every person will engage in the employment he prefers, and change it as he chooses, under certain regulations. Even the offensive and disgusting kinds of work will be performed from pure choice, because they will be, (in some way not explained,) made the most honorable of all, so that the love of praise will be brought to bear upon them. A hazardous expedient, however! for to assign different degrees of honor to different kinds of work, is to open the door to all the odious distinctions with which labor is marked in the old system of society. But to proceed. With all these productive and necessary labors, public and private amusements are to be mingled, in just proportion, so that there shall be no chance for oppressive weariness in the tasks. The members will pass from one work-shop to another, from one field to another, and thence to the baths, the ball-rooms, the conversation-parties, the rides, the

lyceum-lectures, or the religious meetings, in a circle of perpetual and never-tiring variety. Every thing will be managed on the single principle of attraction. Constraint will be wholly unknown; and, at length, there will be no occasion even for self-denial. The law of repulsion is to be abrogated in the practical world, though we suppose it will still continue in the physical.

A perfect system of moral education, conducted on the same principle of attraction, will complete the work thus begun, by developing all the instincts, passions, and faculties, in their proper relation to each other, and in accordance with the new state of things. Thus, man will be restored to harmony within himself, and to harmony with his outward circumstances. He will toil, study, recreate himself, indulge himself, or refrain, only as he spontaneously chooses. His passions will be so educated, and his external condition, laws, regulations, &c., so thoroughly conformed to their demands, that they will find their full gratification without injury to himself or others; for that social system alone is the right one, in which the free action of the passions will produce order instead of disorder. As a member of the Association, he can have no permanent property or pecuniary interest distinctly his own; none, indeed, except as a sharer in the capital and interest of the whole body; so that no personal cares will oppress him, and no motive can lead him to oppress or defraud others. And as the passions will have a clear field for innocent gratification, all crime and vice will cease; for no temptation from without will be left, and no conflict within. Thus, human nature will be perfected, by being placed in a perfect form of society, and by having a correspondent education. This result, however, can, indeed, be completely obtained only after a long course of trial.

Such is the dream of these speculatists; for whatever may be thought of some of the arrangements proposed, it would seem that no one, acquainted with human nature, can doubt that the project, taken as a whole, is a dream of the most fantastic kind. But, admitting for the present that it could be carried through in practice, there are a few things that still demand our consideration.

In the first place, its operation, if completely successful, would go directly to sink the individual into a mere creature of the Association,—in other words, to destroy his individuality. He is to begin his life, and develope it, and finish it, only as a component piece of that body, and not as a distinct and complete agent, who has the centre of action and impulse in himself; for he has neither interests nor responsibilities that are *primarily* his own. His interests and responsibilities and pursuits,—all that tends to develope his individuality,—come to him only through his relation to the community of which he is a part. He has no separate property, no separate income, has no separate cares, no separate sphere in which he is to contrive, manage, and struggle alone, and take the consequences; he has no fears of loss, separate from that of the community, no hopes of personal independence. The Association stands first in every thing, and is the head, brain, and soul of every thing. From that he receives his influences, to that he returns his avails, in that he lives, moves, and has his being. Now, this is to set the social before the personal; that is, the mere relation before the substance; than which a greater absurdity cannot be conceived, nor a greater violation of the law of nature. Can such a reversing of the natural order of things end in aught but confusion? And can there, indeed, be a more radical injury done to a person, than to destroy his individuality?

It is true, the plan, as laid out in these two pamphlets, allows such, as choose, to conform only in part to its provisions, and, of course, to enjoy only a part of its alleged advantages, while they adhere, in some other respects, to the old perverse order of society. They may bring in but part of their property, and own the rest according to the present fashion of the world; they may lay up part of their share of the common income against the time they may choose to withdraw; they may adopt the regulations of the scheme to any given extent, and, in other respects, live according to a plan of their own,—that is, if they have the means. But, then, these are cases in which the benefits of the system, as they are called, or the evils, as we call them, are but partially seen. To have a fair illustration, we must take those examples only in which there is a thorough conformity. It may help us to realize the

case, if we make it our own. Suppose, now, we enter the Association in good faith. Here, then, we fix ourselves, without any subterfuge in reserve. We have taken Fourierism, for better or for worse, with no provision for leaving it. Of course, we have brought in all our property, or else we give the rest away; for, in the case supposed, it never can be ours again, as personal owners. We receive a certificate, entitling us to a proportionate income; security for the principal would be of no use, for the reason just given. Our share of the income, as well as the appraised value of our labor, is spent in supplying our necessities, and in gratifying our taste, within the range prescribed by the new social order. We rent a family-apartment, or, as the case may be, a single room, elegant and commodious in proportion to our means. Our children are taken care of, educated, and managed, by the groups that have chosen those offices; our domestic affairs are disposed of in the same way. We have, indeed, a local habitation, but stripped of that genial environment of private cares and pursuits, of private joys and griefs and possessions, which constitutes "Home, sweet home." There is an infinite diversity of employments provided for us at hand, agricultural, mechanical, household, literary, artistical, scientific, &c., each of which is distributed to various groups. We enter into such pursuits, and into such groups as we prefer, under the regulation, however, of the community. We labor and study, as we choose, and, when we please, resort to more idle amusements. But, then, nothing is, or can be, our own; the whole belongs to the Association. The Association provides every thing, arranges every thing, cares for every thing, receives the gains, deals them out, suffers the losses. The Association educates us, fixes the standard of morality, (it must, at length, fix a standard of fashion, too,) forms our characters, and, in fine, makes us what we are. It is around us on every hand, interpenetrates and shapes all our concerns, and is the *primum mobile* of our entire life.

Now, we say nothing, here, of the intolerableness of such an *impersonal* condition, when considered as the permanent one, and not merely as a temporary relaxation. We will suppose, if we can, that we are content with it for life, and that all are content with it. But, to this end,

what sort of a character must our minds be reduced to? acting, thinking, and feeling but as component parts of the Association, without personal interests, personal responsibilities, or a personal sphere of enterprise, exclusively our own, our individuality itself lost in an omnipresent and all-informing, all-directing socialism! One thing is obvious, namely; this is not the order of nature. God made the individual first; society he ordained to come afterwards. The individual is the substantive agent; society, but the relation in which he stands. It grows out of individuals as from so many distinct centres of vital energy; not they out of society. Its only value is that it supplies a certain class of their wants, they still remaining as individuals. They stand first. Their personal interests and responsibilities and agency, must take precedence. And whosoever attempts to reverse this order, will find that his arrangements work wrong in the result.

We do not say but that some of the proposed arrangements might operate advantageously, in certain respects, if they were separated from the rest of the system. Some of them might prove at least economical, whatever evils of other kinds they might involve. To have all the tenements in a single edifice, and to warm them by one furnace; to make one cellar, and one set of out-houses, answer for all; to purchase all the necessaries at wholesale; to do all the cooking in a common kitchen, and all the washing in a common wash-room; to conduct all the labor on a large scale, by large companies, &c. &c., might save much of the waste that is incurred on the present plan of isolated households. It must not be forgotten, however, that this would depend on the character of the respective managers, and of the general superintendent. Let us not be deceived by calculations on paper, which fail so often in practice. How frequently do we see ruin in the conduct of mammoth-establishments, while an equal amount of business is carried on with success, when parcelled out among a great many private firms. In these latter, the greater simplicity of operation, together with the peculiar vigilance and energy of immediate personal interest, often more than makes up for the waste of multiplying what may be called the machinery and implements of trade. Take such an infinitely complicate scheme as that of one of these Asso-

ciations, and if the managers were of a somewhat visionary turn, a little touched with mania for new and wonderful projects, rather disposed to "go on to perfection," it is pretty certain that the certificates of stock would stand at a low price, if at any, in the course of some dozen years. If, on the other hand, they were downright practical men, sharp calculators and close economists, adhering inflexibly to a given plan, with cool and strong heads, they might indeed realize some of the pecuniary advantages contemplated for the scheme. It is for those, who are concerned, to judge which kind of characters they would be most likely to find at the head of such an institution as we have described in the beginning of this article.

After all, we must be cautious of concluding that an increase of pecuniary means would be attended with a corresponding increase of leisure, or of physical comfort, or with a proportionate degree of moral and intellectual improvement. For, the probability is, that new and more expensive fashions of living would be introduced to swallow up the additional income, and to task all the energies of enterprise for a supply. Such is always the tendency of human nature. Look around; and, even in the present state of society, how much might the very poorest family spare for purposes of ease and of mental culture, were it not for the necessity that is felt of conforming to arbitrary customs! A tight, snug hut, one or two long benches, a board fastened to the wall for a table, wooden trenchers, straw beds, coarsest clothes,—all the rest is mere tribute paid to fashion.

We have endeavored to show that these schemes would go to destroy our individuality, even should they, in other respects, operate as favorably as is alleged. But, now, for their operation in these other respects,—have we reason to suppose that even here they would realize the good they promise? It is claimed for them, that they will remove, if we mistake not, about all the evils found in the present state of society. They will do away (so it is pleaded,) with the odium that now rests on poverty, and on certain kinds of labor; because, they will prevent poverty, at least in its odious forms, and render all labor honorable. They will put an end to idleness, by making toil a sort of social

game, a relief to the accumulating restlessness of the muscles and animal spirits,—in other words, by thus making it attractive. They will abolish all invidious distinctions between different classes and between different individuals, and thus extinguish all envy on the one side, and all superciliousness on the other. They will leave no room for exclusive selfishness, competitive rivalry, interference in business; in short, they will bring mankind to live together, as a family, in perfect love, because the interest of each will be seen to depend immediately on the interest of all. There will be no social inequalities, no fraud, no contempt, no hatred, no wrong!

Magniloquent promises, these! By what means is it proposed to fulfil them? Not by beginning the reform, after the old absurd fashion, at the fountain-head, at the wrong passions and follies of the heart. These, it is said, would all be right enough, were it not for the perverse arrangements and laws of our present social system. The reform is to commence by rectifying the outward circumstances of life, by bringing these into such a condition that men, with the same characters they now have, will meet with no external allurements to wrong, and thus become virtuous without the discipline of struggling against temptation,—which, by the by, is supposed to come altogether from without, and to be capable of being removed by external arrangements. Thus, for instance, the odium of poverty is to be taken away, by taking from poverty itself every thing that has occasioned odium; the same contemptuous disposition still remaining as before, had it only the same object for its exercise. The invidiousness between different classes is to be remedied, not by inducing them to overcome their mutual antipathies, but by changing the relations of those classes. Idleness is to be cured, by transforming toil into amusement, which is the gratification of idleness; selfishness, by deriving all personal interest directly and visibly from the universal interest, thus making the whole selfish; fraud and falsehood, by leaving none of the objects they now aim at; the evils of the passions, by arranging things so that the passions themselves may be freely indulged without harm; and so on, to the end of the social and moral code. In other words, that blessed state is to be brought about, by removing the *outward occasions*

of evil; and, we must add, by sometimes calling that good which others have called evil.

Now, we will pass over the questionableness of such an *ab extra* reform; but we must say, that, taking the plan according to its own specified details, it does by no means remove even these outward occasions of evil; it only modifies them, some for the better, and some for the worse. Let us enter the Association again; let us see how it is constructed in this respect, and how it will actually operate. Here, then, out of the 1800 members, there are some eight or ten who have put in about $50,000 apiece, and who have each an annual income from it, say, of $2,000, besides current earnings, if any. Twenty others have deposited, each, from $15,000 to $20,000, and each of these receives a dividend of from $600 to $800, a year. Some have brought with them $5,000, some $3,000, some $1,000, some $500; and they receive accordingly from $200 to $20, per annum. And a numerous class have contributed nothing in the form of capital, and receive nothing, but the appraised value of their labor, which varies according to their respective strength, skill, and industry. Is it possible that men can be so blinded by a habit of fond speculation, as not to see that here is the same endless difference of wealth, as in the old state of things, so far as respects occasion for odious distinctions, envyings, jealousies, and exclusiveness! The man with a large income lives very differently from others, in splendid style, in a splendid suit of apartments, all splendidly furnished,—why? For the same reason that he did so in the former condition of society,—because he has a taste for these things, or because he wishes to outshine others, or to hold a position above the commonalty. And still, no invidious distinctions, no rivalry! The Goddess of Discord has thrown in her golden apple among the fraternity; but there is no scrambling for it! By a wonderful trick of fortune, it happens that nobody wants it, but he who has it. Nobody has his pride, nobody his ambition to shine, but just those who have the same means and belong to the same artificial rank! He will of course associate, on peculiar terms, with those of similar means and style of living; will have his select circle of exclusives, where only he is perfectly at home, as with his equals; and this, too,

in sharp contrast with the poor member, who lives in the very plainly furnished room immediately under him; and who, in cheap clothes, meets his princely brother, every day, at the foot of the common stair-case, and is thus privileged with looking perpetually into that elysium of affluence, splendor and *bon-ton*, which he cannot enter! From what little we have seen of the workings of human nature, we should not think it for the peace of either of these two characters, to cage them together within the very narrowest compass, where they will be the more constantly reminded of the social distinctions between them. Let them have elbow-room. They will do better, and feel their contrast less sharply, out in the open world, than when pent up in this fraternity. There are no antipathies so bitter as those of the same family, especially if under the same roof. Give them a little more breathing space! Verily, our old form of society, though imperfect, is not, after all, so utterly at variance with the necessities out of which it grew, as these new schemes would be. "O, but in the Association, the rich members will be so polite, and the poor so refined! they may all mingle together, without any fear, on the part of the former, of meeting with vulgarity to disgust them, in the manners of the latter, nor will there be any danger that the poor will encounter haughtiness in the rich." No doubt, there will be instances of this mutual congruity, in the Association, as there also are in our present state of society. No doubt, too, there will be, at first, much politeness of condescension and *protégéing within certain limits*, on one hand, and much refinement of aping (sometimes called toad-eating,) on the other; for one class will want admirers, and many will be eager to offer the tribute of obsequiousness, in order to ingratiate themselves with a circle which it has been the height of their ambition to enter. But under all this outside show, lies the permanent matter of fact, that there still are artificial grades of society provided for, in the Association, as much as anywhere else. And it will be found, that the more the lower ranks have been flattered with the expectation of equality, and the more they are tantalized with a seeming prospect of it, the fiercer will their disappointment be, when they have reached the limits of approach. Gentlemen Fourierists would do well to be

prepared for trouble from this quarter. They will have it; not, perhaps, the first year or two,—for, in every new settlement, the social distinctions are for a while partially confounded by the novelty of situation, and by the hurry of arrangements;—but as soon as these elements of inequality shall have leisure to ferment into mutual conflict. Brother A, who fled from an unjust world, and came here to be a man among the very best and greatest, will grow offended, because he is not taken into the choicest circle; sister B, because she is not as much admired and followed and *congéed* to, as the affluent sister C. Poor brother D, who is exceedingly sensitive, and withal of superlative merits, will have to form a little party of his own to maintain his share of influence against the undoubted conspiracies of the men with large incomes, just as he always had to do, when out in the unreformed world. And there are many, as poor as he, and almost as meritorious, who will be satisfied, from their own sad experience, that his suspicions of the "proud Dons" are all true. Some of the affluent members, too, will take it in dudgeon that they are no better appreciated, since they have brought so much wealth into the Association, and spent their incomes so liberally. "A very wrong form of society, this!" will soon be the cry; "the occasions of evil still remain; it is nothing still but the same old *social abyss;* we must go on to perfection;" and then comes the demand for an equal division and community of goods.

We pass by, for the present, the ten thousand heartburnings and petty resentments that will grow out of the rivalship of beauty, dress, fashion, visitings, &c., in a household of 1800 heterogeneous characters. We speak only of the permanent discontent that will arise, there as well as elsewhere, from the diversity of incomes and style of living. "But, no," we may be told, "the peculiar excellence of the system is, that those of each grade will here find associates enough of their own taste and class to satisfy their wish for society,—the poor man, as well as the rich." Indeed! May we ask, Cannot the poor man, in the existing order of society, also, find as many as he wishes, of similar character and standing with himself, to consort with? But we all know that this privilege, which he has from time immemorial enjoyed, at least in cities and large

towns, does not satisfy his ambition, nor even his reasonable desire for equality. The social abuses that arise from differences in wealth, were never owing to any want of associates; and to supply these, is doing nothing to remedy *them*. The arrangements of the scheme in question are not only nugatory in this respect, but they also involve, under aggravated circumstances, the very evils they propose to do away.

If we turn, now, to another point, and ask, How will these schemes operate with respect to labor? we shall find several things worthy of notice. According to the principles here avowed, all the work performed by these 1800 members, is to be drawn forth from them, only by the attractiveness of their tasks, instead of being exacted by any sense of necessity or of obligation on their part. To work, because one is *obliged* to work, is to be under a false and cruel slavery. But, in the first place, we must point out the fact, that, in spite of all pretences to the contrary, there will be left much of the old-fashioned motive of downright constraint, with a numerous class; namely, with such as have not an adequate income from stock. These will be as dependent as ever on their labor for the means of their support. Of course, they will be *obliged* to work, or starve. They will know and *feel*, as they do now, that they are under this necessity; and others will know it, and feel accordingly towards them. They will be obliged to work, too, not in the more favorable relation of independent proprietors, but as mere day-laborers, or, rather, as hour-laborers,—so much work per hour, for so much wages. Now, who does not see that here is another broad inlet to those odious distinctions, in their very worst form, which the system professes to shut out? One class has an income from stock sufficient for all the demands of splendor and luxury, without a stroke of work; another class has, in the same way, enough for an elegant competence; a third, for a decent livelihood; and so down, till we come to the pennyless multitude who are necessitated to earn their daily bread in the sweat of their brows; and all these classes are brought into perpetual and offensive contact with each other, in every relation of life, public, social, and even domestic! Here are the necessitous workers, and there the gentlemen workers! Think of the multifarious

occasions on which this hateful comparison will come up, in the field, in the ball-room, in the public walks, &c. We shall not, however, stop to trace out its operation in detail; it is sufficient to remark, that the single fact that some are *obliged* to work, while others are not, lies at the bottom of all the false odium which rests on labor, and of all the discontent connected with it, in the present state of society. For this, and for the innumerable consequences growing out of it, Fourierism has no remedy to prescribe. For even if all the members should, contrary to probability, be induced to labor, to the utmost extent that is promised, it would still be under the grand and radical distinction just mentioned. We often see the rich and genteel amusing themselves with a little exercise at work; but we have never heard that this reflected any dignity or honor on the toils of the necessitous working-man, (it would be an insult to him to pretend it!) or relieved his occupation of any of its disparagement in the absurd notions of the world.

It is true, as we have stated, that, in respect to labor, the studied aim of the Association is to take away all sense of necessity and constraint, even from its necessitous members themselves; though we have seen that it can by no means succeed in this purpose, on account of the conditions on which its members are admitted. Its favorite boast, however, is, that it recognises no motive to toil, save that of attraction; and indeed all its *industrial* arrangements are actually made on this principle exclusively. Let us, then, in the second place, look at its operations in this respect. And here, we have a graver objection to bring forward. So far as this vaunted principle takes effect, (and it is thoroughly carried out, except in the starting-point,) it goes to form and to cherish habits of universal idleness and wayward indulgence. It allows no task to be undertaken but spontaneously, and as an amusement; not because it *must* be done, or *needs* to be done, at a given time and in a given manner, but because the member happens, at that juncture, to prefer it to sitting still, or to recreating himself in some other way. And even after he has thus engaged in it, as soon as the employment grows irksome to him, it is exchanged, either for relaxation, or for another occupation; and so on, continually. He is directly encouraged to pass from group to group, and thence to sport after sport,

as his caprice may fluctuate. Perhaps we shall be reminded, that this is one of the excellences of the plan, inasmuch as its arrangements are so wonderfully contrived that all this idle frivolity is turned to good account, and made productive, how far soever it be indulged. Yes; but that is the very objection. For in this way, the system studiously provides for fickleness, fosters it, approves of it as a valuable agent, — indeed, as its only recognised agent, — and glories in training up its subjects in this habit; a habit which, every body knows, is, when indulged, as rapid and overmastering in its growth, as it is fatal to all the nobler properties of the human character. Were it necessary to expose merely the absurdity of the plan, it would be enough to observe that it is simply a project to make idleness answer the purpose of industry, and do its work. The old Rosicrucians spent their lives in trying to transmute the base metals into the precious; here is a still more remarkable project to transmute clear dross into gold. And yet, we remember, the author of one of the pamphlets before us, had the misfortune, two or three years ago, to talk about the attempts of common reformers, as being, in comparison with his own, nothing but "what the wild speculations of astrology were to astronomy, or the wilder researches of alchemy to chemistry!"[1] Our business, however, is not, at present, with the philosophical absurdity of the scheme, but with the practical evils of its operation. Before we proceed, one thing should be distinctly marked, namely: our objection against it, is not that it aims to increase, even to the utmost, the element of attractiveness in the tasks, leaving still the sense of obligation, of necessity, to remain unimpaired in the motive to labor. Our objection is, that it wholly discards this latter, which is the determining and regulating element, and relies on the former exclusively. It dispenses with the indomitable spirit that perseveres through hardship and difficulties; it sets aside all self-control of our wayward inclinations, and instead of disciplining us to triumph over outward circumstances, it calls upon us to be obsequious to them. Instead of the principle of resolute, determined industry, it takes merely the restlessness, or instinctive mobility of our

[1] Boston Quarterly Review, for April, 1842.

nature, as its moving power; and then it seeks to contrive its arrangements so as to get all its work done by this capricious agent in its own capricious way. This morning, one has a fancy for the exercise of ploughing; and there is ploughing for him to do, in group No. 20, which he follows, say, for two hours, and is accredited accordingly. But now, a whim seizes him to go fishing; and yonder is ready a fine trout-stream, from which he draws two pounds, — valued at so much. The next hour, he is disposed to saw wood, with group No. 15, and holds on, till he has despatched a couple of feet, — work appraised at so many cents. Then the spirit moves him to lay wall with group No. 10; and, after dancing a couple of jigs, to do a little carpentry, by himself, in yonder work-shop; for all which, he is duly accredited. And so on, through the day, and week, and month, and year, he follows, as every one of the rest follows, the turns of his ever-shifting caprice, which always grows more fickle and extravagant, the more it is indulged. It is true, if he happen to have a taste, strong enough to master him, for some one employment, he will, indeed, adhere to that employment; or should he get an ambition to excel in a certain profession, *that* may confine him to a steady pursuit, though against the most powerful temptations to the contrary. The entire doctrine, as well as the practice, of the Association, is, Change every occupation as soon as it grows irksome to you. Work only at such times and in such ways, as you are attracted to work. Now, what will be the consequence? To say nothing of the ruinous waste of labor when performed in this irregular manner, can any thing be plainer than that the arrangements are adapted to bring about a universal dissipation of mind and practice? They go to destroy all self-control, all power of forming a purpose, or of maintaining a resolve, and to leave the individual at the mercy of his petted humors and whims, which are treated as a sort of divine impulses. We do not say, that this result, in all its terrible malignity, will actually follow. By no means; for there are counteracting principles in the human breast, which will operate more or less, in spite of all that the Association, by its unnatural plans and doctrines, can do; but so far as the influence of the system goes, it tends towards this consummation. And, in process of time, it

cannot but affect both the character and the practice of the members to a very great degree. Is a school established? The attendance of teacher and students will be rather fortuitous; the orderly course of recitations will be perpetually broken, sometimes driven on with preternatural activity, often changed, sometimes suspended for days or weeks, just as the sacred whim takes the principal or the scholars. And so, in every other occupation. Think, what must gradually be the effect of this discipline on the character!

We have traced out the practical operation of this scheme, in two or three of its relations only; but its results in these, are a specimen of its results in about all the rest. Let the reader pursue the course of exemplification, and carry it over the whole ground. If we do not mistake the workings of human nature, it would be difficult to contrive a plan less adapted to secure the well-being of individuals or of society. At all events, it has no power to effect the reforms it promises. It must leave things as bad as it found them.

Here we take leave of its practical details, and turn to its moral principles and religious pretensions. Its philosophical speculations concerning cosmogony, metempsychosis, and the relation of man to the universe, as they are set forth in Mr. Godwin's pamphlet, may, we trust, be safely passed by; which we are the more glad to do, for a reason which we have no wish to mention.

In the course of this examination, the reader may frequently have been ready to ask, How is it, that a scheme which has been elaborated with an ingenuity truly surprising, happens, nevertheless, to work so contrary to its aim? The reason is, that it is developed throughout from a false principle. Its fundamental and pervading principle is this: That the passions and instincts of our being are all right in themselves, in such a sense as that they ought not to be restrained, but fully gratified. They are all holy; they are inspirations of God; their direct and spontaneous tendency is only to good; they never produce evil, but by coming in conflict with the obstructing circumstances with which society has surrounded them. It is society, therefore, that needs to be reformed, not the individual, except

as perverted by his social condition. Take this pressure off from him, and he becomes right, as he is. Accordingly, the grand and only object of Fourierism is, to devise a state of society, in which all our affections and tendencies, both those which we are wont to call bad, and those we call good, shall be safely indulged, without check or control,—our ~~inconstancy~~*, selfishness, pride, our love of ease and of voluptuousness, &c., as well as our benevolence and other moral feelings. Indeed, it will strike a careful observer, that the more jealous favor is shown to the former class of impulses, on account of the cruel wrong which, it is alleged, has hitherto been done them in all the institutions of human life. We trust it is unnecessary to enter into any argument in order to show, that a scheme which sets out from that starting-point, and which holds on true to this aim, cannot but make sad work throughout, just as we have seen that it does.

And here, if any one should ask, Whether that perfect system of moral education which is proposed, may not counteract some of the evil? he can easily judge, by this principle on which it is founded, what chance there is for such a corrective influence. It must aggravate, instead of diminishing, the evil. The child is to be taken at the earliest period at which he is susceptible of motives, and trained up by the free developement only of his own propensities; and as soon as he is old enough to understand, he is to be directly taught to regard them as the rule of his life. This is the boasted peculiarity of the new and perfect system of education. It may indeed present an antidote to his wrong tendencies, so far as it can do so by merely drawing off his attention in other directions; but it must not restrain him, because this would violate the grand principle. Instead of habituating him to self-denial, and self-government, its discipline consists essentially in self-indulgence. On this, his entire character, as a practical agent, is to be formed.

It is a received axiom, at least in the current language of the multitude, that our passions must be kept under strict subjection to our reason, and that otherwise they will prove mischievous. Whether expressed precisely in these terms, or not, the common sense of mankind has always recognised the rule, that the only condition in which our

* inconstancy

feelings and propensities ought to be held, is that of obedience to some regulating principle, subserviency to its authority; in other words, that they ought ever to be under the control and direction of the higher laws of our nature. The error of the new doctrine, (which, by the way, is not confined altogether to Fourierism,) is, that it aims to set aside this subjection, and to place even the blind propensities on an equality with those higher laws, in point of authority. Indeed, it supposes no authority in the case. It regards each class of these elements as sovereign, and both of them as mutually irresponsible in their respective spheres; though it assumes that they would be perfectly harmonious with each other, were they but treated as equal. Perfect harmony between our passions and our moral laws, not by holding the former under perfect subjection to the latter, but by freeing them from all such servitude! We do not mean, that this idea is thoroughly developed, and carried out to all its results, in Fourierism, or in any other system; for, among all its advocates, there never was one, who could avoid admitting contrary positions, or who did not unwarily involve, in his details, the laws which our nature itself obliges us to recognise. But notwithstanding many inconsistencies of the kind, still this is the philosophical idea which pervades the scheme, and on which its peculiarities are founded. We beg again that we may not be misunderstood. Our objection against the doctrine is, not that it *facilitates*, in ever so great a degree, obedience to authority, or that it unites *attraction* with authority; but that it seeks to do away with obedience on one hand, and authority on the other. It proposes to arrange things so that there shall be no need of either; and this, it is contended, is the state in which things ought to be arranged. The passions, &c., are supposed to have naturally as good a right to be indulged without constraint, as has the reason to be freely exercised, or the conscience to—dictate, we were about to say; but, in such case, there must be no dictation. For, it is pleaded, all these various elements are equally properties of our being, all equally constituted within us by the Creator; and, therefore, they ought equally to be allowed free scope of action. Shall we impiously presume to check the tendencies of those powers which God himself

has given us, or to oppress any of them with servitude? Now, it is enough to reply, that, here, the very question which lies at the bottom of the matter is wholly overlooked, namely, What were these passions, &c., given for? for *unrestrained indulgence?* No doubt, they were given for some use; does it follow, against the common sense of men, that *this* is it? To assume this, would be like arguing in the following manner: God has given us the element of fire; *ergo*, we must not restrain its natural tendency, but arrange things so that it may burn forth without control; and the adage, that "fire is a good servant, but a bad master," is an impious calumny against its Creator, suggested by the misarrangements of the old modes of life. We remember a similar piece of logic, which was current a few years ago: God has created water for drink; God has also created alcohol; *ergo*, he created it to—*be drunk.* It could, of course, be for no other purpose! Had it been known, at that time, that God created chain-lightning and wild-cats, we suppose that these, too, would have had to be drunk. Man's appetite for indulgence is so enormous, that his first thought is to apply every thing to this purpose; as we see in the case of infants, who begin by bringing all objects indiscriminately to their mouths. May we not suppose it possible that there are things created for other uses than eating, or drinking, or simple gratification? With all deference to the infant's theory, we think that higher uses may be conceived of.

God has, indeed, constituted us with passions, and made us susceptible of infinitely varied impulses. But that they were adapted, or designed, for indulgence without authoritative control, would not follow, even were we unable to discover any other use for them. In this case, we should have simply to confess our ignorance, as in so many other cases. The fact is, however, that there is another and very different design, actually recognised, as we have observed, by the common sense of the world, namely, that they should be held in subjection as servants; that they should be either repressed, or made to do the authoritative biddings of duty. And this, every body knows, is the doctrine of the Scriptures. Self-denial, not self-indulgence, is the beginning, middle, and end of the discipline prescribed by Christianity. If we proceed, now,

to trace out, philosophically, the workings of these various elements in our being, we shall see that it is through their conflicting tendencies, and, then, through the necessity we are under of maintaining at least some degree of order among them, that nearly all the moral virtues are formed, and the nobler powers of the mind developed. In this way, our propensities become the *occasion* of our acquiring self-control, self-government, the habit of deciding, of resolving, and of maintaining resolves, and, in short, of exerting what is called the will. Without some such occasion for internal rule and authority, our minds would be powerless, a mere mass of instincts, condemned to float passively along with the tide of circumstances, like a hulk, abandoned to the single element of the waves, without a sail to catch the breeze. Nor is it possible for us to conceive how any of the nobler excellences of the human character could be realized, in the present state of existence, were it not for that conquest over passion and temptation, out of which they grow.[2] But for this purpose, let it be carefully observed, there must be a conquest over the spontaneous inclinations, so as to hold them under control; for the moral good is attained only in the rational government of them, and not in their instinctive movements.

Any doctrine, therefore, which sets aside this government, must be essentially vicious. So far as it is embodied in forms of life, it must go to subvert the very foundations of order as well as of morality, no matter what substitutes it provides for control. Nothing can make fickleness identical with constancy, idleness with industry, selfishness with benevolence, voluptuousness with sobriety. Nothing can make idolatry of wealth or fashion answer

[2] A well-known reviewer, in a late and able exposure of the Fourier-doctrine, seems to account for the necessity, we are now under, of restraining the passions, &c., on the ground that they were corrupted by the fall of Adam, as theologians term it. He tacitly admits, that before the fall, they might be freely indulged in all their tendencies. If this be really his meaning, and not merely an *argumentum ad hominem*, we must confess our surprise. What was the fact, in the case of Adam? What in that of Eve? The only human creatures who lived before the fall — what did their propensities actually result in, when indulged without control? Why, in the very same that ours now do, — in sin. The mass of nonsense, which has been consecrated and *canonized*, respecting the fall of man, is of rather the blindest sort.

the purpose of noble sentiment, or indulgence work like self-government, however we arrange and adapt things. If this were practicable, the old devil would be a saint in the Association, not by being converted, but by being rightly harnessed, and set to work in a congenial group of other devils. All these elements, if allowed free action, will act like themselves, in spite of our enchantments. If we wish a real reform, we must go back to the method of Christianity,—begin with the individual. The first word was, "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand;" not, "Let the kingdom of heaven, (which it seems is the Association,) first come, and then you will need no repentance." Reform yourself, and seek to reform other individuals. If any improvements can be made in the arrangements of society, to facilitate *that* work, make them; but do not forget the object—to reform *individuals*.

We fully exculpate the authors of the pamphlets before us, and, so far as we have read them, all the American advocates of Fourierism, from intending to favor vice. Some of them, at least, have even modified the system at the expense of consistency, and rejected Fourier's suggestion that it may be found necessary to indulge certain classes in conjugal infidelity. But, though rejected, this item belongs to the very essence of the system, and will follow, notwithstanding all disclaimings, if the plan be carried out into permanent and unobstructed operation. For the entire discipline of the Association goes to gratify fickleness, and, by gratifying, to strengthen it indefinitely, —fickleness in labor, fickleness in pursuits, fickleness in attachments, fickleness in pleasures, fickleness in every thing; and can any body suppose that a mere word will stop the accumulated tide from invading the departments of sexual love and wedlock?

A few words, now, on the religious pretensions of Fourierism. It claims to be in agreement with Christianity, and even more. It professes, not only that "the gospel of Christ is the highest revelation given to man," but, also, that it will be perfected only in the Association. The complete developement and realization of Fourierism, is "the coming of Christ in the glory of his Father," spoken of in the New Testament. We confess, however, that we cannot but suspect all this show of deference to Christiani-

ty, it has so much of Mephistopheles' air about it. Were the advocates religious fanatics, we might conceive that they had persuaded themselves, in good faith, that Christ meant to teach Fourierism, and that he came into our world to prepare the way for Fourier and the Association. But, evidently, they are not religious fanatics. We will not accuse them of deliberate, conscious imposture. It has, of late, become so fashionable, in certain quarters, to talk eloquently, and even piously, of revelation, and inspiration, and divine mission, meaning nothing more than such as Plato, and Shakspeare, and Cromwell, and, in a still less degree, Jack Cade, had; and to extol Christ as a God-man, that is, in the sense in which every man is measurably such; that these speculatists may, perhaps, think themselves justified in adopting the style, to recommend their doctrines. Do they believe the gospel, as it is given us in the New Testament, an absolutely authoritative revelation, and that their system is identical with it? If so, we respect their sincerity, though we wonder at their interpretations. But if they are seeking to palm off a fancy of their own, under sacred language equivocally used, we have no words to express our abhorrence of the practice, by whatsoever example it be sanctioned.

The Scriptures are always spoken of with respect, and sometimes quoted in the way of authority or of accommodation, we know not which. But such applications of texts — old Barnabas and Origen themselves would have sung over them for joy. "Here," says Mr. Godwin, "we have the great social fact," — namely, that when population increased, in the infancy of society, and food therefore grew scarce, men began to wrong each other, —

"Here we have the great social fact which Moses has impressed upon his *Sepher*, [book.] *Eve*, the Will of Man, corrupted by the *Serpent*, an emblem of cunning, cupidity and selfishness, seduces *Adam*, the Universal Man. The *tree*, covered with fruits, symbol of material wealth, is the determining cause; and the Serpent is the potential cause, of the Introduction of Evil. . . . .

After the *Fall*, Adam, the Universal Man, driven from Paradise, was deprived of the blessings of the first society, the elements of which are dissolved at his death. The *death* of Adam, the Universal Man, is the dissolution of the primitive humanitary

Unity, and different people cover the earth, under the name of his children. Humanity is no longer one Man, but many Men.

Man is condemned *to earn his bread in the sweat of his brow*, until the time of his social redemption, when *the head of the serpent* will be bruised by the annihilation of selfishness. The *seed of the woman*, or the volitive faculty of Man, restored to its true passional destiny, will bruise the head of the Serpent under its feet."—*A Popular View*, &c. p. 36.

Thus gravely does Moses teach Fourierism! Is this interpretation given in the simplicity of good faith,—as was the explanation of Christ's miracles, which we once heard from an enthusiastic convert to Thompsonianism, that they were done by "roots and herbs;" or is it of a piece with Mr. Godwin's talk about the Trinity, original sin, transubstantiation, &c.?

We close this article with the remarks of that profound thinker, M. Guizot, on certain similar doctrines and projects, out of which this grew. He is describing the state of the public mind in France, at the end of the last century. As there was little faith in God or in futurity, while there was nevertheless much love of man, there was, of course, says he, "an immoderate thirst, in the name of man and for man, for happiness, immediate, terrestrial, and palpable. Really loving man, and having nothing to offer him superior to the happiness of this world, it became absolutely necessary that he should be happy, that all should be happy, happy here, since their destiny and treasure were only here. . . . . And as some minds, penetrated by so amiable a desire, could not believe the impossibility of satisfying it, they were obliged to assign, for the sufferings and the wrongs of man's condition, an accidental, factitious cause, which human wisdom and human power were competent to remove. Hence, that other maxim of the last century, that men and things do very well, if left to their own course and their natural equilibrium; that evil proceeds not from our nature and essential condition, but solely from a society badly arranged, arranged for the advantage of the few, who have substituted their will and interest for the will and interest of the whole; that it is society which needs a reformation, not man, who does not require it, or at least would not require it if society did not

corrupt him: — a maxim which has produced the most irritable and most manifest of modern sores, that incurable impatience of whatsoever is, that unbounded restlessness, that insatiable desire of change, in the pursuit of a social condition which shall finally secure to men, to all men, all the happiness to which they can aspire."[3] H. B. 2d.

Art. VI.

The Existence and Office of the Religious Element in Man.

Man needs but to acquaint himself with the pressing and abiding necessities of his own being, and observe the adaptation of the gospel to those necessities, in order to be deeply impressed with the exceeding value of the religion of Jesus. The more he shall understand of the secret springs of his actions, the more he shall study the instinctive longings of his soul, the more will he regard his spiritual wants, and the more will he honor the race. He will perceive a greater dignity in human nature, and greater glory in the blessedness which God's truth begets in the soul. And it is gratifying to observe that the idea, thus stated in a somewhat general manner, will generally receive the assent of the divided and subdivided Christian world. So long, at least, as the important bearings of the principle upon all the theology of the times, is not perceived, it will be approved by almost every sect. But let the same truth be stated in another form, and more at length, — let it be affirmed that man is a religious being, that there is implanted within him a religious sentiment, that God has conferred upon him certain powers of soul which presuppose certain truths, or great existing facts; that he possesses an instinctive consciousness of dependence, which implies the existence of a higher power on which he depends; that his ardent yearnings for continued being crowned with blessing, imply the yet future bequest of immortal good; in short, that the harmonic powers of his soul, which can be awakened sympathetically only by the

[3] American Eclectic, for Sept. 1841, p. 242.

anthem whose key-note is love, imply that the key-note of the great anthem of the universe is love; that the infinite soul of all music is love; that the evils on which philosophers now speculate are but passages of chromatic discords, which will give greater effect to the grand chorus of love that will at length burst upon us from the whole rational creation; — let the truth be thus explicitly and definitely stated, and the low murmur of "heresy" will rock the globe beneath your feet.

That there is a religious element in human nature, is a truth that liberal Christians are disposed to acknowledge. Among them it has ceased to be a controverted point. It has become a premise in all their reasonings, and in some measure determines all their positions. Indeed, I see not how any, save the Atheist himself, can logically deny it. It would seem to matter little in the argument, whether man, in becoming a child of God practically, is acted upon by God's truth, and thus led as an intelligent being into the kingdom, or wrought upon in some indefinite and supernatural way. In either case, the effect is *upon* the man; that is, upon certain powers possessed by him. It is not *within* him, in such a sense that his powers are unaffected thereby. Not within him, as respects locality merely, but within him as respects his spiritual being; and therefore it is exerted *upon* some, or all, of the powers that constitute that being.

To deny this proposition, is to maintain that God's truth is addressed to, or that his spirit operates upon, no power in man, but does its work in an empty void in his soul. To make man a Christian in such a case, can be no less than to create a new being in that void, who shall act through the man, as a mere instrument. And this, even, will bring us ultimately to our former conclusion. For as truth, or God's spirit, if you prefer that term, acting upon certain powers in man, would prove the susceptibility of those powers to religious impressions, and hence that those powers are, in so far, at least, religious powers; so the subjection of man, as an instrument, to the influence of some new religious agent, introduced into the empty void of his soul, would prove the man susceptible of religious influences, and, in so far, again, a religious being. Nothing is gained, then, by denying to man definite religious pow-

ers, since the very theologians who make this denial, first draw a veil before their eyes, and then indirectly admit the very thing they have denied. Hence, I repeat, that none but those who deny the existence of God himself, and consequently deny the duty of allegiance to him, can, consistently with themselves even, deny the existence of a religious element in man. And such a denial, however boldly made, stands in direct opposition to the universal history of the race. He who makes it is bound to meet the arguments which the past and the present furnish. Every age, clime, and nation under heaven, bears testimony to their force and appositeness.

The disposition of men to recognise a power superior to themselves, is seen not only among Jewish and Christian worshippers, but is manifested, also, in the admirers of Minerva's wisdom; in the worshippers of Jupiter Ammon; in the devotions of the blest subjects of Ceres; of the scathed sons of Neptune; of the warlike hosts of Mars; of the doomed victims of Moloch; and of the worshippers of the thousand-and-one other gods that have received the adoration of misguided men. The fact of this universal tendency to worship a superior power must be explained, and shown to be instigated by no native impulses. It will be of no service to allege that this fact is now, and has ever been, but the manifestation of a gross superstition. The universality and permanency of that superstition must be accounted for. Where nothing is, nothing comes of it. But where something is, where a power exists, results may follow; though the legitimate results may be somewhat modified by incidental circumstances. Hence, Atheism never propagates itself extensively, especially when dissociated with extraneous advantages. It has no vitality; nothing to give it influence and permanency; while every human soul is a fact, which pleads for God and religion. If, therefore, Atheism triumphs for a time, it cannot retain its triumphs. The voice of God, speaking in the powers of the soul, will be heard, and unbelief departs.

Now it will be granted that there are abundant manifestations of superstition in the religious worship of the present age, as well as of past ages; but this superstition is evidently not indigenous. It is a scion grafted upon the indigenous stalks. Besides, the superstition is mani-

fested, not in the *fact* of worship, but in the *mode* in which that worship is performed, and in its misdirection. In the impulse to worship there is a uniformity, so general, at least, that the exceptions but serve to confirm the rule; while in the accompanying superstitions there is every possible variety. Thus it is shown that the worship springs from native impulses; while the superstition comes of ignorance, erroneous education, and other attendant circumstances.

If, therefore, it be conceded that there are powers in man, to which God's truth should be addressed; powers, to which that truth is adapted, as light is adapted to the eye, air to the lungs, and food to the physical system, it will follow, as an unavoidable conclusion, that man is by nature a religious being. And when we speak of him as such, we wish to be understood as meaning that God has inwoven into our spiritual being certain powers which give rise to certain wants, impulses, and susceptibilities; and that these can find their appropriate gratification only in religious truth, and the performance of duty. Without attempting metaphysical nicety on this point, we would mention among the powers thus forming an element of our being, those from which arise the impulses to worship, the longings for immortality and spiritual bliss, and the yearnings of benevolence for the good of the race. These yearnings, longings, and impulses, help to constitute what we mean by the religious element.

Dr. Dick, in his "Philosophy of Religion," distinctly recognises the existence of these impulses to good. Speaking of the primary idea of morality, he says, "I conceive that the first or most general idea of morality is, Order,—or, that harmonious disposition and arrangement of intelligent beings which is founded on the *nature of things*, and which tends to produce the greatest sum of happiness. . . . . Thus, *reverence*, *adoration*, and *gratitude*, from creatures, correspond or harmonize with the idea of a self-existent, omnipotent, and benevolent Being, on whom they depend, and from whom they derive every enjoyment; and *love*, and *good-will*, and a *desire to promote each other's happiness*, harmonize with the idea of intelligences of the same species mingling together in social intercourses. For, it will at once be admitted, that affections

directly opposite to these, and universally prevalent, would tend to destroy the moral harmony of the intelligent universe, and to introduce anarchy and confusion, and, consequently, misery among all the rational inhabitants of the material world."[1] Here this writer speaks of reverence, adoration, gratitude, love, good-will, and benevolence, (or a "desire to promote the happiness of others,") as "affections" of the soul, at least, impliedly; he affirms that they are in harmony with the duty of man and the well-being of the race; and that the primary idea of morality lies in this harmony. Nor does he regard this as simply the primitive condition of man, while in his present alienation nothing of native good remains. For, having compared the principle of love in man, by which he is bound more or less strongly to his fellows, to the great principle of attraction in the material world, and having shown that as by the destruction of the one law, the most disastrous consequences would result in the physical world, so by the destruction of the other, would result the most terrible consequences to the rational world, he adds, "The power of attraction has never been completely suspended in relation to our globe, nor has the moral Governor of the universe suffered the principle of love to be entirely eradicated from the minds of its inhabitants."[2] Thus does he allow the existence of this religious element after corruption and sin have done their work. Bishop Butler's testimony is to the same point. "There is," says he, "a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is, in some degree, to society what self-love is to the individual. And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship; if there be any such thing as compassion, for compassion is a momentary love; if there be any such thing as the filial or paternal affections; if there be *any* affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another, this is itself benevolence, or the love of another. Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher degree and more extensive."[3] The argument

[1] Sect. i. chap. i. [2] Chap. ii. sect. vi.
[3] Bishop Butler's Sermons upon Human Nature. Christian Library, vol. ii. p. 503.

thus furnished for the innateness of the religious elements in man, cannot be met or gainsaid. The fact of man's sinfulness, or the sinfulness of all men, if you please, is incompetent to set it aside. This sinfulness is not the legitimate offspring of innate powers; at least, not the legitimate offspring of the legitimate action of those powers. It comes not of the use of powers in their proper modes of action, but of their abuse, of their misdirection. Sin is manifestly not the end for which any power was instituted. The mind does not approve such an abuse of its powers. But gratitude to God and trust in him, hope in a future life of bliss, and good to our fellows, are evidently ends produced by the legitimate action of certain powers. The mind approves this action, while it wars against the other. Says Bishop Butler, again, "There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which no inward principle leads him to evil."[4] We have but to study correctly ourselves to feel compelled to acknowledge the truth of this position. The establishment of this is a virtual establishment of the broader one, that man has innate religious powers which respond to truth and the calls of duty.

This being conceded, the question arises, Can the natural dictates of these powers aid us in determining what is truth? a question upon which theists will by no means agree.

The traducer of human nature will answer in the negative. He will "allege that men differ in their moral perceptions and estimates; that what one people reckons blameless or praiseworthy, is condemned by another; and that the inhabitants of one country esteem honorable what, in a different country, is thought degrading; that the Chinese expose their infants, and Indians knock their parents on the head, or leave them to starve in the wilderness, that a Georgian boasts of the number of executioners that his family has furnished, while in Iceland no person can be found to inflict a capital punishment."[5] So pervert-

[4] Sermons upon Human Nature. Christian Library, vol. ii. p. 505.

[5] Tournefort's Voyage au Levant, tom. ii. p. 210. Mackenzie's Travels in Iceland. I quote this second-hand. Cn. Lib'y, vol. i. p. 224.

ed and depraved is the religious element in man, that he regards it incapable of responding to the calls of truth and duty.

Another answers our question in the affirmative. He sees in the religious element a power that can help not only to some truth, but to all; a power which acknowledges no master save God himself; a power superior to Paul and Jesus, and which can point out to us the divine and the fabulous in the pretended revelations of God; a power which claims admittance to the audience-chamber of Jehovah, and an intimacy of acquaintance with the counsels and will of the Most High, that leaves far in the distance inspired men of old. He alleges, that the unperverted religious sentiment can pronounce at once upon the truth of Christianity, and can decide that those miracles which as one has it, "now hang as a millstone about the neck of many a pious man,"[6] if they are not impossible, are at least of no value. Thus, while the Atheist denies the existence of a religious sentiment in man, the advocate of entire depravity acknowledges it but to dishonor it; and the Transcendentalist, almost to deify it.

The last two are the extremes, between which, as usual, the truth will be found. Much of the apparent difference between them is occasioned by the great distance between their points of observation. The one looks upon humanity in its best estate, the other in its worst. The one beholds it through the rainbow-hues of a lively and hopeful, though proud and skeptical, imagination, and expects of it too much. The other also views it through the telescope of the imagination, but with the instrument wrong-end-foremost, thus diminishing the object much below the original size. This expects too little. Neither reasons closely, or logically.

The following reflections will correct the errors of both. First, it should be remarked, that it is not the religious element in man that goes out into the world in search of truth, and that performs the work of comparing positions, and of receiving or of rejecting them. This belongs to the intellect, to reason. The mind sallies forth amid the works and truth of God, selects from supposed truth, as it is able,

[6] Parker's Discourse on Religion, p. 280.

and comes and lays its offering upon the altar of the soul as food for the religious element. That element, like the young bird in the nest, which is waiting the arrival of the parent bird, and, longing for its nourishment, receives what is laid before it, and if possible, feasts thereon. Speaking of the sense of dependence, one of the religious elements in man, an eloquent writer remarks, "This sentiment does not, itself, disclose the character, and still less the nature and essence of the object on which it depends; no more than the senses disclose the nature of their objects; no more than the eye or ear discovers the essence of light or sound. Like them, it acts spontaneously, and unconsciously, soon as the outward occasion offers, with no effort of will, forethought, or making up the mind."[7] This is evident truth. The religious nature and the intellectual must act together. The intellectual discovers truth; the religious is blest with that truth. This truth may be revealed in God's works, or in his word; but in either case it will be found outside of man, save in so far as man himself forms a part of those works.

By these principles, the thousand varieties of the manifestation of the religious element are explained, without supposing that element entirely depraved, or wholly useless. "Education, fashion, and habit," says the Rev. Henry Fergus, "have a vast influence over our intellectual operations; and exercise a powerful sway over our moral judgments. But this does not disprove the moral constitution of man, nor establish any original difference of moral sentiment among the different families of the human race, any more than an artificial difference in the figure of some parts of the body proves a different organization. On viewing the distorted cranium of some tribes of American Indians, or the small feet of the females in the Chinese empire, shall we maintain that nature has assigned no particular shape or size to the human head or feet? Because different nations entertain different opinions concerning the figure of the earth, or the motions of the solar system, shall we argue that reason is essentially different in the inhabitants of different nations, or that the figure of the earth, and the motions of the solar system, are merely

[7] Parker's Discourse on Religion, p. 18.

ideal, and have no real existence? In like manner, on witnessing a difference of moral sentiment, shall we imagine that the Creator has bestowed no moral nature on man, or that there is an original difference in the moral constitution of human beings? No: both in the one case and in the other the peculiarity is a perversion. It is the triumph of bad education and vicious fashion over the appointment of the Creator."[8] This philosophy seems just, and is adequate to account for all the distortions of the religious element with which the history of the race presents us.

But notwithstanding the religious element is in a measure blind, and dependent upon the intellectual faculties to lead it to the fountains of truth, notwithstanding it cannot, of itself, pronounce what is truth, yet I remark, Secondly, That it can oftentimes determine what is *not* truth. The religious wants and necessities of the soul being natural, and truth being the natural supply of those wants, it is reasonable to believe that God would adapt them to each other, as the eye is adapted to light, and light to the eye. That truth is as congenial to the spiritual taste, as is wholesome food to the physical taste. And hence, that the unperverted religious taste can pronounce the sentence of condemnation upon those bitter nostrums that claim to be spiritual food, with as much safety and certainty, as can the unperverted physical taste, upon bitter fruits, or putrid flesh. Not by reasoning, but by instinct, is this rejection. Present to the child whose tastes are unperverted, the noxious tobacco for physical food, and the idea of a Father, hating and cursing forever his own children, as an object of love and reverence, and as surely as the physical powers rebel against the one, so surely will the religious against the other. True, a false education from very childhood may bring the soul, tremblingly and reluctantly, to acknowledge allegiance to such a God; and so also continual insult to the physical powers may bring them at length to endure the infliction of tobacco. But in each case an element of disorder is forced into the system, to which it endeavors in vain perfectly to adjust itself.

With this ability to condemn, there stands connected, of course, the counter ability to approve. Yet this ability

[8] Christian Library, vol. i. p. 224.

seems to go no farther than to pronounce upon the fitness or unfitness of what is presented. Where there is but one alternative, as between the duty of loving and of hating, a decision upon the fitness, is a virtual decision upon its truth. Since, then, love is the essence of Christianity, and since the religious sentiment at once pronounces upon the fitness of the command to love, it so far pronounces upon the truth of Christianity itself. But when we come to a class of positions, all of which are equally consonant with the religious sentiment, it can have no power to decide upon the true. Whether Jesus taught three, or ten years, lived in Palestine or Greece, died a violent or natural death, rose from the dead on the third or thirtieth day, or not at all, are questions upon which the religious sentiment can no more decide, than can the physical taste upon the comparative nutriment in vegetable and animal food.

Bring in the reasoning powers in general, and though you extend your circle of truth and your platform of judgment, yet fitness and harmony remain your standard still. Of several propositions equally harmonious with known facts, reason can have no power to decide upon the true. It must go *beyond* itself for a multitude of truths that we need to know. History, and testimony in general, may furnish some of these truths; nature may furnish others; and revelation others. All these truths come to the mind and heart through reason, but do not originate in it.

Even granting that God's works reveal all truth necessary for us to know, and that reason and the religious sentiment are capable of arriving at this truth, still the fact, that the mass of mankind are never philosophers, and have never attained to a knowledge of necessary truth, would not only justify, but require, a revelation of that truth. Viewing the matter from this point, it appears absurd, if not blasphemous, to declare that man, misguided and benighted as he is, has no need of revelation! that miracles can be of no value! that the resurrection of Jesus is of no importance! that the record of his divine life possesses no authority over us, unless, perchance, our corrupt hearts happen to be in a mood to respond to its teachings! Who is competent to stand up, and, speaking for the race, declare that the miracle of Christ's resurrection is of no

value? Who can say it did not sustain a Stephen, and enable him to pray, when crushed beneath the stones, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit?" Who can say that it did not strengthen the weak and timid Peter, who had just denied his Master, and nerve the soul of a Paul for the trial of martyrdom? Who can say, that the timid are not now made strong — yea, and the strong made stronger — when at the shutting in of the night of death, they resign themselves to the conqueror and the grave? Who can say, indeed, that Christ's life is not the life of all the life that true livers have lived since life began? Let those who fear not, and hope not, say it. But come not, O my soul, into their secret!

I am aware that it is somewhat fashionable, in this day of fancied wisdom, to talk of every man as inspired; of the Bible as a doubtful record of the past; of Jesus as an amiable personage, in the main, but whose claim to uniform truth is questionable, and to perfect rectitude of conduct, still more so. But, I confess, when I hear my fellow-striplings in theology, pronounce thus flippantly upon the merits of him, before whose radiant glories, the wisest of men have bowed in admiration, I am driven to believe that they have not yet learned the A B C of Christ's excellences; and that they are equally ignorant of the wants of their own souls. Jesus' character cannot be comprehended at a glance, nor his truth rejected with impunity, by every lawless innovator. And before that volume, on which we depend for a knowledge of what he was and what he taught, shall be cast aside as a relic of semi-barbarian times, I claim, at least, that it should be read; and, if untrue, that *that* fact should be demonstrated.

When it is said that every man is inspired, if nothing more is meant, than that every man has within him powers which, when unperverted, enable him to judge of the fitness of some truths, and of the unfitness of some errors — if nothing more is meant, than that the "pure in heart" shall see more of God's truth and love than the impure; that "he that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself;" that is, that he finds faith working out for him peace and salvation; in short, that he who walks in the path of duty as far as he can see, shall be enabled to look still farther onward than he who moves not at all; if nothing

more than this is meant, few will object. It is what we naturally expect of the religious element in man. But if it is meant that every man is inspired in the same sense in which Jesus was, when he prophesied of his own death and resurrection; of Peter's denial; of the establishment of his kingdom; of coming judgment; and of the overthrow of the Jewish state; in the same sense, in which Isaiah was, when he foretold the desolation of Idumea and of Egypt; or Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, when they looked forward to the coming Messiah; or in the same sense, in which the apostles were, when through the power of God they healed the sick and cast out devils; if it is contended that every man is inspired in the same sense in which these were, I would only remark, that it is a position which has not even one fact to rest upon, nor one argument for proof. Such an inspiration comes not of the mere action of the religious element in man, following the ordinary laws of its developement; but must be a superadded gift from God. Its very definiteness and limitation are conclusive on this point. Had it been the result of general progress in virtue, we should have expected the inspiration itself to pertain to truth in general, and not to be confined to particular points or topics. But if it were superadded light from God himself, given on special occasions, for special purposes, we should expect it would be confined to special subjects, fitting those occasions and purposes. This is precisely what we do find. Abraham was inspired, or informed, upon certain subjects, widely different from those embraced in the range of Isaiah's inspiration. The inspiration of Jesus and the apostles differed as widely from both. Each seems fitted to some great purpose, between which and their virtue, there appears no characteristic relation by which the specialty of their inspiration could be determined. Again, the suddenness of these divine communications shows the inspiration of holy men of old to have been the result of something else than the unfolding of goodness in the soul, or the ordinary developement of the religious element. Look at Peter, whom God inspired, by means of the vision of a vessel let down from heaven, to go and preach to Cornelius and his household. Was his sudden enlargement of view, touching the glorious designs of God in the

gospel, the result of sudden progress in goodness, or of special instruction from God? The same questions apply to Cornelius, who was directed to call for one Simon, whose surname was Peter, and who lodged in Joppa, at the house of one Simon, a tanner, by the sea-side. The question is not whether pure-minded men were chosen to whom to make these revelations; but whether the revelations themselves were the result of that purity, or whether they came directly from the Father. The answer is obvious. The inspiration was special, and such, undoubtedly, as is not common to all men.

The foresight of shrewd men, in our own times, is not to be ranked with the prophecy of Jesus and Isaiah. Such foresight is the result of reasoning from the premises already furnished. From the present state of England, *we* may predict an ultimate revolution in that kingdom; but we cannot limit it to five, or ten years, or to the present generation, as did Jesus the overthrow of Jerusalem. Much less can we point out the particular steps that shall precede that event, as did Jesus. So a shrewd man, if you please to assume it, might have predicted Peter's denial, but he could not have predicted, on the grounds of ordinary foresight, that the denial would have been thrice repeated before the cock should crow. Men prophesy now from facts before them. Jesus' prophecies cannot be thus accounted for. There is no likeness between them.

To say that all men are inspired, because God gives them powers which make them what they are, is only to give a new name to an old fact, while the fact itself remains unchanged. That all men possess these powers, and that they receive them from God, are positions readily acknowledged. But if we must say that all men are inspired, because God has given them those powers which constitute them men, and which enable them to perform the labors and duties of men, why shall we not say that every thing to which God has given powers to accomplish a certain work, is inspired for that work? By this reasoning, the sheep is inspired to produce wool, because God has given it powers to that end. The cow is inspired to produce milk; the tree to produce fruit; and the earth to yield its increase. If this be alleged to be a prostitution of the term inspiration, I heartily confess it. But let it be

remembered, it comes necessarily from the premises laid down.[9]

The only mode of avoiding this result, and of still maintaining the doctrine of universal inspiration, is to disconnect that inspiration from man's powers, and maintain that every thought flows directly from God. But this position, so taking at first sight, is beset with very serious difficulties. For it obliges us, as some of its advocates have admitted, to ascribe the thought of the pirate Gibbs, as well as of the blessed Jesus, to the direct inspiration of God. Miller's falsehood and Paul's truth stand on the same ground. The thoughts of the murderer, of the profane swearer, of the libertine, of the liar, and of every sinner of every grade, are inspired of God.

It does not meet the point to say, that God is overruling the hatred, falsehood, and wrath of *man*, for his own glory. This position of universal inspiration makes God himself, and not man, the very *source* of that hatred, falsehood, and wrath. It makes it as proper to talk of the errors of God, as of the truths of God, since both the truths and errors of men come directly from God.

Thus have we endeavored to show that there is in man a religious element, giving rise to certain innate wants, longings, and impulses; that this element, by an erroneous education, may be greatly perverted; but that, if allowed to act, it will reject much of error, and respond to truth; that it is incompetent, with all the aid reason can render, to attain to a perfect satisfaction of its wants, and, hence, that a revelation from God is necessary. I have also endeavored briefly to show, that, however much of dignity this element may confer on man, it possesses no inherent light which, as an illuminating, or inspiring power, can equal, much less supersede, the inspiration granted to Jesus, and to other servants of God, in ancient times. A. A. M.

[9] The position under examination applies the term inspiration to the mere gift of *powers*, entirely aside from the infusion of thought. Those who thus use it, doubtless design to restrict it to man; but when it is used in so wide a latitude, there can remain no reason why it should not extend to every thing to which God has given powers of any kind.

Art. VII.

The seared Conscience.

"— having their conscience seared with a hot iron."—1 Tim. iv. 2.

It may be well to observe in the outset, that the passage we have placed at the head of this article, is the only one in the Bible in which we read of the conscience being seared, or hardened, or in which we meet with any expression of the kind. And even this one passage, standing alone as it does, appears to have been currently misunderstood, in two important respects.

For, in the first place, Who are these commonly supposed to be, who have their consciences seared with a hot iron? Why, those who have long been inured to vice or crime or impiety; such as the scoffers at all religion, or the intemperate, the utterly dissolute, robbers, murderers, pirates, &c. Now, it certainly is not this class of sinners that the apostle is here speaking of, but a very different class. He is describing certain false teachers of religion, or rather of superstition, who were soon to arise among the Christians; as we see by the context, which is the following: "Now, the spirit speaketh expressly, that, in the latter times, some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils; speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their conscience seared with a hot iron; forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving," &c. These followers of seducing spirits, these teachers of the doctrines of devils, who forbade to marry, and who prescribed other austerities in the Christian life, were the persons who spoke lies in hypocrisy, and had their conscience seared with a hot iron. Let this be remembered,—what class of men the passage relates to.

In the second place, it is generally taken for granted, that, by the conscience being seared, is meant its being rendered perfectly callous, all its sensibility destroyed, so that it ceases to reprove the sinner, or to give him any trouble, do what he will. We think, however, that this is

not the apostle's meaning. At all events, the best commentators do not explain the phrase in this way, or make it imply any idea of the kind. The learned inform us, that the expression alludes to the ancient practice of branding criminals with certain marks, denoting the offences they had committed,—stamping the marks into their flesh, with a hot iron, that they might carry the record of their guilt wherever they went, so that every body might know the character they bore. We will lay before the reader the note which Rosenmüller, the distinguished German commentator, gives on this passage: "*Having their conscience seared with a hot iron,*" says he; "that is, branded "with the stamp of their offences, of which they are conscious within themselves. It was customary to burn "marks with a hot iron on fugitive slaves, and on such as "had committed sacrilege, or perpetrated other flagitious "deeds. Hence, of those who are wounded in their conscience, and are conscious to themselves of great offences, "which do not escape the divine judgment, even if not "punished by men,—of them it is figuratively said that "their conscience is branded." Thus far Rosenmüller; and with him agree other learned and popular commentators, as Drs. Hammond, A Clarke,[1] &c.

Accordingly, the meaning of the apostle is, not that the conscience had been deprived of its feeling, but that the false teachers, spoken of, wore the manifest stamp of their hypocrisy, burned, as it were, into their very consciences; that they carried, within their own bosoms, a signature of their guilt, as indelibly impressed as were the marks on the flesh of branded criminals. So far is he from implying that they had no sense of their wrong, or that they felt no self-condemnation! The conscience might be as acute in its feelings, as ever; it was only stamped with the record of guilt.

[1] To these add, Theophylact, Erasmus, Luther (in his translation,) Calvin, Clarius, Zegerus, Sculterus, Grotius, Estius, Bengelius, De Wette (in his translation,) &c. The only commentators I have happened to meet with, who understand the phrase to denote *insensibility* of the conscience, are Gualtperius, Whitby and Macknight. Beausobre and Lenfant give both interpretations; so does Schleusner, (Lexicon in New Testament,) who, however, appears to prefer the latter. The literal translation of the passage is, "being cauterized in their own conscience."

Perhaps we should not have deemed it requisite, however, to spend so much time in correcting the common misapprehension of this one solitary passage, were it not for the general principle that has been involved in the mistake, and sanctioned by being associated with this language. It is to that general principle, the abstract idea itself, that we shall now direct our attention.

Notwithstanding all that has been said by people concerning a hardened conscience, a dead conscience, a conscience seared to insensibility, we cannot believe that there ever was a human creature, who had so utterly destroyed the tone of his moral nature, but that it avenged, fully avenged, his guilt upon him, whenever he went astray. Hardened wretches there, no doubt, have been; but not beyond the feeling of remorse, or inward suffering, (no matter what we call it,) wretchedness of some kind from within. This is the proposition we mean to maintain. We may harden ourselves in sin, or, if we prefer the expression, we may harden our consciences, by continued indulgence; but in no such manner as to make the way of transgression any the more comfortable to us. So, too, we may harden our flesh, by repeated injury; we may produce a callousness that becomes almost insensible to a gentle touch; but if we have ever had experience of such an effect, on our hand or on our foot, we know that the same process which perverts the natural sensibilities of the parts, introduces another set of diseased sensibilities, which are a thousand times worse to manage. They will twinge, and sting, and bite like a serpent. And if we pervert the laws of our moral nature, in a similar way, we shall certainly find the result analogous. We cannot annihilate them, for they are an essential part of our being; but we may derange them, as we may our nerves; and we may thus change them into avenging furies, such as the ancients have described, in their poetical fables. Harden the conscience, obstruct its natural functions, stifle its reproofs, suppress its healthful operation; still it is there, and alive, though irritated perhaps into a cancer that eats like a vulture within our bosoms, while we know not what is the matter with us. The nature of things makes it absolutely impossible that there should be any way, by which long-

continued practice in sin will render it less painful. God will not be mocked, nor can we contrive to evade his laws with impunity. The longer we persevere, and the deeper we go, in wickedness, the more wretched must we become. And it appears to us, that any maxim, or mode of representation, which tends to keep this fact from the clear view of mankind, is of the most dangerous and demoralizing influence.

We know, it is often treated as an axiom, a point unquestioned and unquestionable, and one that is understood on all hands, that by going to certain extreme lengths in vice, and by becoming thoroughly inured to it, a person may at last destroy all his moral feeling; and that, when he has once reached this stage, he may ever afterwards indulge in the most flagrant enormities, without the least check, or rebuke, or pain from within, and even enjoy his wickedness, as another enjoys a virtuous life, because there is nothing left to disturb him. We might, however, as well talk of a person becoming so thoroughly diseased, so utterly sick in every limb, joint and organ of his body, as to suffer no inconvenience or trouble from that condition, and to enjoy sickness, as others enjoy health. All sin is compared to sickness. It *is* sickness, moral sickness, or disorder. And wheresoever there is disorder, there must be suffering. Introduce disorder into our hand, or foot, or any part of our body, and there will be corresponding pain or inconvenience; and if we introduce it into our soul, the very seat of all sensibility, we may be assured that the consequence will be felt, manage how we may. If we suppress it in one form, it will come up in another.

We shall, perhaps, be told, that all this may appear very plausible in the illustration, but that it does not well agree with the facts we observe in actual life. Look abroad into community, and we see multitudes who have run the downward road to destruction, for a long time, without finding it painful, or at least painful enough to deter them, or even to impede their advance. There is our neighbor, for example, who has followed a course of intemperance, year after year, till he has, at length, completely besotted himself. And there are many others like him. Now, if this theory were true, and they had actually found that every new step in their career only carried them into

greater and greater wretchedness, would they not, of course, have turned about, long ago? No man loves pain, or knowingly pursues it. Even the infant, after a few experiments with the blaze on the lamp, will keep his hand away. And, in the case of these persons, if indulgence had really proved to them like the flame which burns the intruder, would they not have refrained, as soon as they had made a trial or two? Now, here are certain facts which we observe in abundance; how shall we account for them, on the theory proposed?

We will answer that question, by asking two or three, in our turn. Have we ourselves ever found the practice of sin, in whatsoever degree we gave way to it, result in any thing but discomfort? And have we not, nevertheless, pursued it, to a greater or less extent, in spite of this experience? We have not, perhaps, been guilty of flagitious crimes, or of the grosser sort of vices. But if we deal honestly with ourselves, and consider our short-comings, the time we have misspent, the privileges we have neglected, how often we have indulged evil thoughts, how frequently we have given vent to wicked passions in words if not in deeds, our mouths will be stopped, and we shall be all compelled to acknowledge ourselves guilty before God. Now, has there been a single instance among all our departures from duty, in which the fruits of our folly were not bitter? No. Then, why did we ever yield the second time, and the third, and the fourth, and the hundredth time, when we knew, by all our past experience, that the wages of sin was death? Why do we still continue, at times, to give way to temptation, with the lesson of our former life before us? If we can account for this, we can also account for the fact, that the more flagrant and abandoned offender still pursues his course, notwithstanding he finds it one of wretchedness and increasing anguish of soul. It should be distinctly observed, here, that the supposed difficulty, in the case alleged, is not confined to such as have become hardened in sin; it extends equally to every transgression we commit after we have once had sufficient experience to learn the painful effects. And to bring it forward, now, as an objection, is to presuppose that no man ever continues to offend, until his conscience has already become so thoroughly dead, by habitual trans-

gression, as to offer no remonstrance, and to give him no trouble; all of which is not only false, in point of experience, but manifestly absurd in itself, account for the real facts how we will. People ask, as if it were a mystery, why the slave of appetite, or of passion, does not forsake the service when he finds it comfortless! It is because he *is* a slave, and is no longer his own master. No man ever sins, except under the conditions named by our Saviour: "he that committeth sin is the servant (or slave) of sin." He gives up his freedom when he yields to temptation; and then it is not for him to say how far he will go, nor where he will stop. That will be determined, in a great measure, by the influences to which he has abandoned himself. Is it not the fact, that, in almost all cases, he resolves, beforehand, that he will take but a single step, and then return? but that one step taken, he finds that he is at the mercy of an overmastering power which impels him onward, and he must obey. Often would he gladly retrieve his error; but if he strive to put forth an effort, the chain of habit binds him fast and drags him along to deeper ruin. This is the reason he proceeds in his folly; it is not that he finds it pleasant, or that he is insensible to the wretchedness of his condition. We appeal to the experience of every one who has made trial of such a life.

If people would but consider the obvious facts, that lie all open to their view, in the case, they would see at once that even the most hardened transgressors have by no means lost their consciousness of suffering, nor diminished it, though it may indeed have been changed from the simple sense of remorse, to a more confused and distempered feeling, which it would be perplexing to analyze. Here is the difficulty with us: we look only at the most superficial appearances, instead of regarding the decisive facts that are brought out, from time to time, and that betray the real state of the case. Nothing is more common than to hear it argued that it cannot be that the confirmed offender suffers much retribution from within, or finds his life a miserable one; for he appears to enjoy himself, and wears a look of gayety. And is not the countenance a pretty true index of what is beneath? Who is there that wears a more untroubled face than the sot, or the thoroughgoing knave who prowls upon society, the robber, the

practised murderer, or the pirate? Do these appear to know any thing of the heart-ache? No; they have literally burnt out from their moral constitution all capacity of feeling. Go to the abandoned drunkard, for instance; try to reach his finer or nobler sensibilities, and you will see that he has none. Admonish him of his wickedness; and how will he answer you? with a torrent of ribaldry, scoffing, profaneness, and blasphemy. His very looks, coarse, deformed, and brutalized, show that he has lost all the better elements of human nature. All care and fear and responsibility have, long since, been thrown to the winds, amidst the storm of uproarious laughter, or of outbreaking oaths, in which he lives. Give him but the means of intoxication, and he is content, whether in the parlor or in the gutter. What does he know of the pains of conscience that are so much talked of?

But let us not be deceived by these shallow appearances. If we look a little deeper, we shall certainly discover that these very characters have consciences still, and consciences that torment them, too, though they may practise, with all their skill, to keep their sufferings from the knowledge of others. There is a very curious propensity in human nature, which comes in here to play its part, and which we should do well to consider. Now, whenever we openly pursue any disreputable course of wickedness or folly, and are at the same time conscious that it makes us unhappy, and are, nevertheless, unwilling to reform, the first thing we usually do is to take care that nobody suspect the secret misery we endure. We can bring ourselves, by degrees, to submit to the shame of the offence, out of love to the habit of indulgence, but we cannot bear to have it known that all we reap from it is wretchedness. Such a discovery of our impotence and stupidity would be more intolerably mortifying than the exposure of our sin. If we ever resolve effectually to reform, we shall then, perhaps, be willing to disclose the state of the case, for the good of others; but until then, we shall guard the secret with all our watchfulness, and try to divert suspicion from the hidden wo by outward smiles,—smiles that are themselves painful in proportion as they are false. Now, this is the way in which human nature works. Old offenders, of course, acquire a surprising dexterity and

readiness in the art, by long-continued practice. But let any accident lift only a corner, as it were, of the veil they have spent their lives in weaving around themselves, and we see, at once, into that terrible dungeon of secrets, a sinner's heart. Let but one of those poor slaves of appetite, of whom we have spoken, break his fetters, and come forth God's own freeman, and what a story does he tell us of his past life! As he stands up, in the midst of his fellow-citizens, and utters the broken narrative of his experience, old, hard-faced men melt into tears at the recital. The days and nights of hopeless anguish he calls up, and the horrors, the transcendental horrors he reveals, alternately drown his audience in tears, and curdle the blood in their veins. Now, here the veil of affectation and false appearances is removed, and we look straight into the reality. We see what it actually is. Let a second burst his chains, and come forth from the same prison-house of sin; let a third and a fourth come; let them come by dozens; let them come by hundreds, as they have done for the last three or four years, and they all have the same experience to relate, of wretchedness beyond description, and almost beyond our power to conceive. What was it that made them so wretched? was it merely their physical pains, rather than the horrible anguish which arose from conscious self-degradation, guilt, remorse, and black despair? If we have any doubt of the cause, let us ask, Would a brute, say an ox or a horse, with the same intemperate living, experience the same torments? No. Why? Because it has not the peculiar capacity that is requisite, though it has the mere physical capacity in full. Their bodily pains were but a small item in the dreadful account. It was their moral nature, distempered, deranged, and all in rebellion against them, but not dead, that inflicted the severest of their tortures, and gave pungency even to their corporeal sufferings. We find, then, that the very class of men who are so often supposed to have attained to the art of sinning without moral retribution, are themselves among the most striking examples of the impossibility of such a condition. The innumerable facts which they have disclosed, of late, and which they are still continuing to disclose, are an everlasting demonstration of the truth which was plainly enough declared, nearly thirty

centuries ago, that "there is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked. They are like the troubled sea when it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire and dirt." Never let it be said, again, that the sinner, by long-repeated indulgence, can deaden his conscience in any such way as that it will not disturb him. God's word, God's law, the demonstrated facts in human experience and observation, stand all arrayed against the assumption.

The highwayman, the murderer and the pirate are sometimes adduced as examples. They live in open defiance of heaven and earth; they have become utterly hardened even to human blood; they have trained themselves to hear, alike unmoved, the piteous pleadings, or the shriek, of the victim struggling in their hands, and, after the deed is done, to look their ghastly work in the face without a shudder. Can it be, that these men have still the power of feeling left? Yes, indeed; a thousand incidents and circumstances betray it. Have we ever read the confessions of any of these characters, after they were apprehended, and convicted, and awaited in prison the execution of their sentence? when their desperate game was over, and they felt that they had no longer a part to play before the world, but that all was changed to grim reality with them! When all hope of escape is gone, and all motive for concealment past, then it often is that the truth bursts its way up from their hearts where it had so long struggled with earthquake throes, and they lay open to public view the hell that had raged within them for years. It is not too much to say, that all the horrors that have been fabled of a lake of fire and brimstone hereafter, are not so dreadful, as the torments which some of these confessions disclose: a constant battle with their better nature, fits of gloomy madness and black despair, loathing of life, remembrance of long catalogues of outrages, of blood that has been shed, the never-ceasing echo of the dying shriek that still rings in their ears, the ghosts even of the murdered haunting their dreams, or following their steps by daylight! And all this they have borne from year to year, till it seems incredible that human strength should be equal to the endurance. No wonder that some have found the burden absolutely intolerable, in spite of all their disciplined hardihood, and that they have at length laid violent hands on

themselves, in their desperation. These disclosures seem like the sudden uncapping of a volcanic mountain, and letting the sun-light in on the deep floods of lava, that had long been surging under the fields that looked so quiet and secure above. The most popular novelist of the present day, has described several cases of this kind; and on reading them, who does not feel that they are true to nature, instead of being extravagant sketches of a wayward fancy?

Talk as much as we please of the conscience becoming so callous, so thoroughly indurated, that it ceases to act in any way, or to give pain to the transgressor; there never was such a case, and there never can be one. True, it may be so abused as to be perverted, and lose its finer susceptibilities, just as the natural functions of the body may be impaired by disease or excess; but, in both cases, the palsying of the more delicate sense is followed by evils aggravated in proportion to the injury that is done. The unperverted conscience, or moral nature, (for we do not aim to use the terms here with philosophical precision,) when it is first violated, may be likened to a fresh wound, that smarts, because the parts are yet in their healthful state, and that gives warning even of the approach of injury; but after it has been long abused, it becomes like a dead sore, gangrened, scarcely sensible to a slight pressure, but throbbing with a dull, incessant pain, infecting every bone, muscle and nerve, and corrupting the very springs of life. Then, the whole body is sick, and the whole heart faint. Who does not know that the latter case is incomparably worse than the first?

The view we have taken of the subject is demanded, not only by the particular facts, to which we have referred, but also by the general principle, that the laws of our nature cannot be thwarted with impunity. We need not show that it clears away some of the difficulties which people have felt in admitting a righteous moral government of the world, under the present administration of divine Providence. H. B.[2d.]

438044B

Art. VIII.

Sonnets.

I.

"He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good."

Joy to the earth! the glorious sun hath risen!
All nature now the genial influence feels;
Into the nun's lone cell the sunbeam steals,
And through the grated windows of the prison,
Making the tear-dimmed eye with grateful pleasure glisten.
Its cheerful glow illumes alike the haunt
Of Vice, and her companions, Care and Want,
And the low cot, where peasant children listen,
While reverend lips the law of love proclaim!
Where wretched Judas doth his Lord betray,
Where loving hearts in truth and meekness pray,
Whate'er the spirit's motive or its aim, —
Alike doth God, our heavenly Father, shed
His glorious sunshine upon every head!

II.

"And sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."

He bids the soft and gently-falling showers,
Upon the parched and drooping earth descend;
In dewy vales upspring the fair, sweet flowers,
And to the balmy air their fragrance lend.
The rain falls kindly on the deeply sinning, —
The wretched wanderer from virtue's way, —
As on *his* brow whose daily life is winning
Souls by the gospel's pure and gentle sway.
While man, frail creature of a brief hour, turneth
From his own sins, a neighbor's faults to scan,
And from his path an erring brother spurneth,
Bidding him perish 'neath the cold world's ban, —
Alike to all, God's boundless mercy floweth,
And every path of life with blessings streweth!

C. A. J.

Art. IX.

Literary Notices.

1. A History of Greece. By the Right Rev. Connop Thirlwall, Lord Bishop of St. David's. New York: Harper and Brothers. To be completed in eight numbers. 8vo.

This work is a valuable addition to general literature. It illustrates very forcibly the influence which has been exerted upon the study of history, by the philosophic spirit of our times. It is now pretty generally understood that the true history of a people should include something more than an account of battles and sieges, the acquisition and loss of territory, or the rise and downfall of parties. It must be something more than narrative, for it should go beyond facts and events to their causes. It must, if it would fulfil its purpose, acquaint us with the inner life of the people as exhibited in their manners, laws, and institutions; and unfold to our gaze the working of those elements from which springs national character, and which constitute national identity. We need not say, that it requires a rare combination of faculties to fit a historian for his task. Besides the artistic power that is necessary to ensure simplicity of arrangement, and skill in the construction of the narrative, he must possess a critical judgment that can sharply discriminate between what belongs to the domain of history, and what lies in the shadowy region of myths and legends; a perfect freedom from bias; and, above all, a philosophic spirit which alone can enable him to reach the centre of his subject, and, into a mass of dry details, infuse a living soul.

Dr. Thirlwall seems to possess nearly all these excellences. He has really given us a history of Greece. After the perusal of his work, we know something more than the old stories about the intrigues of Themistocles and the ostracism of Aristides; we are acquainted with the Grecian people. Besides the account of the victories of Marathon, Salamis and Platæa, with which we have been familiar from our schoolboy days, we have some conception of the structure of Grecian society, the perfection of Grecian art, and that restless activity which was displayed as well in the triumphs of Grecian intellect as of Grecian arms. To us, one of the most interesting chapters, is that which treats of the manners, the knowledge, and the arts of the heroic age. The principal source of the history of this period is the Homeric poems; and we cannot forbear to speak of the admirable skill

with which all the allusions scattered throughout the Iliad and Odyssey have been arranged, and the light which he has thrown upon this comparatively obscure period by his cautious criticism. There is no desire to press facts into the service of preconceived theory. Indeed, the work is distinguished throughout by a freedom from that hasty generalization into which a philosophic disposition is too apt to degenerate. The author evidently possesses a healthy English mind. The style is clear, manly and energetic; and, it will be no small recommendation to the American reader to know, that the work is not conceived in that spirit of hostility to popular liberty, which gives so much malignity to many of Mitford's pages, and which induced Gillies to dedicate his work to George the Third, as an exhibition of the "dangerous turbulence of democracy." The vices of the Athenian people and the errors of the Athenian constitution are candidly exposed; but the author's criticism is not dictated by a spirit which sees every thing that is vicious in a democracy, and every thing that is good in an oligarchy. Dr. Thirlwall seems peculiarly fitted for the political department of his history. Besides the impartiality of which we have spoken, there is a freshness in the accounts of the busy scenes which he portrays, that seems to be imparted by the actual knowledge and accurate conception of an eye-witness. No multiplicity of details encumbers him. His practical genius readily seizes the connection which facts bear to each other, and, everywhere, weaves into the narrative the Grecian spirit which alone can give it life and meaning. In proof of this, we can only refer the reader to the volume on the Peloponnesian war, and the chapters on the stormy and unfortunate period which called forth the eloquence and talents of Demosthenes.

We could wish that some further chapters had been devoted to Grecian philosophy, especially of the later school; but, this of itself furnishes material enough for a history; and we will bestow whatever fault we have to find with the work upon the mechanical execution of this reprint by the Messrs. Harpers, who, we think, owed it to the public and to themselves, to publish such a work as Thirlwall's Greece in a style a little superior to that in which they put forth a novel by Eugene Sue. The cheap publications of the Appletons are infinitely superior in this respect.

2. A Drama of Exile, and other Poems, by Elizabeth B. Barrett. New York: Henry G. Ayley. 1845. 2 vols. 12mo.

We hardly know how to speak of these poems. They contain much to praise and much to censure. We will venture to

say, that they place Miss Barrett in the front rank of cotemporary English poets. There are passages in the volumes which, for beauty and sublimity, are unsurpassed by any female writer. And yet, we are almost ready to say that the whole is spoiled by extravagance and vagueness of expression. There are passages which we cannot comprehend, and which we hardly hope to comprehend, after two or three readings. We wonder at the style which has been adopted, in this instance. Sometimes writers employ such strange and misty language in order to conceal poverty or triteness of thought. But Miss Barrett does not need this device. There is enough of true genius in her poems to win its way if expressed in the English tongue as it is known and spoken by the people, without resorting to such a mistified and outrageous style. To use the language of a recent critic, respecting these volumes, they "are filled with the raw material of genius, but it is not always worked with skill. We feel in reading her poems that she ought to take the first rank; and are nettled that her love for uncouth and discordant jargon should prevent her mind from doing justice to itself."

We would mention as characteristic examples of her style, the poems entitled "Crowned and Buried," "A Child Asleep;" and as a more favorable specimen, "Sleeping and Watching," which we subjoin.

"Sleep on, Baby, on the floor,
  Tired of all the playing,—
Sleep with smile the sweeter for
  That you dropped away in!
On your curls' full roundness stand
  Golden lights serenely —
One cheek pushed out by the hand,
  Folds the dimple inly:
Little head and little foot
  Heavy laid for pleasure,
Underneath the lids half-shut,
  Slants the shining azure;—
Open-souled in noon-day sun,
  So you lie and slumber!
Nothing evil having done,
  Nothing can encumber.
I, who cannot sleep as well,
  Shall I sigh to view you?
Or sigh further to foretell
  All that may undo you?
Nay, keep smiling, little child,
  Ere the sorrow neareth,—
I will smile too! Patience mild
  Pleasure's token weareth.

Nay, keep sleeping, before loss;
  I shall sleep, though losing!
As by cradle, so by cross,
  Sure is the reposing.

And God knows, who sees us twain,
  Child at childish leisure,
I am near as tired of pain,
  As you seem of pleasure;—
Very soon, too, by His grace
  Gently wrapt around me,
Shall I show as calm a face,
  Shall I sleep as soundly!
Differing in this, that *you*
  Clasp your playthings sleeping,
While my hand shall drop the few
  Given to my keeping;
Differing in this, that *I*
  Sleeping shall be colder,
And in waking presently,
  Brighter to beholder!
Differing in this beside
  (Sleeper, have you heard me?
Do you move and open wide
  Eyes of wonder toward me?)
That while I, you, draw withal
  From your slumber, solely,—
Me, from mine, an angel shall,
  With reveillie holy."

3. Anastasis: or the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, rationally and scripturally considered, &c. By George Bush: Professor of Hebrew, New York City University. New York and London: Wiley and Putnam. 1845. 12mo. pp. 396.

This is one of the most remarkable works that have appeared in our day, whether we consider its internal character, or the circumstances of its origin. From both of these considerations, we think it is likely to produce considerable agitation in the theological world, not loud and boisterous, perhaps, (though it may assume that character,) but deep, and of permanent effect. That an eminent Professor, standing in the ranks of the Orthodox, so called, and holding, so far as it appears, the abstract principles of that class, has nevertheless come out, not only with so different a theory of the resurrection, but with such a developement of general doctrine as tends manifestly towards the views and Scripture interpretations which have been the most contemptuously treated, when given by Universalists, — all this may be re-

garded as marking something peculiar in the state of religious opinions around us, and as foreshadowing the changes that are to come. We do not mean that Professor Bush has intimated a belief in the final salvation of all mankind; rather, the contrary. We here speak only of the manifest tendency of his arguments to undermine the ground on which the popular dogma of endless misery stands, and to introduce more just and rational views of God's moral government of the world. He sets entirely aside the common notion of a general judgment hereafter, and shows that the Scripture doctrine on the subject, is, that Christ began to judge the world when he began his reign on earth, and that the duration of his kingdom here is a continued process of judgment. To this, he shows that the larger part of those texts refer, which have been most relied on to prove a day of judgment at the end of the world; and among them is the twenty-fifth chapter of St. Matthew, or what is commonly called the Parable of the Sheep and Goats. He supposes, however, that they cover the whole duration of Christ's reign on earth, from the destruction of Jerusalem, onward. His views of the "coming of Christ in the glory of his Father," of his "coming in the clouds of heaven with his angels," of his "sitting on the throne of his glory," of his "coming at the end of the world," and his interpretation of the figurative language applied to the event, are, in the main, simply those which Universalists have so earnestly labored to demonstrate. Let the reader consider, what a wide revolution in the popular notions is involved in the restoration of so important a department of Scripture to its true sense! The change will reach much farther than one would, at first thought, suppose.

His peculiar views concerning the *mode* and *time* of the resurrection, we are by no means ready to receive. At present, they appear to us unscriptural, though we confess that we have not had leisure, since his work came to hand, to give it an adequate examination on this point. The hypothesis, however, is not wholly new to us, as we have seen the same theory, in substance, proposed by some of the ancient fathers, and again by some writers in our own denomination. We have hitherto regarded it as at variance with the example of Christ's resurrection, and with the doctrine of St. Paul, in 1 Corinthians, xv. Nor are we prepared to say that our author has not strained the language of several texts in his interpretations, and run into some speculations that are "fanciful, chimerical, visionary," notwithstanding his implied protest. But no one can deny him distinguished ability, manly independence and frankness, a large extent of view, and candor in an unusual degree. His work also abounds with facts and thoughts and illustrations, which may be used with advantage on a great variety of scriptural and theological topics that

are not immediately connected with his main subject. Indeed, we do not remember to have read a recent publication, in the theological department of literature, which is more suggestive than the present. We must here content ourselves, however, with a slight sketch of the theory he has presented of the resurrection.

He disproves, conclusively we think, both on scientific and on Scriptural grounds, the popular notion that it is identically the same physical body in which we live in this world, that is to be raised. Properly speaking, we have no such identical body during the whole of our lives; since our corporeal frames are in a state of incessant transition, all the particles constantly passing away to be replaced by others. Nor is it possible to make it appear that the matter which composes our bodies at death, will be raised; because it soon becomes decomposed, and is reconstructed in other forms, whether of vegetation, or of reptiles, insects, fishes, birds, beasts, and, through them, of men; so that the same particles pass, in process of time, into bodies of innumerable individuals, all of whom would, on this ground, have to rise in one conglomerated mass, growing into each other. Indeed, the Scriptures never intimate that the identical body, which is buried, is to be raised; on the contrary, St. Paul obviously denies that this is the case. Here we part company with the Professor; for he proceeds to contend that there is not even any affinity, (such as we think St. Paul maintains,) between the body that is buried, and that which is raised. He thinks that, within our physical body, there is another and distinct one, namely, the *psychical* body, the principle of vitality, formed perhaps of the electric or galvanic fluid, and of light. This is the germ of what St. Paul calls the "spiritual body." It is the immediate vehicle of the soul, the proper organization by which the soul acts, and by which it communicates with the gross husk, or outer shell, of flesh and blood and nerves. When the physical body dies, its connection with the individual is forever at an end; but the psychical organization becomes separated, and passes away with the soul; and this etherial or psychical organization is the body that is raised.

The resurrection takes place with each individual at the moment of his death; and this was the case before Christ's advent, as it always has been since, and as it always will continue to be, while man continues to live and die on the earth. It is a process that is incessantly going on; and, of course, there is no general or simultaneous resurrection. Here, however, we must distinguish: It is of the saints only that this language is used. They alone are raised; the wicked do indeed exist hereafter, in their psychical bodies, and are miserable, (forever miserable, so far as

distinctly appears,) but they have no part in the peculiar process which is denominated *the resurrection.* This, it would seem, is a glorifying of the psychical body, by the divine agency, and exalting it ~~with~~ into a spiritual body. On these last-named points, however, we confess that we have not a clear perception of our author's meaning; and to us it appears that his ideas are somewhat clouded and indistinct in his own mind.

He thinks his views of the psychical body receive confirmation from the phenomena of mesmerism; and he acknowledges that his doctrine of the resurrection agrees, in substance, with that of Emmanuel Swedenborg. Respecting the light which animal magnetism is to throw on the mysteries of our nature, he says: "Nor is it any less clear to our convictions that the physico-psychical system of Swedenborg, *in this connection*, is destined to engage the study of all reflecting minds; for sure we are that no one can institute the comparison that we have, between the facts of animal magnetism and the doctrines of this remarkable man, without seeing that they stand in the same relation to each other as do the laws of gravitation in the universe to the philosophy of Newton. We have learned — and not a little to our surprise — that the system of Swedenborg, so far from being a mere wild incoherent farrago of spiritual hallucinations, is really built upon a profound philosophy of *matter* and of *mind*, and that the question of the truth of his theology must be decided by that of his philosophy; and this, strange as it may appear, is rather receiving confirmation than refutation by the results of scientific research. Nor will a supreme regard to truth allow us to withhold the declaration, that the view of the resurrection advocated in these pages is substantially the same with that taught in his writings, though arrived at by an independent process, and before we were aware of the features of affinity between them."— (*Note*, p. 76.)

We hope to find opportunity, before the close of the present volume of our work, to enter into an examination of this theory of the resurrection.

4. The Reformers before the Reformation. The Fifteenth Century. John Huss and the Council of Constance. By Emile de Bonnechose, Librarian to the King of France, Author of "Historie de France," "Historie Sacrée," &c. &c. Translated from the French, by Campbell Mackenzie, B. A., Trin. Col., Dublin. Complete in one volume. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1844. 8vo. pp. 199.

We regard this work as a valuable contribution to our current literature in the department of ecclesiastical, and even of dogmatic, history; for it is not without interest in the latter, as

well as in the former, respect. The period, to which its subject belongs, must have fixed the attention of every student, or intelligent reader, of the grand and exciting movements of the Reformation. It was in the fifteenth century that the causes, which resulted in that event, were quickened into life and matured; and it has always been a matter of intense curiosity, with historians, to look back into that perplexed scene, and to trace out the operation of the fermenting elements. But has any one, as yet, succeeded to analyse and arrange the innumerable influences that were gathering, like clouds, during that transition-period, and preparing for the tempest which followed? We confess, we know of none who has thoroughly accomplished this; and it is no special disparagement to our author to say, that he has left considerable to be done, where all others have failed.

We do not think that his work covers the whole ground which one might expect to be embraced by its leading title, "the Reformers before the Reformation." It hardly mentions the Waldenses, and the still older heretical sects, which contributed something towards the general awakening. It does not even bring out into full light the series of efforts which were made in the Catholic Church itself for a reformation. A more appropriate title, perhaps, would be, "John Huss, Jerome of Prague, and the Council of Constance." The only important topics which are treated with much particularity, are, the Great papal Schism of the West; Wickliffe and his doctrines; the lives and doctrines of Huss and Jerome, and the religious affairs of Bohemia, down to the establishment of the Moravians, or United Brethren; the Council of Constance, and the parts acted by Gerson, D'Ailly, and others. Even these topics, though pretty fully illustrated in their separate capacity, are not presented in their mutual bearings, and in their relation to other important considerations, so as to form a *tout ensemble.* The work is, indeed, written with somewhat of a philosophical spirit, but it wants philosophical arrangement and completeness. It opens separate views of the state of religion in those times, but it does not let us into a familiar acquaintance with the interior life of the Church, nor show us distinctly how all things were disposing for a crisis.

Nevertheless, it is well worth an attentive perusal. Among the books in current use, we know of none that gives so full, and apparently so impartial, an account of the several matters it embraces, especially of the life and doctrine of Huss, and the Council of Constance. Though written by the "Librarian to the King of France," who, we suppose, is in some way connected with the Catholic Church, we should have taken it to be the work of a Protestant. He has adhered faithfully to the profession which he makes in his preface: "The object of this work," says he,

"is not to convert believers — to engage in proselytizing at the expense of any church — to draw away the living members of our communion to the bosom of another. No creed will be presented here as the only creed; no particular formula will be advanced as the sole real expression of the truth, out of which there is nothing but error and falsehood; for we believe that it is, before all things, important to serve the universal church; and there is one religion in our eyes higher than all particular forms of worship — above Roman Catholicism as above Protestantism; and that religion is Christianity."

5. History of the Reformation in Germany. By Leopold Rankè, Author of the History of the Popes, &c. &c. Translated from the last Edition of the German, by Sarah Austin. Complete in one Volume. Philadelphia: Lea and Blanchard. 1844. 8vo. (Part I. pp. 160. To be completed in about four Parts.)

We have waited, with much impatience, for the appearance of this work, ever since we saw the notice that it was in process of translation, in England. Judging from the reputation of the author, we have expected to find it the best history of the Reformation in Germany that is to be met with in our language. So far as this first Part, or No., of the American reprint extends, we see no occasion to fear a disappointment. The author appears intent on bringing the whole ground into view, and on treating every thing thoroughly. We must wait, however, till the republication shall be completed, in order to form a satisfactory judgment of the work. Meanwhile, our readers may gather some idea of the breadth of the design, from a sort of table of contents which we give of this first Part:

I. *Introduction:* view of the early history of Germany, beginning with the Carolingian times. Saxon and Frankic emperors. Emancipation of the papacy, 1074. Relation of the papacy to the princes of the empire. First attempts of resistance to the encroachments of the papacy, 1338. Altered character of the empire, after 1400. State of Germany in the middle of the fifteenth century. II. *Book I:* attempt to reform the constitution of the empire, 1486–1517. Foundation of a new constitution. Diets of Worms, Lindau, and Freiburg, 1495–1498. War with France, 1498. Diet of Augsburg, 1500, and its consequences. Bavarian disputes, 1504. Diet of Cologne and Constance, 1505, 1507. Venetian war. Diets of Worms, Augsburg, Treves, and Cologne, 1508–1512. Intestine disorders, 1512–1517. III. *Book II.* Origin of the religious opposition. Position of the papacy with regard to religion. Opposition raised by the secular powers. Character and tendencies of the popular literature.

Condition and character of learned literature. Early career of Luther. Sale of indulgences, and the dispute that followed. Diet of Augsburg, 1518. Mutual relations of the German princes. Character of the emperor Maximilian. Charles V. elected emperor, 1519. New government. Luther before Cajetan and Miltitz. Melancthon. Luther's disputation with Eck, 1518. Progress of the theological opposition. Hutten. Bull of Leo X., 1520. Luther's secession from the Catholic Church. Secular and internal affairs of the empire. Foreign relations. Luther before the Diet of Worms, 1521.

We cannot but revert, once more, to the size of the type with which these cheap republications are printed. We commend the style of execution, in all other respects; but can it be supposed that so diminutive a letter is befitting large works, that must be read slowly, and with careful attention, in order that they may profit? We are sure these editions do not meet the wants of those whose eyes are growing dim; can they be used with safety even by those who are yet in the full possession of their sight? What do oculists say on this point? Let us have a more legible page, and pay accordingly, rather than destroy our eyes. There may be less objection to this manner of publishing novels, and other light reading, which is to be galloped over, in most cases the faster the better; but, surely, it is rather stretching the point, when such works as Thirlwall's Greece, the Reformers before the Reformation, Rankè, Michelet, &c., are sent forth in miniature letter, to fill the market, and thus to foreclose the chance of such editions as alone would answer the purpose of a large portion of the readers of this kind of literature. The type with which the Messrs. Campbell and Co. republished Neander's History of the Christian Religion and Church, is, we think, as small as ought ever to be used in works like those we have mentioned; how little would it have added to the expense to have employed a type equally legible, in the present cases!

6. The Sacred Flora: or Flowers from the Grave of a Child. By Henry Bacon. Boston: A. Tompkins and B. B. Mussey. 1845.
7. Hours of Communion. By Edwin H. Chapin. Boston: A. Tompkins and B. B. Mussey. 1845.

The books whose titles are here given, are not numbered among the large and elaborate. They are pretty gift books — miniature editions. This, however, is not all. They possess interest. The first contains many touching and profitable utterances of a bereaved parent's soul, when affliction had poured out its bitterness upon it. In a deserved tribute to a beloved young

daughter, the author has spoken instructive and consolatory truth in genuine gospel strains. Though we cannot say that the peculiar style of the author's composition is always clear as it might be, we have less to complain of on this score in the Sacred Flora than in some other works from the same pen. It is so fresh and so fervent — so gospel-like withal, that we have found pleasure in perusing its little pages; and we are satisfied that it will afford gratification to many a heart seeking rest from the visitations of bereavement and affliction. Its just views of the value of earthly enjoyments, however transient, of the goodness of God in our trials and afflictions, of his care of all his offspring whether here or hereafter, and the spiritual improvement and joy, even, which may be drawn from the grievous allotments of our present being, are the best with which men can be made acquainted. As a helper in the needed work of their instructions in this heavenly wisdom, we bid this little book a cordial welcome.

The work by Mr. Chapin is written in reference to the communion service. It comprises a number of sermons on topics closely connected therewith. These are — An Argument for Church Membership; the Lord's Supper considered as a Memorial; Our Saviour's Prayer of Forgiveness; the Crown of Thorns; Christ within us; the Cross of Christ; Religion founded in Character; the Great Exemplar; Thoughtfulness and Meditation; Christ after the Resurrection; Christ's abiding Presence invoked; Hour of Communion. We have no book like it in our denomination; and we doubt if any other denomination can present a much better one of no greater pretensions. It is strong in truth, stirring, attractive, and highly practical; and we believe it will do good, where good is especially needed; for it is not to be questioned that in reference to the observance of the Lord's Supper, we need a deeper sense of duty and a more general conformity to it. There is too great a lack of individual interest in this subject by many who profess to love Christianity and its accredited institutions; and any thing that will call attention anew to this subject, we hail with joy. It is thus we welcome this excellent little work, and pray that it may prove the true light to many an inquiring mind, and an instructive and cheering companion to those who have already numbered themselves among the communicants at the table of our Lord.

8. Travels in the Great Western Prairies, the Anahuac and Rocky Mountains, and in the Oregon Territory. By Thomas J. Farnham. New York: Greeley & McElrath, Tribune Buildings. 1843. 8vo. pp. 112.

If it be thought rather late for a notice of Mr. Farnham's pamphlet, our apology is that we have but recently become ac-

quainted with it. We are glad even of this opportunity to mention a narrative which has been so interesting as well as instructive to us in the perusal. Many of our readers have, no doubt, gone over part of its ground, in the beautiful and graphic pages of Irving's "Astoria," and "Rocky Mountains;" but, still, they will find the interest fresh in following Mr. Farnham through the scenes he describes, as none but an eye-witness can describe, or rather, present them.

On the 21st of May, 1839, he set off, with a small company, from Independence, in Missouri, and, following the trail of the Santa Fé traders, struck the Arkansas. This river guided the party up to its source in the Rocky Mountains, near Long's Peak. Here they entered the Great Gap, and pursued their course through the successive ridges, till they reached the upper waters of the great southern branch of the Columbia River. The remainder of their way ran either on the banks of the stream, or at no great distance from it.

One of the most striking pictures which the author gives, is of the moving world of buffaloes on the great western prairies, near the Arkansas; herds that covered, in one dense, black, stirring mass, the whole prospect, all around the horizon. The natural scenes, too, which presented themselves in the mountain region, and the views which stretched around him, sometimes for days together, are inexpressibly wild and grand.

On the western side of the mountains, it appears, large tracts of country are irreclaimably barren; and it seems, indeed, that much of the Oregon Territory will always remain as it now is, a desert.

Mr. Farnham gives a very clear account of the various tribes of Indians who roam over the regions through which he passed. Their habits, characters and occupations are detailed, and especially the dangers which the traveller has to apprehend from the more fierce and mischievous among them. Geographical surveys of all the country west of the mountains are given, and notices of the ~~travelling~~ establishments both of the English and of the Americans. To conclude the whole, we have an abstract of Commander Wilks's Report and Statistics of the Oregon Territory. We commend the work both to those who wish information of the character and condition of that region, and to those who wish to read a very interesting book of travels.

Art. X.

Religion and the Fine Arts.

Under the deadening influence of the sensual philosophy of the eighteenth century, the æsthetic arts became greatly deteriorated, and imagination and genius lost much of their wonted elevation and interest; but, in our immediate age, they seem to have regained something of their natural inspiration; they have begun to exhibit new signs of life and vigor, and are assuming again their proper rank in the estimation of the civilized world. The philosophy of Schelling, which makes the science of Æsthetics "the key-stone of the Absolute Philosophy," has operated in conjunction with many lesser causes, to awaken a fresh interest in the arts, and to incite multitudes of enthusiastic aspirants to strive after distinction through devotion to the chisel and the pencil. Even in our own country, where hitherto the spirit of practical utility has prevailed the most exclusively, for a few years past the arts have received more comparative attention than at any former period; and it is perhaps not too much to hope that, among us, their claims will soon come to be better understood and acknowledged, and their relative value be, at length, generally appreciated.

Under such circumstances, it would be interesting, without doubt, to take a general view of the philosophy of the fine arts, and to set forth at large the duties which they devolve, at the present time, upon the American people. Our present purpose, however, is somewhat different. We propose rather, in the following article, to sketch hastily the philosophy of the connection which subsists between religion and art; to indicate, in a very general manner, the relation which several of the principal historical schools of art have sustained to the respective forms of religion, under which they have arisen; and finally, to point out, in particular, how greatly and how directly modern art is indebted for its excellences to the Christian revelation and faith. And, in following out our design, we may be able to throw

some light on the distinctive spirit symbolized in each of the great schools of art, that have flourished in past ages, and may thus incidentally help some of our readers perhaps to attain a truer appreciation of each, and to bestow their patronage, at the present day, with greater discrimination and justice.

The multiform phases which the civilization of any given people will be found to present at each particular epoch of its history, might, at first glance, lead to the belief, that such a diversified phenomenon cannot possess any common principle of unity and wholeness; but a deeper insight will detect everywhere points of resemblance and agreement, and a profound philosophy will always discover, at the bottom, one grand pervading law of harmony. Accordingly, the particular style of art and the peculiar form of religion, which spring up together in any one people, are, like all the other parts of its civilization, never cotemporary by accident; their coëxistence and reciprocal influence proceed from the intimate connection which subsists between religion and art in their inmost nature.

Religion is based on the idea of the good; art, on the idea of the beautiful; and philosophy and science, on that of the true. The good applies strictly to the intrinsic *essence* and *substance*, in which the objects of our perception have their consistence; it is impersonated purely and absolutely in the All-perfect One, and is set before man as the ultimate end of every aspiration and effort. On the other hand, the beautiful has reference to the *form* and *order* under which objects are presented to our notice; and it constitutes, at once, the groundwork and the legitimate sphere of the æsthetic arts.

Now, as substance must always of necessity appear under some form, must of necessity appear either as one or as many, as infinite or as limited, so the apprehension of the good is necessarily accompanied, in some degree, with the perception of the beautiful, and thus religion, the realization of the good, and art, the embodiment of the beautiful, will, each in its turn, involve and engender the other. A people, therefore, cannot be religious long, without attaining unto some conceptions of beauty, and making some corresponding efforts to embody these conceptions in the material symbols of art; nor can a people, on the other

hand, possess the true spirit and genius of art, without becoming also, to some extent, religious.

And not only will religion and art in general thus reciprocally reproduce each other, but also by virtue of this same connection, which has just been traced out, every particular modification of the one must, in like manner, lead to a corresponding modification of the other. Introduce a change into the spirit and character of the prevailing religion, and it will immediately, as history will show, reäppear in the tone and form of the cotemporary art.

Before proceeding, however, to illustrate and confirm these positions by an appeal to the history of art, it will be requisite here to give some analysis of the principle of beauty, and to present, in a few words, its fundamental laws and modes of manifestation.

It is not, then, in the *materiel* of which a being or thing is composed that its beauty consists; the beauty always lies, as we have already stated, in the *form*—in the *order* of adjustment and construction. The two prime elements of beauty are unity and variety; and all the manifold phases, which the beautiful ultimately exhibits, are but different combinations of these two elements. The equipoise of variety and unity in the scene or object contemplated, constitutes that which is usually denominated beauty, in a more restricted sense of the term; a marked predominance of unity over the variety is the essential characteristic of majesty and grandeur; while the apparent obliteration of variety in an all-absorbing prevalence of unity, distinguishes whatever is properly sublime. On the other hand, the predominance of variety, in as many consecutive degrees, produces successively the wild, romantic, picturesque, and, finally, the irregular and chaotic.

If now we accept as true the above definition of beauty, (which our limits will not allow us to verify here,) it will follow directly that the ideal of absolute beauty can be realized only in a variety, which, while strictly infinite in itself, is yet pervaded and regulated throughout by a perfect unity; and, in accordance with this, the conclusion is at once obvious, that the boundless and all-various universe, of which we are a part, subsisting, as it does, in the bosom of God, and everywhere animated and informed by his divine presence, is, in truth, the exact realization of

absolute beauty. The ideal of absolute sublimity, again, which requires, as is apparent above, the entire extinction of variety, is found realized in the Infinite and Eternal One; in him, who is not only above all and in all, but is also, at the same time, the One-all and All-one. But, in the more subordinate forms, the outward world of matter and motion is plainly the great theatre of the beautiful and picturesque, while the sublime is more confined to the internal world of imagination and reason, whose conceptions, in their loftiness, transcend the limits of space and time, and take hold on the infinite and eternal. Every perception of beauty, grandeur or sublimity, is, moreover, in consequence of the intimate connection subsisting between our æsthetic and sensitive nature, necessarily followed by a peculiar and appropriate emotion; and, conversely, whenever any of these particular emotions are awakened in us, from whatever cause, they tend, by force of the same connection, to call up some corresponding idea of the beautiful or sublime. Accordingly, scenes that are wild and romantic in their features, excite a certain thrilling and tumultuous sensation of delight. The contemplation of beauty, on the contrary, is attended with a sense of serene and placid enjoyment. The grand awakens emotions that are more lofty and energetic, but yet entirely equable and composed. It is for the sublime alone to stir up feelings that reach to the very depths of the soul, and that become, at times, almost overpowering to the mind in which they are excited.

From the view now given, it will, further, be readily seen, that there are open, in the outset, to the choice of art, two principal and opposite courses; — it may take, on the one hand, an external and objective direction, devoting itself chiefly to the beauties of outward and material nature; or, on the other hand, its aim may be eminently subjective, directed in the main to the ideas of the reason and the inward life of the soul. The art, again, which is purely subjective in its character, may be distinguished into two great classes; it may have for its leading object the embodiment of rational ideas and conceptions, or it may aim exclusively to express the feelings and sentiments of the heart. The perfection of human art presents, however, neither of these different characters to the exclusion of the other; it gives the predominance indeed to the subjective,

as its own intrinsic superiority demands, but does not on that account, deny to the objective a proper degree of importance, and, still further, in the subjective itself, it makes sentiments and ideas equally conspicuous.

Having thus noted hastily the æsthetic elements as well as great natural distinctions of art, we are now ready to inquire how these have manifested themselves historically in connection with religion; and we shall find that the earliest productions of art, at least, received their character almost wholly from the religion under which they appeared. The monuments of art that have been left to us at the present day, by the people of ancient India, are in strictest keeping with their religious and philosophical belief, and their consequent views of practical life. In the Indian religion there reigns, with crushing sway, an omnipotent and terrible theism, before which the human worshipper cowers down in vague and mysterious awe. The infinite, in the Hindoo's mind, is every thing; to him the world without is nought but illusion, and man himself a mere passing shadow. Says the Hindoo poem of Bhagavad-Gita:—"Every thing is illusion except the eternal principle. What is to-day a man, was yesterday a plant, and to-morrow may be a plant once more. Like every thing else, action also, when regarded as real, is illusion. It is necessary to act, undoubtedly, but to act as if we acted not;—to do what we are compelled to do, but as if we did it not." Under practical views like these, it is not strange that the Indian artist paid but little attention to either the beauties of material nature, or the dignity and grace of the human form and lineaments. His art, naturally enough, turned away entirely to the subjective side, and, even in that, it dwelt mainly upon the rational ideas, to the neglect of passions and sentiments. The infinite of Oriental philosophy, unlike that revealed by Christianity, is altogether blank and dead; it is an empty conception of the reason, uninformed by the inherence of spirit and life; and the impressions it leaves in the mind, are the mere stagnant repose of indifference, and the passive revery of dreaming mysticism. To symbolize an infinite of this sort is the great aim of Oriental art. To this end were raised the huge and unsightly temples, the colossal columns, the gigantic figures and images, that are seen, at the present day, amid the

ruins of Elephanta, and along the coast of Madras and Ceylon. We meet there an architecture massive and astonishing, a sculpture gigantic and bold, yet utterly unshapely and destitute of either beauty or grandeur. The Indian poetry, also, breathes a spirit essentially the same. The delicious dream of bewildered mysticism, the surpassing felicity of solitude and repose, the earnest longing for self-oblivion and immersion in the infinite, are, we are told, the Indian poet's favorite theme and burden. In short, to pursue the matter no farther, the gigantic in conception and the mystical in spirit and effect, though without beauty, or grandeur, or true sublimity, are, we may conclude, the distinguishing traits of Oriental art.

The religious views of the ancient Egyptians were materially different from those which we have attributed to the people of Hindostan, and there will be seen also an equal and analogous difference in the art of the two nations. Religion and science were, obviously, the two primary characteristics that distinguished the peculiar mind of the Egyptian people. It was science that determined the character of their religion, and it was religion that gave them an interest in science. Their religion consisted in the deification and worship of the powers of inanimate nature. To their minds, as to every mind that is too exclusively scientific, the laws of nature seemed rigid, uncompromising and omnipotent, working out their end without regard to the feelings or interests of men, and in defiance of human resistance. Awe and dread are, plainly, the only feelings which such a religion is fitted to inspire, and passive obedience, the great duty incumbent on its adherents. This spirit of the religion reäppears to the fullest extent in the art of Egypt. That massive, solemn, frowning architecture, that colossal, sombre-visaged statuary, is a fitting symbol of the stern and crushing spirit of its religion.

The master architects, indeed, of those wonderful temples, which have survived to our day the devastations of time, were themselves, for the most part, men of the sacerdotal class, and they both embodied in their own character the spirit and essence of their religion, and endeavored to express it also in the forms of architecture and sculpture with the truth and intensity of life. The whole art of the

Egyptians should be interpreted, in fact, as directly and strictly emblematical of their religious notions and sentiments. Their pyramids were reared to typify the vastness and durability of eternal nature; the sphere with its wings and serpent, seen so often on their temples, was an image, to their minds, of the universal spirit which extends its presence, as on *wings*, through the whole of creation, and evinces in all its operations the perfection of *wisdom;* and the inverted torch, so common and striking, declares the Egyptian's belief, that, with death, the soul as a human spirit is extinguished. But, to omit particulars, and to give, in a word, the prevailing characters of Egyptian art, we may designate it the genuine symbolical expression for ideas of gloom, dread and impregnable might.

In both India and Egypt, art, as we have already seen, took its leading features and complexion from the religion of those countries respectively; but in the "classic land" of Greece, where the muses had their seat, these relations are exactly reversed. In the Grecian character the artistic tendency was originally ascendant, and the Grecian religion was, in consequence, but the foster-child of Grecian art. "The mythology of the Greeks," says Ritter, "had its source in their keen perception of the beautiful in art. The plastic spirit of their art is indeed generally acknowledged; but the operation of this spirit upon the mythology of Greece is as distinctly perceptible." The Grecian religion is, indeed, as one may see at the slightest glance, emphatically æsthetic, — a religion throughout of the fancy and of beauty. All its gods wear the dignity and beauty of the human form; and woman, the prime emblem of grace and loveliness on earth, plays her full part among the divinities of Greece. Every fountain and river and forest, in all that delightful land, was the haunt of nymphs, unrivalled for their charms; and the Hours, the Graces, and the Muses were, if we may credit the father of history, as favorite deities with the priest and prophet of Greece, as they were with her poets and scholars. A religion, then, like this, it is evident enough, must have owed its origin and character more to the æsthetic genius than to the religious sentiment of the Grecian people. The peculiar art of the Greeks, again, sprang up itself through their peculiar circumstances of life, and then, in its own turn, as shown above, it impressed

its peculiar features upon their religion. We shall proceed to give the leading characteristics of Grecian art, in order that it may be seen what are the excellences and deficiencies of art, when it proceeds purely from a spontaneous artistic impulse, and is neither cramped by a false, nor inspired and spiritualized by a true, religion.

There has never existed, perhaps, in the history of the world, another people so well fitted by natural character and physical condition, for the cultivation of the arts, as the people of ancient Greece. Blessed originally with a physical temperament the happiest in the gift of nature, with the sprightliest spirits and exuberant health, situated, moreover, amidst the noblest scenery, under the fairest skies, and in the pleasantest climate, and supplied with resources the most ample for commerce and the arts, and with every influence, external and internal, for inspiring activity and life, the people of Greece, it would seem, enjoyed thus the most favorable advantages for the development of a buoyant and vigorous mind and of a healthy and symmetrical character, which the condition of humanity affords. Grecian character and art, under such circumstances, became, almost necessarily, of an opposite tone and spirit to those of both Egypt and the East. They were allured forth into an outward direction by the genial influence and pleasing attractions of external nature. Abstract truth and spiritual sentiment, indeed, were little suited to the general taste of the Grecian mind. Nay, his very gods the Greek was disposed not only to conceive under human forms, but even to bring bodily before his eyes in the chiseled marble. And, in accordance with this general objective spirit, portraying the beauties of the material world, singing the outward achievements of heroes, and celebrating the visible workings of the Olympian powers, formed the especial delight of Grecian poetry, from the time of Homer to Oppian. To the outward, also, the Grecian sculptor gave his chief attention. He selected the subjects of his art by their beauty or dignity of person; he took for his favorites the majestic hero and the graceful god — a Hercules and Apollo — and then labored to chisel out from the block the symmetrical graces of form rather than the deep expression of spiritual life.

Inasmuch, moreover, as the outward world is the pe-

culiar theatre of beauty, this objective turn of mind led the Greek artist, in the next place, more particularly, to the contemplation of the beautiful; and all the productions he has left us, bear, in consequence, the traces of his intimate familiarity with every form and phasis of beauty. It is their artistic beauty, more than any thing else, that has given immortal distinction to the trágedies of Sophocles and the statues of Phidias, as well as to the orations of Demosthenes and the dialogues of Plato. In the works of Sophocles, indeed, every thing appears measured out into mathematical proportions; an admirable harmony subsists between the part of dramatic dialogue and that of the choral songs; each character is moulded and fashioned in the severity of chiseled beauty; the hero obeys, it would seem, no law but the laws of artistic propriety; he entertains only the sentiments of a high-minded spirit, and utters them in language, which, for elegance and harmony, will remain forever unrivalled. The same severe beauty characterizes, in an equal degree, the productions of Phidias and Praxiteles. The divinity of beauty and grace, that distinguish the Venus of the latter, has received the united homage of the world. The Apollo de Belvidere, which has been the subject of no less admiration in modern times, will stand also as long as marble shall endure, the embodied ideal of symmetry, dignity, and grace.

Even the Phidian Jupiter, reposing as he does amid his flowing robes and favorite birds, appears more the emblem of dignified and majestic beauty than of any thing remarkably sublime or awful. But, perhaps, the one art of Greece, which, in fulness of beauty, surpasses all others, is her incomparable architecture. Here, without question, she stands alone. To the consummate symmetry and majesty of her Parthenons and Theseions the architecture of the world offers no rivals,—nothing to be compared with them, as symbols of noble and harmonious beauty.

Lastly, though the expression of inward life was too much neglected by the Grecian masters, yet so far as exhibited at all, its leading trait is an air of calm complacency and cheerful enjoyment. This complacent and tranquil satisfaction, as was remarked in the beginning, is just the feeling induced by the contemplation of beauty; and it is the sentiment, it seems to us, that reigns almost

single and alone throughout the productions of Grecian genius.

Whether, indeed, we listen to the musical strains and Epicurean sentiments of Anacreon, or laugh at the comic wit and pleasing humor embalmed forever by the skilful art of Aristophanes, or watch the heroes of Homer, as they exultingly brave the dangers of war, or joyfully share the banquets of victory, we shall be everywhere greeted with the same prevailing spirit of overflowing cheerfulness and enjoyment, as well as of preëminent beauty.

Even Pindar, as he soars with the bird of Jove above the clouds and storms of heaven, or floats majestically amid lightnings and thunders, dismisses fear and enjoys the while a serene and lofty pleasure. In Grecian tragedy, too, the heroes, with scarcely an exception, are clear-hearted and self-satisfied men; they go to their work, audacious though it be, untroubled with any misgivings of spirit.

Clytemnestra murders her "wedded lord," and boasts exultingly over the daring deed; Orestes slays his mother and suffers, it is true, the vengeance of her furies, yet feels, for the rest part, no stings nor upbraidings of conscience; and Prometheus himself, chained to the naked crags of Caucasus, pelted by the fury of tempests and whirlwinds, and a prey to the appetite of vultures, retains still his native equanimity, and bears all with the firmness and fortitude of a man. Nay, even the tears of Grecian poetry seem to fall in the measures of music; they tell us of a sweet and tender grief, of a gentle and suitable sadness, which the spectator contemplates almost with feelings of pleasure. The Dying Gladiator of the sculptor, in just the same spirit, expires with the look of resolution and triumph; Niobe petrifies in the quiet loveliness of matronly grace united to motherly affection, and the extreme agonies of Laocoon are tempered with an air of self-possession and manful dignity.

From the stately temples of Greece, too, the same peaceful composure and satisfaction look forth; and the paintings, in fresco and mosaic, found at Pompeii, speak a language entirely similar. In these latter, the groups of frolicking dolphins and tritons, the jolly satyrs and dancing fawns, the hours, graces and muses, and, more common than all, the gentle maiden, with smiling features and

glowing health, with laurel wreaths and flowing robes and sweet-toned lyre — these so conspicuous and abundant, and all exhibited in the liveliest colors, tell, better than language can describe it, the spirit of ancient painting. It is cheerfulness and enjoyment everywhere. Almost the only pains, indeed, which Grecian art portrays, are physical suffering and the pangs of love; the workings of conscience and the deeper emotions of religion are passed over with scarcely the slightest notice. There is, then, in Grecian art, much of outward symmetry, much of polished beauty, and much also of quiet and cheerful complacency; but, at the same time, very little of lofty grandeur, almost nothing of true sublimity, and hardly any thing of tragic passion and overpowering emotion.

We pass over the art of the Romans, which was simply a reproduction of Grecian art, with a little additional magnificence and pomp; and we come now to the art of Christendom, and shall endeavor to point out, with some degree of precision, the new elements and new character, which Christianity has introduced into the whole realm of the arts of taste.

Christianity not only presents the absolute view of truth and right, but it involves also the absolute view, and indicates the central element of the principle of taste.

In the Christian religion, the objective and subjective phases of things are both assigned their proper places. The outward world is regarded, indeed, as the workmanship of God, and therefore worthy of respect; but still of only secondary importance, compared with the soul of man and the great realities of eternity.

In the next place, Christianity reveals the Infinite One, the object of highest sublimity, as the being in whom centres our deepest interest, and who demands our supreme reverence and service.

Thirdly, it shows us man, fallen from his native dignity and lamentably sunk in the degradation of sin; and it sets before him, thus debased, as the prime end and mission of life, the great work of spiritual regeneration and recovery; it enjoins purity of soul, and claims the homage of the heart.

And lastly, though not yet recognised in the creeds of the Christian world, it represents, as its grand consumma-

tion and issue, the universal family of man loosed from the bonds of mortality, corruption and sin, and rejoicing together in immortal freedom, beatitude and glory, around the throne of God.

These are the principal features in the Christian religion, that are fitted to exercise an æsthetical influence; and, in the course of the following remarks, we hope to show, that excepting the last, all these several elements of Christianity, together with its dominant spirit, have passed, in an eminent degree, into modern art.

First, then, the art of Christendom is, in its character, emphatically subjective. The outward beauties of form, it does, by no means, overlook; but yet, while giving to these a suitable attention, it directs all its greatest efforts to the expression of the inward and spiritual. External nature and heroic achievements are not its favorite subjects; its themes of mightiest interest are derived from the spiritual relations of man. The grandest efforts of modern poetry sing the loss and regaining of Paradise, the scenes of heaven, hell and purgatory, the passions and aspirations, the joys and sorrows of man on earth, and the solemn retributions of the judgment hereafter.[1] Christian architecture, too, is almost, as Coleridge has expressed it, "petrified religion;" and statuary, in the hands of Michael Angelo, Canova, and we may add, Greenough, has assumed a more subjective air, and made the embodiment of character the prominent object of the chisel. More strikingly yet, does this influence of Christianity appear in the productions of the pencil. The mere fact, that painting, the peculiar art of expression, has been cultivated, in modern times, to the comparative neglect of statuary, which is properly the art of form, is in itself proof of this influence of Christianity upon the arts. The subjects of the modern painter are mainly borrowed from Christian story. Over the walls of the churches and palaces of Christendom are hung, without number, the pictures of prophets and apostles and martyrs, of Madonnas, Magdalenes, and nuns. Almost every miracle, wrought by the early Christians or their Master, has been reproduced upon the canvass; and

[1] These are misconceptions of Scripture, it is true; but still their origin must be traced to Scripture, though misunderstood.

even, (that dread event in the creeds of Christendom,) the great, concluding judgment of the world, which has been sung in verse, and set to the notes of music, has also come up before our eyes through the skill of the Christian painter. And, finally, music, an art exceedingly imperfect among the ancients, has grown up the rival and compeer of her sister arts, under the operation of Christian influences. The necessities of Christian worship introduced the chant and choral music into the church at an early date; and this one circumstance has been regarded, not without reason, as the ultimate source of those wonderful musical compositions, to which the present age listens with admiration and delight. Such productions as Haydn's Creation, Handel's Messiah, Mozart's Agnus Dei, and the symphonies of Beethoven, could never have been conceived by one that was born in the time of Pericles.

Secondly, Christianity has given to modern art the grandest conceptions and the loftiest sublimity of spirit; and even modern productions that are purely models of the beautiful, it has elevated and inspired with a higher expression of spiritual life. Whence, we would ask, but from Christianity, shall we seek the source of that intense and fervid sublimity, which glows, like a furnace, in the great Epic of Milton, and which is not wholly wanting in the "Divine Comedy" of Dante? Those grand conceptions embodied in the Fallen Angels, and in the Michael, Messiah, and Jehovah of modern poetry, took their origin, through misapprehension indeed, but yet not the less truly, from the Bible; and it is the Bible, that has in very fact revealed the possibility of such fearful wickedness, almost sublime for its enormity, on the one hand, and the reality of sentiments and purposes so much more sublime, on the other.

A kindred sublimity, equally the offspring of Christianity, is expressed in the vastness and imposing effect of Gothic architecture; and statuary, in like manner, under the impulse of Christian influences, has constantly inclined to the grand and lofty. Michael Angelo's statue of Moses, so gigantic in dimensions, standing, seemingly, in the vestibule of eternity, and gazing onward into its deeper recesses, and Canova's colossal, though unfinished image of religion, fitly exemplify much of the sculpture of modern

times. Nor is painting behindhand in these higher æsthetic qualities. Than the Creation and Last Judgment of Michael Angelo, and the "La disputa del Sacramento" of Raphael, there can be conceived nothing grander within the power of the painter's art.

Grandeur and sublimity are, thus clearly, distinguishing features of modern art; and, apart from Christianity, there is no source apparent, from which they could proceed. They are, we must conclude then, Christianity's exclusive as well as legitimate fruits. The Christian artist contemplated in faith the sublime objects and scenes of eternity, as revealed in the Bible, until his soul was transfigured by them, and it became the purpose of his life to shadow forth, in human symbols, things unseen and eternal.

Thirdly, though the infinite is the grand and central idea of the Christian, as well as Oriental art, yet, in Christian art, it does not predominate to the exclusion of human passions and sentiments.

Christianity is, preëminently, a religion of the heart, requiring, as it does, entire conformity of will, thought and affection to the Divine law; it finds man in a state of irreconciliation and rebellion, and presents to him, as the end of life, the work of spiritual redemption.

The entire line of this mighty process of redemption, modern art has occupied, point by point; and it has copied the aspects of the soul, from the deepest wickedness and guilt and despair, through every shade and variety, up to the grand consummation, where the "warfare is ended," and union with our Father in heaven finally attained.

There is, accordingly, revealed, in the poetry of modern times, a depth of iniquity and guilt, of which the ancients had no conception. Where, in all antiquity, shall we find a death-bed scene to compare with that of Cardinal Beaufort? Where is there such a burning sense of guilt, such remorse of conscience, as appears in the Satan of Paradise Lost? The Prometheus of antiquity, though subjected to the severest punishments, which the Grecian poet could imagine, suffered nothing in comparison with the Fallen Angel of Milton. The Titan, amid all his extraneous tortures, endures no pangs from within. He feels a consciousness that his oppressor is in the wrong, and cannot

but fail; he knows that his own cause is just, and must ultimately triumph; and therefore he is able to defy the tyrant of Olympus with right good-will, and the full concurrence of his conscience. His bosom remains without perturbation, and he is emboldened and sustained throughout by hope and a feeling of complacent satisfaction. But Satan knows nothing of this quiescence and complacency. His own breast is itself the "lowest hell," and his outward features and looks are transfigured by the passions that war within it. He is conscious that all his punishments are deserved as well as unalterably sure; and it is under this consciousness, in the very desperation of wickedness, that he pours forth against the Most High that strain of shuddering blasphemy and defiance; he is ready to welcome hell; to bid farewell to hope and fear, and to cry out to "Evil, be thou my good." The great actors in ancient tragedy exhibit but little comparative consciousness of guilt. They resemble, in this particular, the water-spirit, Undine, previous to possessing a soul. Their wickedness appears more like the spontaneous and unconscious overflow of frolicksome, wayward instinct.

Christianity has given to man a *soul*. The recklessness, which characterizes the Satan and Faust, the Richard and Cain of the modern poet, is as self-conscious as it is audacious. Richard chooses the path of iniquitous ambition, in the full light of its iniquity; Cain blasphemes, and feels the while its enormity; Faust follows each sinful desire, only, it would seem, because it is sinful.

In the characters of poetry, too, that are not so flagrantly bad, and yet not properly good, the effect of Christianity upon the workings of passion and the course of action, is no less manifest. Whence, in fact, but from Christianity, is the spring of that painful, almost terrible interest, which we feel in the heroes of Shakspeare, and with which we are ever straining forward to the development and issue of their destiny. The reader shudders, as he follows their fortunes; he sees them, like man in his spiritual warfare on earth, falling at times into passes over which broods the darkness of night, into exigencies from which, it seems, no human wisdom or power can rescue. In their fortunes, as in the state of the soul, every thing is disordered and "out of joint." It appears their delight to ponder over the

mysteries, and grapple with the darkest enigmas, of existence; a Hamlet or Wolsey is ever dropping almost unconsciously some sentence or expression of deep significance; they wear a serious, even solemn air, and seem burdened with the pressure and weighty meaning of life, and though ever struggling to rise, yet falling, at last, the monuments of human frailty and impotence.

The language of Mrs. Hemans is not more true of the great musician of Christendom, than of the poet and the poet's hero,—

> "Something far more divine
> Than may on earth be mine,
> Haunts my worn soul, and will not let me rest."

A wave of irrepressible restlessness, a spirit that yearns for inward deliverance, and longs without ceasing for something higher and better, is ever pouring up from the inner fountains of the soul. Even Byron, ungodly and reprobate as he was, is, in this respect, an evidence and monument of the power of Christianity. In his writings, we everywhere recognise one impressed with a sense of the deep mystery and solemn import and responsibility of life; a soul, full of restless longings, ever straining to be free, and ever moaning out the elegy of its failure.

Still more conspicuous is Christian influence in the class of characters that stand a grade higher; in those, who are sighing and struggling, directly and with the whole soul, for redemption, but have not as yet obtained it. Examples of this sort are common in the modern poets generally, and, especially, in Schiller; and it was, too, this species of spiritual experience, it seems to us, that led to the characteristic peculiarities of Gothic architecture.

It has been already stated, in another place, that romantic scenes excite irregular and tumultuous feelings; and, conversely, that feelings of this kind lead to the contemplation of what is wild and romantic, and call forth an effort to embody the corresponding conceptions and emotions in the forms of art. Accordingly, while the grand, general effect of Gothic architecture is remarkably sublime, all its ornamental details, on the other hand, exhibit mainly the character of the unharmonized and romantic. "The rifted arch and shafted window," the crowded and inter-

mingling towers and turrets, the free profusion of fantastic frieze-work, the intertangled tracery of the painted glass, letting in "a dim religious light," all betoken a spirit dissatisfied with itself, and groaning and striving after its own disenthrallment and salvation. In truth, the architectural creations of Erwin von Steinbach, more perhaps than any thing else, gave to the Christianity of a mystic age its free and full expression.

A manifestation, but little less complete and admirable, of this peculiar phasis of Christian experience, is presented in the musical compositions of Mozart. The feelings, involved in certain kinds of religious experience, are hardly different from the æsthetic emotions awakened in the mind by particular airs and movements in music; and Mozart, taking advantage of this fact of our nature, has succeeded in reproducing the heart's religious longings through the instrumentality of music.

A large portion of the paintings of Christendom breathe also precisely the same spirit. The Christian painter, instead of deriving his lessons, like the ancient artist, from the balancing boxer or the nimble racer, watched rather, with a sympathizing soul, the saint at his devotions, and the nun at her confession; and hence, at the touch of his pencil, there sprang forth upon the canvass those divine forms, whose pale, spiritual tint, and intense countenance and eye, rolled up in fervent devotion, bespeak a sense of something greater and deeper than Grecian or Roman ever knew.

Nor, indeed, has modern art failed to celebrate the great consummation of all the Christian's aspirations and efforts, the restoration of the soul. In Raphael's virgins, infants and saints, and, especially, in the Saviour of the Transfiguration, there breathes as much composure and serenity and peace, as in any of the productions left to us by ancient art. But it is, in this case, a peace, which the world cannot give. Profound life appears in union with profound repose; and outward form becomes the faithful expression of holiness of heart. On the features of Giovanni's seraphs and glorified spirits there reposes the same serene beatitude; and even the painter's martyr at the stake is, in most cases, but the embodied triumph of assured faith and pious resignation. In no less degree do

the lyrics of Christendom, the psalms of Watts, the songs of Schiller, the odes of Kirke White and Spenser, breathe, at times, the incense of heaven, and hymn the joys of paradise. Nay, the drama, too, as employed by the genius of Calderon, though leading its characters through the darkness and turmoil of worldly life, still closes their career in the brightness of Christian hope and felicity. Nor is architecture without some faint symbols of even this form of religious experience. The pointed dome, which, though exotic in origin, is yet an adopted and favorite growth of Christian soil, impresses the beholder's mind with a feeling, in some measure, analogous to that lofty consciousness, which accompanies purity of heart and holy elevation of sentiment and character. But among the arts, music is the truest representative of this celestial holiness and bliss. If ever the highest and purest joys, of which our present capacities are susceptible, were poured forth in unrestrained freedom, it is in the symphonies of Beethoven. The seventh symphony, in fact, were hardly unmeet for a choir of the ransomed in heaven, and its composer, we can scarcely help thinking, must have believed in the universal redemption of his race.

In the last place, there are some modern productions, which embrace, at once, all the higher excellences of art; which combine beauty, grandeur and sublimity in one harmonious whole, and present, together with symmetry and grace of form, the loftier beauty of intelligence and sentiment. This last and highest perfection of art is exhibited, to some extent, in the great works of Dante and Milton, but appears most conspicuously in a few incomparable efforts of music and painting. As an example of this ultimate achievement of Christian art, we know of nothing to surpass the fifth symphony of Beethoven. This admirable and truly Christian symphony presents a compendium of the soul's efforts and success in the work of redemption. The yearnings of the soul after its true and primitive estate; the restlessness it feels under the burdens of sin; its desperate struggles for deliverance; its tones of despondency; its glimmering, gradually brightening hopes, and its final triumph, together with the jubilee of exultation and the sublime joy of freedom, are successively exhibited in this unrivalled composition. The wildness of tumultu-

ous inquietude, the loveliness of hope and aspiration, the grandeur of indomitable resolve and resistance, and the sublimity of illimitable joy, all combined in one beautiful whole, contribute to render this symphony as honorable to Christian art, as it is true to Christian experience. Had we ground to regard the author of this symphony, as a believer in universal restoration, we should have interpreted it, as the grandest representation, ever yet made, of the follies, wanderings and strugglings of the human family on earth, and of their final ingathering and eternal beatitude in the kingdom of heaven.

The great work of Raphael, which adorns the walls of the Vatican, is distinguished for much the same qualities in painting, as the symphony we have described exhibits in the department of music. And, to close our review, at length, with an example, which is yet fresh before our eyes, the last and greatest historical painting of America, though left, unfortunately, without the finishing touch of the master, will still, we are confident, go down to posterity, as a monument and model of the crowning excellences of Christian painting.

The last great element of Christianity, which we have mentioned among those calculated to exert an æsthetical influence, has not hitherto received the faith of the Christian church, and consequently has not as yet produced its legitimate effects in the sphere of art. An idea of a kindred character indeed is expressed, as we have already stated, in the fifth symphony of Beethoven, and, we may add, also in the Messiah of Handel. The closing part of this latter composition sets forth, with striking effect, the resurrection of all in Christ, the change of all, and their anthems of rejoicings and thanksgiving before God. If the believers in universal salvation wish to have their faith realized to their senses as well as hearts and feelings, let them lose no opportunity of listening to this sublime oratorio of Handel's, as well as to the symphonies generally of Beethoven.

It is in the future, however, that the doctrine of the universal ingathering of mankind is to exercise its destined influence on art. It shall be in coming times the theme of grander music than was ever yet struck. A pencil surpassing Raphael's shall portray on the living canvass that

finishing scene of unequalled sublimity; and a verse, loftier than Milton's or Dante's, shall sing to other ages its transcendent and ineffable glories.

After the somewhat rapid review, which has now been taken, of the æsthetic arts, we are able to comprehend, at a glance, the effect, which Christianity has had upon their general character and course of developments. All the art, which preceded the introduction of Christianity, was essentially one-sided and partial. Oriental art was absorbed in its one vast, yet barren idea of the infinite; the art of Greece was devoted, no less exclusively, to symmetry and elegance of form; and the genius of Egypt thought only of symbolizing the indestructible energies of nature. Christianity, on the other hand, came with nothing partial or exclusive. It bore in its bosom all the great elements of art, and all in their true proportion. It not only introduced elements, new and peculiar to itself, but also brought with it the germ and principle of every thing that went before it. The Christian artist, therefore, acting in the true spirit of his religion, was ready to accept every improvement, and take advantage of all the progress, which art had already made; he appropriated, at once, whatever was valuable in the past, yet, at the same time, applied it all under new modifications, and in a higher spirit. In consequence of this higher spirit, the infinite and sublime, which are bodied forth in Christian art, tend as much to call forth admiration and love, as they do to arouse the deeper feelings of reverence and awe; and, from the same cause, beauty of form, in the hands of the Christian artist, has become the expression of inward life. And, finally, for this last accomplishment of art—the expression of deep and intense life—all the praise and credit are due to Christianity alone.

In concluding this protracted article, we wish to urge, in a single word, the reasonableness of a spirit of tolerance and of just appreciation towards all the great national styles of art, that have now passed under review. They all have their truth and value and appropriateness. Art, let it not be forgotten, is like humanity itself, progressive, and its ultimate destiny is to express every phasis, and address every condition, of human nature.

The art of India, or of Egypt, expresses just those æsthetic ideas, which naturally strike the mind in a state of civilization such as theirs, and it expresses feelings, too, which every mind in every state of civilization, must at times experience. There are times in every man's experience, when it seems that the arm of inexorable fate is held over us, when it seems that the wheels of necessity are rolling on, stern and resistless, crushing alike the strong and the weak; and, at such times, the art of Egypt will speak to our feelings a true and congenial language. Grecian art, in just the same manner, expounds to us that form of human nature, which was developed under the peculiar influences of ancient Greece; and whenever we wish to represent such ideas, or feelings, or character, as there prevailed, we have prepared for us and ready to our hands, models of unsurpassable perfection. And, finally, in Christian art we recognise the latest triumphs of human genius, and the true models for the expression of Christian ideas and sentiments.

On the broadest view, then, in fine, of the mission and destiny of art, the very poorest productions of artistic genius must be reckoned not without value, provided only they are true to the spirit and character in which they originate; and he, who wishes to understand humanity in all its extent and variety, will not be forward to disparage any thing, which manifests any prominent aspect or trait of our common nature. S.

Art. XI.

Αἰώνιος, as used by Philo Judæus.

Philo, a learned and very eminent Jew of Alexandria in Egypt, wrote his works, chiefly on religion and speculative philosophy, between A. D. 20 or 30, and the middle of the first century. Accordingly, he was cotemporary with Christ and the apostles; and though his writings appeared a few years, probably, before those of the New Testament, they may nevertheless be considered as belonging to the same age. It is not our purpose, here, to speak of their general character, nor to set forth the philosophical princi-

ples that pervade them, or the perpetual and absurd allegories with which he interprets Moses and the prophets, in order to make them teach his Platonism. We wish only to have it observed, that, as they are the productions of a Jew, who was cotemporary, and who wrote in Greek, they naturally offer important advantages in illustrating the language in which the New Testament was composed; though it must be confessed that, had the author been a Jew of *Palestine*, like Josephus, the advantages for this purpose would have been still greater.

In a former periodical work, we gave a pretty full, if not complete, collection of the passages in which Josephus uses the word *αἰώνιος*. We now select a few examples of the use of that adjective by Philo, thinking that they may serve as a slight contribution towards illustrating, from original sources, the sense in which it was employed and understood. We have not read all of Philo's works; but from a perusal, of considerable extent, which we gave them, several years since, we gathered the following as the general conclusion; namely, that his favorite epithet for *eternal*, or *endless*, is *ἀΐδιος;* and that he commonly employs *αἰώνιος* either in an indefinite sense as to duration, or else in the sense of *continual*, *unintermitting*, though he may sometimes use it, in a loose manner, to denote *eternal*. The examples, however, which we subjoin, may be taken as a fair specimen of his prevailing usage of it.

Concerning those who make promises, he says: "It is "better not to promise at all, than not to give prompt assist-"ance. For no blame follows, in the former case; but in "the latter, there is dissatisfaction from the weaker class, and "a deep hatred and *lasting* punishment (*κόλασις αἰώνιος*,) "from such as are more powerful."—(*Fragmenta*, *Tom.* ii. p. 667. *Edit. Mangey*, 1742.)

Enjoining the practice of humanity towards brutes, he says: "Grant the dam the gratification of suckling her "young, if not always, (*εἰ καὶ μὴ τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον*,) "at least for the first seven days; and do not render use-"less those fountains of milk which nature has made to "flow in the breasts; nor thus take away nature's second "favor [namely the supply of milk,—birth being the *first*,] "which she with much forethought has prepared, per-

"ceiving from afar, with a *long-reaching* and perfect "sagacity, (αἰωνίᾳ καὶ τελείᾳ φρονήσει,) what things are "suitable."—(*De Humanitate. Tom.* ii. pp. 396, 397.)

Of real slavery and true freedom, both of which he places in the mind, he says: "He who, with an abject and servile "disposition, applies himself, against his own reason, to "abject and servile things, is a slave indeed. But he who "adapts his concerns to the present state of things; who "voluntarily and patiently endures the allotments of for-"tune; who regards nothing pertaining to men as extraor-"dinary; but sees, after careful examination, that the "divine allotments are distinguished by a *constant* order "and enjoyment, (αἰωνίῳ τάξει καὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ,) while every "thing mortal is borne about with the tossings and fluctua-"tions of human affairs, and vibrates to unequal impulses; "he who nobly endures whatsoever comes to pass—is a "true philosopher and free."—(*Quisquis virtuti studet. Tom.* ii. p. 449.)

Commenting, in his allegorical way, on the passage in Gen. xxi. 33, "And Abraham planted a grove in Beer-sheba, and called there on the name of the Lord, the ever-lasting God,"—he says: "What, therefore, the fruit of it "was, he himself shall inform us. For, he called on him "by the names *Lord, the everlasting* (αἰώνιος) *God.* Now, "the names here selected denote the perfections that belong "to the [*Divine*] Essence: the name *Lord* implying the "relation in which he rules; the name *God*, that in which "he blesses. On which account it is, that according to the "sacred words of Moses, he assumed the name God "during all the work of creating the world. For it was "proper that the Creator should be recognised, throughout "this work, by that attribute by which he was founding "and arranging the creation. As he is a Sovereign Ruler, "therefore, he can both do good and do harm, adopting "either course as it may be necessary for recompensing "the conduct of his creature. But as he is a Benefactor, "he chooses only one of these courses, namely, to bless. "It would, however, be the highest good of the soul "(ψυχή.) never to stand in distrust of the power of the "King in relation to either course; but confidently to free "itself from the fear that oppresses it on account of the "power of the Sovereign, and to cherish the most con-"firmed hope of obtaining and enjoying good, because he

"is spontaneously bountiful. Moreover, the name *Ever-*
"*lasting* (*αἰώνιος*) *God*, is tantamount to this, namely, He
"who is merciful, not now and then, but always and con-
"tinually; who is uninterruptedly doing good; who is
"incessantly adding favor upon favor; whose mercies
"revolve as in a constant circle, being united and con-
"joined with each other by his perfections; who neglects
"no occasion of doing good;—though he is Lord, so
"that he has the power also to injure. *Τὸ δὴ θεὸς αἰώνιος, ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ· ὁ χαριζόμενος οὔ ποτε μέν, ποτὲ δε οὔ, ἀεὶ δὲ καὶ συνεχῶς· ὁ ἀδιαστάτως εὐεργετῶν, ὁ τὴν τῶν δωρεῶν ἐπάλληλον φορὰν ἀπαύστως συνείρων, ὁ τὰς χάριτας ἐχομένας ἀλλήλων ἀνακυκλῶν, καὶ δυνάμεσιν ἐνωτικαῖς καθαρμοζόμενος· ὁ μηδένα καιρὸν τοῦ ποιεῖν εὖ παραλείπων, ὁ κύριος ὢν, ὡς καὶ βλάπτειν δυνάσθαι.*"—(*De Plantatione Noe. Tom.* i. p. 342.)

In this last example, it is plain that Philo means to define, 1, the name *God* as signifying the Supreme Benefactor, He who blesses; and, 2, the word *everlasting* as meaning continual, without intermission, constant. And this, let it be observed, is strictly the etymological definition of the epithet:—*always being.* E. B.[24]

Art. XII.

The Idea of a Social Reform.

"The ideas upon which Human Society is based, are but partially and imperfectly imbued with the divine and eternal essence from which they emanate; for a time they are beneficent and vivifying, and new creations spring up under their breath. But on earth nothing attains to a pure and perfect existence, and therefore nothing is immortal. When the times are accomplished, *higher aspirations and more enlightened schemes spring out of the tottering remains of former institutions*, which they utterly overthrow and efface; for so has God ordered the world."—Ranke, *Hist. Reformation in Germany*, B. I.

—"But it was a *Social* evil; and its source was not to be dried up by less than an entire renovation of the Social System."—Michelet, *Hist. France*, chap. 3.

To the Editor of the Universalist Quarterly and General Review:

Dear Sir,—The extended and caustic notice given in your last number (Art. V.) to "Fourierism and *similar*

Schemes" seems calculated to provoke the advocates of those 'schemes' to claim, though it may not impel or even incline you to grant, that they be allowed a brief hearing before the readers of the Review. Aware, however, that your work is not intended as an arena of controversy, and that its inculcations are set forth as of authority, I shall endeavor in the following pages to touch as seldom and as sparingly as possible on any thing advanced in that article. What I mainly desire is that intelligent, inquiring, and benevolent minds may not imbibe their ideas and impressions of the Association movement and its aims wholly from the conceptions and representations of the adversaries of that movement, however learned and candid they may be. I think no new 'scheme,' contemplating vast and radical changes, is likely to be fairly appreciated when exhibited under such auspices. With your permission, then, I will proceed to state, as briefly as I can, some of the leading positions of those termed 'Fourierists'—a designation condemned in advance by Fourier and disclaimed by ourselves. For the sake of convenience, however, and of distinctness in speaking of different schools of Social Reformers, we tolerate its use by others.

Let me explain in the outset the relation wherein we stand to Fourier; for if we are to be known to the world as 'Fourierists,' it is important that the term should be so defined as not to mislead. The idea of a radical reform in the structure of Society has already attracted very extensive regard, and is daily gaining on the public attention. To those who consider earnestly, untiringly, and contemplate with a profound sympathy, the Destitution which is and has long been the inevitable destiny of the mass of mankind —their want of Knowledge, of Opportunity, and of Food as well as of Virtue—it can hardly be matter of surprise that a large and rapidly increasing class has been driven to conclude that the relations of man with man which constitute Society, the laws, written and unwritten, which govern the applications of Labor, and the production, distribution and consumption or augmentation of Wealth, must undergo some vital change before happiness, or even a reasonable share of knowledge and comfort, can be secured to the greater portion of the Human Race. Now whoever has been led to this conclusion, and is ready to act

upon it as the good of his brethren requires, is a Social Reformer, and will often be termed a Socialist: but widely different are the suggestions of Reform to which this conviction has given rise. One class of Social Reformers advocate the *division* or apportionment of lands — some on the death of the owner; some a general division at once; others of the yet unappropriated public lands, so as to give every one who needs it (for his use, not in fee) a tract for a farm; while some have even advocated a general and equal division of Property. All these are distinctively *Agrarians.* — Another class protest against the monopolization by individuals of God's earth and the fruits of past industry, and claim that every thing — at least every thing derived from Divine bounty — shall be and remain free and common to all men, and that each shall labor and produce for the good of all. These are *Communists*, though often termed distinctively Socialists. — The third class, rejecting what is peculiar to each of the above, maintain that each child has a *right* to claim at the hands of the Race a thorough Physical, Moral and Intellectual Development, or Education, and that to every individual a complete Opportunity to exert his faculties and energies, developed and perfected as above, is rightfully due. To this end they propose that a more intimate and systematic Association of Labor with Capital, and both with Art, Science or Skill, shall be effected, so that all Wealth, as nearly as may be, shall be employed in giving occupation and efficiency to Industry, and all Industry, to an extent not now popularly conceivable, shall be devoted to the production and increase of Wealth. They hold that the entire Wealth of the world may thus be made to minister directly and signally to the advantage and comfort of the comparatively Poor, without despoiling its present possessors, but while securing to them a fair and equitable proportion of the proceeds of its union with Labor. Thus preserving all the existing Rights of Property, but securing to those who are now destitute the fullest opportunities to earn and enjoy, they confidently hope to render useful labor Attractive, by the influence of that more healthful Public Sentiment which cannot fail to result from a Social Order in which Industry, undegraded by slavish constraint, justly rewarded and wisely directed, shall not only be but appear the imme-

diate source of Man's material comforts and blessings. Such is *Association*, or, if you please, Fourierism.

Hence it will readily be seen that the Associationists, whether as a class or as individuals, feel under no possible obligation either to adopt or defend any suggestions of Fourier which do not *to them* appear inseparably identified with the principles above stated. They cherish a profound respect and gratitude for his memory as a discoverer and pioneer in the great work of Social Reform — not, indeed, as the first adventurer on the unknown ocean which he plowed so fearlessly and so far; for, not to speak of others, Plato and Sir Thomas More had preceded him — but as the originator of the plan of a complete Organization of Industry so as to harmonize and promote all interests, and of a Social Order which shall happily blend the general with individual well-being, and combine every laudable incentive to personal exertion with the strongest tendencies to universal Harmony and Peace. Thus regarding him, they do not usually object to the designation Fourierists, though *he* condemned it in advance, and they give themselves the more accurate name in this country of Associationists — in France, of *Phalansterians*, (from Phalanx,) of the same purport.

The mass of them do not feel called upon either to believe or disbelieve that such a *Harmony of the Passions* as is contemplated by Fourier can be attained through Association. That a community wherein every individual shall be trained from infancy to industry as the high road to wealth not merely but to honor and consideration, — in which the wisest and best shall be habitually teachers of the young in every department of Knowledge — in which the common atmosphere shall be one of kindness and mutual aid, and wherein every one shall be secured the fullest opportunity to learn, to do, to earn and to receive, and in which individual want and suffering from privation shall be unknown — that in such a community there will be infinitely less temptation to depravity and wrong than for the mass of men there now is, and that the characters of those born and bred therein will be formed under far more favorable circumstances than are now vouchsafed to the great majority, would seem hardly to admit of dispute. But that every one nurtured in an Association will necessarily grow

up thrifty and prudent, wise and virtuous, is what I do not believe, and what (though this is not material) Fourier never taught. Everywhere he holds that there will be exceptions in practice to the rules which he lays down as tending to the best general results. It is made one of the chief grounds of attack upon his followers here that Fourier, while holding that Purity will be the general result of a reliance on the laws of Attraction in opposition to those of Constraint, admits that there will be instances of unchastity or dissoluteness, and proposes, instead of casting the offenders out to sink into deeper pollution and spread the poison of their licentiousness everywhere, to set them apart as a caste or corporation, subjected to such rules as are necessary to preserve others from corruption by their presence. In all this he may have been flagrantly in error — he himself regarded the suggestion with distrust, and insisted that there must be no relaxation of the laws of sexual relation already existing, until, some three generations after the Social change shall have been effected, the Clergy and the Women shall sanction and enact the law proposed. I cite thus but to establish the fact that Fourier never expected universal perfection to result from his system, fully established and obeyed.

How fast and how far Labor may be rendered Attractive, is a question which, apart from all theories or systems, appears to me one of the first importance. We all see that Free Labor is more effective and more elevating than that of Slaves; we may easily be convinced that the man who works for himself, and knows that he will receive the full reward of his toil, will accomplish more than the hireling who works unwatched by an overseer. But we know, moreover, that, in spite of the popular perversion of the necessity of Labor imposed on Adam, there may be, there *are*, men to whom Labor is not a curse but a blessing. Each of us knows some Pastor, some Physician, — yes, some Farmer, some Artisan — who works arduously and cheerfully, not because he must have the fruits of his toil, but because he chooses to perform his proper work, takes pleasure in it, does not wish to be relieved from it. He may or may not clearly recognize that Labor is the appointed sphere of Man on earth, the element wherein he is trained to the perfection and elevation of his whole being.

Many a man apprehends practically truths which he could not, if required, clearly enunciate. Those who *do* thus labor from love of Man or a sense of duty rather than from necessity or a passion for accumulation, have thoroughly redeemed themselves from the curse of drudgery. And should their example profit us nothing? Can we not learn from it how to save others also from the scourge of reluctant and degrading toil? If a few men have found Delight in Duty, may not others be enabled to do likewise? Bear in mind that I am not contemplating the case of those who are upborne by the spirit of self-denial, of self-sacrifice, in the patient, persistent discharge of duties essentially repugnant. I am regarding the not uncommon case of men in all ranks and conditions of comfortable life who do the work they should do, not because they must, or even because God will pay them for it, but because they find pleasure immediately in so doing. May not the number of these be increased? and is it not desirable that it should be? I think I know men and women whose lives are such as God approves and Man must admire, not because their rebellious passions are held in rigorous subjection by Reason, but because they have no Passions which impel them to violate and trample on the laws of God and of their own being. Is not this class one that we would gladly see more numerous?

Let me here turn aside to dispel a grave error which is commonly cherished by the adversaries of Fourier, who have imbibed their ideas of him from the necessarily imperfect summaries of his doctrine which have appeared in our language and country. When he speaks of the *Passions* as radically good, and capable of a harmonious development, he uses the term Passions to denote the Senses, Faculties, impelling powers of Man. He no more intends to maintain that such subversive, perverted impulses as Envy, Jealousy, Hatred, Lechery, are good than you, if you should remark that cider is a palatable beverage, would intend to affirm that vinegar is so. This explanation has been made a hundred times already, and after it has been made a hundred times more we shall have opponents gravely asserting that Fourier teaches the inherent rightfulness of all the depraved impulses to which we give the name of Passions.

Whoever imagines that Fourier has no place in his system for Self-Denial, Self-Sacrifice, does both him and his system great injustice. He anticipates, arranges for, and greatly relies on this spirit. But he does not feel any need of multiplying *occasions* for its exercise, and does not believe that, in a wisely-organized and well-ordered community, the whole lives of large classes need be made subservient to the convenience of others. Equally erroneous is the conclusion that he would have all Passions, (i. e. appetites) sated at every stage of our being. He holds to the gratification of individual desires only as they shall have been trained to find Pleasure in Obedience — Liberty in conformity to Law. He would have nature reverently followed, only because he believes that her unwarped, unperverted aspiration is upward and homeward to the bosom of God whence she sprang.

Enough of Fourier. I proceed to consider briefly these two related questions — *Do we need a Social Reform?* and — *Is a vital and beneficent Reform practicable?*

I. I live in the most populous, most wealthy, most energetic of American cities. It acquires by Commerce, and Commerce is now active and prosperous. Every year adds largely to its resources, its trade, and its wealth. Yet in this city there cannot be less than Fifty Thousand human beings who have not the means of providing a month's subsistence. Thousands of them work as Seamstresses, Hand-Loom Weavers, Book-Folders, &c. &c. for wages which will barely secure them the necessaries of life. Of course, when work fails, as it sometimes does to whole classes, very often to individuals, they and their families must suffer. Here are thousands of young women employed in sewing, folding, &c., whose weekly earnings, though they work faithfully, are less than two dollars each — many ranging from a dollar to a dollar and a half — while the poorest board and lodging costs two dollars per week. Of course, they generally live each with some relative and pay what they can for board, often lodging in some dark closet or recess, utterly destitute of air fit for breathing and every requisite for comfortable repose. Many women, so long as eye-sight lasts, bend over the needle, in a cramped, unhealthy position for sixteen hours per day. And yet the average earnings of the plain sewers, book-folders, &c.,

will scarcely exceed by thirty dollars a year the amount which they are required to pay for board and such lodging as they have. Out of this pittance, they have to buy clothing and all other necessaries but food. Such is the condition of a large class of Female Workers in times of *prosperity*. And when adversity comes — that is, when sickness strikes or work fails — what are they to do? Where is their resource? You can judge whether they are likely to have much treasure laid away to meet the emergency. Take, then, the common case of a depression of business, throwing one-fourth of those employed as seamstresses, folders, &c., out of employment. What are they to do? The least skilful will naturally be dismissed first — the very ones who have earned least and saved least — that is, have saved nothing. How are they to subsist through an interruption of their work, of indefinite duration? Those with whom they live are usually just above want themselves, and cannot, if they would, feed them without pay. Thus are thousands around me constantly doomed to live yet unprovided with the means of honest livelihood. In their best estate they can but live; in altered circumstances what *shall* they do? I will tell you what many of them are *driven* to do. When all is destitution and blank despair on the side of virtue, some villain steps forward with words of sympathy and of indignation at the sight of such unmerited suffering, presses offers of aid and comfort with a pertinacity which will not be denied, tenders his purse and his heart, and, in a tumult of gratitude and joy for the unexpected relief, seals the ruin of the hapless victim. Some, more coldly calculating, say, "I have followed Virtue to the brink of starvation; Vice can make me no more wretched, and its degradation will be relieved by Luxury and Ease." The end is the same — Ruin; and *ruin which would have been averted if Society had devised some means of guaranteeing to every individual the simple opportunity to earn needful bread.*

Is this asking too much? Consider the abyss of Destitution, the labyrinths of Crime, which spring from *inability to find employment* and inadequate recompense for labor. A family breaking up, and sending infant children to live with some kind relative, because the husband and father can find nothing to do — a family living in a cellar beside

a stable, in a narrow, filthy alley — a family turned into the street by officers on a distress warrant, and preparing to pass the night on their bedding under an open sky — these are incidents which I have seen here and of which any other city would doubtless afford parallels. The fact is most palpable that a large portion of the human race exist among us, as they have long done here and elsewhere, in a state of suffering from destitution, and that this destitution is rather increasing than diminishing. I have been some thirteen years a resident of this city, during which its population, wealth and business have nearly doubled. During that time hundreds of valuable inventions have been perfected, knowledge has been widely diffused, and the efficiency of human labor increased. But Society rests on the same substratum of abject poverty and misery as at first; the needs of the poor are as great and their earnings as scanty; dense ignorance and terrible depravity are as rife as ever within the shadow of our two hundred churches; and all goes on as though Man had utterly abjured faith in the prophecies that wretchedness and wrong are ultimately to be banished from earth by the prevalence of Religion and Love.

— And here let me clear up a point on which we Reformers have ever been grossly misapprehended and misrepresented. Such emphasis is laid by us on the prevalence of destitution and want — so prominent in our inculcations is the necessity of doing something for the relief of the suffering — that many rush to the conclusion that we have no higher aim than the cure of Physical ills — the dispensation of bread and clothes and shelter. But this is a grave mistake. We do indeed deplore and primarily struggle against the prevalence of hunger and nakedness, but this not merely because they are evils in themselves, but *because their existence is incompatible with intellectual expansion and moral growth.* How can you expect goodness and moral beauty of the child born and nurtured in a cheerless hovel, struggling from infancy to repress the gnawings of famine, early sent out among strangers to earn or glean something wherewith to eke out a subsistence? How shall the father, the mother, whose daily thought and nightly dream are of the rent which cannot and yet must be paid, the wages too scanty yet likely

to be withheld, find time and means to rightly discipline the minds and mould the hearts of their children? How shall we expect Religion, Benevolence, with all holy and lofty affections, to take root and flourish in homes from which comfort and even the hope of attaining it are utterly excluded? No, it is not that we regard bread as the end of existence, but because we feel that the famishing must be fed before they can effectively be taught, that we demand some social basis which shall secure a modicum of physical comfort to every child of Adam.

II. Brief indeed is the space I have left for constructive hints on the practicability of a true and genial Reform of Society, but for the sympathizing a little will suffice, and to others much would be urged to no purpose. Whoever has contemplated, studied with interest, a community of *Shakers*, so called, must have been struck with the evidence that, in spite of their unnatural but not at all dangerous asceticism, they have solved some of the deepest problems which have engaged the human mind. *They have abolished Slavery*, or that condition in which one department of labor, and that the most arduous, is less honored and more meagrely rewarded than other labors. In what other community do you find human servitude but a reminiscence? Compare the relation in which these men stand to each other with that which prevails in your Boston Society, or in our New York, where I meet Christian families going to church on Sunday in their chariots, with coachmen and outriders in livery to wait while they worship, leaving half a dozen more human conveniences at home to cook their dinner. Can I help asking, Is this Christianity? But my hasty judgment does wrong. These are well-meaning and often pious people, and give liberally for the spread of the Gospel and the relief of the Poor. It is not they but the *Social system* which raises some men on the degradation of others which should attract our earnest efforts for its renovation.

I have instanced the Shakers, because their persistence and their eccentricities have rendered them far more generally known than any other class of Socialists. They, too, have fairly conquered prejudice to this extent, that no man now pretends that their enterprise is not, in an economical sense, perfectly successful. They have no paupers, though

they have raised many from pauperism, and they were not far above it any of them, at the outset. They are a people who have, by a Social innovation, vanquished Pauperism and Servitude, twin curses of Humanity and the reproach of Christendom. To the Shakers, if they observed it, the Eucharist would be no form but a living reality; to them the Church is a substance not a shadow. The primitive disciples who 'had all things in common,' and 'gave to every one as he had need,' would find here some resemblance to their own divinely instituted church at Jerusalem.

But the Shakers are not alone in this triumph. I believe those true and noble followers of Christ, the Moravians, were their predecessors in Socialism. Others are rapidly following. The community led by Mr. Rapp, located at Economy, near Pittsburgh, Pa., is now forty years old. It began in poverty and has passed through many severe ordeals. It never condemned Marriage and has no Religious test of fellowship. It still endures, and is now wealthy and flourishing. The community of Germans at Zoar, Ohio, is now some twenty-five years old. Commencing in abject poverty, and for a season preserved from starvation or dispersion by charity, and obliged to decree a temporary separation of the sexes (which was maintained for ten years) because of their extreme destitution, this little band has persevered until it is now wealthy and in the enjoyment of every physical comfort. A division of its effects would give every family an independence. But they do not wish to divide nor talk of it. They know they are happier as they are. Here, too, Pauperism and Slavery have no abiding-place.

Need I speak of the recent beginnings at Brook Farm, Northampton, Hopedale, and elsewhere? These are too young to be yet spoken of with confidence. They doubtless embody many imperfections, as all preceding attempts had done. Any or all of them may fail, unlike those of which I have spoken. What then? The *effort* to extricate the mass of mankind from the mountain of Social evils under which they groan is deserving of the admiration of all generous hearts. Every such effort, impelled by the right spirit, must be of great and lasting benefit to mankind. It may not secure a personal, palpable success, but the record

of its failure will teach men how to avoid its errors, and it will be worth more to the Race than the success of any conqueror from Nimrod to Wellington.

No, the general effort for a Social Reform *cannot* fail. This or that plan may, on trial be found defective — Fourierism, Communism, or any 'similar scheme,' may require amendment to adapt it to the promotion of the well-being of Man. The great end to be obtained is the abolition of Servitude except for Crime and of Pauperism save for those (and they are very few) whom the Providence of God has deprived of the means of earning a livelihood. This, Society as it has come down to us has not done and cannot do; this, Socialism, rude and imperfect as are the 'schemes' by which it has been thus far directed, *has* done, *is* doing. Though we believe not the message, we must believe the works. They *will* make themselves respected. Not as a new religion, not as the amendment of an old one, but as *the application of Christianity to the Social relations of mankind*, does the cause of Association challenge the consideration and support of all followers of Christ. Despite the errors of its advocates and the prejudices of its opposers, it will yet vindicate its claims to universal approval and adoption.

Respectfully yours,

HORACE GREELEY.

New York, Feb. 1, 1845.

ART. XIII.

The Minstrel's Curse.

From the German of Uhland.

THERE stood in olden ages a tower so high and grand,
It shone far o'er the valleys to the blue sea's rocky strand;
Around it sprang fresh fountains, by glittering rainbows crowned,
And gardens, rich in blossoms, like garlands spanned them round.

There sat a haughty Monarch, in land and conquests rich;
Pale sat he on his throne, like a statue in a niche;
All that he thought was terror, all that he looked was rage,
His words were fearful scourges, and blood filled every page!

Once went to this grand castle a noble minstrel pair;
One shone with golden ringlets, and one with silvery hair;
The old grey-headed Harper a gallant steed bestrode,
And on the flank, well-mounted, his blooming comrade rode.

The elder to the younger said, "Be ready now, my son!
Our deepest airs remember, — 'cord to the fullest tone!
In songs of love and sorrow we 'll blend our mightiest art,
For it must be our aim to-day to move the King's stern heart!"

Already stand the minstrels in the pillared hall of pride,
Where on the throne are seated the Monarch and his Bride;
The King fearfully splendid, like the bloody Northern lights,
The Queen as sweet and gentle as the moon on summer nights.

Then struck the aged Minstrel his harp with hand so skilled,
That rich and ever richer on the ear its music swelled;
And now, in heavenly sweetness, the Young Man's strains begin,
While like a dull ghost-chorus, the Old Man's song flows in.

They sing of Spring and Friendship, of the blissful golden time,
Of Freedom and man's Dignity, of Truth and Faith sublime;
They sing of all the sweetness that trembles through man's breast,
Of all the scorn that maddens him, and breaks his spirit's rest.

The band of circling courtiers forgot each sneering word,
The King's old valiant warriors bowed low their hearts to God;
The Queen, dissolved in sorrow, and by thrilling joy opprest,
Threw, smiling, toward the minstrels the rose from her white breast.

"You have bewitched my people, will you now seduce my Bride?"
Raved the King, his whole frame shaking in his fury and his pride;
He hurled his sword, that gleaming, through the Young Man's bosom swept,
Whence, in place of golden music, the crimson blood outleapt.

While from this frightful tumult the listening crowd retired,
The golden-haired young Minstrel in his Master's arms expired.
Then he wrapt him in his mantle, and sat him on the steed,
And from the stately castle set forth in silent speed.

Yet at the high gate halting, his harp the Old Man grasped;
It was the prize of all harps that ever Minstrel clasped;
Against a marble column he dashed it in his wrath,
And sent his curses fearfully through hall and garden-path.

"Wo be to thee proud castle! No sweet sounds e'er again
Shall ring along thine arches, of harp or minstrel strain;
But groans, and creeping slave-steps that dread the tyrant's frown,
Until to mould and ruins the Avenger tread thee down!

"Wo be to you, ye gardens, in the sweet, soft light of May!
Here, look on this grim visage, this pale, disfigured clay!
That henceforth ye may wither, your gushing founts run dry,
And stones and broken columns o'er all your beauty lie!

"Wo be to thee, thou Murderer! cursed of the minstrel Powers!
In vain are all thy conquests and bloody wreaths of flowers;
Thy name shall be forgotten — in night eternal veiled,
Or like a rattling death-gasp, in empty air exhaled!"

The Old Man hath pronounced it, — to Heaven the curse hath flown;
The walls lie low and crumbling, the halls are overthrown;
To tell its vanished splendor but one column now remains,
And that, already shattered, will soon o'erstrew the plains!

In place of fragrant gardens lie waste and dreary lands; —
No tree throws there its shadow, no fount o'erflows the sands;
No songs, no books of heroes the Monarch's deeds rehearse;
Down-trodden and forgotten, — that is the Minstrel's Curse!

S. C. E.

Art. XIV.

The Fifteenth Chapter of 1 *Corinthians, with Notes.*

General Observations. It appears, from ch. iii. ver. 6–10, of this Epistle, and from Acts xviii. 1–18; that St. Paul was the first who preached the gospel at Corinth. He went thither about A. D. 52, and remained there a year and a half, and indeed "a good while" longer, (Acts xviii. 11, 18,) laboring with his accustomed activity. In this way he gathered a church from among both the Jewish and Gentile inhabitants. After his departure, other teachers visited Corinth, some of whom became the occasion of schisms and contentions in that church, (ch. i. 11, 12; iii. 3–10, 22.) A sad state of things followed. Many scandalous disorders crept in, partly no doubt from the prevalent corruption of manners, as the city was famous throughout the world for its utter dissoluteness. St. Paul wrote the Christians, there, a monitory epistle, (ch. v. 9,) which has not been preserved. Their divisions and irregularities, however, still continued. Some of their teachers, it would seem, (ch. iv. 18, 19; ix. 1–3; xiv. 37,) openly discarded the authority of the apostle. Certain errors of doctrine, as well as of practice, had been introduced; among which was the denial, by one party at least, of the resurrection of mankind

from the dead. At length, some of the church wrote a letter to St. Paul, asking advice on certain points, (ch. vii. 1,) and sent it, probably, by Stephanus, Fortunatus, and Achaicus, (ch. xvi. 17,) to Ephesus, where the apostle was then tarrying. On receiving this, and learning more fully from the bearers the condition and practices of the Corinthian church, he wrote the present epistle. Its date is generally fixed at about A. D. 56 or 57; four or five years after he first entered Corinth, and two or three years after he left the city.

Remark. Concerning the party, in the church at Corinth, who denied the resurrection of the dead, we have no other notice, than what is contained in the chapter before us. It is therefore impossible to ascertain how they fell into this error, or whence they received it. We may conjecture that they were, originally, Jews of the Sadducean sect, who held no future existence whatsoever, and that they only retained their former disbelief on this point; or they may have been Gentile converts from the Epicurean multitude, which certainly abounded among the Greeks of Corinth; or, again, they may have received, on their conversion, the Christian doctrine of immortality, but have been afterwards misled by "evil communications which corrupt good manners." All, however, is uncertain. Nor can we determine whether they distinguished between the general idea of a future existence of some kind, and the particular one of a resurrection, so as to hold the former, while they rejected the latter; or whether they rejected both together. See, however, the *Quære* in the note on ver. 18. It should be distinctly observed, moreover, that the tenor of the apostle's argument, throughout the former part of the chapter, implies that they still acknowledged the resurrection of Christ, though they denied that of mankind. With these preliminary considerations in mind, we proceed to the text.

Chapter XV. 1. Moreover, [*literally*, but,] brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which also

Ver. 1. Observe how abruptly the apostle passes from the topic of the preceding chapter, to another subject wholly dissimilar, and totally disconnected from it. Nothing marks

ye have received, and wherein ye stand; 2. by which also ye are saved, (if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you,) unless ye have believed in vain. 3. For I delivered unto you, first of all, [*lit.* among the first things,] that which I also received, *how* that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures, 4. and that he was buried, and that he rose again, the third day, ac-

the transition, except the Greek particle *dè*, (*moreover*, or rather, *but.*) This is characteristic of St. Paul's manner. See, for instance, 1 Thess. v. 1, where there is, perhaps, an equally abrupt transition, marked only by the same particle, in the original.—*the gospel which I preached unto you,*] when I was with you, gathering your church.

2. —*ye are saved;*] i. e. brought into the true spiritual relation to God and his law; into a state of moral soundness, such as is analagous to that of bodily health. This is the idea of Christian salvation; (see Expositor, &c., Vol. IV., New Series, art. iii,) and this is effected within us by the gospel, when properly received. —— *unless ye have believed in vain,*] inconsiderately, idly. From their conduct and condition, he had reason to suspect that some of them, at least, received the gospel in so vague and indifferent a manner that it could have little influence upon them, especially those who denied our resurrection.

3. He proceeds to lay down the grounds of that doctrine. —— *among the first things,*] or leading facts of the gospel, were Christ's death and resurrection, as here stated, together with the *proofs* of his resurrection; and these were some of the principal things St. Paul had delivered to the Corinthians, when he preached in their city. —— *died for our sins, according to the Scriptures,*] namely, of the Old Testament; for instance, Isa. liii. 7–10, &c. The larger part of the New Testament had not been written, at this time; and none of it was, as yet, called by the technical title, "the Scriptures."

4. —*rose again, ... according to the Scriptures;*] say Ps. xvi. 10, which St. Paul otherwhere refers to this subject; see Acts xiii. 35–37. Here, the clause "according to the Scriptures," probably relates only to the fact of Christ's resurrection, and not to the particular time, "the third day," which we think is not specified in any Old Testament prophecy of that event.

cording to the Scriptures; 5. and that he was seen of Cephas; then, of the twelve. 6. After that, he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once; of whom the greater part remain unto this present, but some are fallen asleep. 7. After that, he was seen of James; then, of all the apostles. 8. And, last of all, he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time, [*lit.* as of an abortion.] (9. For I am the least of the apostles, that am not

5. — *seen of Cephas,*] called, also, Simon Peter. This appearance of Christ is probably the one referred to, in Luke xxiv. 34. St. Paul proceeds to give only a few of the instances in which Christ was seen after his resurrection, just enough to render his premises unassailable. The stress of his argument is not on this point; for it does not appear that the Corinthians denied the resurrection of Christ. —— *then of the twelve,*] or, the apostles, who were collectively called *the twelve*, whether all were present or not. On the occasion here referred to, Judas was dead; and even Thomas perhaps was absent, (see John xx. 19–24,) for St. Paul afterwards (ver. 7) mentions another time when "*all* the apostles" saw the risen Saviour.

6. — *seen of above five hundred brethren at once;*] probably in Galilee, where Christ had directed his disciples to meet him, and where he actually did appear to them, (see Matt. xxvi. 32; xxvii. 7, 10, 16; John xxi. 1.) It is uncertain whether all of these five hundred were known as disciples before Christ's death; some of them may have become established in the faith by this very appearance, — *are fallen asleep;*] were dead when this epistle was written, about 23 or 24 years after the event they had witnessed.

7. The two appearances of Christ, mentioned in this verse, are not specified by the Evangelists. Observe, too, that as none of the four Gospels were written, at the date of this epistle, St. Paul must have known all the facts, here stated, on some other authority; doubtless, on the personal testimony of the witnesses.

8. — *seen of me also,*] on the way to Damascus, some years after he appeared to the other apostles. — *as of an abortion:*] merely a term of self-disparagement. In our current English version, there seems an allusion to the late period at which he was converted; but none in the original. The real idea is more clearly unfolded in the next

meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God. 10. But by the grace of God I am what I am; and his grace, which was bestowed upon me, was not in vain; but I labored more abundantly than they all, — yet not I, but the grace of God, which was with me.) 11. Therefore, whether it were I, or they, so we preach, and so ye believed.

12. Now, if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? 13. But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen; 14. and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith *is* also vain; 15. yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ, — whom he raised not up, if so be, that the dead rise not. 16. For if the dead rise not, then is Christ

verse, where he makes a digression from the tenor of his argument, in order to dwell on the humiliating thought which his own case had suggested.

10. *— am what I am:*] a modest circumlocution for *am an apostle*. I am, indeed, "not meet to be called an apostle;" still, the grace of God hath made me one. —— *was not in vain.*] The grace of God which elected him to be an apostle, had been effectual; for it wrought within him so as to make him even more laborious in his ministry than any of the other apostles: a fact which the history of his life verifies.

11. Having finished the short digression in the last two verses, he now resumes the discourse at the end of verse 8. Whether it be the rest of the apostles, or I, who preach, we are all agreed in declaring this fact of Christ's resurrection; indeed, it is what you yourselves believed. It would seem, from the tenor of the argument, which follows, that the Corinthians had not yet rejected this fact. (*Remark.* Here, St. Paul ends his statement of the importance of Christ's resurrection, as lying at the foundation of the Christian faith. In the next verse he proceeds to point out the bearings of this fact on the question in dispute.)

12–16. Here we come to the argument, the amount of which is this: If Christ was raised from the dead, as you yourselves admit, then there is such a thing as the raising of dead persons. But if, as some of you contend, there can be no raising of dead persons, then, of course, Christ is not risen; and so our preaching, as well as your faith, is

not raised; 17. and if Christ be not raised, your faith *is* vain; ye are yet in your sins; 18. then they also, which are fallen

a delusion,—yea, we have testified falsely of God, by testifying that he raised up Christ. (*Remark.* In the original, the omission of the article, before the plural "dead," gives the argument an acuteness of form which cannot be preserved in English.)

17. Having shown them that their denial of a resurrection of the dead, involved a denial also of the resurrection of Christ himself, he goes on to argue from this latter consequence. Two things would follow from the supposition that Christ was not risen: 1st, the Christian faith was a delusion; and the believers, instead of holding the truth of God which purifies the heart, were dupes,—were trusting in an enormous falsehood; and this could not, of course, save them from their sins. The reason was, that faith in a gross imposture could not bring them into the true spiritual relation to God, whatever they might think of their character. (N. B. Observe the bearing that St. Paul's decision, here, has on certain Deistico-Christian systems of the present day, which deny even Christ's resurrection. We do not ask whether they are scriptural, for that is not pretended; but would St. Paul have received their advocates as Christians?) And 2dly,

18. *Then,*] referring to the argument in the 16th and 17th verses, —— *they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished,*] or have ceased to exist. That is, we have no proof of their existence; for the resurrection of the dead, and especially of Christ, is the Christian ground of assurance in a future being. The fact of the resurrection demonstrates, of course, another life; but we would add, it does not, of itself, determine whether that life continue onwards from the death of the body to the resurrection, or whether it begin at this latter event. (*Quære.* Does not the point of St. Paul's argument, here, presuppose that even the Corinthians with whom he was contending, held some kind of surviving life, at least for deceased Christians? for he confronts them with the inference that, if there be no resurrection of Christ or of the dead, then those "who are fallen asleep in Christ are perished;" as if this conclusion were what they themselves would not admit. It is possible,

asleep in Christ, are perished. 19. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable, [*lit.* most to be pitied.]

20. But now is Christ risen from the dead, *and become* the first-fruits of them that slept, [*lit.* that have fallen asleep.] 21. For since by man *came* death, by man *came* also the resur-

however, that, in the heat of discussion, he did not carefully confine his argument to the particular points that bore on these Corinthians; he may have suffered it, in this instance, to branch out into a more general appeal to those common sentiments of our nature which revolt at the thought that our deceased friends have utterly ceased to exist.)

19. —*most to be pitied,*] if they must narrow down their hope in Christ, to the present life only, without any futurity to which they could look forward. He does not mean, as some understand him, that they actually were miserable in this life; they had "the peace of God that passeth understanding," amidst all the persecutions and hardships they endured. But, take away their faith in immortality, and what would be their condition, then? (Here he closes his argument for the present, against the error of these Corinthians; and, in the following verses, goes on to illustrate affirmatively the doctrine of our resurrection.)

20. It was an admitted fact that Christ was risen from the dead. —— *the first-fruits of them that have fallen asleep,*] or died. According to the Jewish ordinances, the first-fruits were to be selected and presented in the sanctuary, before the harvest at large could be gathered in. And in a similar order, Christ was first raised, as a pledge that the general harvest of the dead was to follow; as St. Paul says, in ver. 23, "Christ the first-fruits; *afterwards* they that are Christ's, at his coming." Others, indeed, had before been recalled to the present mortal life, as the Shunamite's son, Jairus's daughter, the young man at Nain, Lazarus, &c.; but these were not instances of the resurrection which is here treated of,—the resurrection to immortality.

21. Since man brought death, with him into the world, it was fitting that man also should bring in the antidote, the resurrection from the dead: Adam, in the former case; the man Christ Jesus, in the latter.

rection of the dead. 22. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. 23. But every man in his own order, [*rather*, but each in its own order:] Christ, the first-fruits;

22. As descendants of Adam, and in that constitution which Adam brought with him into the world, we know that all men die; so, it is equally certain that they shall all be made alive, or raised to immortality, in that constitution of which Christ is the head, and which his resurrection first demonstrated. Christ was "the first-born from the dead," as Adam was the first-born into the present life; Christ, the head of the new economy, as Adam was of the old. And it is in this economy, over which Christ is placed, that the resurrection is to be effected.——*all die*, ... *shall all be made alive.*] Their dying is present, is now going on; their resurrection is future, *shall be.* Of course, he does not mean that it is simultaneous with their dying, as some contend.

23. But the proper order is to be observed, in the rising of the dead; Christ first, as having in all things the preëminence; afterwards mankind. ——*each in its own order;*] i. e. each of these two divisions, Christ and mankind. The original admits either the rendering in our current English version, or that which we have given it; though ours is the most literal. The meaning is plain enough from the context. ——*Christ the first-fruits.*] He was not only the first, in order of time, who rose to immortality; but his resurrection was a forerunner, a pledge, of the gathering in of all the dead, at a future period. (N. B. Compare the whole tenor of St. Paul's illustration, here, with the hypothesis that men have always risen to immortality at the instant of their death,— before Christ, and since.) ——*afterwards,*] i. e. "at his coming." This latter clause is, by most commentators, joined with "afterwards," as a more definite specification of the time; so that the meaning is 'afterwards, at his coming, they that are Christ's shall be made alive,'— not, 'they that are Christ's at his coming, shall afterwards be made alive,' as if some were not his then, who might become his at another time. ——*at his coming*] to raise the dead; as the whole subject, of course, presupposes. (*Remark.* Some have concluded that this must have been at the destruction of Jerusalem, because Christ was to

afterward, they that are Christ's, at his coming. 24. Then *cometh*

come at that time, and also because *the sound of the trumpet*, which is mentioned in connection with that event, is likewise mentioned in connection with this. Now, all such interpretations are founded on the assumption that *the coming of Christ, with the sound of a trumpet*, &c., is a sort of technical phrase, like a proper name, appropriated to one particular event, and inapplicable to any other; whereas, in itself, it is like a common name, designating indifferently any remarkable manifestation of Christ's agency, and depending altogether on its context, &c., to determine *what* one. It grew out of the Old Testament usage, in which *the coming of God, the coming of the Lord*, &c., was tantamount to our modern form, *visitation of God, visitation of Providence;* that is, any remarkable and solemn event in providence, of which we happen to speak. In the New Testament, the phrase in question is used in the same manner; though it was natural that it should refer to the destruction of Jerusalem much more frequently than to any other visitation, because that impending storm of judgment was oftener spoken of. There is, then, no occasion to refer the phrase, here, to the destruction of Jerusalem; and none will contend that there is any necessary identity of that event with the raising of the dead, the delivering up of the kingdom to the Father, the destroying of the last enemy death, the complete subjection of all things to Christ, and God being all in all. These are certainly the grand results that are to mark the period here described.) ——*they that are Christ's;*] i. e. all mankind; they being related to him as the general harvest to the first-fruits: "Christ the first-fruits, afterwards they that are Christ's"—are his to make alive, as mentioned in the preceding verse. The distinction is manifestly intended to be drawn only between him as the first, and them as coming after; not between them and some others, as if they were but a part of mankind. (*Remark.* Most commentators who believe in partial salvation, seize on this phrase, to confine all that follows in this chapter, to believers. But the context, both preceding and succeeding, does not allow of such a restriction. It is "all men," who are to "be made alive in Christ," thus determining who are Christ's in respect to the resurrection;

the end, [*rather*, shall be the end,] when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power. 25. For he

and then, on the raising of these, "all things" are to be in complete subjection together with Christ, and "God be all in all." This shows what is to be the universal moral condition, after this resurrection.)

24. *Then*,] at the resurrection just mentioned, —— *shall be the end*,] the grand consummation of the Christian scheme; the end of Christ's mediatorial reign, as the apostle proceeds to show, more fully, in what follows. (*Remark.* Some have argued that, since "the end" is a term often used with reference to the destruction of Jerusalem, it here points out that event. But this is a puerile sort of reasoning; as if that term were an algebraic sign, invariably denoting the same individual thing, in whatsoever combination it be found. Of itself, it means simply the close of any series of things, which the speaker or writer has in view, at the time. For example, we are told (Matt. xxvi. 58,) that when Christ was led away to Caiaphas, Peter "went in and sat with the servants to see *the end*,"— that is, the result of the trial then going on, not the destruction of Jerusalem. And so, in other cases innumerable.) —— *when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God even the Father:*] Christ's kingdom; which he originally received from the Father. This he will now deliver back to God, as he will have accomplished all for which it was committed to him, having made all other rule and authority and power to cease; that is, having reconciled all things, as St. Paul elsewhere expresses it. —— *put down;*] literally, made to cease, rendered void, abolished.

25. He cannot resign his kingdom to God, before all this be done; because he was expressly appointed to reign until he should have overcome all opposing tendencies. —— *all enemies*,] such as all dissenting rule and authority and power, hostile influences and operations, the last of which is death, as we are told in the next verse. It would seem, from the specifications in the context, that the apostle does not here refer the term "enemies" personally to men, but abstractly to adverse principles, conditions, &c. As authority for his assertion in this verse, he probably alludes

must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. 26. The last enemy *that* shall be destroyed *is* death.—[*lit.* the last enemy, death, shall be destroyed.] 27. For, He hath put all things under his feet. But when he saith, All things are put under *him*, *it is* manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him. 28. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.

to Ps. cx. 1. "The Lord said unto my Lord, sit thou on my right hand, [i. e. reign,] until I make thine enemies thy footstool." He must therefore reign until all is subdued; he cannot deliver up the kingdom before.

26. *The last enemy, death, shall be abolished.*] This is the true rendering. It would seem that the authors of our current English version inserted their supplied words, here, for no other purpose than to impair, or prevent, the inference intended, viz. that no enemies will be left.

27. He proceeds to confirm the foregoing conclusion. —— *He hath put all things under his feet:*] a quotation from Ps. viii. 6, which St. Paul here refers to Christ; as does the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, ii. 8. 9. —— *but when he saith,*] i. e. when God saith, in Psalms viii. 6. —— *he is excepted,*] viz. God. The argument in this verse is, that God, who speaks of things that are to be, as already done, had promised to put all things (himself alone excepted,) under Christ; and therefore Christ must sit on the right hand, or reign, until this be completed.

28. When this shall have been accomplished, there will no longer be any occasion for the Son to reign; as the work of the mediatorial office will have been wholly consummated. He will then resign his delegated kingdom, and become one among all the other subjects of the Father's immediate dominion; and God shall be all in all. Such is the illustration St. Paul here gives of the glorious issue of the Christian scheme. His language is too explicit, one would think, to be reconciled to any body's satisfaction with the doctrine of partial salvation.

(*Remark.* Among those whose doctrine naturally conflicts with the idea that Christ will eventually resign his kingdom to the Father, a very few have attempted to explain the last five verses to a different purport, viz. that the

kingdom to be delivered up is not Christ's kingdom, but the opposing one; that Christ will conquer this, and give it to the Godhead, that is, to himself and the Father conjointly, so that he will perpetually share in the subsequent rule thereof; that the sentence, "He must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet," does not mean but that he will continue to reign afterwards also; and that his becoming subject to the Father, when all things shall have been subdued to him, means only that he will then continue to be subject, in his human nature, just as he was before. (See Amer. Bib. Repository for Oct. 1839, Art. ix.) We presume that so hard-strained an interpretation will never gain currency, even among Trinitarians. Still, it may be well to observe that, besides doing violence to the language of the text, it breaks up the continuity of the apostle's argument, and requires foreign considerations to be brought in, at every step, in order to make out some connection in the train of thought. The delivering of the kingdom to God even the Father, is made to be the giving of it, not to the Father emphatically, but to the Father and Son; the reign of Christ which must continue till, &c. is not his reign in that kingdom, though it is so evidently identified with it in the text; and his being subject, after delivering up the kingdom, is made to be totally unaffected by this event. Nothing can be plainer, on the other hand, than the connection of St. Paul's argument. He speaks of Christ's delivering up the kingdom to the Father, when he shall have abolished all opposing agencies; for, adds he, Christ must reign (that is retain his kingdom just spoken of,) till all hostile power is overcome; and when all is thus subdued to him, then shall he himself be subject, (resign his kingdom) to the Father, that God may be all in all. As for the difficulty which, it is alleged, arises from the fact that the Scriptures often speak of Christ's kingdom as an everlasting one, that should have no end, &c., it is so easily solved, as to be unworthy of a place among objections.)

Having carried out the foregoing illustration to the grand and glorious result, the apostle, in the next verse, reverts to that stage of his argument which he left at ver. 19, where he was showing the absurdities involved by denying the resurrection.

29. Else what shall they do, which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why are they then baptized for the dead, [*or, according to Griesbach*, for them?] 30. And why stand we in jeopardy every hour? 31. I protest, by your re-

29. *Else;*] referring back, as we have just observed. —— *which are baptized for the dead.*] This very perplexing sentence has had many different interpretations; of which we shall give only the most probable: 1. "who are baptized for, or in behalf of, such converts and believers as have died without baptism," (as was the custom in some churches, as early at least as the beginning of the third century;) 2. "who are baptized on professing their faith in Christ and the resurrection from the dead"; 3. as St. Paul otherwhere says figuratively, "who are baptized into Christ's death, that, as they are buried with him by baptism into death, they might also be raised up to newness of life"; 4. "who are baptized, *immersed*, in persecutions and dangers, which they are enabled to endure by faith in the resurrection of the dead," (so "baptize" is used by Christ, in Matt. xx. 22, 23, &c.) Whatever was the practice, or idea, here alluded to, it was evidently something that would become an absurdity on the supposition that the dead are not to be raised; and, it is in this that the force of the argument lies. Without attempting to fix the particular meaning, we will only mention one circumstance which should be observed by the interpreter, namely, that the use of the Greek article in the clause "baptized for *the* dead," while it is generally omitted in the sentences in which the dead *universally* are spoken of, seems to indicate that here St. Paul alluded only to a certain class of dead persons, for whom others were baptized, and not to the dead in general.

30. Here he adduces another consideration; or, (if the reader choose,) amplifies the one mentioned in the preceding verse. —— *why stand we in jeopardy,*] expose our lives continually for the gospel, if the dead are not to rise?

31. —— *your rejoicing which I have;*] rather, "the rejoicing which I have concerning you"; for having been the means of bringing you to Christ. —— *I die daily,*] i. e. am daily exposed to a violent death; and why should I encounter such dangers, if the hope of the resurrection be vain?

joicing which I have in Christ Jesus our Lord, I die daily. 32. If after the manner of men, I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. 33. Be not deceived; Evil communications corrupt good manners. 34. Awake to righteousness, and sin not; for some have not the knowledge of God. I speak this to your shame.

35. But some *man* will say, How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? 36. *Thou* fool! that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die; 37. and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain,—it may chance of wheat, or some other *grain;* 38. but God

32. — *I have fought with beasts at Ephesus:*] a metaphor, which appears stronger in the English, than in the original. It represents the fierceness and rage of the mob which Demetrius raised at Ephesus against St. Paul, as related in Acts xix. 23–40; and which, it appears from the narrative, must have happened there about the time of writing this Epistle. What motive, to involve himself in such hazards and trials, if there be no hope of the resurrection? —— *let us eat and drink; for to-morrow we die,*] and that is the end of us. The sentence is quoted from the Septuagint version of Isa. xxii. 13; and St. Paul implies, by it, that if the present life is our only existence, these lower gratifications are about all that is left us, so that we should do well, in that case, to secure these as our highest objects.

33, 34. *Be not deceived,*] by the loose doctrines that prevail around you. Corinth was notorious for the gross Epicureanism of the public sentiment. —— *evil communications corrupt good manners:*] a quotation from an ancient Greek poet; by which the apostle reminds them that they were in danger of contracting corrupt sentiments, on this point, from those with whom they associated. It was time for them to "awake to righteousness," &c. By so doing, they would be fortified against the corrupting influences to which they were exposed, and which tended to cherish their errors with respect to another life.

35. He now introduces an objection, or difficulty, which some might feel, concerning the resurrection; namely, With what body are the dead to be raised?

36–38. Answer: not with the self-same body that dies, but with a different one; just as the body with which the

giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his [*rather*, its] own body. 39. All flesh is not the same flesh; but *there is* one *kind of* flesh of men, another flesh of beasts, another of fishes, *and* another of birds. 40. *There are* also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial *is* one, and the *glory* of the terrestrial *is* another. 41. *There is* one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for *one* star differeth from *another* star in glory. 42. So also *is* the resurrection of the dead: it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; 43. it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; 44. it is sown a natural [*lit.* animal] body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural [*lit.* animal] body, and

springing grain rises above-ground, is different from the bare seed that was sown, (and which represents, in this simile, the human body that is buried.) —— *to every seed its own body;*] such as is proper to it, but still a new one. So will it be with us in the resurrection, (see ver. 42.)

39. There is no difficulty in the fact that our future bodies will be of a different kind from our present; for, even now, we see examples of a diversity somewhat analogous. We know, for instance, that there are diverse kinds even of mortal flesh, as of men, of fishes, &c.; why may there not be bodies differing, as to their elements, in other respects also?

40, 41. Indeed, we know there are diverse kinds of bodies, likewise; some terrestrial, some celestial; and all with different kinds of glory.

42–44. *So also is the resurrection*] to differ from our mortal state: the sowing, or burying, of the dead, is in corruption, the raising of them is to be in incorruption; the sowing is in dishonor, the raising in glory; the sowing is in weakness, the raising in power; it is a *psychical*, or animal, body which is buried; it is a spiritual body which is to be raised. —— *it is sown*] i. e. buried; a figure retained from the simile, he has just used, of the grain that is "sown," before it springs up. The Greek verbs, here, having no nominative expressed, naturally give their meaning in an impersonal form; a form which we have endeavored to approximate by the uncouth circumlocutions, 'the sowing,' and 'the raising.' (*Remark.* Some have understood the first clause in ver. 42, as meaning

there is a spiritual body: 45. and so it is written, The first man, Adam, was made a living soul [*psuchè*,] the last Adam *is made* a quickening spirit. 46. Howbeit, that *was* not first, which is spiritual; but that which is natural [*lit.* animal;] *and* afterwards that which is spiritual. 47. The first man *is* of the earth, earthy;

that, in or after the resurrection, mankind will differ from each other, as one star now differs from another star in glory. But a glance over the context, preceding and succeeding, will discover that this is not the idea. The difference, which St. Paul is illustrating, is that between the mortal state and the resurrection, not between man and man hereafter; and the examples he adduces, of different kinds of flesh, different kinds of bodies, and of different kinds of glory, are used only to call to mind the general law of existing diversity, from which to infer the possibility of still another kind of diversity. He indeed adds example to example, and thus amplifies his illustration; just as he afterwards, (ver. 42–49,) multiplies the points of contrast between our future constitution and our present. —— *there is an animal body;*] that with which we live here, and with which we are buried. *Animal*, or *psychical:* in the original it is the adjective form of the word used in the next verse, "was made a living *soul.*" —— *a spiritual body,*] which we are to have in the resurrection.

45. — *so it is written,*] in Gen. ii. 7. "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and *man became a living soul,*" or living animate being. Such is the constitution we all inherit from the first man. —— *the last Adam:*] either, man collectively in his last state, that of the resurrection; or else, Christ, who is the representative of all men in that state, and in whom they are all to be made alive. —— *is made a quickening spirit,*] a spirit that vivifies, makes alive. Such is to be our constitution hereafter.

46, 47. All men receive the animal constitution or body, first; the spiritual, afterwards: such is the order. —— *the second man is the Lord from heaven:*] as the first state of man is in the same kind of constitution that Adam had, i. e. of the earth, earthy; so, the second state of man is to be in the constitution of the Lord Jesus Christ, i. e. of heaven, heavenly, — as is more fully expressed in the next two

the second man *is* the Lord from heaven. 48. As is the earthy, such *are* they also that are earthy; and as *is* the heavenly, such *are* they also that are heavenly. 49. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly.

50. Now, this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption. 51. Behold, I shew you a mystery: We shall not

verses. (In the original, the phrase translated "from heaven," in the latter clause, is an exact counterpart to that, in the former clause, rendered "of the earth," and the true construction evidently is, "The first man *is* of the earth, earthy; the second man, the Lord, *is* of heaven," not of the earth, earthy.)

48, 49. An amplification of the idea briefly stated in ver. 47. Nothing can be plainer than the meaning, here, that as men universally have been of the earth, earthy, they shall also be of heaven, heavenly; that as all have borne the image of the earthy, they shall bear the image of the heavenly; in one word, that "as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

50.—*flesh and blood:*] our present corruptible bodies. —— *cannot inherit the kingdom of God.*] This is the only text we remember, in which "the kingdom of God" is referred *exclusively* to the future state. As we cannot enter that state with our present corruptible constitution, the apostle proceeds, in the next verses, to solve a difficulty, which might otherwise perplex the Corinthians, respecting such as should be alive at the resurrection.

51. —*I shew you a mystery;*] something that had not hitherto been understood, namely, the sudden change of those who shall be alive at the resurrection. ("Mystery," in the New Testament, means what is not generally known, how simple soever it be in itself; the term seldom, if ever, signifies what is incomprehensible in a subject.) —— *we shall not all sleep*] in death, as the generality of mankind will do, for a period; for some will remain alive till the very moment of the resurrection. —— *but we shall all be changed.*] Whether living at the time, or dead, all must be changed in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, &c. For though such as are then alive will not indeed sleep in death, yet they, too, must put off the corruptible constitution, and,

all sleep, but we shall all be changed, 52. in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump. (For the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.) 53. For this corruptible must put on incorruption,

like the dead, receive the incorruptible. All must pass through that change. (*Remark.* The expression "*We* shall not all sleep," &c., and again in the next verse, "*We* shall be changed," has furnished ground for an argument of some plausibleness, that St. Paul expected the resurrection would take place within the life-time of some to whom he was then writing. We confess that, so far as we recollect, there is no other instance, except 1 Thess. iv. 15, 17, in St. Paul's writings, where the first person plural does not relate to himself, or to his cotemporaries. Yet, it is so common a practice, in all languages, to use it in the *general* sense, and it is so natural to do so, even unconsciously, when speaking of what concerns mankind generally, that any conclusion drawn from its occurrence here, must be very precarious. One thing is certain: If St. Paul thought the event here described, was to take place in his own age, he made an enormous mistake; unless, indeed, we will have it that all the dead were then raised, and, together with the living, changed instantly from corruption, to incorruption, from mortality to immortality,—that all things were then subdued to Christ, the last enemy death abolished, the kingdom delivered up to the Father, and that God became all in all.)

52. *in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye*, &c.] a clause that belongs properly to the preceding verse. The change of the living will be instantaneous; and this will be at the same time with the resurrection of the dead, as appears from what follows. (Of course, he does not mean that the resurrection has been taking place ever since men began to die, or ever since the time of Christ.) —— *at the last trump:*] a symbolical figure, with which the notice of great changes and important events, is often introduced in prophecy. This was to be "the last" of events or changes, "the end" of the Christian scheme. —— *the dead shall be raised,*] at that moment. —— *and we shall be changed:*] such as shall then be alive.

53. For, as he had before showed, all, whether the living

and this mortal *must* put on immortality. 54. So, when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory! 55. O death, where is thy sting? O grave [*Hades*,] where is thy victory? (56. The sting of death *is* sin; and the strength of sin *is* the law.) 57. But thanks *be* to God, which giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ.

58. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord.

or the dead, must pass from corruption and mortality to incorruption and immortality.

54. Then will death be swallowed up in victory; that is, abolished, as he had said in verse 26. —— *the saying that is written*,] in Isa. xxv. 8, "He will swallow up death in victory."

55. Having finished his illustration of the subject, the apostle breaks forth into an exclamation of triumphant joy at the scene he had dwelt upon till it seemed present to his mind. —— *O grave*, (*Hades*,) *where is thy victory!*] The place, or state, of the dead, which had hitherto swallowed up all, and triumphed over our race, shall yield its spoils, and cease to be.

56. *The sting of death is sin*,] as St. Paul shows in Rom. v. 12–14. —— *the strength of sin is the law;*] as he argues, at large, in Rom. vii. 5–14. This verse is thrown in by way of parenthesis, to bring out an idea suggested, in the preceding verse, by the phrase "sting of death."

57. *Hades* will no longer have the victory over us, but we shall have obtained the victory over that, by our Lord Jesus Christ, in whom all are to be made alive. (Mark the somewhat general relation in which the first person plural is here used.)

58. The apostle concludes the whole, with an exhortation to steadfastness and strenuous activity in the cause of Christ; for the resurrection which he had illustrated, gave his brethren assurance that their labor was not in vain, as it otherwise would be, according to verses 13–17, 29–32.

H. B.[2d.]

Art. XV.

Frederica Bremer.

I write the name with a peculiar feeling of joy. It is, as if amid the jargon of unmeaning words, the truth-loving ear has distinguished the voice of eloquent inspiration; it is as if "the dreary intercourse of common life" had been suddenly suspended, while the true tones of that sympathy for which it yearns, has reached and thrilled the heart; or as if when listening to some low sweet chorus, there should spring up, in the still space beyond, a wandering strain, bearing the same burden of love and joy, that shall come floating on, to blend the distant melody with the near.

A mingled pleasure, similar in character to all these, could they be blended into one, was the pleasure with which I read, successively, as they were furnished us, by the English translation, "Tales of Swedish Life; by Miss Bremer." A lingering memory of the rich enjoyment thus derived, has led me, once more, over these singularly interesting pages. Again the triumph, the sympathy, and the music, are with me, and deeper, more joyous, and sweeter than before. This is no critic's mood. But I assume no office of criticism. I have been more pleased than otherwise, and I seek only to express that pleasure. I might easily search out faults, in the volumes before me, since who is there, however imperfect, but may discover imperfections in others? but I have a friendship for Miss Bremer, which takes not upon itself the task of measuring her distance from any possible standard of perfectness, which may have been set up, by others. Its impulses are rather to extend the hand, and to call her by her country's endearing and significant *thou.*

She goes to work in such earnest sincerity, there is such a "home" purpose in all her delineations of life, and she makes it so manifest, that, criticise her as we may, we trust her still. We feel that she is one of those whose mission is "not to destroy, but to fulfil." For in the scenes which she describes to us, or rather in the characters which figure in them, we see the evidences of that truer individuality, and thence, that happier sociality, which, missed of as it is

in the world, no one doubts is the legitimate privilege of human nature in human life. We need such teachers. On every side, we hear eloquent voices deprecating slavery in all its forms; but how few there are who make us feel that we ourselves can indeed be free. There are those, in abundance, who can expose and degrade what is *false;* but who is able to answer the question, How shall we be true? It is easy to remark upon the past; it is easy to prophesy of the future; but how difficult it is to explain the present; how difficult to teach effectively the true method by which it may be improved and enjoyed.

I do not claim for Miss Bremer that she has done all this invariably, but I would place her among the best of those who instruct the public mind, through fictitious delineations of life; because she seeks to win us to the love of right enjoyment, by most amiable manifestations of individual freedom and social truth; and because she adopts for her characters, the rule that has been so earnestly expressed by our best poet;

> "Trust no Future, howe'er pleasant,
> Let the dead Past bury its dead;
> Act,—act, in the living Present,
> Heart within, and God o'erhead;"

and because she delights in no dark picture, for the sake of that darkness. It is either to show the cheerfulness of morning when morning comes, or, to exemplify the triumph of Faith, in the continuance of human effort, even when the last sunbeam of human joy has set beneath the night. In the operations of her own mind as illustrated in her sketches, there seems continually at work, a most expansive and determinate benevolence. She would produce the goodness she believes in. She would produce it *now*, and everywhere. And she would show that it actually does exist, if not in all the abundance we could wish, still that there is enough for progress, or at least for hope. Give her to write out the lives of the great ones of her country's history, and not only would she discover the hero Gustave, in the Dalecarlian miner; but she would prove that to the very last of her life, there lingered some freshness in the queenly wreath that bound the brow of the youthful Chris-

tine. Let her journey, with her creative talent, over the varied scenery of the North. Shall we hear the voice of love, only on the summer shores of Sweden's romantic lakes? Shall we find home only in the sumptuous halls of its island capital? There, indeed, and in the depths of the dark fir forest, and amid the bleak solitude of the mountains, and far away towards the region of the polar night, where lie the eternal snows — wherever a human habitation is reared, or a human footstep can be traced, there beams "the sunshine of kind looks;" there echoes "the music of kind voices;" there struggles the good against the evil; and there the high purpose, and the noble deed, prove the ultimate triumph of virtue. There is no limit to the pervading spirit of her benevolence. Like the holy tree of life, in her ancestral mythology, "it extendeth its roots through all oceans, and spreads its branches over the universe."

There is not, indeed, a well-defined feature in the character of her books, and scarcely a page in them all, which does not associate with itself some thought of the *locale.* We see everywhere around us, the wild beauty, we hear the stirring music, and we feel the rush of the free vigorous breeze of the Northland. We study the character of its civilization, we drink in the spirit of its poetry, and we call to mind the strange legends of its ancient faith. And if Miss Bremer's merits as an authoress, exhibited in the beauty of the life she describes to us, may be considered a proof of the benign influence of Christianity upon the noble barbarism of the North, may not many of the errors into which she falls, be referred to the fact, that she lives where grew the groves, and where mouldered down the altars, once consecrated to the worship of Odin and Thor? She says, of a remote province of Scandinavia, that, "the light of the gospel endeavors, in vain, to dissipate the shadows of a thousand years; the old night holds them back." In other regions of the Gothic peninsula, Christianity has gained the ascendency; still, it is by no means difficult to discover the influences of these old superstitions on the minds and hearts of those who live nearest to the warmer shores of the Southern Baltic. It is not because we notice the want of artistic skill in the grouping of some of her pieces, and find circumstances without any adequate producing cause, and causes which are followed by no corre-

sponding consequences, that I judge of her as she does of the whole world; "We are all of us somewhat related to Chaos." There are other and more conclusive evidences that, even in the mind of this most Christian authoress, there lingers some little trace of the mysteries of Hertha; some faint emblems of the Ausgaardsjera of the mountain caves. Most clearly does it appear, that her mind is not quite free from the influence of the ancient giant worship. But I mention this, for no other purpose than to claim for her the merit of truth,— truth to her country as it is, and as it was. She is true to its institutions as they now exist, and true also to the poetry of its earlier ages. She is true in all things else; true to Christianity as received into her own soul, true to her own experience of life, true to womanhood, true to truth itself.

I have elsewhere called the earnest expression of this truth, in her works, the voice of inspiration, heard amid the confusion of unmeaning words. And as such, I regard the difference between her delineations of life, and those which fill the pages of most modern novels. They approach the actual, about as near as the four or five acts of a scenic performance do the real lives and fortunes of those who listen to them. There is a pomp of words, there are people in fancy dresses, there is novel shifting of scenery, and a glitter of false lights. The excited imagination revels for the time being; but how much of the sympathy which encourages virtue does the heart derive from it? How much of it all can the understanding take home to the inner life? I speak of the stage only as it resembles the modern novel, in exhibiting detached portions of existence, in a light too concentrated, to compare with the natural sweet sunlight: the only safe medium, for the exercise of vision. There is no truth to nature in these representations; no truth to any thing in particular, except what are in themselves untrue,— "the dreams of fancy in her wildest mood."

Miss Bremer's tales, on the contrary, relate not merely to an episode, in life, but to life in its wholeness. She selects not a single modification of a single passion, with the vain wish to throw around that every beauty and every charm with which the "God of all love" has filled his universe. But true to her belief in the necessary freedom

of individual character, she writes: "Life is rich. Its tree blossoms eternally, because it is nourished by immortal fountains. It bears dissimilar fruits, various in color and glory, but all beautiful; let us undervalue none of them, for all are capable of producing plants of eternal life." She is true to this sentiment throughout. To her own sex in particular, she enlarges the realm of usefulness and enjoyment by imparting to every proper object of pursuit, or of regard, the same interest, and the same worthiness of affection, which is bestowed so abundantly, for them, upon one or two. "Youthful love, the beaming passion-flower of earth! Who will belie its captivating beauty? Who will not thank God, the Creator, that he gave it to the children of earth? But, there are flowers which are as noble as this, and which are less in danger of being paled by the frosts of earth; flowers from whose chalices also you may drink life, from the life of the Eternal." In what almost impassioned language one is made to express a newly-awakened love for the acquisition of Knowledge! "Enjoyment!—Joy! they are no longer strange names to me. How swiftly does the day pass, how fresh is my mind, in the evening; how happy the thought that I am richer than yesterday; how light the glance cast on to-morrow! O, these peaceful conquests in the world of thought, how worthy of the labor by which they are won! how full of blessing they are!"

I select this as one among many instances, in which we are made to feel, that it is the active mind when employed upon any proper object, let that object be what it may, that fills all earth with beauty, and gives to the passing time an influence over the future, which the affections, without this mental life, can never exert. One of her characters relinquishes the object of her dearest hopes, at the moment when she might have secured it, because she had discovered that she could not act otherwise, and preserve her self-respect, and the esteem of others. But she sinks into no weak repining, she has marked out a course for her future life, and goes nobly forward to possess the joy of a well-directed mind. To one who would have lamented her fate, she addresses the following language: "Do not pity me, I have won much; I have won that which I never till now possessed, *true human worth;* and in this moment, I

feel a certainty, and a peace in my soul, which I never enjoyed till now. . . . . No, for myself I do not lament. I feel that I have conquered. But rather will I lament for the many who, in a situation like my own, seek for such a helper, and go on forever forlorn: who, through a false education, a misdirected guidance, are shattered from the beginning, and never more can collect themselves into a whole. . . . . Do you see that it is daylight! Do you see how the world brightens! O certainly will the twilight of humanity also brighten more and more! Certainly the comprehension of the great object of life, the true worth of a human being, will become ever, more and more, living in the human heart!"

In all this there is somewhere a sympathy which every reader of her books will be sure to find. There is in them, not only truth to be understood, but truth to be applied, truth to be felt. Love is made lovely in all its forms, if they be wise and pure; and not only are there all modifications of love that exist in human hearts, for human hearts, but love of virtue in the abstract; love of duty and character; love of nature, and love of the arts; love of study, and love of thought; and all-sustaining, all-comforting religious love. The characters in whom these manifestations are made, are created purposely for sympathy and respect; and sympathy and respect will they have, and pleasant society will they be found, by all those who make their acquaintance. The incidents, too, are, in most cases, life-like, and have a bearing upon the true purposes of life. They do not stand out and startle us, as if they were miracles, nor are they linked together, and drawn, as in a magic round, nearer and nearer to some hour of surpassing earthly felicity, — of most essential romance; "and nought beyond, O Earth!" but they have all a *present* purpose, and an abiding power. They tell of progress and conquest. The true "excelsior," whose consummation is,

"*The good hath gained the victory.*"

"The good will gain the victory;" and that victory will be complete and eternal. This is the music, the harmony. Of what avail were all the benevolence, and all the truth, — the high poetic feeling, the pure purpose, the ardent wish, and the far-reaching faith, all exercised for the improve-

ment of humanity, if they have not their origin in the Author of all good; and receive not from Him the prophecy of their fulfilment. Thank Heaven that they do. Thank Heaven that continually new voices, both of "them that are far off, and them that are nigh," join in with the song of redeeming grace for all. Thank Heaven that so clear a tone as this from Sweden, has reached us here, and that it comes in that popular voice which is sure to find its way to many hearts.

It is indeed no strange thing to meet in the pages of modern literary writers, of every religious name, passages of great force and beauty, which imply a faith in the triumph of good over evil, to be exhibited in the final purity of every intelligent being. Many of them no doubt prophesy, as did some of old, without apprehending the spirit by which they speak; and others it is to be feared, have asked permission to bow down with their master when he worships in the house of Rimmon. But with neither of these can we class Miss Bremer. The truthfulness which she discovers in every thing else, is observable also in this. She is certain that, "the work of reconciliation shall be completed," and she speaks out like a true believer; not in all points of "the faith," as we receive it; but so, as regards the grand result.

It would not be proper, perhaps, to attempt to draw out a system of theology from a series of tales like these, but should we do so, the best we could derive from them, would appear, I think, to want simplicity. There would be something in it, to remind us again of the Mythic age of the North. It would be like another "Song of Vala," imperfect in the means, but glorious in the fulfilment. There is a monstrous brooding evil, and darkness, to be destroyed; and to effect this, the heroes war against the giants; but the heroes in their turn must be destroyed, before the more perfect order and beauty can be introduced. That this order and beauty will at length appear, she has no doubt; and she speaks out in relation to it, as she does in every thing else. That is, she takes no pains to disguise her sentiments, but follows her convictions wherever they lead her. She finds the character of woman inefficient, and her life too often useless and unhappy; and she hesitates not to claim for her a better equality, and a wider freedom. She

sees much confusion and misery in social life, and she traces them to their true cause; the want of a more distinct *individualism*, in those who make up society. She sees the spiritual life disorganized in all its parts, because the image of God in man has become darkened by reason of his sin.

"But God, the eternal Goodness, the highest Love, will He forsake his fallen, his unhappy child? Will He do less than a mother does for hers? O, no! He will never turn away his face; He will seek his child; He will call it; He will reconcile it to Himself. If God in holy worlds lives as the giver of bliss, on earth he must live as the Reconciler. This hymn of anguish, and home-sickness, which before the memory of man has risen from the earth,—this ardent cry, 'Lord, come,' is from eternity to eternity answered by, 'Here, my child.'"

Even on this earth, God wills that man shall partake of the fulness of this life; but what, before all does Christianity say? "*God is love.*" He will therefore never cease to desire the delivery of man; here, and in eternity, He will labor for it. God is the only principle, ever the same, ever active. O, surely, the time will come when the Son, the eternal Word, shall have subdued all to the Father.

L. M. B.

Art. XVI.

Illustrative Imagery.

When Dr. Witherspoon was once asked by a lady, whether he loved flowers? he answered that he neither had them in his garden nor in his sermons. The reply of woman's keen perception and ready wit, is not in the record, but we may readily surmise, that it was some allusion to God's gardens and sermons. The choice which the learned Doctor made of doctrines out of the vast mass of human traditions, did not permit him to cultivate any fondness for the overflowing of the divine Benevolence which decked the earth with flowers; and, unlike the master of Christians,

he had no religious impulses that inclined him to bid his hearers "consider the flowers, how they grow." A loftier lesson, and one of deeper import was never uttered, than came from the lips of the Teacher when he pointed to the graceful lily, and drew the contrast between nature's loveliness and the show of royalty. He did not forget that all through the Scriptures the sermons of Heaven had some flowers in them, and that they were woven into the wonderful fabric which became the peculiar earthly residence of God. In the Tabernacle was centred all the beauties of the then known world, that wherever the Israelite might journey, he might behold some thing, which, through the senses, should aid the soul's recollections of the spiritual home. And thus may it be with the Christian, if he will. Every thing, from the tiniest flower to the magnificence of the starry firmament, may symbolize some precious thought; and like some of those cheering words which are mingled in with the Lamentations of the prophet, a single flower in the desert may remind of consolations which will infuse strength into the soul to press on and endure. All things lovely and good should be made contributive to the unfolding of religious truth by the pulpit; and into the world of Theology the sunshine of poetry should be permitted to enter, revealing beauties which otherwise must be hidden. We must attract the mind to the truth, before we can impress the heart with its momentous realities; and whatever is discovered to be a generally effective means of attracting intellectual attention, is worthy of being cultivated by him whose alpha and omega of purpose and desire is, to enlarge the dominion of truth, unto the divine glory, in human holiness of thought, feeling and action. And this is the sober argument for giving more consideration to Illustrative Imagery, or that use of the imagination and fancy, which makes words colors, and language pictures; which presents ideas in things; "apples of gold in pictures of silver;" and which gives "heavenly visions" unto which the awakened soul cannot be "disobedient." "Beauty and strength are in the sanctuary," said David, but the beauty did not lessen the strength, any more than the precious stones in the high priest's breast-plate harmed the golden rims within which they were placed. And not to an Oriental imagination, or to the exuberance of an Eastern fancy, are we to refer the

peculiarities of the exquisite combination of beauty and strength in the illustrative imagery of the Scriptures, as where the true religious character is symbolized by "the growth of the lily and the casting forth of the roots of the cedars of Lebanon." In imagery like this, thoughts are seen — they are incarnated, and breathe sweetness and move in gracefulness. We have something to interest the mind, parallel to the effect of demonstrative experiments in the hand of the lecturer on chemistry, as he mingles colorless fluids, and proves the wonderful changes of the combination.

I have no doubt but that the lady who received Dr. Witherspoon's answer, felt a new sympathy for the floral innocents of her garden, as for the injured, and could have made a brave argument in their behalf. I wish I had the ability to do justice to a similar feeling in reference to illustrative imagery, the use of which so often brings from sneering critics, the remark, — "Poh, it is nothing but flowery preaching." It is time to say a word or two in defence, especially as these very critics need some few cautions to assist them in better imitating what they profess to despise.

It is the province of the preacher, and of all who in any sphere design to assist him, to arrest the wayward mind and turn it from the all-engrossing tendencies of toil and pleasure, that it may receive considerations which shall keep the true significance of life so distinctly in sight as that it may incline the soul effectually to think wisely and to act well. He performs his work successfully, in proportion as he makes *impressions* favorable to this end; and to make such impressions, he should employ whatever means his own mind can grasp and use, and which are adapted to reach various classes of intellect. He should never forget, that on the right training of the young, whose world is the present, depends, in a great degree, the success of all good projects for the improvement of our race; and with this remembrance he should associate the difficulty — sadly enough felt by some — of interesting this class in religious truths, in the diligent contemplation of man's highest duties, which alone can fix in the mind those Christian principles which can discipline the impulses, modify the appetites, restrain the passions, and give to the soul the mastery of the senses. How shall they be interested? not in this

or that service — not for this or that length of time, limited by some extra excitement or happy festival — but *how* shall they be interested so that the whole current of life shall be forever impregnated with the religious element, pure in the bounding joyousness of youthful vivacity, and pure in the calmer flow of sober manhood and age? We must do this by employing what we find *is* attractive, and which can be employed with a healthy and permanent effect. And can any one declare that even a redundance of imagery is more to be shunned than an entire want of it? — that it is better to hang up no pictures at all in the chambers of the mind, than to cover the walls with them? — that it is wisest of all to be a Witherspoon, not entering the "kitchen garden" when the vegetables are in blossom, lest he should find that even potatoes are adorned with flowers? One thing is certain, that with a class, by far the majority, when the arguments of a speaker are gone with his statements, some figure, some pictured thought, is still retained, and by it, the *impression* made by the speaker, is felt again; an impression, it may be, in behalf of the most heroic devotion to life's best interests; an impression which, but for that illustrative imagery, would have passed away with the time and occasion. And in reference to this matter, it is useful to recall the confessions made by many who have received life-long impressions in this manner, which seemed to enter at the very roots of existence, and diffuse a regenerative power through the whole being; as in Dr. Boucherie's invention, a whole tree, to the leaves on the very summit, is imbued with the richest colors and most delicate odors, by the aspirative force of the vegetable transporting a prepared fluid, possessed of virtues that can change the entire tree to its own colors. Such a force, though it be but a metaphor or a trope, is not to be hastily set aside, for the work of an insignificant worm has undermined a fabric which man had deemed impregnable against ruin.

But ere we proceed farther, let us here drop a caution. I treat of and magnify *illustrative* imagery. I hold in as deep dislike as any one the vanity of metaphor and symbol, having in its connection no more significance than the *cross* in a late advertisement of an infidel stone-cutter, where a weeper is represented standing by a tomb, holding in her arms the cross; nay, having less significance than this, be-

cause this maker of grave-stones may intend to signify that he is willing to work for those who, unlike himself, thus weep, clinging to the cross as the symbol of surviving and immortal love. I have heard preachers and speakers who, when treating the most solemn and momentous of all subjects, have reminded me of a Spanish artist, who gave an example which they ought to copy. He painted the Lord's supper, but when the work was exhibited, he found that a cup on the board, so exquisitely was it painted, drew vastly more attention than the representation of the Saviour, or any other feature of the picture. He drew his brush over it, as a sacrifice of vanity to religion. It would be well when the gospel board is spread, to leave off all silver and golden cups that may serve to turn attention from the Divine Guest and his holy teachings. All the cups that we use should be commended by what they contain, bearing the water of life and the wine of the kingdom, which are more valuable in a broken earthern vessel, than all the jewelled cups of Eastern magnificence without them. And so with all imagery; let it be illustrative of the main theme or any relative idea of a discourse, and it is of consequence, like the golden bells on the high priest's garment, beautiful in themselves, but immeasurably important when they made the only sound that, on the day of Atonement, told the prostrate and hushed people in the Temple, that *he* lived before the Lord, in the holy of holies. "Blessed the people that know the joyful sound; they shall walk, O Lord, in the light of thy countenance."

He who has no love for symbolical imagery, can have no perception of much of the beauty that lies hidden in the Scriptures; and before his mind may pass true spiritual sublimity, but it will be all unseen. The mountain may be full of horses and chariots, and he, poor soul! seeing not the heavenly aid thus symbolized, will be heard crying, "Alas, Master! what shall we do?" How shall he enter into the richness of those grand and bold comparisons of the Scriptures, which throw open the gates of the temple of truth, and permit the active and delighted imagination to wander on and on, beholding at every step some new beauty, and catching sight of some new promise of unfolding glory. How shall he estimate the fulness of metaphor whereby so vast a catalogue of names and titles are applied to Christ;

and how shall he train himself to that use of the holy Word which brings in some parable or fable, that makes all the preacher has said like the work of John the Baptist, to prepare the way for the chief glory of God — the "Express Image," and the "Faithful Witness." And how will this dislike or inadequate appreciation of the worth of imagery, affect that observation and reading which are given as preparatory to public effort, impelling to leave unnoticed those passages, incidents, or allusions, which to other minds become quickeners of thought, and add grace and beauty to their ministrations in the sacred desk. If they will sneer at "flowery preaching," — the flowers of the acanthus, on the Corinthian column, crowning stateliness and strength,— if *they* will have none of it, they must be content with exciting less interest than they might excite.

The use of imagery keeps the imagination lively, and in many the imagination is the chief faculty of impression. It pictures thought, and thus has a similar influence over the mind as the fine arts; for in the hall of memory there hang not, nor stand, any portraitures or statuary, more distinct and perfect, than those which came there by the perception of beautiful thoughts. In the soul, the artist and the poet are greater rivals than where their works meet in the hall of art and literature, and severe indeed would be the task to decide, which has painted for memory the most perfect pictures. Where is the sculptor that can make a creature to dwell in the soul more perfectly than Little Nell? But beyond the enlivening of the imagination, and the greater distinctness given to uttered truth, by the use of illustrative imagery, there is another consideration — it increases and deepens emotion. Emotion is what we want — deep, strong, abiding. This is not to be obtained by pathetic appeals addressed directly to the feelings, but by the opening of the truth and increasing its distinctness. The regions of the intellect and the feelings are nearer each other than many imagine; thought flies quickly over the suspension-bridge, whose braided wires quiver according to the weight that is borne along. It is no uncommon thing to behold an audience aroused to intense interest in a subject by the introduction of some peculiarly striking figure, some happily conceived illustrative imagery. Why, a bird of paradise has suddenly entered, spreading to the fullest extension

its brilliant wings, in the clear sunlight, and soared aloft in the gracefulness of majestic beauty, while the temple seemed to be immeasurably extended. Fully awakened to the speaker's theme, feeling soon sympathizes with thought; and emotion created by distinct and truthful ideas, is emotion that can again be felt as the ideas are recalled to mind. Greater emotion than followed the first sensations may be felt, as reflection and meditation open more of the treasure in the happy thought. Truth, reproduced in the soul, is emotion. It is seen to be so especially in vocal social prayer, where the commencement may be formal and without unction, but as the service goes on, as the concentrated attention of the mind is given to the mercies of Inexhaustible Bounty, and the heart grows warm,—"heart speaks to heart," because thought speaks to thought, imagination to imagination, emotion to feeling. Ere we can have what we need of religious sensibility, truth must take some of those forms that, like a loving face, will not let us be without feeling, but quicken the whole heart. Illustrative imagery assists in doing this.

Nothing is more ill-judged than making a far-off pilgrimage for illustrative imagery. Grand strokes of thought may sometimes be made through a use of the classics, ancient mythology, and the sublimities of history. But much of the force of ideas, just, beautiful and weighty, is lost by the antique garb in which they are dressed, or the affixing to a modern dress, some gem from the ancients, which charms the attention or puzzles the mind, so that the answer of the questioned hearer in reference to a recognition of the idea, would be like that of a certain traveller; he was asked if he saw the face of a certain nobleman who had just passed him? and replied, "No — who was he? I only saw the queer figure on the lappet of his coat."

The Scriptures afford us the best example in this respect. The imagery of truth is drawn from things familiar; and thus, not only was the mind enabled more clearly to comprehend divine revelations, but the familiar things in after-time became symbols of the divine, and recalled forgotten truths. A reference to familiar history, sacred history, is especially effective when successfully made, inasmuch as it not only pictures the thought conceived by the writer or speaker, but recalls the history, revives associations, brings

back old and hallowed feelings, and thus softens the heart to receive a deeper impression of the truth. The author of the poem entitled "The Spleen," gives a good example when treating of the morbid feelings which press so heavily on the spirits, and which may easily be thrown off by exercise; "Throw but a stone," he says, "the giant dies!" How effectively the familiar things of life can be dealt with, our Saviour has shown us; and every day does but reveal, that success in speaking is best achieved by that activity of mind which gives new associations to old things. How masterly does Dickens manage this point, making "the slow potatoes bubbling up, knocking proudly at the saucepan-lid to be let out and peeled," recall to us Bob Cratchit and all the family, on that glorious Christmas-day, and we are shaking hands once more with Tiny Tim; hearing again his "God bless us, every one!" Fiction, after all that has been said against it, is the great agent of truth. It exhibits to us, in delineating society and man, what is the reality we should own, did we but look deep enough below the surface of things; and if we mourn that so much is written that discourages the Christian, let us use the same means of exciting interest in a more rational and humane manner. Let us not shun to speak as Nathan to David, as Daniel to Belshazzar, as Jesus to the Pharisees, when he pictured the lost sheep and piece of silver, the Prodigal Son, and the good Samaritan.

And here we may offer a cautionary suggestion. How many controversies have been turned, and essential points, at least for the time being, have been gained, by the directness and aptness of a figure! The whole force and impression of a lengthy and elaborate and scholar-like argument has been lost by some illustrative image which has set the true point before the audience, as fortunately introduced as the penny with which Christ answered the flatterers who desired to entangle him; a small thing was that penny, but it bore an image, more than which was not needed to end the wily charm of the enemy.

Among anecdotes of the pulpit, it is said, that in Edinburgh, one of two colleagues discoursed one Sabbath morning on the beauty of virtue, and in the course of his sermon declared that if virtue would but come in her true character and stand before men, all would love her, charmed

with her attractiveness. In the afternoon, the other preacher discoursed, and treated of the obstacles to the appreciation of virtue, and referring to what his colleague had said, he added,—"Virtue *has* come to our earth, *and was crucified!*" That single reference to Jesus and his fate, had more power than all the declamation which before had engaged the congregation. It modified all the praise which had been bestowed on man's love of the good and the true.

I choose another illustration from a recently commenced and now active contest, in which our Unitarian neighbors are so much interested. Strange claims have been set up in reference to the independence of the pulpit, as though men who have consecrated wealth to the support of Christianity, should suffer the propagation of Deism within the sacred enclosure. An apostle of this theory of independence has published a sermon entitled "Obstacles to the Truth." The text is spoken of as "a very significant one;" but let us look at it in its connection in the Bible, and see if an answer to the whole matter cannot be found. It is in these words,—"*And a great stone was upon the well's mouth*;" Gen. xxix. 2. The poetry of this compares the pulpit to a well; and obstacles to perfect independence of will and manner in using the pulpit, are like the great stone rolled against the mouth of the well. Now look into the Record and ask the question, *why* was the stone upon the well's mouth? and why was it a *great* one? Jacob and his friends came to it and found no difficulty in rolling it away; they watered their flocks, and quietly rolled it back again;—and why? doubtless to keep the sands and dirt from entering to defile the waters, impairing their virtue. It was a great stone, lest children might remove it and be endangered, or some wild animal should throw it off, and its struggles, after falling, end in leaving a dead carcase to poison the entire well. The text is indeed *significant;* and it is to be fondly hoped that whatever is as valuable as that well at which Jacob tarried and watered his flocks, may carefully be guarded. The independence of the pulpit is not unlicensed disregard of the purposes of those who erected it, for the simplest theory of rights secures to the owners of a house of worship and instruction the legitimate objects of its erection. They who think that prayer should be offered in the name of Jesus, "the mediator between

God and men," do not wish, and should not be inflicted with the presence of one as a spiritual teacher and leader in devotions, who describes such prayers as "whining and whimpering in our brother's name." It is right to put the great stone on the well's mouth, and seal it, if need be.

In controversies into which Universalists are so frequently drawn, there are great temptations to the use of illustrative imagery, and rashness here is dangerous indeed. Even those who are apt to deem plain prose the best language, contemning ornament, are thus sometimes drawn into the exercise of imagination and fancy, without making a very enviable figure. This exercise, however, is essential to quick perception of error, inasmuch as most of the arguments employed in popular debate are drawn from the figurative language of Scripture; and where the picturing of inspiration is present to the imagination, it is easy to compare the drawings which are made by those who take a wrong point of view of divine things. And how essential this is in reference to the connections which are attempted to be made between the sacrificial rites of the Mosaic ritual and the vagaries of the doctrines of vicarious atonement, I need not state. The student of the Epistle to the Hebrews has felt it all.

Another cautionary observation should be made in reference to ill-proportioned and ludicrous imagery. By ludicrous imagery, I mean the employment of figures which are utterly incompatible with the seriousness of religious discussions. In the old English pulpit almost every license was given to wit, and figures and imagery were employed in discourses, which if used now, would disturb, beyond endurance, the gravity of a Sabbath congregation. But there is enough of this kind of wit in use, and great injury is done by uniting ludicrous associations with Scripture passages, by quoting them in a comical connection; and also, by giving a likeness to characters or events of which none would ever have dreamed but irreverent minds. The pulpit of partial Christianity must account for much of this common desecration of God's word. It has given countenance, even amid the refinements of the present age, to all the grossness and boldness of such imagery as Dr. South employed. We meet in his writings, and others of his class, much of the figurative descriptive language that is

now put forth as original by great revivalists, who, not daring to imitate the theatrical Whitefield putting on the black cap, when about to pronounce sentence of everlasting wrath upon "the sinners," make up for this lack by going beyond him in the extravagance of metaphor and hyperbole. South could describe sinners as "hell and damnation proof"—as "fattening for the slaughter of eternity"—some as going "to hell with more ease, more flourish, and magnificence than others." Describing the wrath of God, he says, "The strokes, as it were, *shook and staggered Omnipotence itself.*"

The rule whereby to judge the propriety of a figure, in order to guard against the profane and the ludicrous, is that given by the enthusiastic Fuseli to his pupil. "Try to see what you are attempting to paint;" or as Goethe implied in his remark on a certain poet;—"The good Klopstock," said he, "would never have represented the Graces running a race, enveloped in the dust they kicked up, if he had ever been in the habit of making pictures of what he thought." I recalled this reading when I lately met in a letter to a Baptist minister by one of our own preachers, the use of ridicule in an argument against Water Baptism. The writer spoke of the baptism of the Ethiopian eunuch, and that decency would have required him to retain his clothing; and if, therefore, he was baptized by *immersion*, he must have pursued his journey in his wet clothes, "*like*"—so runs the comparison—"*a soaked weasel.*" In the same connection, an earnest advocacy of Water Baptism, is denominated "mill-pond Christianity," and "aqueous religion!" Such a use of ludicrous imagery is sure to awaken feelings which will entirely indispose the mind candidly to weigh arguments, when an omission of it would leave the truth to have "free course." If we attempt to argue against error, we must be cautious not to deal in ridicule towards that which the errorist holds sacred, lest our ridicule be remembered long after our argument is forgotten.

A word must be said in reference to ill-proportioned or incongruous imagery. Take, as an example, the description which Hazlitt gives of his favorite books;—after describing himself at ease "at mine inn," and shaking hands with old acquaintances, he enumerates several authors, and then adds,—"Spenser is hardly returned from a ramble

through the woods, or is concealed behind a group of nymphs, fawns and satyrs. Milton lies on the table as on an altar, never taken up or laid down without reverence. Lyly's Endymion sleeps with the moon that shines in at the window; and a breath of wind stirring at a distance, seems a sigh from the tree under which he grew old. Faustus disputes in one corner of the room with fiendish faces, and reasons of divine astrology. Bellafront soothes Mattheo, Vittoria triumphs over her judges, and old Chapman repeats one of the hymns of Homer, in his own fine translation." Now, how this picture, which is, for the most part, truly graphic, is injured by the incongruity, whereby glorious Milton is made but the title of a book among kindred spirits which are introduced in person! Milton "lies on the table, as on an altar," to be taken up and laid down reverently, as some precious relic on a shrine, while the rest of the writers are seated round and manœuvre in the room! And this, too, by one who was ever on the lookout for slips and falls on the part of all pilgrims to the realms of poetry and fancy. Such incongruities spoil many an otherwise fine picture, weakening vastly the force of the impression designed to be made, as by them the mind that was walking with spirits, is brought suddenly and cruelly back to the cold clod. An opening is made, through which we see the magic lantern and all the machinery of the show. These incongruities sometimes change the serious into the ludicrous, as a certain sea captain describing a battle engagement, in a letter sent home, remarked that "one of the *hands* was shot through the *nose*." Incongruity is always a characteristic of error, as unity is of truth. Attention to this will open the folly of many attempts to beguile unsuspecting candor by the subtlety of sophistry, and unravel the intricate web woven to entangle the feet of the mighty. More minds are deluded into a confirmed disbelief of Universalism by the sophistry of comparisons and analogies, so called, than by any other means. What Saurin calls "the sophism of zeal," is well illustrated by the common use of analogy. Many seem to have no idea of the truth of Pitt's remark to Wilberforce, who loaned him a copy of Butler's "Analogy of Religion." When Pitt returned the book, Wilberforce asked his opinion of it, and Pitt replied that there is nothing which may not be proved by analogy,

if it is admitted as a mode of positive proof. Some seem to place more confidence in this inferential reasoning than in the plainest declarations of the revealed word. It is indeed a good course of argument to reason "from what is acknowledged to what is disputed," but we must be careful that we do not take for our premises, assumptions in the place of things acknowledged, nor force things acknowledged into limits, or enlarge their boundaries, in opposition to or beyond the admissions of reason. Thus it is taken for granted that there *is* an analogy between sin and misery, as permitted by the Deity here, and the eternal perpetuation of them; whereas, the rectitude of permitting temporary evils, for the advancement of great good, may easily be allowed, while every energy of thought rises against admitting the rectitude of the eternal continuance of unmitigated evil. And so, also, in reference to the change which a removal from one state of being to another, has over mind and character. The translation effected by death, has been frequently compared to a voyage across the Atlantic, and the question is asked, Does it effect a change of moral character? It would be a sufficient answer to say — as we can in truth say — *it does sometimes.* The awfulness and sublimity of a fearful storm, have stirred the depths of the soul, and like some of those convulsions of nature which have brought the lowest strata of the earth's crust to the heights of the mountains, forever in the light of heaven; so has the religious element been diffused through the whole being, crowning the character. This breaks the analogy. But the fact of the case lies here; — those whom the use of analogy is intended to influence, do not admit the justness of the comparison first instituted; for what comparison is there, more than the mere idea of a voyage, between the passage of death and the Atlantic? If there were no more difference than the separation of soul and body — which in the latter case does not take place — there would be sufficient to make the analogist to pause. But there is more — more than language can picture, be it never so eloquently descriptive — more that wakes such hopes as never dawned upon a mind from simply an idea of visiting Europe. What is Europe, were all its attractions gathered into one city, and all its repulsiveness swept away, in comparison with the glories which Paul anticipated beholding

when he stood on the shores of Time, ready to embark on the soundless sea? "I shall see soon the Eternal City!" exclaimed an enthusiast when preparing to embark for foreign shores. A few moments passed, and he fell and died. Had he known what voyage he was that day ordained to take, what comparison would hold in his mind — the mind of a Christian — as just, between the glories of Rome and the Eternal City of God?

Did ever a man find in gazing on Niagara, that he had anticipated his feelings when thinking on the effect which would follow that sight? Many a one has found strange feelings awakened, and mysterious thoughts have gone with him forever afterward, whose mist was like the vapor above the glorious flood, crowned with infinite rainbows. Many a one cannot better define it than a blind man once defined to me his idea of his mother — "a beautiful thought." And who, then, shall presume to speak so coldly of the transition of the soul from time to eternity, as to declare that the change of states has no effect on the mental and moral being? How fares your analogy when the ideal is seen? We must beware of forming those chains of reasoning which are like chain-lightning only in one respect — as you try to examine one brilliant link, the rest are gone!

There is yet another caution which it is well to keep in mind, and that is, to beware of a limited range of imagery. Some writers deal so continually with the stars, that it would seem that they cared for nothing but for astrology with its dreams and poetry, and astronomy with its realities and sublimities. And a similar absorbing passion others have for the flowers, and others yet, for the symbols of warfare. It would be well to copy the device of a clergyman, who placed in large characters over his desk, in his study, the caution,—"*Beware of the Sea!*" A friend was surprised at reading this alarm, and asked what danger the clergyman had met with on the sea? He laughed heartily at the inference, and remarked, that he had found himself going too frequently to the sea for his imagery in composing sermons; his hearers had remarked it, and this caution was a hint to break up this monotony of illustration. Not a few need a similar caution, that they may disappoint a common expectation, and surprise by some new costumes

for their thoughts, and that, too, without forming a masquerade, where fancy holds high carnival.

While error is continually reducing the greatest truths of Revelation to a metaphor, and exalting metaphors above eternal realities, while the imagination is a chief faculty of impression, and its exercise increases the interest of the mind in any theme; and while so much needs to be done to give greater permanent attraction to the pulpit, and greater force to its teachings, it cannot be unreasonable to ask an increased attention to Illustrative Imagery. H. B—N.

Art. XVII.

Life and Immortality.

"And hath brought life and immortality to light." 2 Tim. i. 10.

It is agreed on all hands, that this passage has reference to man's condition after death. And the meaning commonly put upon the language is, that Jesus "illustrated," made "clear," "made certain," or demonstrated the truth of man's immortal existence beyond the grave.[1] This interpretation is predicated upon the supposition, that some-

[1]The word in the original, translated "hath brought to light," is rendered by Dr. Bloomfield, "who hath illustrated, and by implication, made certain, what was before obscure and dubious, just as bringing to light any object ascertains its reality," etc., (see note, in loco.) Dr. Macknight renders the word, "made clear;" and says it "is explained by Scapula, *lucidum reddo; lumino; illustro: I make a thing*, which was formerly dark, *clear* and plain," etc. See Translation, Par. and Com., *in loco*, Note 3. Dr. Clarke says, "The literal translation of the original is, *He hath illustrated life and incorruption by the gospel*," etc. Com., *in loco*. Professor Bush appears to entertain a similar view of the meaning of this language. See his Anastasis, pp. 141, 142.

It appears to me, that all these men have erred in supposing, that this language means no more than mere existence hereafter. Knowing that some ideas concerning this, prevailed among men, before the advent of the Messiah, they have felt compelled to interpret the original word in accordance with this fact: a well known and just canon of interpretation. Although it may seem presumptuous in one of my humble attainments, I shall attempt to show the incorrectness of their views of this text.

thing of the doctrine here asserted, was known by the human race, prior to the advent of Jesus of Nazareth. And if we construe the language to mean no more than mere existence hereafter, it is unquestionable that mankind have had some ideas concerning it, in every age of the world; for words expressive of such an idea, are found in all languages, even those of the most uncivilized and barbarous.

But it has ever seemed to me, that such an interpretation presents altogether too low a view of the meaning of this language, and one, too, not sanctioned by the New Testament usage of the term *life* in particular. I believe the apostle meant to express more, by this language, than the exegesis under consideration supposes. At any rate the words are susceptible of a higher, and, in my humble judgment, a meaning more honorable to the Saviour's character.

According to our best lexicographers, the Greek word rendered *hath brought to light*, means "to make known."[2] And this is the sense in which I would have it understood in this text, as Dr. Robinson contends in his Lexicon.[3]

If this view of the matter be correct, that Jesus was *absolutely* the revealer of *life and immortality*, it is a necessary inference, that it is something of which men had no knowledge before. It is, in fact, an affirmation, that Jesus brought to light, or revealed, some new truth in relation to man's future existence. And as the idea of the simple fact, that man is to exist after his mortal dissolution, is one which has prevailed in all nations, and in every age of the world, it cannot mean this, because it would not be making *known* any thing; it being a fact with which men were

[2] Donnegan's and Dr. Robinson's Lexicon, in φωτίζω.

[3] I think the interpretation of the participle in the text under consideration, given above, is abundantly confirmed by the usage of the verb and its participles in the writings of St. Paul. This word in any of its forms, is found only in Luke, xi. 36; John i. 9; and in three instances in Revelations, aside from the Pauline Epistles. Whoever will enter into a critical examination of these texts, will perceive, that while it is used in a sense approaching to that of St. Paul, by Luke, and especially by John, the usage in the Apocalypse is widely different. If I mistake not, in every instance in which the original word, in any of its forms, occurs in the Epistles of Paul, *if* we except the text under consideration, it bears the sense "to reveal" or "make known." The following are all the instances, I believe, in which it occurs. 1 Cor. iv. 5; Eph. i. 18, iii. 9; Heb. vi. 4, x. 32.

before acquainted. If the first proposition be correct, then the term *life and immortality* must mean more than mere existence after the death of the body, as it is commonly interpreted.

Hence the inquiry naturally arises, Will these words bear any other construction, in accordance with the legitimate laws of interpretation? I believe not only that they will bear this, but more. I believe the usage of the terms, in the New Testament, imperiously demands, that a different construction be put upon the term life, especially. It will be my object, therefore, to establish this, and to show, in the present article, that it accords with the facts in the case.

Throughout the New Testament, Christ is represented as having much to do with life in man; and such is the manner in which this matter is spoken of, that it is manifest it refers, not to existence merely, but to something which pertains to man as a moral being — to his inward nature. Hence, while men have an existence in this world, they are often represented as destitute of this certain something called life, or eternal life; and also as being dead.

I will notice a few passages in point. Jesus says, "Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die. I am the living bread which came down from heaven. If any man eat of this bread he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world. The Jews, therefore, strove among themselves, saying: How can this man give us his flesh to eat? Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life: and I will raise him up at the last day. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me. This is that bread which came down from heaven; not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead. He that eateth of this bread

shall live forever."[4] I have quoted this passage, not for the purpose of explaining its peculiar language, or to remark on its general meaning; but to show, that the life communicated by Jesus, is something men may either be destitute of, or possess, while living in this world. This, it will be seen, is clear enough from this single passage; for while men have an existence here, they are represented as being destitute of this life under a certain circumstance. Hence the inference is inevitable, that this life cannot be mere existence.

"And this is the record, that God hath given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son, hath life; and he that hath not the Son of God, hath not life."[5] By having the Son, is intended, no doubt, in this text, embracing the doctrines of Christ, or becoming true Christians.[6] But to be a true Christian, it is not necessary to confer upon a human being mere existence. Man must have existence before he can be a Christian. Beside, mere existence is possessed alike, both by Christians and by unbelievers, good and bad men, whether they be in this world or the next; for the apostle declares there is to be a resurrection, "both of the just and unjust."[7]

What can be more obvious, than that the certain something called life, and eternal life, in these texts, is not mere existence, either of body or soul? To my mind, nothing can be plainer. And if it does not mean mere existence, to what can it refer, but to something pertaining to man's inward, moral, spiritual nature; to a state and condition of the soul? It certainly can refer to nothing but one of these; for man has but two natures or modes of existence to be affected any way — the physical and intellectual, the carnal and spiritual, the natural and moral. And if it does not refer, as I have shown, to mere existence,

[4] John vi. 49–58. Those who wish for a good and common-sense exposition of this language, are referred to Livermore's Commentary, *in loco*. Some additional facts and suggestions may be found in Barnes's Notes, *in loco*.

[5] 1 John v. 11, 12.

[6] This view of the subject is well set forth in the Christian Examiner, No. for December, 1828, p. 447.

[7] Acts xxiv. 15.

nor to any physical condition, as I suppose all will admit,[8] then, it must refer to some state or condition of the soul; to something pertaining to the moral or spiritual nature. Now if the reference is to man's moral or spiritual nature, it must mean some condition or state of that nature; for the mere existence of that nature, it cannot mean, because all men equally possess a moral or spiritual existence, as well as a physical one, in this world just as truly as in the future, whether they be good or bad. There is no difference in respect to mere spiritual existence, between the good and the bad. Both equally possess it.

What then are we to understand by the term life, when applied to man as a spiritual being? In answering this question, I will refer to the manner in which this word is used in the New Testament. In quoting texts, I shall make no distinction between those where the term life is used, and those where the phrase eternal life, or everlasting life occurs; because this term and these phrases manifestly mean the same thing.[9]

Before introducing any texts, I may call the attention of the reader, to the point where we now stand; and also state my views of the meaning of the term and phrases, which the texts will be introduced to sustain. I do this that the reader may be prepared, beforehand, to judge whether the passages introduced reach the point, and will sustain the position.

The point already established, is the negative position, that the term life, and the phrase eternal life, or everlasting life, do not have reference to mere existence, either physical, intellectual or moral; because this is not at all dependent upon any of the conditions attached to the attainments of this life; it being alike the possession of him who has faith and of him who has it not; the Christian and the infidel, whether in this world or the next, in a state of happiness or one of misery.

[8] That it cannot refer to any physical condition of man, is plain from the very manner in which it is spoken of in the New Testament. See Luke x. 28; John xi. 25; Rom. viii. 13; 2 Cor. iv. 11; Gal. ii. 20; iii. 11.

[9] To be satisfied of this, any man of ordinary intelligence need but compare a few texts. Comp. John v. 26, 40; x. 10; xx. 31. 1 John v. 12, with John iii. 5; xvii. 2, 3; 1 John v. 11; John iii. 16, 36; v. 24; vi. 40, 47.

Affirmatively, it has been established that this term and that phrase, have reference to some state or condition of the soul itself, or the moral nature, aside from its mere existence, which is presupposed; and that it is something peculiar to the believer, the Christian, wherever he may be, just as truly in this world, as in the next, and in the next as in this.

Having attained this position, it now remains for us to answer the question, What are we to understand by that language? In reply to it, I remark, that I suppose there is some peculiar fitness in the term life, in its application to this matter, or it would not have been used. If this be the case, we may derive some aid in determining the sense, by referring to its meaning when applied to our physical existence. When thus applied, what does it mean? The term life is used in two senses. *First*, for that peculiar, indefinable, intangible something, which constitutes its essence, the thing itself. *Second*, for those manifestations peculiar to beings or things in that state called living. Ordinarily, the word is not used to represent the essence of life; that mysterious energy which produces those manifestations peculiar to living things, but for the *effects* which flow from vital force. We have no idea, not the most faint and distant, as to what the essence of life is. It is something so subtle that the most careful investigations have been entirely unable to make any discovery, which gives the slightest intimation, or that will enable any one to form the remotest idea as to what it is. Hence the term life, from necessity, is commonly used to represent the *effects* rather than the *cause*. When it is said, a man has life, all that is meant by it, is, that he exhibits those peculiar manifestations which distinguish men in that state called life.

Precisely so, I think it is, as to the use of the term life, when applied to the soul, or our moral nature. It is used to describe, not so much that certain subtle something, which is the essence of life itself, but certain results and manifestations which pertain to moral beings, in a state called living. When a soul is represented as living, all that is meant by it, is, that it exhibits certain results, indicative of an inward power or energy, the essence of which is unknown, called life; the *effects* being put for the *cause*. In the New Testament, I think the term life is commonly

used in this last sense, though in a few instances, it is used for the vital energy itself.[10]

The state called life, is very fully and clearly described in the New Testament, under the designation of the fruits of the Spirit. It is a state of "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance."[11] When these results are manifested, we have demonstrative proof, that there is life in that soul; because these are the results which distinguish men who have life in their souls, according to the Scriptures, and which flow only from that inward energy, that vital force, which we call life, in a strict and philosophical use of language, which is not the way in which it is commonly used in the New Testament; and of which we know nothing except from its effects. Hence the term may come to mean, the ultimate result of such a state of mind, feeling, and principle, which is bliss, although with this is necessarily associated the producing cause. And as the phraseology is used in the New Testament, it means *inward* bliss. The term life means this. If the phrases everlasting life, eternal life, denote the same thing as the term life, as I have shown, the words everlasting and eternal, used as they are to describe the *nature* of that life, are proof that it is inward bliss, bliss of soul. I think it has been most conclusively proved, that the original word, of which these words are a rendering, means *spiritual.** This life is a *spiritual life;* and, of course, an inward one; a bliss of soul![12]

Let us now examine a few texts, and see if the term life, in them, does not obviously mean, inward happiness.[13]

[10] The following texts, I think, are to be taken in this last sense. John i. 4, v. 26; vi. 53, 63; 1 John i. 2, v. 12.

[11] Gal. v. 22.

[12] Those who wish to see a very thorough discussion of this point, are referred to a series of papers, by the late E. S. Goodwin, of Sandwich, Mass., published in the Christian Examiner, commencing in the Dec. No. of 1828, and ending in the May No. of 1833.

[13] Prof. Robinson in his Greek and English Lexicon gives "*happiness*"

* We suppose that the author means that the word is *sometimes* used in a sense tantamount to "spiritual," particularly in the connection of which he is here speaking. Mr. Goodwin's authorities, to which reference is made, will hardly bear out the inference that such is the *proper* meaning of the word.—EDITOR.

"If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments."[14] What does the word life here mean, but happiness within? And what construction can be put upon this text, but, If thou wilt secure inward enjoyment, bliss of soul, keep the commandments? "For God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life."[15] That is, they should secure that energy and exaltation of soul which prevent their becoming wretched, let what would come, and which also confer upon them, as moral beings, positive spiritual enjoyment, under all the circumstances of their existence, in all worlds. "He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not on the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him."[16] What can the term life, and the phrase everlasting life, mean, in this place, but that bliss, and negatively the want of it, which flows from that inward energy of soul, that produces holiness of life, that gives man power to resist evil

as one of the meanings of the Greek word rendered *life*. He also says, that "eternal life," "in the Christian sense," means a "life of bliss and glory in the kingdom of God." I am aware that he refers this entirely to the future state, in which I can by no means agree with him. My only object in quoting his language, is to show that in his judgment, as well as in that of men who would make a wider application of the Greek term, it bears the sense of *happiness*, and of course happiness of soul.

[14] Matt. xix. 17.

[15] John iii. 16. Dr. Robinson says that the Greek word for *life*, means "that life of bliss and glory in the kingdom of God, which awaits the true disciple of Christ after the resurrection;" or, as he would have more correctly said, *is* the possession of the true disciple on becoming such. John iii. 36.

[16] John iii. 36. Barnes's Notes, *in loco*. Dr. A. Clarke, *in loco*. "We may consider the phrase *wrath of God*, as a Hebraism, *punishment* of *God*, that is, the most heavy and awful of all punishments, such as sin deserves, and such as it becomes divine justice to inflict. And this *abideth on him* — endures as long as his unbelief and disobedience remain." Dr. Jebb says, as quoted by Dr. Bloomfield, "He who, with his heart, *believeth* in the Son, is *already* in possession of eternal life; he, whatever may be his outward profession, whatever his theoretic or historical belief, who *obeyeth not the Son*, not only does not possess *eternal* life, he does not possess any thing worthy to be called life at all; but this is not the whole, for as eternal life is the present possession of the faithful, so the wrath of God is the *present* and *permanent* lot of the disobedient; it *abideth on him*." Note, *in loco*. Kenrick, *in loco*.

and all its temptations, and to do good amid the worst discouragements; and the inward bliss that is the consequence of such a course? "But whosoever drinketh of the water I shall give him, shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him, shall be a well of water springing up unto everlasting life."[17] That is, it shall be a living, a never-failing fountain of spiritual, inward enjoyment. "Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life."[18] That is, he is in possession of inward enjoyment, happiness of soul, peace and bliss of mind, having escaped from that desolation and misery of soul, which are the unavoidable portion of every unbeliever. "Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation."[19] That is, those whose characters are conformable to the teachings and spirit of Christ, shall be awakened to a new consciousness, a more full realization, and lively sense of inward enjoyment and the mighty energies in their souls for bliss; while those whose characters were not in conformity with this standard, would be aroused to a full sense of their

[17] John iv. 14. Livermore's Com., *in loco*, and Barnes's note, *in loco*. "The general meaning of these words, when divested of all figure, is, that such shall be the vivifying effect of the gospel, as to satisfy the most ardent desires of the soul." Bloomfield's note, *in loco*.

[18] John v. 24. "*But is passed from death unto life.* Death is the country where every Christless soul lives. The man who knows not God, lives a dying life, or a living death; but he who believes in the Son of God, *passes over* from the empire of death, to the empire of life." Dr. A. Clarke, Com., *in loco*. "*Hath everlasting life*, that is, everlasting happiness or blessedness, for such is the idea generally conveyed by this phrase in the New Testament." Livermore's Com., *in loco*. "Religion, and its blessings here and hereafter, are one and the same. The happiness of heaven is living to God — being sensible of his presence, and glory, and power, and rejoicing in that. . . . . This *life*, or this religion, whether on earth or in heaven, is the same; the same joys extended and expanded forever. Hence, when a man is converted, it is said that he *has* everlasting life; not merely *shall have*, but is already in possession of that life or happiness." Barnes's note, *in loco*.

[19] John v. 28, 29.

utter desolation of soul, and abandoned to all the miseries of such a state.[20] "For to be carnally minded is death; but to be spiritually minded is life and peace."[21] That is, to have the mind subjected to the dominion of outward things, and all its thoughts absorbed in things of a physical nature, and under the dominion of the passions and lusts of the flesh, is destruction to the peace and happiness of the soul; but to have it under the thoughts and contemplations of the spiritual world, and a faith which works by love and purifies the heart, affords an inward power and energy of soul, which gives constant peace. "For he that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reap life everlasting."[22] That is, he who lives only to gratify his animal passions, will receive as his reward, only the miserable and short-lived pleasures they afford, and with them, wretchedness of soul; while he who lives to cultivate high and holy thoughts and feelings, and actions conformable to such a state of mind, shall secure to himself spiritual enjoyment, enjoyment of soul, that does not perish in its using.

Nothing, it appears to me, can be more obvious to a discerning mind, than that the term life and the phrase everlasting life, or eternal life, mean spiritual or inward enjoyment, bliss of soul, without intending to limit it to any place where the soul may be; whether it is in this world or the next. That it is something possessed, or that may be possessed, in this life, is certain from these texts. This view is confirmed by the manner in which the term *death* is used as the opposite of this life. I will notice a few texts where the term death occurs in this way.

"Verily, verily, I say unto you, if any man keep my saying, he shall never see death."[23] "That as sin hath

[20] Bush's Anastasis, p. 234–41, and 122.

[21] Rom. viii. 6. "*Is death.* The expression is one of great energy, and shows that it not only *leads* to death, or leads to misery, but that it is death itself; there is wo and condemnation in the *very act and purpose* of being supremely devoted to the corrupt passions." Barnes's note, *in loco.*

[22] Gal. vi. 8. Barnes's note on John v. 24.

[23] John viii. 51. To see death, means to suffer death. Barnes's note, *in loco.* "*He shall never see death.* He does not assert that keeping his word, or obeying his instructions, would save the gross,

reigned unto death."[24] "Whether of sin unto death."[25] "For the end of these things is death."[26] "For the wages of sin is death."[27] "And the commandment which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death."[28] "To be carnally minded is death."[29] "Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death."[30] "He that loveth not his brother abideth in death."[31]

Whoever will take the pains to compare these passages with their connections, will at once perceive that the term *death* expresses the opposite of life; and that while men have an existence, both as physical and spiritual beings, they are said to be dead, the same as they are said to be alive under other circumstances; and that in the present state, as truly as in the next.

Mr. Barnes, in remarking upon the words, "is death," says, "The expression is one of great energy, and shows that it not only *leads* to death, or leads to misery, but that it is death itself; there is wo and condemnation in the *very act and purpose* of being supremely devoted to the corrupt passions."[32] Dr. Robinson also admits that life and death, as used in the New Testament, are antithetical, the one being opposite to the other.[33] From the very manner in which the terms *life* and *death* are used in these texts, it is plain that they do not mean existence and a suspension of existence, either physical or spiritual, but that they denote two opposite moral conditions of the soul; a state or condition, without reference to locality, of happiness or misery of the inward or higher nature. This, certainly, is the case,

material body from dying. His meaning is, that his disciples would be delivered from the bondage of the fear of death, and above all from spiritual death." Livermore's Com., *in loco.*

[24] Rom. v. 21. "The reader will not fail to remark that *death* is the direct antithesis of *eternal life.*" Stuart's Com., *in loco.* "*Is death.* This stands opposed to eternal life, and proves that one is just as enduring as the other." Barnes's note on Rom. vi. 23.

[25] Rom. vi. 16. [26] Rom. vi. 21. Macknight's note, *in loco.*

[27] Rom. vi. 23.

[28] Rom. vii. 10. Barnes, *in loco*, and on v. 9, Dr. A. Clarke Com., *in loco.* "Every sinner is *miserable* in both body and mind by the influence and the effects of sin."

[29] Rom. viii. 6. Barnes, *in loco.* [32] Note on Rom. vii. 6.

[30] James i. 15. [33] Greek and English Lexicon.

[31] 1 John iii. 14.

if any reliance is to be placed upon the *usage* of terms, in determining their meaning.

This being the case we must understand the apostle to declare, by the term *life*, that after the dissolution of the body, man is to have spiritual enjoyment, perfect blessedness of soul, of the same kind as in this world, though in a higher degree; and that this great truth was first made known, brought to light, or revealed to the world, by Jesus Christ.

We come now to the consideration of the term *immortality*. Little need be said, in relation to the meaning of this word; for there is little if any disagreement concerning it. All, I believe, are agreed, in its bearing the sense of indestructible existence; or an existence that will not decay. I will introduce a few examples of the usage of this term, or rather of the original of which it is a rendering.[34] "So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in *corruption;* it is raised in *incorruption.*"[35] That is, its first existence is perishable, but its existence in a future state, is imperishable. It is not liable to be taken from us, as our physical existence is, in this world. "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth *corruption* inherit *incorruption.*"[36] That is, this perishable body cannot come into the enjoyment of God's spiritual kingdom, nor this perishable possess the imperishable. "The trumpet shall sound and the dead shall be raised *incorruptible*, and we shall be changed. For this *corruptible* must put on *incorruption*, and this *mortal* shall put on *immortality.*[37] So when this corruptible shall have put on *incorruption*, and this *mortal* shall have put on *immortality*, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory."

So in the passage under consideration, the term immortality, means an imperishable, or indestructible existence. Not an existence which Omnipotence cannot destroy; but an existence that is not perishable; that no power short of

[34] The Greek word is rendered incorruption and immortality, and literally means "incapacity of decay." Rob. Greek and English Lexicon.

[35] 1 Cor. xv. 42. [36] 1 Cor. xv. 50. [37] 1 Cor. xv. 52–54.

Omnipotence can destroy. I suppose what God confers, he can take away, if he is pleased to do it; and that He alone has immortality in the highest degree; that is, an immortality which is absolutely indestructible, that makes his existence one that cannot decay, neither any power destroy.[38]

From what has been said, it appears, that the passage under consideration, may mean that Christ has revealed, made known, or brought to light, the doctrine of an indestructible existence and perfect blessedness in a future state, after the dissolution of the mortal body.[39] And this, I believe to be the idea the apostle meant to express. In this it is implied, of course, that no such idea had before been known among mankind. If a knowledge or belief of such an existence and blessedness was in existence among our race, then our interpretation is at war with facts, and must be false.[40] This brings us to the inquiry, whether any belief of this kind did have an existence among mankind, prior to the advent of the Messiah. I believe no such idea was in the world before Jesus made it known, brought it to light, or revealed it, to the world; and this point I shall now attempt to prove. If I fail in this, my views of this text must be false; but if I succeed, it will be a strong confirmation of them.

The idea that man exists after the dissolution of the body, has prevailed among all nations and in every period of the world's history, from the most refined, cultivated and civilized, down to the most rude and barbarous; but I believe it is susceptible of the clearest demonstration, that no nation,

[38] 1 Tim. vi. 16. Macknight's note 1, *in loco.*

[39] "*And revealed life;*" that is, bliss of soul in an "*imperishable*" existence. I regard "immortality" as descriptive of the nature of the existence, and of course, of what is connected with it. It is an existence that is *imperishable*, not subject to decay; and "life," of the condition of the human soul, in that existence. It is a condition of happiness, of bliss that is uninterrupted, permanent, like the existence with which it is connected. Christ was the first teacher of this doctrine.

[40] Any interpretation of a text of Scripture, which conflicts with known and established facts, cannot be a correct exposition, unless we charge the author of it, with error or falsehood. For all language, that is expressive of truth, must be so interpreted, as to accord with the facts of the case. This is one of the most important rules of interpretation, but one most sadly neglected by a vast proportion of the readers of the Scriptures.

not blessed with the light of the Christian revelation, ever yet came to view that existence, as one of perfect and uninterrupted felicity, or indissoluble. This will appear from a simple statement of the views of the people in the different ages and nations, prior to the Messiah's advent. In order that the subject may assume as distinct and definite a position as possible in the mind of the reader, I shall consider it under three divisions. 1. The Old Testament representation of a future state; 2. The Classical representation; and 3. The views of the Jews in the time of Christ.

I.—THE OLD TESTAMENT REPRESENTATION OF THE FUTURE STATE.

The word used in the Old Testament, to represent the state of the dead, is *Sheol.* This term, as Prof. Stuart remarks, "designated *the world of the dead*, the region of *umbræ* or *ghosts.* It was considered as a vast and wide domain or region, of which the grave seems to have been, as it were, only a part, or a kind of entrance-way. It appears to have been regarded as extending deep down into the earth, even to its lowest abysses. This was not unnatural. In the present life, men inhabit a region over which the air extends indefinitely. Imagination formed something like this, for those who were placed in the sepulchre. A region deep and wide existed all around them. In this boundless region lived, and moved at times, the manes of departed friends."[41] Mr. Barnes gives the following account of the representation of the future state by the Old Testament, which I consider very accurate.[42] "There is an abode to which the grave is but the entrance; a world where there is still consciousness, and susceptibility of happiness or wo. In that world the Shades, or the *Rephaim* reside, the spirits of departed men:

> "The shades tremble from beneath;
> The waters and their inhabitants.
> Sheol is naked before him,
> And Destruction hath no covering.[43]

[41] Essay on Future Punishment, p. 116. See also Gesenius's Heb. and Eng. Lexicon.

[42] Introduction to his Commentary on the book of Job, as quoted in the Biblical Repository for April, 1844, p. 172, *et seq.*

[43] Job xxvi. 5, 6. "*The Shades:* that is, ghosts, departed spirits, the inhabitants of *Hades*, or the under-world, whom the ancient Hebrews

"It is clear here, that this world is supposed to be beneath, that it is under the waters; that it is the region of Sheol to which the grave is the entrance; and that there is a dominion of God over those departed Shades or Rephaim, so that he has power to make them tremble. There can be no doubt, that by the Shades or Rephaim here, there is allusion to the *manes mortuum*, the spirits of the dead, confined in Sheol."

This view is very fully established by the following texts, but one of which I shall quote.

"Sheol beneath is in commotion on account of thee,
To meet thee at thy coming;
He stirreth up before thee the Shades, all the mighty of the earth;
They all accost thee and say:
Art thou, too, become as weak as we?
Art thou become like us?[44]

"That world is dark and dismal. There is an obscure light there, but it serves only to heighten the gloom.

"Are not my days few?
O spare me, and let me alone, that I may take a little ease,
Before I go whence I shall not return,
To the land of darkness, and the shadow of death —
The land of darkness, like the blackness of the shadow of death;
Where there is no order, and where its shining is like blackness.[45]

"This view of the future world is remarkably obscure and gloomy, and shows that even the mind of Job had not such anticipations of the future state, as to cheer and support him in the time of trial. The apprehension seems to have

conceived of as without strength and with little sensation; mere shadows of what they once were. Ps. lxxxviii. 10; Prov. ii. 18, ix. 18, xxi. 16; Is. xiv. 9, 10, xxiv. 14, 19.

"*The under-world — Destruction.* These are different words, expressing the same thing, namely, the abode of departed spirits, which was supposed to be a vast cavern, far in the interior of the earth. See Jahn's Arch., § 203 and 207." Noyes's Notes, *in loco*, Revised ed.

[44] Isaiah xiv. 9, 10, Noyes's translation. See also Ps. lxxxviii. 10 Prov. ix. 18; Isaiah xxvi. 19.

[45] Job x. 20–22. "*Are not my days few?* that is, my life is short, and hastens apace to an end. Do not, then, continue my afflictions to the last moment of my existence. Let the very short term of life which remains to me, be a season of rest and enjoyment. *Before I go — whence I shall not return*, &c. These verses contain a description of *Sheol*, or *Hades*, the under-world, the place of all the dead." Noyes's note, *in loco*.

been, that all the dead would descend through the grave to a region, where only a few scattered rays of light would exist, and where the whole aspect of the dwelling was in strong contrast with the cheerful regions of the 'land of the living.' To that dark world, even Job felt that it would be a calamity to descend; for though there was an expectation that there would be a distinction there between the good and the evil, yet, compared with the present world of light and beauty, it was a sad and gloomy dwelling-place. That world was regarded, by the ancients, as less desirable, as a place of residence, than this, in several respects. It was dark and gloomy. It was entered through the grave, and the grave was only its outer court. They who dwelt there, were cut off from the enjoyments of the present life. It was a land of silence. Thus Hezekiah, speaking of that world to which he had a prospect of descending when so sick, says:

> "I said, I shall not see Jehovah,
> Jehovah in the land of the living;
> I shall see man no more,
> Among the inhabitants of the land of stillness.[46]

"In like manner, it would be a place where the worship of God could not be appropriately celebrated. Thus Hezekiah says:

> "For Sheol cannot praise thee;
> Death cannot celebrate thee;
> They that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth.
> The living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day;
> The father to the children shall make known thy faithfulness.[47]

"A similar sentiment is expressed by David.

> "For in death there is no remembrance of thee;
> In the grave who shall give thee thanks?[48]

"A similar view of that world appears to have been taken by Job. Indeed it is not improbable, that the view of Job was even more gloomy in regard to that future world, as he lived at a period so much earlier than David and Hezekiah. The idea of the future state was more and more developed, though in the time of Hezekiah it was

[46] Isaiah xxxviii. 11. [47] Isaiah xxxviii. 18, 19. [48] Ps. vi. 5.

accompanied with much that was dark and gloomy.[49] . . . . . It will be apparent from these illustrations, that the views of the future state in the time of Job, were very obscure." They may be summed up in this way. After the dissolution of the body, the spirit became a ghost or shade, which was a thin, aerial substance, retaining a shadowy form of what the individual was in life, though somewhat larger;[50] that it descended through the grave into Sheol, where all was dark and gloomy, silent and dreary.[51] Here it existed in a kind of inactive or torpid state, as it were, half asleep, but conscious of all that was passing about it. It had a kind of dreamy existence, suffering neither pain, or enjoying pleasure, and seldom moving.[52] It "was a quiet resting-place; a place where toil and wo and care would cease."

[49] Herder says of the Hebrews, "The sad and mournful images of their ghostly realm disquieted them, and were too much for their self-possession." Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, Marsh's translation, vol. 1, 176. See, also, the entire dialogue on this subject, pp. 170–185; vol. 2, 21–22.

Bishop Lowth says, "In the under-world of the Hebrews, there is something peculiarly grand and awful. It was an immense region, a vast subterranean kingdom, involved in thick darkness, filled with deep valleys, and shut up with strong gates; and from it there was no possibility of escape. Thither whole hosts of men went down at once; heroes and armies with their trophies of victory, kings and their people, were found there; where they had a sort of shadowy existence as manes or ghosts, neither entirely spiritual, nor entirely material, engaged in the employments of their earthly life, though destitute of strength and physical substance." Lectures on Hebrew Poetry, (note to page 64,) page 347. Andover edition, 1829. Campbell's Four Gospels, Dissertation 6, p. 2, §19. For a very full account of the phraseology of the Jews on this subject, see Univer. Expos., vol. 3, p. 397, *et seq.*

[50] In that world men are "powerless, as a shadow without distinction of members, as a nerveless breath. . . . . They were represented there, as still having an animated though shadowy existence. Their living power and energy were destroyed, and they only wandered and flitted in the realm of the dead, in the dark nether-world, as limbless and powerless beings." Herder's Spirit of Hebrew Poetry, vol. 1, p. 173. See, also, Ossian's Poems. Stuart's Essays, p. 118, (5.)

[51] Lowth's Lectures on Hebrew Poetry, p. 64, and note pp. 347–48. Stuart's Essays on Future Punishment, p. 116.

[52] Isaiah xiv. 9–10. Stuart's Essays, p. 116 and 117, (3.) This is strictly true, however, only of the earlier views of this people. Quite a change took place in the views of the Hebrews, between the times of Moses, and the later prophets, concerning the future state, as indeed

"For now should I have lain still and been quiet;
I should have slept;
Then had I been at rest
With kings and counsellors of the earth.
Or as a hidden untimely birth, I had not been;
As infants which never saw the light.
There the wicked cease from troubling;
And there the weary be at rest.[53]
My days are passed;
My plans are at an end—
The cherished purposes of my heart.
Night has become day to me;
The light bordereth on darkness.
Truly I look to Sheol as my home;
My bed is spread in this place of darkness.
To corruption I say, 'Thou art my father;'
To the worms, 'My mother and my sister.'
And where now is my hope?
And who will see my hope fulfilled?
To the bars of Sheol they must descend;
Yea, we shall descend together to the dust.[54]
There the prisoners rest together;
They hear not the voice of the oppressor.
The small and great are there,
And the servant is free from his master."[55]

Such is the view of the future state, as presented to the mind in the Old Testament; and I cannot but ask—What is there in it, that looks like perfect felicity, and a permanent, indissoluble, indestructible existence beyond the grave, such as Christianity describes? So far is it from this, that the present state of mingled joy and sorrow, was considered far preferable to it. Indeed, so far was it from being regarded as a desirable place, that it was considered one of the greatest calamities, under the ordinary circumstances of life, to be cut off from the land of the living and sent into that world.[56] It was regarded as preferable to this present state, only when the person was weighed

there has subsequently. See Campbell's Four Gospels, Dis. 6, part 2, §19. Univer. Expos., vol 3, p. 397, *et seq.*

[53] Job iii. 13–17.

[54] Job xvii. 11–16; Biblical Repository, Jan., 1844, p. 171–2.

[55] Job iii. 18, 19.

[56] It is on this account that we find death so often spoken of as punishment, and that bad men are threatened with it. Their dread of that world was, not from the apprehension of punishment there, but from its gloomy and uninviting character, in the general apprehensions.

down with disease, suffering from misfortune, or calamity, or old age, while nothing better was to be hoped for in the land of the living. It is for this reason, that we find so little said, in the Old Testament, concerning a future state, especially as a matter of comfort and consolation, in trouble, and on the approach of death. It was too dreary, dark and gloomy, in their apprehensions, when contrasted with this bright and beautiful world, to be regarded as desirable, except in cases of extreme suffering.

If the representation of the future state, which is here presented, be a correct view of the doctrine as developed in the Old Testament, then it is manifest, that it teaches no such doctrine as "life and immortality," as I have explained these words. Such ideas as these words convey to the mind, as explained in this paper, were utterly unknown to the patriarchs and prophets of the old covenant. So that, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, the exposition given of the words, "hath brought to life, light and immortality," not only stands uncontradicted, but is strongly confirmed by the facts in the case.

II.—THE CLASSICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE FUTURE STATE.

In many respects, there is a striking similarity between the views of a future state, presented by the Old Testament, and those of the Classics, particularly by the older Classics. The Old Testament and the Classics present the same phenomena in one respect, on this matter. In both there is a manifest development and improvement of the ideas of the people they represent, in relation to the subject. In both, the older uniformly present a more dark and gloomy aspect of the realm of the dead, than the later. The main difference between the Old Testament and the Classics, is, that the Classics always represent the underworld more light and cheerful, and its inhabitants more active, than the Old Testament. This is especially the case in regard to the later Classics.

One or two passages from Homer, will be sufficient to present a view of the prevalent opinions of his time, concerning the condition of the inhabitants of the future world, and also the difference between these and those presented by the Old Testament.

"Deep in the dismal regions of the dead,
The infernal monarch reared his horrid head,
Leap'd from his throne, lest Neptune's arms should lay
His dark dominions open to the day,
And pour in light on Pluto's drear abodes,
Abhorred by men, and dreadful e'en to gods." [57]

So, throughout the Classics, the future world is uniformly spoken of as the "dismal regions," the "lonely land," "dark regions," "the black place of eternal night," "the dolesome realms of darkness," "dark dominions," and the like; all of which shows that it was regarded as any thing but a desirable abode. Another example will place this matter in a stronger light. In his visit to the realm of the dead, Ulysses meets with Achilles, whom he addresses thus:

"But sure the eye of Time beholds no name
So bless'd as thine, in all the rolls of fame;
Alive we hailed thee with our guardian gods,
And dead, thou rul'st a king in these abodes."

Achilles replied,

"Talk not of ruling in this dolorous gloom,
Nor think vain words, he cried, can ease my doom.
Rather I 'd choose laboriously to bear
A weight of woes, and breathe the vital air,
A slave to some poor hind, that toils for bread,
Than reign the sceptred monarch of the dead." [58]

That, surely, cannot be a very desirable or happy abode, in which the most favored would gladly exchange conditions with a slave of the poorest and most abject peasant in this world, with "a weight of woes." We can hardly call such a state one of perfect felicity.

I know, indeed, that in the time of Virgil, the underworld had been newly modified, in the popular belief, and had assumed a more pleasant and inviting aspect. But whoever will carefully look into the matter, will perceive, that all its pleasures were derived from engaging in the unreal, the imaginary employments, in which they delighted in the present life. This was the best they could hope. One passage may suffice.

[57] Pope's Homer, Iliad, book 20, lines 83–88.
[58] Odys., book 11, lines 591–600.

"The chief beheld their chariots from afar,
Their shining arms, and coursers trained to war,
Their lances fixed in earth — their steeds around,
Free from their harness, graze the flowery ground.
The love of horses which they had, alive,
And care of chariots, after death survive.
Some cheerful souls were feasting on the plain,
Some did the song, and some the choir, maintain,
Beneath a laurel shade, where mighty Po
Mounts up to woods above, and hides his head below."[59]

Can we regard even this best and most pleasant view of the abode of the dead, as a place of perfect bliss? Surely not; for it is certainly a very low kind of enjoyment, that is derived from the imaginary care of horses, and such kinds of unreal employments. At any rate, sure I am, that even those who take the most pleasure in such things here, would hardly be disposed to regard the felicity to be derived from such a source, sufficient to constitute a very ecstatic heaven. Under such a view, the present world, with all its ills, would seem quite as desirable as that state.

Besides this, I affirm without the fear of contradiction from any well-informed source, that the Classics know nothing of an immortal, a perpetual existence in the Elysium they describe.[60] It was only for a term of years, that souls were admitted to that realm. The following passage will explain this matter.

"Now in a secret vale the Trojan sees
A separate grove, through which a gentle breeze
Plays with a passing breath, that whispers through the trees;
And, just before the confines of the wood,
The gliding Lethe leads her silent flood.
About the boughs an airy nation flew,
Thick as the humming-bees that hunt the golden dew
In summer's heat; on tops of lilies feed,
And creep within their bells, to suck the balmy seed;

[59] Dryden's Virgil, Æneid vi. 885–894.

[60] This I think incontestible, although there seems to be some confusion in the statement of the matter by different authors. At the same time, it appears, that the residence of those who rendered themselves obnoxious to the gods, was permanent in the future state; whether it was to be endless, may be a question, though the cases of Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the like, squint that way pretty strongly. Still in Virgil there is a representation that looks like an arrangement for the deliverance of all men from that state and punishment. Æneid vi. lines 979–1005, Dryden's Translation. Original, lines 724–742.

The winged army roams the field around;
The rivers and the rocks re-murmur to the sound.
Æneas wondering stood, then ask'd the cause
Which to the stream the crowding people draws.
Then thus the Sire: The souls that throng the flood
Are those to whom, by Fate, are other bodies owed.
In Lethe's lake they long oblivion taste,
Of future life secure, forgetful of the past." [61]

After defining the source of sin, and the process by which it is purged from the soul, he says:

"All have their manes, and those manes bear;
The few, so cleansed, to these abodes repair,
And breathe in ample fields the soft Elysian air.
Then are they happy, when by length of time
The scurf is worn away of each committed crime;
No speck is left of their habitual stains;
But the pure ether of the soul remains.
But, when a thousand rolling years are past,
So long their punishments and penance last,
Whole droves of minds are, by the driving god,
Compell'd to drink the deep Lethean flood,
In large forgetful draughts, to steep the cares
Of their past labors, and their irksome years,
That, unremembering of its former pain,
The soul may suffer mortal flesh again." [62]

Thus it will be seen, that whatever they may have thought of the case of the wicked, the authors of the Classics had no idea of a permanent residence of the virtuous soul in the future state, nor of a real and perfect felicity for it. Although the Classics represent the soul as possessed of an immortal or imperishable existence, they do not represent it as permanent or fixed in any state. It passed from this to a future state, where it could remain but a thousand years, when it was compelled to return and inhabit a new body. This was the view of the destiny of the good, if not of the bad and all men.[63]

[61] Dryden's Virgil, Æneid vi. lines 953–969.

[62] Dryden's Virgil, Æneid vi. lines 1006–1020.

[63] In reading the different classical writers who have any thing to say concerning the future state, there is no little confusion of ideas in relation to this matter. And it appears to me, that there is a manifest diversity of sentiment among them, conforming to their peculiar philosophical notions. If I mistake not, the different philosophical systems, which prevailed in those times, may be distinctly traced, in their repre-

From what has been said, it is sufficiently manifest, that the view I have taken of the meaning of the phrase "hath brought life and immortality to light," is not at variance with the facts in the case, as developed in the Classics; but in perfect conformity with them. So far, then, my interpretation is sustained by the facts in the case.

III.—THE JEWISH VIEWS OF THE FUTURE STATE IN THE TIME OF CHRIST.

The materials for determining this matter are not very abundant. But from what information we have upon the subject, it is sufficiently manifest, that they adopted, very nearly, the prevailing views of the Greeks and Romans. They believed in the immortality of the soul, and that in Hades the souls of the good would be happy, "and in process of time, obtain the privilege of transmigrating into other bodies. . . . . That this Pythagorean dogma was become pretty general, among the Jews, appears even from some passages in the gospels."[64] One text in confirmation of this position may suffice. It is this: "Who sinned; this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?"[65] That is, was this blindness occasioned by the sins of his parents before his birth, or some sin that he committed in his preëxistent state — the state he was in before inhabiting his present body? To the same purport are the in-

sentations of the future state, and that the popular apprehensions upon this subject, were strongly affected by these different systems.

[64] Campbell's Four Gospels, Prelim. Dissertations, Dis. 6, part 2, §19.

[65] John ix. 2. "The disciples here refer to current opinions among their countrymen, that every evil or calamity was the effect of some sin, and that those who suffered in this world, had sinned in some preexistent state." Livermore's Com., *in loco*. "It was a universal opinion among the Jews, that *calamities* of all kinds, were the effects of sin. . . . . Many of the Jews, as it appears from their writings, believed in the doctrine of the *transmigration* of souls; or that the soul of a man, in consequence of sin, might be compelled to pass into other bodies and be punished there." This last statement it seems to me, is made without sufficient authority. It was rather regarded a privilege to return and inhabit a new body upon the earth; and a privilege too, reserved only for the righteous. Campbell's Four Gospels, Prelim. Dis. 6, p. 2, §19. Josephus, Jewish Ant., book 15, chap. 1, §3. Jewish Wars, book 2, chap. 8, §14. Whiston's Trans. Professor Bush questions the interpretation put upon this language of Josephus. Anastasis, p. 253. Note.

quiries, whether Jesus was Elijah, Jeremiah, or one of the prophets; and of Herod, whether he was John the Baptist.[66] The idea was, that the souls of these persons had returned and taken up their habitation in a new corporeal body, and hence the wonderful works Christ performed.

The language of Josephus upon this subject, is explicit, both in stating his own views and those of the Jewish sects. He says, the Pharisees held, "that souls have an immortal vigor in them, and that under the earth, there will be rewards or punishments, according as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life; and that the latter are detained in an everlasting prison, but that the former shall have power to revive and live again."[67] Also, "they say, that all souls are incorruptible, but that the souls of good men only are removed into other bodies, but that the souls of bad men are subject to eternal punishment."[68] In endeavoring to dissuade his companions from committing suicide, as they contemplated, he says: "The bodies of all men are, indeed, mortal, and are created out of corruptible matter; but the soul is ever immortal, and is a portion of the divinity that inhabits our bodies. . . . . Do you not know, that those who depart out of this life, according to the law of nature, and pay that debt which was received from God, when he that gave it us is pleased to require it back again, enjoy eternal fame; that their houses and posterity are sure; that their souls are pure and obedient, and obtain a most holy place in heaven, from whence, in the revolution of ages, they are again sent into pure bodies?"[69] Such is the account which Josephus gives of his own opinions and those of the Pharisees; and no man was better qualified to state the facts as they really existed, than he was; and no historian is worthy of greater confidence, when dealing with what came within the range of his own knowledge.

From this testimony, it appears, that the Pharisees enter-

[66] Matt. xiv. 2; xvi. 14. "These views of Christ's person, were all founded substantially upon the same ground, the belief in the transmigration of souls." Livermore's Com., *in loco*.

[67] Jewish Ant., book 18, chap. 2, §3.

[68] Jewish Wars, book 2, chap. 9, §14.

[69] Jewish Wars, book 3, chap. 8, §5.

tained opinions concerning the future state, very nearly allied to those of the Greeks and Romans; and of course that they had no idea that the souls of the good, at least,[70] would enjoy, in the future state, any such thing as an immutable and unending existence and perfect felicity, arising from purity of soul, like what Jesus taught. Although they believed that the good would have some sort of enjoyment in a future state, still it was a limited one, so far as that state is concerned. For, "in the revolution of ages," they were to be sent into new and pure bodies.

No more need be said, I think, to show that the idea of that perfect, refined, exalted spiritual felicity, flowing from inward purity, and the indissoluble existence of the soul, in a future state, never existed among the Jews in the Old Testament times, the Greeks and Romans in the days of Homer and Virgil, or the Jews of the Saviour's time. Ample proof of this has been presented, if what has been advanced be facts; and that they are facts, I suppose, will be questioned by very few, if any, who are competent judges in the case; and none others are to be listened to in a case like this. This being the case, the interpretation I have put upon the phrase "hath brought life and immortality to light," is sustained by facts. Jesus was the revealer, the one who first made known the doctrine of perfect spiritual felicity, founded upon purity of soul, and an imperishable existence in the future state, for the good. In this respect, he stands unrivalled and alone. No one comes in to share with him, the honor of first promulgating this great and transcendently glorious idea.

Although men have ever entertained, in all nations, and in every age, the idea that something of man survives the dissolution of the body, they have ever entertained low and material views of its enjoyments, when they have even come to entertain any idea of enjoyment in that state, which they

[70] By their goodness they were supposed to obtain the privilege of returning and inhabiting new bodies upon the earth. This is in perfect accordance with the representation of the Classics, and also with what is said in the Old Testament, Job xiv. 13. The Jews of the Saviour's time, believed that in the Messiah's reign they should be raised from the dead and reign with him. It is to this idea we are to refer what is said by Martha, John xi. 24.

have been very slow to do. How wretchedly low and unworthy the ideas of the Greeks and Romans, and indeed of all nations not blessed with the light of Christianity, even at the present day, when compared with the doctrine of Jesus! There are hardly two ideas held in common between them, upon this subject. Theirs were material and unreal; his were spiritual and real. He reveals a blessedness of soul, with which the outward or material has little or nothing to do. It springs from the deep fountains within, and is as enduring as the soul itself. D. F.

Art. XVIII.

Another Chapter from Carlyle the Younger.

Eritis sicut Dii.—Die Schlange.

Very great is Bubblery; whether primary, in Hydrosoapy form, or secondary, in Land-speculations, Merchandise-puffing, Stock-chicaneries, or tertiary, in Theosophico-mystical projections. Note-worthiest, meseems, of all things that are going ahead, in this Age-of-progress, is great Bubblery! Hast thou heard, O Reader, that our own Epocha, even this in which we are now living, is the long-talked-of Divine Aion, come at length, rather unexpected? or, perchance, hast thou not taken the papers, of late? Get them quick, and read; that thou mayest learn what Time-o'-day it is on the great World-clock; also, that thou mayest know, if not thyself, at least thy Neighbor, in his new Divine metamorphosis,— not without astonishment at Him!

Thou thinkest, it may be, that Man is yet, as formerly, a Worm-of-the-dust, beholden as heretofore to some little speck of solid Ground for foothold, quite Finite in his Ablenesses, groping his way painfully through the Immense-obscure with uncertain skill and dim vision, and needing Blessed Guides from above to lead him into Heaven's light. Dearest Reader,— I cannot but smile at thy simplicity! — all this was done away, some half-dozen years ago, if I read aright. Look narrowly; thou shalt see, now

in process, the queerest Transformation under the sun: Humanity (I think they call it,) passing from its old Grub-state into a tiny Fire-fly, with a pair of nascent wings; for flight rather sublime. Wonderfullest to behold! sundry of the Species already *out*, soaring Moon-ward, buoyed up on empty Æther, disporting themselves in the Azure Void with rapid circumgyrations, summersaults, and convolutions, hither-to, thither-to, innumerable, untraceable; while others, down yonder, have got as far as the Chrysalis, and but few are left in the Vermiform condition,—memorials of what *was*. Miraculousest Palingenesia, going on before our eyes, and yet we mark it not! for want of suitable microscopes, which, it is hoped, we shall be furnished with, in due time. To see Men, not "as trees walking," but as little-gods, or godicules, aerializing!

Mean time, the old Evangels, Christianities, and Faiths, which served the need in our undeveloped state, are getting decomposed and vaporised, to serve our new needs; as is fitting. See, how they are bursting out, frothing with intensest inward ferment, all their Concrete Solidnesses quite dissolved; their once-substantial Frame-work turning into shadowy Myths, or, more unreal still, into mere idle tales! Your Historical, Documentary, Matter-of-fact Christianities—we will no more of *them;* it shall be the spirit-Oils, and Alcohols, and Volatile essences thereof, distilled after each man's fashion. On these will we live, and grow clear-headed; the gross residuous Grains and other Dregs, the original Substances, we cast out, to be trodden under foot, and eaten of dull Worms. All in violentest fermentation, we say, these old Evangels and Beliefs! now steaming up in thinnest Vapor, many-colored, changeable-hued, rarer and rarer, evanescent; or, now bolting forth sky-ward in hugest Divine Bubbles; which unhappily have a tendency to dilate, in middle air, betokening certain results, should the law-of-Expansion hold true,—which it is hoped it will not. Bubble after Bubble! around which fantastically weave the new-swarmed Fire-flies their aerial courses, in cycle and epicycle; not without infinite hum of "*Eureeka! we have found!*" as often as the thin Transparencies soar away towards the Inane. "These be our rarified Christianities and Faiths! these be, for us, the permanent Foundations and firm Footings! whereon, rising, we shall

soon over-look the Universe, and see through the Great Secret." So stands it written in the Evangel of Bubblery. Good-luck to ye, light-headed Aeronauts; may ye find plenteousness of Wind to support ye, whither ye go.

Christianities and Faiths? my simple brother! Thou shalt not believe in Actualities and Facts; they are unmanageable, and enslave thy soul; but in the extracted Essences of them, which are manageable at will; in these then, unless thou wouldst be still a servile Worm-of-the-dust, after the obsolete fashion. No longer shalt thou believe in Book, or Bible; or, if thou must, then not in one Book, but in all books, or rather in such impalpable Gas, we say, as rises from them, after due process of sublimation, — called by the Unscientific, 'Laughing-Gas.' Inspiration? why so great Ado about *it?* thou thyself art Inspired only be Inflated, and canst make thine own Bibles, with the best of them: Bibles at least, in which thou mayest for the piety's sake, believe till thou — get time to make other. Nor shalt thou believe in the One Christ; but, grander! in the universe of Christs, of which thou art one; or, best of all, in thyself, who bearest a Christ, of the newest-improved patent, in thine own bosom, as the Fire-fly carries his torch in his belly. In this mayest thou trust, quite piously, unbeholden to any Authority of God or Devil, save thine own; and therefore free. Doth the Fire-fly look to Sun, or Moon, or Stars, for light? *He* manufactures his light in his own belly; and so shalt thou do, or be no Fire-fly, but doomed everlastingly to thy Grub-state. Take the Evangel of Bubblery, O my gropeling of a Brother! and "your eyes shall be opened," — so it is written of old; opened, to see that man hath all Knowledge and Guidance in himself, would he but turn from other sources, and look right intently where — the Brahmins look. Very wonderful, very solemn to think of! that we are become Omniscients, though somewhat microscopic as yet; of the genus Omniscientcula, in Leuwenhoeck's nomenclature; Divine Fire-flies, as we say, just begining to realize that ancient Promise of the Father-of-flies, "Ye shall be as gods." It is expected, I understand, that we shall work the Miracles over again, if indeed there were Miracles, when once we get our god-gear a little better adjusted; which, I think, might be useful in verifying our

much-talked-of Missions, 'Laughing-Gas Inspirations,' and claims to Divinityhood.

And now, my poor undeveloped Brother! wouldst thou put forth thy latent Omniscience, and play the god fittingly, as others? then, heed the Proprieties of the part, as Critics say. First, put from thee all those Matter-of-fact Books thou hast been delving in, — at least, study them not; it doth not beseem a god to study. Only imagine a school-class of gods, sitting up there on a spray of Vapor, studying Horn-book! to the merriment of all Olympus, I think. Thou shalt Know, without study, or be no god, neither godicule. Also, go not about, seeking diligently, like a blear-eyed Worm, and, by slow painful process, inquiring carefully of Fact after Fact, to find out Truth; *know* it at once, like a god, and have done with it. Canst thou not project all Truth forth from that Inspiration of thine, as other Bubbles are projected from water-and-soft-soap Effervescence? Or, if unequal to such feat, take at second-hand the Bubbles that others have projected, and make them thine own, by Divine art of Parrotry; whereof we have had discourse, upon a time. Are not the Absolute, the Infinite, Unconditioned, Eloihim, the Me, and the not-Me, utterable by thee? Utter them, then, and be Divine. It is questionable whether gods be allowed to speak Human sense — it is not so written in any new Evangel; but theirs it is to give forth, from time to time, the hugest inflated Leviathan-of-a-thought, floundering in an ocean of foam. Whoso would know *how* huge, let him first catch it; if he can.

C. S. N.

Art. XIX.

Literary Notices.

1. History of France, from the earliest period to the present time; by M. Michelet, Professeur suppléant ál a Faculté des Lettres, Professeur á L'Ecole normale, Chef de la Section Historiques aux Archives du Royaume. Translated by G. H. Smith, F. G. S. New York: Appleton & Co., 200 Broadway. To be completed in twenty numbers.

History seems to be the engrossing study of the day. Every week, some new historical work is announced, frequently from the pens of some of the most distinguished men in Europe. What science in modern times can boast greater names than Niebuhr, Neander, Ranke, Arnold, Hallam, Thirlwall, Bancroft, Prescott, Guizot, Thiers, and Michelet. We are glad that such men have taken the field. No pursuit demands higher powers, severer labors, deeper penetration. The treasures of every intellectual field are laid under contribution for History; philosophy, philology, geography and science. History has ceased to be amusing merely; it is found to have a meaning and to be instructive. The life of Abbot Sampson has some significance when treated by a master. Even yet we have comparatively very few good histories, probably for the reason that there have been very few minds fitted to write them. We are glad, however, that one great want has lately been supplied. There never has been, till recently, a good history of France. We have only seen the first number of Michelet in the reprint of the Messrs. Appletons, but from a perusal of this number, we have no doubt that literature has gained by the delay. It is always preferable that the history of a nation should be written by one of its citizens. This requisite is admirably filled in the author of the History of France. He is a true Frenchman. If his merits as a historian are individual, his faults may be fairly charged to the French spirit. By education, also, and position, he is excellently fitted for his task. His mind has been formed in the eclectic school of philosophy, the peculiarities of which may be distinctly traced in his work. M. Michelet commences with the earliest periods of the history of France, and devotes some chapters to the ancient Celts and Gauls; and it is here, perhaps, as much as anywhere that he displays the characteristics of his style and of his mind. The sketch must necessarily be slight from the poverty of materials and the vast extent of the field before him; and yet from the allusions of the ancient writers, a very vivid picture is presented of these barbari-

ans, drawn with admirable skill and presented with wonderful felicity of expression. The primitive features and elements of society among the Germans, Celts, Gauls, their restless temper and indiscreet, headlong valor, their incursions into Asia, Italy, Greece, the Cimbric campaign of Marius, the Gallic campaigns of Cæsar, and the gradual emergence of Gaul from barbarism into civilization, and from a province to independence, are portrayed within the compass of a few pages, yet seemingly with considerble fulness and detail. The author interests us in the affairs of these barbarians, because he shows that he is himself interested in their character and fortunes. They are his ancestors, and he scarcely takes pains to conceal a little national vanity, sometimes exhibited at the expense of historical consistency. Thus the early Gauls are "the most sympathetic and perfectible of the races of man." Although in war their "fruitless audacity" could effect nothing against the impenetrable masses of the "Roman legions" and "the terrible pilum,"—although they had been twice driven from Italy, still "Hannibal wins his great battles with Gallic blood;" and "when cut off from them in the south of Italy, cannot stir a step." "A Gaul formed the eloquence of the two great orators of the day, Cæsar and Cicero," and "a Gallic hand impressed on art that impulse towards the gigantic, and ambition of the infinite, which, at a later day, launched forth the vaulted roofs of our cathedrals." However, these failings, if they are so, are very pardonable, and are amply redeemed by the many and various excellences of the author, and the general soundness of his views. It would be difficult, we think, to name a work in modern times, which combines to such a degree, philosophical depth, extensive and minute research, and poetic fancy.

In proof of the former, we may refer to the pages on the fall of the Empire, of the later to those on the Celtic character, and the fate of the Celtic races; we leave the reader to be convinced on the other point, by a perusal of the work itself. One word as to the style. It is different from any thing we remember to have read. Though very simple it is graphic, and poetic with scarcely any imagery. It resembles lively and animated conversation rather than historical composition. It is as easy and brilliant as Cousin's, without being so inflated; as pointed and finished as Bancroft's, though not so labored. His genius and spirit cannot be weighed down by his erudition. He is always master of his materials, and writes like one fresh from the scenes he portrays. One of the most striking peculiarities of M. Michelet, however, is the manner in which he blends the narrative and the philosophy of history. There are no reflections after the facts are collected, nor any process of reasoning to get at the reason of the

facts. The facts and the reason go together. He seizes both at a glance. Every thing is spontaneous, nothing labored nor reflective. It is this which gives so much brilliancy to his pages, and which affords such continual stimulus to the mental activity of the reader. We await with some impatience the appearance of the second number, and feel that we are conferring a favor upon such of our readers as have not heard of the work, by calling their attention to it, and advising them to procure a copy, in the beautiful reprint of Messrs. Appletons.

2. Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation. Second edition. London, &c. 1844. 12 mo. pp. 394.

This may be called a remarkable book. It is an attempt to combine the latest discoveries in the different branches of science into a theory of creation — of the agents and processes by which the present system of the material universe has been evolved. This is done in no spirit of presumption we should judge, and yet by a mind that shrinks not from the most startling opinions, and from the boldest conclusions. The author is evidently under no fear of excommunication, and no restraint of creed. And yet he is evidently a Theist, and a reverent one. The work is distinguished by candid and patient argument, and an interesting, and to many, perhaps, novel array of facts. If we should designate any part of it which appears to us now as rather weak and inconclusive, it is the chapter upon "the Macleay system." Of course, we are not qualified to criticise the work upon scientific premises, but admitting these to be fairly laid down, we must say, that the author has made out an ingenious and a strong argument. If his positions are true, we do not see that they will destroy any thing vital in our faith, as Theists or as Christians — certainly they cannot shake any thing that is true. If on the other hand, his conclusions are lame, his theory crude or false, his arguments specious, then time and truth will make the exposure. We deem this the best method of meeting all novel and startling propositions. It is true that error in a plausible dress may do some harm before it is discovered. But this is one of the evils inseparable from free inquiry, and cannot be avoided without the sacrifice of that fundamental principle, with all its blessings. On the other hand, however startling it may be, we are deliberately convinced that "there is no such thing as a dangerous truth." In this spirit we would salute the volume before us. Upon its truth or its falsity, we are not prepared to decide. We like the tone in which it is written, and deem it well worthy the attention of every student of nature — for even if its theory is false, its facts will be found interesting and instructive.

Art. XX.

Philosophy and Theology.

During the last few years, our community has manifested a lively interest in philosophical pursuits. We can trace very plainly the effects of that taste which the importation of French and German literature, a few years ago, has served to awaken. Besides her historians, her poets, and her artists, New England has now, at least, one philosopher. Journals, devoted to philosophy and kindred pursuits, are conducted by men of different schools, and find a fair support among us. American translations and reprints of the works of distinguished philosophical writers in Europe, meet with a ready sale, and in our universities the study of speculative philosophy has been entrusted to the direction of our soundest thinkers. The habits of thought, formed by a study of some philosophical system, may be detected in every department of the literature of the country; the elements of Kantianism in history, transcendentalism in poetry, eclecticism in religious literature and reviews. It is not difficult even to interest "a popular audience" in the discussion of tenets belonging to speculative philosophy. Some of our readers perhaps may remember the crowded assemblies that listened to the lectures of a celebrated professor, a few winters since, before a literary institution of this city.

This tendency is not surprising. We have arrived at a point, in our intellectual culture, which must come to every nation. Philosophy is a natural want of the human mind. Without it, the cycle of its development is not complete. It has sprung from the intellectual soil of every people. There is implanted in human nature a tendency which cannot be satisfied without speculative coherence in its views of the universe. The mysteries, which the contemplation of nature perpetually presents to us, possess a charm that has always allured the keenest intellects, and brought into action the noblest powers of the soul. If we would seek the commencement of the history of philosophy, we must go back to the early twilight of civilization. The priests of Egypt had their esoteric doctrines; the

Persians, their solution of the origin of evil; while in India the judgment of immobility, which seems to have arrested the development of all the active powers of the soul, could not hold back the tendency to speculation. Almost all the phases of modern philosophy were represented there, under Indian forms, and from an Indian point of view. The restless activity of the Grecian mind was not more strongly manifested, in its various governments, and its thirst for conquest, than in its wealth of philosophical theories, and in the rapid development of schools which exhausted the capacity of progress, in that line, for a thousand years. The national life was equally incarnated in Plato and Pericles, in Aristotle and Alexander. Even in the Middle Ages, under the jealous eye of the church, heresies springing from opposition to the dominant philosophy, continually needed to be checked. With regard to the present rank of philosophy in the republic of letters, we need hardly speak. It is placed at the summit of mental cultivation. The importance which, since the Reformation, it has attained, among the cultivated nations of Europe, seems to justify the remark of a German writer, that "in the new hierarchy of the understanding, the philosophical is the apostolic chair, and philosophers are the cardinals."

It becomes an interesting and important question, then, What is the effect of this tendency to philosophy upon religious truth? or, in other words, What is the connection between philosophy and religion? We cannot expect, within the limits of one article, to do any thing more than to point out the general features of this relation, without stopping to examine the question in all its details. In the first place, then, we may remark that, whatever increases the general cultivation of the mind, improves our sensibility to religious impressions, and enlarges our capacity for religious ideas. None of our readers, probably, will dispute this proposition with us, and it hardly needs illustration. The progress of science has always added strength to the religious convictions of the devout spirit, and developed, in a clearer light, the characteristics which reason and revelation ascribe to the Deity. We have, for instance, an idea of the infinite. It is a necessary judgment of the intellect, is implied in our reasonings, and is indispensable

to our conception of God. It is not, however, an idea which we can completely comprehend. It exists as a mere sign, a barren affirmation, until it is brought out clearly into consciousness, and strengthened by the aid of some positive conceptions of the finite, with which it may be contrasted. How powerfully has astronomy done this! It is when the magnificent conception of the immensity and grandeur of the material universe is awakened in us; when we become acquainted with the vast scale upon which this system of nature is constructed; when thought endeavors to seize the boundaries of that expanse in which the solar system is but a speck, which no figures can express, and beyond which no instruments can reach; it is then, and by contrast with this finite which science has explored, and at the grandeur of whose discoveries the imaginaton is overpowered, that the intellect feels oppressed, and bows with religious awe before the idea of the infinite. So, also, with our conception of the omnipotence of God. Every one feels conscious of such an idea. It is from a necessity of our intellectual nature that we ascribe it to the Deity. Without it, he would not be God. Yet who comprehends the significance of the term, till he has formed some conception of the stupendous force that has disposed worlds into systems, and that moves, and guides, and governs all the complicated machinery of the universe! Again; how has our idea of the wisdom of the Deity been extended and enlarged, by an acquaintance with the simplicity of arrangement exhibited by the geometry of the heavens, and the nice adjustment between the forces that sustain the universe, or by the innumerable instances of skill and adaptation, furnished by physiology and natural history. Whatever has increased our knowledge of the works of the Creator, has deepened and added strength to our conceptions of his nature and his attributes. Such is the intimate and beneficial relation which science sustains to religion. But the same reasons that we have urged to prove this position, may, we think, with equal force be urged in behalf of the claims of philosophy.

First, however, to guard against misapprehension, let us define what we mean by speculative philosophy. Many, we are persuaded, look upon it as merely a dry system of metaphysics, a mass of baseless speculations, concerned

with inquiries, for instance, as to the nature of spirit, the cause of motion, or the medium of connection between the soul and the outward world. So far, however, is this from being the case, nothing has tended more to banish such questions from the learned world, than the progress of philosophy. We define philosophy, the complete science of human nature, the resolution of all human experience to order. Its ultimate aim is to explain the human mind, to define its powers, determine its tendencies, and unfold its laws. This is no barren study. It demands, not only an examination of consciousness, but also an acquaintance with the whole circle of science. We cannot completely know the powers of the mind, till we have some definite conception of the products of its energy. In fact, a complete criticism of the laws of thought, itself, cannot be reached by a pure psychological analysis, by an examination of the thinking subject alone. Our theories, to be entitled to the claim of scientific accuracy, must be framed with reference to the developments of thought in some department of knowledge. No dispute, for instance, has more deeply agitated the philosophical world, than the question as to the origin of many of our ideas. We have no intention of raising that question here, but only wish to remark, that a complete discussion of it is possible, only on condition of carefully examining the characteristics of those ideas, as they form part of the structure of many of the sciences. It is clearly in this way alone, that those peculiarities, which are the subjects of discussion, can be fully brought to view.

But a complete science of human nature must develop something more than a theory of ideas. All the phases of social, moral, and political life, are the outward expression of some tendency of the soul, and of course furnish materials for philosophical science. The ultimate aim of philosophy, then, is to elevate the science of human nature into universal science. The field of its research includes the whole domain of history, poetry, and art. Philosophy, then, is not any particular science; it does not deal with that mass of details, a complete and searching study of which is indispensable to establish a separate science. It is only concerned with the laws of scientific progress, with those intellectual conceptions which may be detected in the

to our conception of God. It is not, however, an idea which we can completely comprehend. It exists as a mere sign, a barren affirmation, until it is brought out clearly into consciousness, and strengthened by the aid of some positive conceptions of the finite, with which it may be contrasted. How powerfully has astronomy done this! It is when the magnificent conception of the immensity and grandeur of the material universe is awakened in us; when we become acquainted with the vast scale upon which this system of nature is constructed; when thought endeavors to seize the boundaries of that expanse in which the solar system is but a speck, which no figures can express, and beyond which no instruments can reach; it is then, and by contrast with this finite which science has explored, and at the grandeur of whose discoveries the imaginaton is overpowered, that the intellect feels oppressed, and bows with religious awe before the idea of the infinite. So, also, with our conception of the omnipotence of God. Every one feels conscious of such an idea. It is from a necessity of our intellectual nature that we ascribe it to the Deity. Without it, he would not be God. Yet who comprehends the significance of the term, till he has formed some conception of the stupendous force that has disposed worlds into systems, and that moves, and guides, and governs all the complicated machinery of the universe! Again; how has our idea of the wisdom of the Deity been extended and enlarged, by an acquaintance with the simplicity of arrangement exhibited by the geometry of the heavens, and the nice adjustment between the forces that sustain the universe, or by the innumerable instances of skill and adaptation, furnished by physiology and natural history. Whatever has increased our knowledge of the works of the Creator, has deepened and added strength to our conceptions of his nature and his attributes. Such is the intimate and beneficial relation which science sustains to religion. But the same reasons that we have urged to prove this position, may, we think, with equal force be urged in behalf of the claims of philosophy.

First, however, to guard against misapprehension, let us define what we mean by speculative philosophy. Many, we are persuaded, look upon it as merely a dry system of metaphysics, a mass of baseless speculations, concerned

with inquiries, for instance, as to the nature of spirit, the cause of motion, or the medium of connection between the soul and the outward world. So far, however, is this from being the case, nothing has tended more to banish such questions from the learned world, than the progress of philosophy. We define philosophy, the complete science of human nature, the resolution of all human experience to order. Its ultimate aim is to explain the human mind, to define its powers, determine its tendencies, and unfold its laws. This is no barren study. It demands, not only an examination of consciousness, but also an acquaintance with the whole circle of science. We cannot completely know the powers of the mind, till we have some definite conception of the products of its energy. In fact, a complete criticism of the laws of thought, itself, cannot be reached by a pure psychological analysis, by an examination of the thinking subject alone. Our theories, to be entitled to the claim of scientific accuracy, must be framed with reference to the developments of thought in some department of knowledge. No dispute, for instance, has more deeply agitated the philosophical world, than the question as to the origin of many of our ideas. We have no intention of raising that question here, but only wish to remark, that a complete discussion of it is possible, only on condition of carefully examining the characteristics of those ideas, as they form part of the structure of many of the sciences. It is clearly in this way alone, that those peculiarities, which are the subjects of discussion, can be fully brought to view.

But a complete science of human nature must develop something more than a theory of ideas. All the phases of social, moral, and political life, are the outward expression of some tendency of the soul, and of course furnish materials for philosophical science. The ultimate aim of philosophy, then, is to elevate the science of human nature into universal science. The field of its research includes the whole domain of history, poetry, and art. Philosophy, then, is not any particular science; it does not deal with that mass of details, a complete and searching study of which is indispensable to establish a separate science. It is only concerned with the laws of scientific progress, with those intellectual conceptions which may be detected in the

fundamental propositions upon which science is founded, and that ideal element which, although necessary to the very structure of science itself, forms also a portion of the philosophy of the human mind. The relation of philosophy to religion is, in principle, similar to the relation it bears to science. We understand by it a full examination of the religious element in human nature, a complete exhibition of the laws of its development, and a view of the harmony of its doctrines, with the conclusions drawn from other provinces of scientific thought. The philosophy of religion, then, no less than the philosophy of science, is indispensable to a thorough acquaintance with the laws and capacities of our nature. The spheres of the philosopher and the theologian cannot be completely disjoined. The one, engaged in a profound study of thought and of the human faculties, cannot rest satisfied till he has attained an idea of the highest objects of thought, to an idea of God, and duty, and eternal order, — thus giving to philosophy a theological aim; while the other cannot consider his science as completely established until he has discovered, in the very constitution of the human mind, a capacity for religious ideas, and a necessity for religious cultivation, — thus giving to theology a philosophical basis.

It will be our desire, in the remainder of this article, to exhibit those points where the convergent lines of philosophy and theology meet and blend; and the influence which must be exerted by philosophical study upon theological speculations.

In the first place, we wish to speak of the influence of philosophy in reconciling faith and knowledge. Religion springs from a primary and indestructible want of human nature. In its original character, it is, if we may so express it, a spiritual instinct in the soul. Its foundation is a sense of dependence on a higher power; its central principle is faith. Side by side with its spiritual want, exists another element, which gives the mind a reflective tendency, which impels it to know, or, in other words, to account to itself for its ideas and its faith. This latter tendency, felt in some degree by every man, can only be satisfied when religion is raised from its primitive state as an instinct, and established as an idea. Now, until the demands of both

these indisputable tendencies of the soul are satisfied, the growth and development of the mind is not complete. Of what use could be a belief in God, if reason discovers it to be nothing but a phantasm raised by human weakness? What support could be drawn from faith in Providence, if it be found to depend on a necessity of our *sensitive* nature; or what efficacy would there be in prayer, if it be felt that the object of our supplications is not a real being, capable of understanding and satisfying our wants, but merely a law of the soul? "Rather, would not the world, with its thousand contradictions, strike us with astonishment, if we could not see the eternal light glimmer through all its phenomena, and feel, from all around, an intimation of the great, first, and enduring Cause?" The repose of the soul upon its religious nature imperiously demands, then, not only that this universal tendency to worship shall be shown to be an innate element of its nature, but it requires also a demonstration of the reality of the object of worship. Not only must we be conscious of a sense of obligation imposed by a moral law, but reason must discover grounds for faith in that eternal order towards which all things tend, and from which the moral law derives its sanction. Besides that "longing after immortality," which we recognise as a primitive instinct in our constitution, we must feel that every thing which we know of our capacities, every thing which, by the light of nature, reason can discover as to our destiny, awakes in us an idea of eternal life, and confirms the spontaneous prophecy of the soul. Religion grounded in mere feeling, may in periods of excitement, when under the influence of a luxuriant flow of spirits, and when the voice of the intellect is still, be completely satisfactory to us. But a religion upon which we may rely, in every state of mind, which can cheer us in despondency, and console us in seasons of gloom, must be ever before us a firmly founded law, resting not merely on the uncertain basis of sensibility, but established on a foundation, as immovable as our surest ideas. Let us not be understood by these remarks, to undervalue the argument for religion drawn from its satisfying the instinctive wants of our constitution. A religion purely rational, which should aim to reach the heart

only through the head, would fail of accomplishing the end for which it is designed. What we contend for, is, that religion should satisfy all the cravings of our nature; that it must be able to subdue the intellect as well as engage the heart, that it must be shown to have, so to speak, its objective as well as subjective side. Now to do this is, in part, at least, the work of philosophy.

Perhaps, however, we shall be able to see more clearly into the subject, by attending to the influence which must be exerted upon theology by our theory concerning the origin of knowledge. This is, in every system of philosophy, the all-important point. D'Alembert called it the "terrible question of metaphysics." No problem which we can raise, in the whole circle of science, has such important corollaries depending upon its solution. Among other consequences, it involves the question as to the capacity of the mind for religious ideas. If we look back through the whole history of philosophical speculation, we shall find that its direction toward spiritualism or materialism, has been determined according to its account of the foundation and origin of knowledge. The solution that has been uniformly offered by one party among philosophers, is, that all our ideas are resolvable into sensations. According to them, the mind is purely passive in the acquisition of knowledge. It is a mere susceptibility to impressions from without, destitute of any inherent tendencies, without primarily any distinctive nature. According to this view, it could scarcely be said, that there is any principle belonging to our nature that can combine the scattered impressions of sense into a harmonious whole, and thus give unity to our consciousness. All our ideas are transformed sensations; the very capacities of mind itself, but internal modifications of our sensitive nature. Reflection, attention, memory, the power of generalization, are not faculties of the intellect, existing independent of experience, and employed by the mind as instruments in the formation of new ideas; but these faculties are themselves the result of sensations; they are more refined internal affections of the sensibility; the recurrence, in a more sublimated state, of some former impressions upon the organs of sense. This is not too strong a statement. We have before us, at this moment, the original statement of these pinciples, in terms

as strong as we have used. Now, it needs no very severe logic to draw, from these premises, the conclusions which they contain, as to the sphere and limits of knowledge. If "every idea is chimerical that cannot attach itself to its sensible archetype," if "every expression which cannot find an external and sensible object to which it can establish its affinity, is destitute of signification," (we use the precise words of an exponent of this system,) what foundation have we for the idea of God? The senses acquaint us only with finite existence; what room, then, is there, in such a system, for an idea of the infinite? By impressions upon our senses from the material world, we acquire a notion merely of appearances, of changes, of antecedents, and consequents; how, then, in such a system, can we acquire the idea of a cause? we do not say, of a first and eternal cause merely, but of any cause. How is the conception of a cause possible? If human nature be a mere blank capacity, and is, previous to education, as susceptible of one impression as another, what reason have we for the conception of a moral law, to which all intelligences are subject, that has a right to command our allegiance? There is no possible way, if we start from such a view of the origin of knowledge, to reconcile our logic with religion. No modification of this materialistic philosophy can harmonize with the faith which religion demands of us. Before we can admit any idea which belongs to the sphere of religion, within the circle of knowledge, we must adopt some element into our reasoning, which can be drawn from a spiritual philosophy alone. Take, for instance, the argument from design, to demonstrate the existence of God. The argument, as it has often been conducted, fails in an essential point. Leaving out of view the fact, that, upon the rigid principles of the philosophy of sensation, it is impossible to attain the abstract idea of *cause;* even granting that, from the various exhibitions of wisdom and intelligence in the construction of the universe, we may arrive at the conclusion that the designer of this admirable order, must have possessed intelligence; still we cannot prove his unity or infinity. The system of nature, so far as we are acquainted with it, is finite, and we cannot reason from a finite effect to an infinite cause. But any argument which fails in demonstrating the infinity of the cause of

nature, must fail in demonstrating his self-existence; and consequently, we cannot prove that there has not been a series of dependent causes, each in turn derived from a preceding cause. The only remedy for this radical defect in the proof from design, taken exclusively, is the introduction into the argument, of an *a priori* principle, drawn from the laws and constitution of the intellect itself. A severe examination of the laws of thought discovers to us, that the self-existence and infinity of the power that sustains the universe, is a postulate of reason. It is an idea of which the clear statement is sufficient, the truth of which is seen by intuition, and which cannot be strengthened by any ratiocination. It is, if we may so speak, a form of our thought, when applied to the argument as to the first cause. Whatever hypothesis we adopt as to the origin or primal cause of the universe, we cannot rid ourselves of this necessary law of reason. We must predicate self-existence and infinity of something. If we take up the atheistic theory, and deny an intelligent cause, we must still admit that nature, the material universe, is self-existent and infinite. Now, introduce this fundamental conception of reason with the argument from design, and it becomes complete and satisfactory. It will then rest on the very nature of reason, as well as on the testimony of experience. But this conception, so essential to the validity of the proof, is at utter variance with the whole fabric of the philosophy we are considering. In its vocabulary there is no meaning to the term, *a priori* laws of reason; for *prior* to experience, the intellect is a mere blank, a capacity alone for receiving whatever may be conveyed through the senses. There is no necessity of multiplying instances to prove the weakness of its philosophy in establishing the validity of our religious notions. Religion deals entirely with questions beyond the reach of the senses, and consequently before the inexorable law of the philosophy of sensation, every question, with which religion is concerned, must be banished into the region of chimera and superstition. Let it not be said, however, that this point is of no practical importance; that it affects merely the manner of stating the argument for religion, but cannot weaken any person's religious convictions. There are many, no doubt, who do not need the results of reflection to strengthen

their faith. "They never feel the burden of doubt, nor need the aid of philosophy to explain the mysteries of their being. On their virgin souls no blight can fall, and they will pass upward unstained by the breath of unbelief." The world, however, is not made up of such as these. There are those of colder temperaments, who feel the spontaneous impulses of a common nature less, and distrust them more, and who, of course, can repose only on the conclusions of their intellect. And it is they who need to be preserved from the influence of a philosophy, before which they will surely fall. We are at no loss for instances to establish this point. The theory of knowledge which Hume adopted, necessarily resulted in his scepticism. He applied, with unsparing rigor, the laws of evidence with which his philosophy furnished him, to all the departments of thought; and of course concluded, to use his sarcasm, that "our most holy religion is founded on faith, and not on reason." Had Gibbon been under the influence of a nobler philosophy, his pages would have been free from many of those sneers at virtue and disinterestedness, and that calm contempt of religion, with which they are now defiled. The whole literature of the age of Louis XIV. and XV., was poisoned by a false philosophy. The tone of thought, among the higher orders, may be gathered from a remark of Madame Du Deffand, in a letter to Voltaire, upon learning that he was engaged in a discussion on the existence of God: "Do not weary yourself, my dear Voltaire, with metaphysical reasonings upon unintelligible matters. Can we communicate, or can we entertain, any ideas which we do not receive through our senses?"

At whatever period of the world we find this system obtaining sway, the evidences of its blighting influences may be discovered in every department of literature. Under its domination, art can only attain a stunted growth, and poetry is deprived of its sweet and mysterious faith. Its religion may be seen in the "System of Nature;" its morality in the Maxims of Rochefoucauld, and in Helvetius's "Sur l'Esprit." The dignity of human nature is sacrificed before it. When Helvetius contended that pleasure was the sole motive of all actions, and that the sense of touch was so necessary to the education of the human faculties, that the species would have been still wandering in the

forest had man been created with hoofs instead of wrists, Voltaire declared that he told the secret of all the world. Cicero long ago remarked, that in the schools of Epicurus, in his day, the names of Lycurgus and Solon, of Miltiades and Epaminondas, were never mentioned; so terrible a fact is heroism and disinterestedness for the contemplation of sensualism.[1] And nothing, perhaps, illustrates better the utter degradation of morals that characterized the period preceding the downfall of the Roman republic, than the general deification of Epicurus, whose image, according to Cicero, was preserved not only in pictures, but engraven on the cups and rings of the household servants.[2] A very just comparison between the moral tone of this philosophy and that of some of the ancient pagans, has been drawn by Addison. "It is impossible," says he, "to read a passage in Plato, or Tully, and a thousand other ancient moralists, without being a greater and a better man. On the contrary, I could never read any of our modish French authors, or those of our own country who are the imitators and admirers of that nation, without being for some time out of humor with myself and at every thing about me. Their business is to depreciate human nature, and to consider it under the worst appearances; they give mean interpretations and base motives to the worthiest actions. In short, they endeavor to make no distinction between man and man, or between the species of man, and that of brutes."[3] We do not say, that all who have adopted the ultra premises to which we have alluded, are atheists, or indifferent to religion; such, at least, have not been their professions, and we know that many of the warmest partisans of this philosophy have been dignitaries of the church. But, in many cases, it is to be feared that the palpable inconsistency has been relieved by a belief that the essence of religion consists in mystery, and is therefore incomprehensible by human faculties. The only reconciliation that can be effected between such a man and his religion, must be obtained by some such position as this; for it is useless to talk of a man's holding one truth in philosophy on grounds which his reason approves, and assenting to an

[1] De Fin. lib. i. [2] De Fin. lib. v; see also Niebuhr, iv. p. 201.
[3] Tatler, 108. Stewart, vi. 103.

entirely different one in religion. The spheres of philosophy and religion are so intimately connected, that false premises in the one, must produce false conclusions in the other; and the manner, in which the principles we adopt in either department must affect our conclusions in the other province, furnishes a criterion by which we may judge of the truth or soundness of those principles themselves.

We have seen to what result the theory of knowledge, which has been supported by a large class of philosophers, must inevitably tend. A sensual and materialistic system of philosophy, selfishness and utilitarianism in morals, and, if the principles be rigidly adhered to, scepticism in religion, are the logical development of the position that the senses are the only source of knowledge. Change that proposition, and the whole complexion of the theories of morals, and philosophy, and religion, will be changed also. If, after a cautious and profound analysis of our ideas, we assume, as the starting-point, that experience is the occasion, instead of the cause, of all of our knowledge, that the mind itself has faculties the operation of which is implied in our fundamental ideas, that sensible impressions are only the exciting causes which call these faculties into action, the prospect of the whole field of knowledge will be changed as if the wand of a spiritual magician had been waved over it. The whole tendency of thought is directed to spiritualism. The icy grasp of materialism, which freezes all the pulses of feeling, yields to a genial warmth. A system of philosophy may, then, be logically raised, in which man may be viewed as superior to nature; the inspirations of poetry and art, as something more than impressions upon the outward sense; and religion, instead of being considered a mere chimera unworthy a place in the domain of science, be looked upon as a development of the highest faculties of the soul. The recognition of the double origin of knowledge, as the fundamental truth in philosophy, affords the only basis sufficiently broad for the harmonious development of every principle of our nature. A man may then be master of all his ideas. His logic will not be the implacable foe of his faith. He may face his convictions with a calm eye, and feel assured that they rest upon a foundation as immovable as the very laws of his

being. Under the direction of those laws of thought, which materialism presents, reason may demand of religion its passport to belief, may desire to know the *sense* to which its evidence is addressed; but a philosophy founded on a correct theory of knowledge, reverses this unnatural order. It shows that religion resides in us, not only as an ineradicable feeling, but that the great ideas which it supposes, are implied in every exercise of thought; that all around us is the infinite; that we cannot think, without an implied recognition of something absolute, some independent law on which the exercise of intellect depends; that every question we raise, every thought we create, leads at last to the great mystery of the universe, before which it is the highest office of reason to bow and adore. Under such a system, religion may become rational, because reason itself may become religious. No attempts are needed to bridge the chasm between what we know, and what we feel. Religious ideas have their root in reason, and religious feeling in the nature of the soul; and they can be displaced only by that "consistent scepticism" which strikes at the root of all certainty and all knowledge.

But, it may be urged that the importance of correct opinions in philosophy, may be necessary where the light of nature is our only guide, but that the question becomes unimportant when revelation is taken into the account. We need not speculate upon religion; we know; truth is revealed to us. We do not want philosophy; we have Christianity. This, of course, opens the question as to the relation between philosophy and revealed religion. We might reply, in the first place, that the possibility of any religion at all, is a question preliminary to the consideration of revelation. And this, as we have shown, is a problem which is intimately affected by our philosophical views. The man who, on philosophical grounds, denies that religious ideas can form a portion of knowledge, cannot be reached with arguments drawn from the sublimity of the truths which revelation exhibits, nor from their harmony with the wants of his nature. He admits no such principle of reasoning. You might as well talk to him of the objects of a sixth sense. His intellect, encased in the armor of sensualism, is impervious to such weapons. He can only be convinced of the truth of revelation, by the

historical evidence of the existence of its founder; the truth of his miracles, and the probability that his doctrines have been transmitted to us in their original purity; a mode of defending the gospel, in which, when addressed to such minds, we have little confidence. Hume has shown that, in such cases, it is much easier to attack the credibility of miracles, than to yield conclusions drawn from a study of the human mind. At least then, so far as scepticism is concerned, a false philosophy must be disarmed with its own weapons, before the claims of Christianity can be successfully advanced. But we think we can show that, besides being necessary for the defence of revelation, philosophy has an important connection with our views of revelation itself. There are some points, of course, where the teachings of revelation are ultimate. We cannot go beyond them. The great truth, for instance, of the paternal character of God, is an idea which the unassisted reason could never have attained. No induction, from any facts within our knowledge, could have reached it. The strong light of revelation must first be thrown upon nature, before natural facts can be seen to bear the impress of Divine love. Philosophy, before the Saviour, had attained a dim and unsteady conception of the goodness of God. Plato exhausted all the richness of his fancy and the loftiness of his diction, to prove that God was the *Supreme Good.* But between this conception, and the truth, that God is the universal Father, there is all the difference that exists between Plato and Jesus, between the loftiest philosophy and the purest religion. We admit, then, that in revelation philosophy has been helped over problems which, by its own strength, it could not solve; but what we contend for, is, that the conception we form of the meaning of the truths of revelation, depends in a great measure on our cultivation of mind, or, in other words, on our peculiar philosophical views. The doctrines of Christianity are stated in words; but the mere reading of those words does not give a man clear conceptions of the depth and meaning of the truths themselves, any more than the mere reading of the words of Newton's Principia, or Laplace's Mecanique Celeste, would give him correct conceptions of the magnitude and importance of the mathematical propositions demonstrated there. Why is it that

we believe that Christianity, as a religion, can never be superseded? Because we believe that the system of morality it teaches, and the worship it demands, are the ideas of worship and morality for all ages. To whatever degree of intellectual or spiritual advancement we may attain, we can never exhaust, and never get beyond, the sublime and simple truths revealed by the Saviour. His religion was a system of principles capable of the widest application, and of indefinite expansion. It assists the growth of the mind, — grows with it. At the very time that it furnishes the elements of human progress, we distinctly see that, with all the increased capacities resulting from progress, we can never exhaust the materials contained in Christianity. A thorough conviction of this truth is of infinite importance in strengthening our religious convictions, and our faith in revelation. And the discovery of this very truth, is the work of philosophy. It is not a doctrine of revelation itself, but is drawn from an acquaintance with the laws of progress. It is the humble confession of reason to revelation, that the highest office of philosophy is to increase our susceptibility to religion, and that its loftiest ambition is satisfied with bringing the light of its researches to bear upon the interpretation of that truth, of which the Son was the appointed messenger.

Our philosophy, then, will be, to a great extent, the interpreter of Christianity. It will translate the words of revelation in harmony with the conclusions which we may form of the human mind, its wants and its capacities. Whether, in the first instance, we derive the foundation of our philosophical views from Christianity, or from reason, still the same tendency exists in the mind to reconcile the teachings of revelation with the developments of this philosophical creed. Take the doctrine of salvation, for instance. Christianity, one would think, is explicit upon this point. And yet, about no question in theology, is the church more divided than about the teaching of Scripture in relation to it. There is every modification of opinion as to its meaning, extent, and mode. And every one of the various hues and shades of belief, respecting it, is dependent upon, or connected with, some system of philosophy, of which this view forms a component part. Let a man, through the prejudices of education, derive from Scripture

the notion of original sin, with its satellites, a corrupted nature, a vicarious atonement, and an angry God, and he cannot adopt, in perfect good faith, a spiritual philosophy in its full extent. He cannot believe in the freedom of the will; he cannot conceive the possibility of drawing a system of ethics from the study of a sinful consciousness; he cannot consistently see, in a depraved nature, the germs of worship and faith in God. On the other hand, no man who, from the study of the will, of consciousness, and of the original instincts of human nature, has arrived at a faith in freedom, at a conception of moral obligation, and a belief that religion is founded on a law of the soul, can see in revelation a doctrine which sets at naught all the conclusions of his intellect, to say nothing of the sensibilities of his heart. Men are never wilfully illogical or inconsistent in their opinions; and surely no man in his senses would attempt to reconcile propositions so fundamentally incongruous. Before Pelagius and Augustine can agree, Pelagius must abandon his philosophy, or Augustine must give up his faith. But this fundamental difference as to the nature of salvation, affects also the question as to the mode. And here again, the influence of philosophy is involved. The corollary of the first view we have mentioned, is, that salvation is instantaneous and supernatural, effected upon man, not in him, and by himself; a work in which he is an instrument, not an agent; in which he is passive, not active. If salvation is thus instantaneous and final, where is the room for progress? Where is that intimate harmony between virtue and religion which philosophy sees intuitively, and which Christianity implies on every page? If the essence of salvation does not consist in being formed in the image of Jesus, that is, in the practice of the loftiest virtue, where is the incentive to take him as our pattern? and what hope may we indulge of ever attaining to his perfection, if we must view him as the Infinite Father? The philosophy which the spirit of Christianity in the world has helped to form, and the conclusions to which the study of man, as he has been affected by Christianity, has led, rise in rebellion against such a construction of the words of revelation. They cannot harmonize. Between them there is a great gulf fixed.

If we reflect, too, upon our conception of the Deity him-

self, we shall find that our interpretation of the Scripture teachings, as to his character and attributes, is greatly modified by the tone of our philosophy. Much of the purity of thought, upon the other essential points of Christian doctrine, depends upon our fundamental conceptions of God himself. We are taught in the New Testament that "God is a spirit;" but how few are there whose views of the nature of the Divine Being are not formed after the idea of the Old Testament, whose conceptions attach themselves to the qualities of gross power and material force; and who, consequently, never pass through the Jewish, and attain a Christian idea of God. One of the most difficult things which the mind has to contend against, in forming a definite notion of the nature of the Deity, is the conflict between the senses and the reason. The senses always tend to anthropomorphism, to some limitation of form, and some precise idea of place; views which the cultivated reason, of course, rejects with abhorrence. The root of this difficulty lies in the constant association of the philosophical ideas of substance and being, with matter and organization, and can be eradicated only by such a discipline of mind as will enable us to entertain these ideas wholly separate from each other. The noble conception which Plato developed of the nature of God, necessarily sprang from philosophical habits of thought. He could not have held an anthropomorphic notion of the Supreme Good, till he had reconstructed his theory of virtue and the powers of the soul. They were inseparably intertwined. On the other hand, the phantom gods of Epicurus, differed from the ardent fire which the stoics conceived to be the vesture of the Deity, precisely because the whole tone of the philosophy of the former was grovelling and mean, and of the latter lofty and ennobling. Gassendi, who, although a Catholic priest, was a very strong advocate of the doctrine that all our ideas originate exclusively in sensible impressions, and who may be considered the founder of that school in modern times, maintained that "we must conceive God under the image of a venerable old man"—that being the noblest form under which a sensible conception could be entertained by the imagination. And are there not, now, large bodies of Christians whose ideas of God are drawn from the imagery of Daniel and the Apocalypse, the great white throne, and

garments of snow, and the chariot of fire—rather than from a full realization of the meaning of those sublime words of the Saviour, "God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth?" Let it not be said that this point is of little importance. Connected with our views of the nature of God as our ideas of his providence and omnipresence must necessarily be, we cannot err in the one, and be sound in the other. And here, of course, the question becomes vitally practical. Faith in the Christian doctrine of universal providence, of course, demands a belief in the intimate and abiding presence of God in his works. He must be viewed as the life of the universe, the present cause of all things, the all-pervading essence which supports and maintains and directs the phenomena of nature. Without this constant recognition of the omnipresence of God in its strictest sense, nature to us is a machine, whose movements are governed by a pre-established harmony; not a manifestation of the constant presence and pervading activity of an all-wise agent. God is separate from his works, providence is the law of fate, prayer a foreordained and component element in the working of a vast spiritual mechanism.

We are taught, in Scripture, that the hairs of our heads are numbered, and that not a sparrow falls to the ground without the notice of the Almighty. But the theory of Providence we see revealed in these words, must form a component part of our rational views of the nature of God, and of his relation to the moral world. It is in the light of these conceptions, that we interpret the meaning of the verbal revelation itself. The signification of the terms expands with the breadth and extent of our spiritual ideas. Certainly, when science has unveiled to us its exalted view of God's omnipresence, and revealed his intimate nearness in the action of every natural force, the Christian view of providence may be accepted in its most literal sense, and partakes of the precision and extent and certainty of our scientific conceptions. The very simplicity of the gospel is linked with the discoveries of science and the depth of our philosophical ideas. But there is another point where our independent speculative views exercise an important influence on the interpretation of revealed religion; I mean, in the connection we establish between the finite and the in-

finite, between God and his works. The immense diversity of opinion that has been entertained by Christians upon this question, proves that revelation lacks sufficient precision to preclude the necessity of personal reflection. And, here, the danger to be apprehended does not consist solely, nor chiefly, in the adoption of a narrow and gross system of philosophy, as in many of the cases we have named; but, in most cases, springs from an opposite tendency, from spiritualism itself become ultra and exclusive. Men, starting from a conception of the infinity, omnipresence, and spirituality of the Deity, have seen only Him in the universe; fixing their view exclusively on the Eternal substance, they have looked upon man merely as an accident, or mode of that substance; accustomed to direct their thoughts to the efficacy of the Infinite Agency alone, they have seen in man no central and self-determining power, no inherent and personal force. A spirit, completely saturated with such a view, may be religious, but its religion is diseased. Religion, to be healthy and strong, must include a view of human liberty, as well as of Divine power; it must see that we have nobler relations to the Deity, than that of absolute dependence. The piety, which Christian Pantheism inspires in man, is a dreamy quiescence, a losing of self in contemplation of the Infinite. All the powers of the soul are absorbed in meditation upon the awful ideas in which the Deity is revealed to us, till an unnatural humility ends by sacrificing the noblest elements of human nature upon the altar of faith. The fundamental vice of this view of the relation of the Creator and his creature, may be, and has been, manifested in a variety of forms, and has tainted almost every doctrine of Christianity.

Revelation warns us of the influence of sense and passion; and mysticism, seizing upon this point of duty exclusively, has driven men to cloisters and solitudes, that they might yield themselves to the luxury of unobstructed meditation. We are commanded to recognise the claims of duty before those of society and kindred; and a rigid asceticism, translating this command into the language of its favorite views, has condemned the exercise of every social feeling as sinful, and placed the perfection of virtue in the infliction of exquisite self-torture.

Christianity is replete with expressions of the grandeur and holiness of the Deity; and Calvinism, from an exclusive view of the divine majesty, has placed a false estimate upon human agency, and resolved all morality into considerations for the glory of God. It was with a view to these instances of the corruptions of Christianity, that Channing profoundly remarked, "It is a fact worthy of serious thought, and full of solemn instruction, that many of the worst errors have grown out of the religious tendencies of the mind. So necessary is it to keep watch over our whole nature, to subject the highest sentiments to the calm conscientious reason." Although the spirit of quietism, of which we have spoken, is foreign to the tone of modern civilization, still, under its practical influence, we may trace the working of the same views with a different form. A false transcendentalism has seduced some of the noblest minds in our very midst. We open their works, and read of the Ideal in religion, of the manifestation of God in the instincts of the soul, and of uniting our life with the universe in the perception of eternal beauty. Such theories are pretty; that, however, is not our objection to them; they are enervating. There is nothing in them to stimulate that substantial virtue which is the morality of Christianity. We do not object to art; we object to the theory of the identity of art and religion; to that philosophy which would substitute poetic reverie for the practical duties which Christianity enjoins as the exhibition and proof of sound religious life. The existence of Christ in human form, by giving us at once a definite conception of the perfection of humanity, and a full revelation of the nature and will of God, is a perpetual rebuke to that dissipation of the human faculties, and that sickly hue of thought which is the inevitable result of every modification of Pantheism.

The most remarkable instance, however, of the effect of philosophical systems in modifying the doctrines of revelation, may be detected in the structure of the theology of the Catholic Church. It is developed there on a colossal scale. In the Middle Ages two great and rival schools contended for the empire of the intellectual world: Realism and Nominalism. The seal of authority was given to the former. The Realists contended that all knowledge was deducible from abstract ideas of the mind; the testimony

of experience was distrusted as unworthy the confidence of a philosopher, and reality was attributed only to the general notions of the intellect. Their system was a compound of Platonism and Aristotelianism, of Platonic ideas under an Aristotelian form. Its great maxim was, "Invisibilia non decipiunt;" *things invisible never deceive.* Nominalism, on the contrary, denied the validity of general notions, unless verified by the testimony of experience; and thus, in a dark age, was the prophet of the modern scientific method. It is curious to observe the facility with which a false philosophy lent itself to the service of the Catholic faith. All the theories of the Church were cast in the mould of the dominant philosophical system. The doctrines of the eucharist and the Trinity, of predestination and grace, bristled with philosophic formulæ. As early as the ninth century, the testimony of the senses was officially impeached to obviate objections to the doctrine of the real presence. Heresies were met with more subtile distinctions, and a finer analysis of the subject and predicate of Scripture propositions. It was as if a solemn incantation had shrouded nature and revelation in an obscurity which Aristotle's system alone had power to dispel. The schoolmen saw everywhere, and in every thing, but the outward symbol of an Aristotelian truth. The doctrine of the Trinity was a scientific view of the principle of causation. The dignity of Aristotle was blended with that of Jesus in the papal chair. The Son was the principle of intelligence, and was generated from the Father, as thought is generated from mind. The Spirit is the love of God to his creation, and proceeded merely from the Father. The terms diversity, difference, separation, distinction, disparity, division, applied to God, became heresy, as they were inconsistent with the great Stagirite's view of substance, according to which God must exist as a Unity of essence under a Trinity of forms. The prevalent theories of justification, of original sin, and of free-agency, were all explained by the physical and moral speculations of Aristotle upon creation, and the relation of the Deity to his works. But the points in which the Church received the most efficient aid from philosophy, may be found in the defence of the Catholic view of the Sacrament and Transubstantiation. The problem was to satisfy reason, and reconcile

the theory with common sense. According to the physical theory of the schoolmen, nature was conceived to be a vast system of powers secretly directed by the sovereign will. All the forms of existence could be analyzed into substance and accidents; substance being the last point to which analysis can attain, the secret ground and support of all appearances, and accidents including every thing which does not enter into a rational conception of the being or nature of the thing defined. Of course, in accordance with the fundamental doctrine of Realism, substance and accident being clear and distinct ideas of the mind, must have distinct and separate existence in nature, and therefore may not always be conjoined in the actual world. Now, in the mystical consecration of the elements in the eucharist, the form of the sacrament, that is, the official ceremony conducted by the priest, partaking of the creative energy of the Divine word, changes the distinctive substance of the elements, and infuses the Divine substance of Christ himself. The accidents, such as the form, the taste, the color, and dimensions of the elements, still remain, not existing in Christ as their substance, but as simple phenomena divorced from all ground of support. The vicious character or forgetfulness of the priest, at the moment of consecration, could not affect the efficacy of the form, as the priest represented no individual authority, his personality being resolved into the abstract individuality of the Church; and it was the general intention of the Church that was manifested in the sacramental ceremony. Realism, here, became an effectual means of power. "It was an admirable expedient of ecclesiastical policy, thus to rest the power of the Church on the purity and indefectibility of an abstraction. Religious imagination was sustained on the picture of the Church as the great mother of the faithful, cherishing her beloved children in her pure bosom; whilst her many-handed agents in the world were securing their hold on the consciences of men, by that prerogative of veneration which they enjoyed in her person."[4] This connection between the logical philosophy of the schoolmen and the Catholic religion, was not accidental. It is upon the principles of that philosophy alone that the theology of Rome

[4] Hampden's Bampton Lectures, p. 324.

can be defended now. Luther, who was, according to Melancthon, a strenuous partisan of the sect of Nominalists, declared that a reform of the Church would be impossible until the whole scholastic philosophy, theology, and logic, should be eradicated. The study of physics cured Bayle of Catholicism; and Gibbon has left a record of the raptures he experienced when the important and recondite truth flashed upon his mind, that the doctrine of the real presence is attested only by the sense of sight, which receives the impressions of Scripture texts, while it is disproved by three senses,—the sight, the touch, and the taste. Catholicism has always opposed philosophical innovation. When Descartes, with his principle of universal doubt, and his distinction of substances into material and thinking, broke the spell of the Middle Ages, an angry controversy was at once excited upon the doctrine of Transubstantiation; which drove the partisans of the new system to the most subtile artifices in order to maintain the show of congruity between their views and the dominant theology. The revival of an ideal philosophy in France, in modern times, occasioned an outbreak of jesuitical bigotry, owing to fear for the doctrines of the Church; and, in our own country, we have lately seen a distinguished theorist, remarkable for the severity of his logic and the consistency, for the time being, of his opinions, after having been led by a metaphysical formula into the bosom of the Catholic Church, turn and decry the whole tendency of modern thought and cultivation, and speak in the most exalted terms of the wisdom and depth of the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

In the history of modern philosophy, too, the reaction of the opinions of every school upon theology, admonishes us of the inseparable connection between these separate pursuits. The peculiar views of Kant, as to the powers of the mind and the laws of science, necessarily led to a peculiar theory of revelation. He aspired to show, *a priori*, what, from the nature of the human mind, revelation must contain, and the evidence it must adduce in support of its authority. Soon, the influence of his system called forth theologians like Paulus, and Rohr, and Krug, and Wegscheider, and a host of others, who swell the ranks of German Rationalism. The dreamy and poetic spirit of Schelling's philosophy of nature, added to the Catholic influence

the theory with common sense. According to the physical theory of the schoolmen, nature was conceived to be a vast system of powers secretly directed by the sovereign will. All the forms of existence could be analyzed into substance and accidents; substance being the last point to which analysis can attain, the secret ground and support of all appearances, and accidents including every thing which does not enter into a rational conception of the being or nature of the thing defined. Of course, in accordance with the fundamental doctrine of Realism, substance and accident being clear and distinct ideas of the mind, must have distinct and separate existence in nature, and therefore may not always be conjoined in the actual world. Now, in the mystical consecration of the elements in the eucharist, the form of the sacrament, that is, the official ceremony conducted by the priest, partaking of the creative energy of the Divine word, changes the distinctive substance of the elements, and infuses the Divine substance of Christ himself. The accidents, such as the form, the taste, the color, and dimensions of the elements, still remain, not existing in Christ as their substance, but as simple phenomena divorced from all ground of support. The vicious character or forgetfulness of the priest, at the moment of consecration, could not affect the efficacy of the form, as the priest represented no individual authority, his personality being resolved into the abstract individuality of the Church; and it was the general intention of the Church that was manifested in the sacramental ceremony. Realism, here, became an effectual means of power. "It was an admirable expedient of ecclesiastical policy, thus to rest the power of the Church on the purity and indefectibility of an abstraction. Religious imagination was sustained on the picture of the Church as the great mother of the faithful, cherishing her beloved children in her pure bosom; whilst her many-handed agents in the world were securing their hold on the consciences of men, by that prerogative of veneration which they enjoyed in her person."[4] This connection between the logical philosophy of the schoolmen and the Catholic religion, was not accidental. It is upon the principles of that philosophy alone that the theology of Rome

[4] Hampden's Bampton Lectures, p. 324.

can be defended now. Luther, who was, according to Melancthon, a strenuous partisan of the sect of Nominalists, declared that a reform of the Church would be impossible until the whole scholastic philosophy, theology, and logic, should be eradicated. The study of physics cured Bayle of Catholicism; and Gibbon has left a record of the raptures he experienced when the important and recondite truth flashed upon his mind, that the doctrine of the real presence is attested only by the sense of sight, which receives the impressions of Scripture texts, while it is disproved by three senses,—the sight, the touch, and the taste. Catholicism has always opposed philosophical innovation. When Descartes, with his principle of universal doubt, and his distinction of substances into material and thinking, broke the spell of the Middle Ages, an angry controversy was at once excited upon the doctrine of Transubstantiation; which drove the partisans of the new system to the most subtile artifices in order to maintain the show of congruity between their views and the dominant theology. The revival of an ideal philosophy in France, in modern times, occasioned an outbreak of jesuitical bigotry, owing to fear for the doctrines of the Church; and, in our own country, we have lately seen a distinguished theorist, remarkable for the severity of his logic and the consistency, for the time being, of his opinions, after having been led by a metaphysical formula into the bosom of the Catholic Church, turn and decry the whole tendency of modern thought and cultivation, and speak in the most exalted terms of the wisdom and depth of the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

In the history of modern philosophy, too, the reaction of the opinions of every school upon theology, admonishes us of the inseparable connection between these separate pursuits. The peculiar views of Kant, as to the powers of the mind and the laws of science, necessarily led to a peculiar theory of revelation. He aspired to show, *a priori*, what, from the nature of the human mind, revelation must contain, and the evidence it must adduce in support of its authority. Soon, the influence of his system called forth theologians like Paulus, and Rohr, and Krug, and Wegscheider, and a host of others, who swell the ranks of German Rationalism. The dreamy and poetic spirit of Schelling's philosophy of nature, added to the Catholic influence

some of the most celebrated names which German literature in the nineteenth century can boast. Hegelianism embodied its religious results in Strauss's life of Jesus, and the theological opinions and spirit of Schleiermacher and De Wette were allied with a criticism of the human faculties and a theory of knowledge, which found a scientific form in the philosophy of Fries. And in our midst, it is easy to trace the influence which the general philosophical spirit, the belief in the *absolute* agency of man, and the dignity of human nature, among the Unitarians, has had in moulding the form of their theology, and in determining their views of revelation. A full discussion of the points of difference between them and their opponents, involves at the outset the justness of their conception of human power.

Among us, it is evident that the topic, of which we have been treating, is a new one. Obliged as our denomination has been to maintain an antagonistic position, in order to support its existence, it is no wonder that it has not meddled with questions which demand more leisure, a higher cultivation, and different habits of thought. Perhaps, too, it is to this polemic tendency that we must ascribe a certain distrust of such pursuits as visionary and uncertain, too often built on abstractions that are the dreams of a distempered imagination, or the creations of a disordered brain. Many of our reasoners, so long accustomed to decide all questions by an appeal to Scripture, seem to have become unfitted for the discussion of questions where the subject is the human mind, and the requisites a delicate analysis and subtile discrimination. They want the positiveness of authority, and suspect the soundness of conclusions drawn by unassisted reason. They are fearful, moreover, that the simplicity of the gospel may be corrupted; forgetting that mysticism may revel in fanciful constructions of the sacred writings, and sophistry lurk under a rigid collation of Scripture texts. But, be this as it may, the wants of a higher cultivation are beginning to be seriously felt among us, and, as a help to attain this cultivation, a philosophical training is not only desirable but necessary. The laws of the human mind are not suspended nor reversed in behalf of religious science. It requires training and discipline and severe reflection, to reach the highest walks in theology, as much as it requires them to reach the highest walks in any

intellectual pursuit. There are questions, at this moment pressing upon the attention of the American theologian, to which he must bring a mind versed in history and science, and trained to habits of patient and untiring thought. Disputes as to the authenticity of the Scriptures, the reality of miracles, and the nature of inspiration, however we may regret that they have been raised, cannot be settled by the dogmatism of common sense, or charmed away by the contempt of indifference. Neither, of course, can they be laid by appeals to Scripture. Philosophy, by examining into the grounds upon which faith is built, has raised them, and it is to enlightened philosophy alone that we must look for those principles of historical criticism which can conduct to a satisfactory solution.

This relation of religion to philosophy, let it here be observed, is not peculiar. A man, who is not penetrated with a philosophic spirit, cannot attain to eminence in any intellectual pursuit. All the provinces of thought are under the dominion of philosophy. It is the air from which they draw the sustenance of a lofty or a stunted growth. The study of history has been revolutionized by modern philosophy; its aim has been changed, its sphere enlarged. Underneath minute events it looks for the spirit of the people, the manners and life which determine national character; and searches for facts in order to attain the ideas by which they may be interpreted. Beyond history now lies the philosophy of history, which is the creation of the modern intellect, and the noblest product of modern cultivation. Science, too, has received its laws from philosophy; and, like a dutiful child, returns to its parent the fruit of its researches, to be used as the material of still wider progress. Literature and art spring from the inner life of the times, and always exhibit, in a form a little obscure, the tone and direction of thought and cultivation. Philosophy, then, is indispensable to critical and exact scholarship, and is at once the basis and summit of a thorough education.

Before closing this article, however, we wish to say a few words upon the objections which have been brought against modern philosophy. With some, the terms in which it deals afford an insuperable obstacle. They are so uncouth, nonsensical, and absurd, as to provoke laughter and disgust. But distinct and different ideas require peculiar

some of the most celebrated names which German literature in the nineteenth century can boast. Hegelianism embodied its religious results in Strauss's life of Jesus, and the theological opinions and spirit of Schleiermacher and De Wette were allied with a criticism of the human faculties and a theory of knowledge, which found a scientific form in the philosophy of Fries. And in our midst, it is easy to trace the influence which the general philosophical spirit, the belief in the *absolute* agency of man, and the dignity of human nature, among the Unitarians, has had in moulding the form of their theology, and in determining their views of revelation. A full discussion of the points of difference between them and their opponents, involves at the outset the justness of their conception of human power.

Among us, it is evident that the topic, of which we have been treating, is a new one. Obliged as our denomination has been to maintain an antagonistic position, in order to support its existence, it is no wonder that it has not meddled with questions which demand more leisure, a higher cultivation, and different habits of thought. Perhaps, too, it is to this polemic tendency that we must ascribe a certain distrust of such pursuits as visionary and uncertain, too often built on abstractions that are the dreams of a distempered imagination, or the creations of a disordered brain. Many of our reasoners, so long accustomed to decide all questions by an appeal to Scripture, seem to have become unfitted for the discussion of questions where the subject is the human mind, and the requisites a delicate analysis and subtile discrimination. They want the positiveness of authority, and suspect the soundness of conclusions drawn by unassisted reason. They are fearful, moreover, that the simplicity of the gospel may be corrupted; forgetting that mysticism may revel in fanciful constructions of the sacred writings, and sophistry lurk under a rigid collation of Scripture texts. But, be this as it may, the wants of a higher cultivation are beginning to be seriously felt among us, and, as a help to attain this cultivation, a philosophical training is not only desirable but necessary. The laws of the human mind are not suspended nor reversed in behalf of religious science. It requires training and discipline and severe reflection, to reach the highest walks in theology, as much as it requires them to reach the highest walks in any

intellectual pursuit. There are questions, at this moment pressing upon the attention of the American theologian, to which he must bring a mind versed in history and science, and trained to habits of patient and untiring thought. Disputes as to the authenticity of the Scriptures, the reality of miracles, and the nature of inspiration, however we may regret that they have been raised, cannot be settled by the dogmatism of common sense, or charmed away by the contempt of indifference. Neither, of course, can they be laid by appeals to Scripture. Philosophy, by examining into the grounds upon which faith is built, has raised them, and it is to enlightened philosophy alone that we must look for those principles of historical criticism which can conduct to a satisfactory solution.

This relation of religion to philosophy, let it here be observed, is not peculiar. A man, who is not penetrated with a philosophic spirit, cannot attain to eminence in any intellectual pursuit. All the provinces of thought are under the dominion of philosophy. It is the air from which they draw the sustenance of a lofty or a stunted growth. The study of history has been revolutionized by modern philosophy; its aim has been changed, its sphere enlarged. Underneath minute events it looks for the spirit of the people, the manners and life which determine national character; and searches for facts in order to attain the ideas by which they may be interpreted. Beyond history now lies the philosophy of history, which is the creation of the modern intellect, and the noblest product of modern cultivation. Science, too, has received its laws from philosophy; and, like a dutiful child, returns to its parent the fruit of its researches, to be used as the material of still wider progress. Literature and art spring from the inner life of the times, and always exhibit, in a form a little obscure, the tone and direction of thought and cultivation. Philosophy, then, is indispensable to critical and exact scholarship, and is at once the basis and summit of a thorough education.

Before closing this article, however, we wish to say a few words upon the objections which have been brought against modern philosophy. With some, the terms in which it deals afford an insuperable obstacle. They are so uncouth, nonsensical, and absurd, as to provoke laughter and disgust. But distinct and different ideas require peculiar

forms of expression, and, in fact, one of the great obstacles which has obstructed the progress of the science of the human mind, has been the employment of terms borrowed from material operations, and suggesting material analogies. We do not admire the euphony, nor defend, in all cases, the propriety, of the philosophical nomenclature; but we cannot see the justice of condemning a pursuit for the precision of its terminology, any more than of condemning a mechanic for the sharpness of his tools. When such criticisms shall be applied to botany, or chemistry, or physiology, they will at least acquire the merit of consistency. Again; the variety of philosophical opinions and schools, has been considered a weighty objection to the usefulness and value of the pursuit itself. But religion exhibits the same variety of opinion, and the same diversity of sects. In fact, the apparent multiplicity of philosophical schools is delusive, and does not really exist. The great central ideas which are the nucleus around which philosophical systems are formed, will be found to be very few and simple. They may, without any violence to facts, be reduced to four; and we think a rigid analysis might resolve these into two: Sensualism and Idealism. The most comprehensive and minute survey of the history of philosophy, cannot find, we will venture to say, another idea as the basis of an additional classification; and certainly this is as near an approach to unity as theology can boast. But this objection, like the last, proceeds, in too many instances, from a weakness of mind, or a narrowness of spirit, that pretends to decide upon what it does not know, and cannot comprehend, and only proves the necessity of the very cultivation it decries. Some, however, object to speculative philosophy, that it is visionary and unscientific, its method too rash, and its results not valid. To a certain extent this objection may be well founded, and it leads us naturally to consider some of the faults of modern speculation. The great errors of modern philosophy have been, a hasty generalization, and too great confidence in the power of the human intellect. The limits of knowledge have not been clearly defined. Philosophers have forgotten the rules of philosophy, and have endeavored to pluck from the universe the "heart of its mystery." Speculation has attempted to reach, without patient toil, results which patient induction alone could

promise; it has desired to wear, without winning, the crown of science. Such attempts, of course, must fail. When men attempt to express in one formula the secret laws of the universe, and the reason of all things, they may expect to see their splendid generalizations turn to "splendid follies." Every endeavor to penetrate beyond the power of the mind to know, has overthrown the system it was intended to adorn, and men are beginning to see that the perfection of reason consists in the recognition of mystery that underlies the whole. This tendency of modern philosophy may be easily explained; it is a reaction against the laws by which, in the eighteenth century, it was confined. Reason, set free from its narrow limits, would tolerate nothing but itself, and consequently has overlooked the importance of the affections and feelings, and aimed too much after a colder, lifeless, and purely rational view of nature. These are faults of philosophers, not of philosophy; and the remedy must be sought in a rigid adherence to true philosophic method. All the great discoveries in mental science, like the discoveries in the material sciences, have resulted from a patient and exhaustive analysis of the facts of consciousness and history, in order to attain a thorough classification, and to construct a legitimate and valid theory. The method of the student of philosophical history is not different from that of the astronomer; the same speculative laws which the botanist observes are equally applicable to the pursuits of the philologist.

Finally, the great argument, with some, against philosophical pursuits, is, that of irreligious tendency. That some philosophers have been sceptics cannot be denied. But Laplace was a sceptic; and is astronomy injurious? Shelley was an atheist; do we estimate the moral tendency of poetry by his belief? Paine was an infidel; but are the principles of common sense to be distrusted, because he professed to be governed by them? Moreover, a thorough theologian would desire to understand the nature of the attacks against his system; and if they come in a philosophical form, how shall he refute them? Must he abandon the ground to atheists, and thus tacitly admit that the advancing cultivation of the age has outrun theology? Old Jerome applied himself to study, in order to improve the tone of sacred literature, and that Christians might be

able to reply to heathens, who despised them as infants in learning and ineloquent in style. And Tholuck, recently, after avowing his belief that theology and speculative philosophy cannot be separated, declared, with reference to the present tendency of philosophy in Germany, that he should not feel that he was discharging his duty as an academical teacher, did he not struggle to become master of a system which is striking its roots so deep into the spirit of the age. Those are the most dangerous sceptics, who are continually fearing the effect of intellectual progress upon religion. What would have been the influence if, a few years since, geology had been abandoned to the opponents of religion, and the whole array of theological force and skill, clinging to a rigidly literal interpretation of Scripture, had set against it? Would the progress of science have been impeded? Or rather, would not religion have lost a most useful ally and defender. But it is for others to make this plea of irreligious tendency against philosophy. If we will not give it our countenance, still let us not be plaintiffs. Modern philosophy, and modern cultivation, in every department, are leagued with liberal Christianity. This is a sign of hope. The dogmas of a narrow theology cannot breathe the air of philosophy or science; it is too pure. Who can rise from a study of the exquisitely perfect and simple mechanism which every branch of science unfolds, in every corner of the universe, and assent to the theological doctrine of the Trinity? The ethical system of Stewart or Jouffroy, is not the ethical system which flows from the doctrines of total depravity, and predestination; neither can the works of Combe, find fellowship in the theory of vicarious sacrifice, and atonement. All those arts which spring from the finer feelings of the soul, condemn them. What music would satisfy the genius of Calvinism? what would be its ideal of art, but the "writhing agonies of Laocoon?" Shall we, then, be behind the partisans of these very systems in cultivating the sources of sound literature? Orthodox theologians are daily making themselves familiar with German Biblical critics and German literature, and, consequently, with German philosophy. If the experiment will elevate their theology to the level of German orthodoxy, the friends of religion will have cause to rejoice. Every thing in the tendencies of the age is favorable to the

progress of liberal Christianity. Moral and intellectual philosophy, science, literature, and art, are in harmony with it, and are moved by its spirit. The implements are prepared, if theologians will use them. We have nothing, of course, to fear from atheism, and least of all from the progress of knowledge. The great question, which, from recent developments, bids fair to agitate the higher circle of theologians, is a question between rationalism and supernaturalism. In the discussion of this point, a thorough examination of the grounds of religion will of course be involved. The spiritual and elevated character of modern speculation, is a pledge for a satisfactory solution. Any apparent hostility between religion and philosophy, will be reconciled by a simple decision. Philosophy does not want supernaturalism as the starting-point; religion does not want rationalism as the goal. Both will be satisfied with supernaturalism grounded in rationalism, with Christian faith as the crown of human reason. T. S. K.

Art. XXI.

Infidelity and Religion.

Two spirits o'er an open grave were bending,
Their gaze far down its gloomy chamber sending.
One, with a brow of stern and cold despair,
And sable weeds and cypress in his hair,
Turned not his eyes, so fixed and dark with wo,
From the cold pit, which, fearful, yawned below.
The other stood with garments pure and white
As deck the dwellers of the Land of Light.
Her placid brow was as an angel's fair,
While calm and joyous was her gentle air;
And though within the grave she dropt a tear,
Her upturned eye was still serene and clear.

"Life!" said the spirit with the brow of gloom,
His arm outstretching o'er the gaping tomb —
"'Tis a deep and sullen river,
Rolling slowly to the sea,

There to be engulfed forever
In a dark eternity!"

"Nay!" said the shining one with upturned eye,
And smile so clear it mirrowed back the sky —
"'Tis a sunny streamlet gliding
Gently on to seek its goal;
There in God's own bosom hiding —
Bright and pure, a white-robed soul!"

But the dark spirit's gloomy voice, again,
Doled out in slow and melancholy strain —
"'Tis a mournful weed, that groweth
Lone and friendless in the world,
Which a ghastly reaper moweth,
And 'tis to oblivion hurled!"

"Nay!" the bright, gentle one replies once more,
And softer still the holy smile she wore —
"'Tis a starry flower, upraising
Through all ills, a trusting eye,
Evermore its Maker praising —
Fading here to bloom on high!"

Slowly the dark one sunk his gloomy brow,
As once again he murmured sad and low:
"'Tis a storm, forever sweeping
O'er a bleak and barren heath;
Tossing, surging, never sleeping,
Till it lull in endless death!"

"Nay!" and the hoping spirit's hands were prest
In meek and holy rapture to her breast —
"'Tis a friendly rain, that showers
On a fair and pleasant land,
Where the darkest cloud that lowers,
By the rainbow still is spann'd!"

Stern was the gaze of sorrow and despair
That now was fixed upon the spirit fair,
As, a last time, the hopeless wailer's burst
Of anguish, came more drear than e'en at first.
"'Tis a haunting vision, blended
Evermore with tears and pain:
'Tis a dream that best were ended;
Life is false, and life is vain!"

Ceased the dark spirit, and a sable cloud,
O'er his set features, folded like a shroud,
Then slowly sank, as sinks the dying wave,
In the dark chamber of the yawning grave.

Silently closed the damp turf o'er his head,
And the stern spirit, like the mortal dead,
Came not again from out his gloomy bed!

"Life!" said the shining one, as stretching forth
Her long, fair arms, she blessed the teeming earth —
"Life is true and life is real!
Life has worthy deeds for all;
Tis no vain and false ideal
Ending with the shroud and pall!
Up, and do, then, dreaming mortal!
With a strong heart toil away!
Earth has cares, but heaven a portal
Opening up to endless day!"

She paused, and o'er her pure and spotless breast,
Drew the soft drapery of her snowy vest;
Her long, fair arms extended yet once more
To bless the earth, she oft had blessed before,
Then turned away to pour her heavenly light,
In genial floods, where all were else but night!

Still dwells she here — that child of heavenly birth;
Soothing the sorrows of the sons of earth;
Drying the tears which dim the mourner's eye;
Gently subduing grief's desponding sigh;
Winging with rapture e'en the parting breath,
And wreathing smiles around the lips of death!

Blest be her path along life's rugged way!
Blest be her smiles which light the darkest day!
And blest the tears that, trusting still, she weeps,
Where the dark spirit yet in silence sleeps!

C. M. S.

Art. XXII.

The Effect of our present Character on our future State.

On account of the different feelings and prejudices with which this subject is met in the denomination of Christians to which we belong, we shall introduce it with a few remarks on the application of human reason.

We are sometimes told that the Scriptures, and the Scriptures alone, are to regulate our faith in this matter; but we shall aim, in the present article, to be guided mainly by reason alone. Do any demur? But why? Do not they themselves reason, independently of the Scriptures, or only from certain acknowledged principles which are recognised in the Scriptures? What is more common than their practice of presenting us the longest chains of abstract reasoning, on subjects connected with the immortal state, and even on that state itself, when the foundation of that reasoning is plainly nothing more than certain views of the attributes of the Deity, or certain principles taken either from philosophy or revelation? Our controversial books and our preaching are full of instances. It may be said, however, that there is this difference: that the topics thus reasoned on by those who object to the validity of reason in our present subject, are matters of distinct revelation; that, for instance, the existence of a future state, and the ultimate holiness and happiness of all in that state, are plainly taught to us in the Christian Scriptures; and that, by applying our reason to such subjects, we only do it to confirm the teachings of revelation, without which, our reason alone should not proceed in the adventure, —or, at least, should not be trusted. Then it seems, that reason would give us no faith in these matters, or but a feeble and faltering faith, and that it is only when they are revealed by the sure word of God, that our reason can be employed in fortifying and strengthening that revelation. To this we have no objection, for it is at once apparent that the whole matter of revelation is to be decided at the bar of human reason. The question, What is God's word? must be determined by this umpire. And I would ask, How strong is our faith in any matter which the Bible may seem to contain, which is, as yet, contrary to our reason? Let us try this. Suppose the Bible seemed to teach the doctrine of endless sin and wo; should we believe it? Would reason surrender itself? No. Nature would rebel, and faith would be impossible. It is of no use to say here, that it is perfectly safe to answer thus, for we do not believe the Bible does contain this doctrine, and therefore the supposition is not fair. For the truth is, this is the only way we can test the question of the authority of human

reason. We may make a distinction between what is opposed to, and what is merely above reason; but the truth is, and we feel it with intuitive power, that we do not and cannot believe in things outrageous to all our reason, though they were to be found in a book we call a divine revelation. You may say they cannot be contained in any real revelation: and I grant they cannot; but they may exist in a collection of writings entitled a divine revelation; and in such a case, I ask, How strong would be our faith? It is this very power of human reason that separates, in such instances, the revealed of God, from the interpolated by man; as in the case of the apocrypha. If historical evidence is also used in the work of deciding upon such and such manuscripts, parchments, &c., this is only the mechanical part of it; after all this has been gone through with, reason is still left to suspect, here and there, the divinity of their contents. However much we may try to argue ourselves away from it, it is reason, to which ultimately we submit the whole matter, of the delivery and contents of a received revelation.

If any should say, this is a precarious basis on which to rest so important a matter, I would urge them to consider the utmost strength of that evidence for a divine revelation, which consists in the mere circumstances of its delivery or communication. Whatever it may have been to those who received it, thousands of years ago, to us who are subjected to the transcribings and mistakes of all this time, our reason must come in largely for a verdict upon the *contents* of a book of any such professions. I say our reason must come *largely* into such a work. So much appears irresistible.

Be it observed here, that we do not deny that any matter of revealed truth is to be received on authority of revelation alone; for we have already made the distinction between things contradictory to, and things merely above reason; and it is with reference to this last named character of truth only, that we bow to authority out of, and independent of, our reason. Still it must be observed that, even this homage to the Scriptures is all with reference to our reason. We bow to such authority, when properly established by its attending evidence, only in case reason has no *hostility* to such truth. It may not indeed be said, that we receive

second, that knowledge and virtue are acquired gradually. We suppose it can hardly be necessary to attempt a proof that these *are* principles recognised in the Scriptures; they are "known and read of all men."

But before we apply them, it is important to understand precisely what is the character of the work we propose to do with them. Be it known, then, that we do not propose to prove rewards and punishments in a future state of being, for certain individual actions, or sins, committed here. Our subject is, the effect of our present *character*, not conduct, on our future state. For, be it observed, every individual sin may here be justly punished, and yet, in the future, we may be losers on account of a sinful life. Indeed, here is a grand distinction, which sheds light on the whole subject. We are punished and rewarded in two ways, — for each individual act, and for a general state of moral character. This last principle will hold good forever; for, in truth, moral and intellectual character is always the measure of enjoyment.

If any say that, even in this case, there is a sense in which our present actions may follow us with their consequences in a future state, — as, in neglect to improve, the consequences of the overt act affect the formation of the character, &c. — be it so; I only mean that a murder, theft, lie, &c., and the immediate disposition that led to them, may not plague us in our future existence, though the character from which they proceeded, may, at least, lessen our enjoyments. Such is the nature of the work which we propose to accomplish with the principles aforesaid.

Let us now try them. But, while it is universally acknowledged that, all through *this* life, spiritual growth is the measure of spiritual enjoyment, we are reminded by some that we cannot connect, in this manner, the two states of the present and future existence, without adopting the principle of *analogy*, which, in reference to such a matter, is altogether imaginary, and unworthy of trust. And many have made themselves merry in exposing, as they thought, the consequences of a course of analogical reasoning, with reference to the future state. As an instance of this, see an article on the subject in the present work, (Quarterly for January, 1845.) In analogy, we are told, "We are brought to a full stop at our first setting out. This state of our

forget how we have remonstrated against such a course; and it ill becomes us, now, it would seem, to join with the "Orthodox," in vilifying human reason, and prescribing for all faith, the limits of the verbal declarations of the Scriptures. Is there no such thing as the smell of bigotry among us?

To be sure, we allow that it makes a difference, as to what particular subject we reason on, and the character of the reasoning we employ. If we start from philosophical principles not asserted in the Bible, we may be more liable to mistake, than when we fix upon some principle, or principles, plainly recognised in the Scriptures, and carry them out to their legitimate conclusions. Now, this is precisely that character of reasoning which is so common among us, when, from the revealed attributes of God, we reason to the conclusion of the final holiness and happiness of all men in a state of immortality. Only, in the latter case, the fact of immortality is revealed to us, to which our reason first assents, and the holiness and happiness of all men in that state are also revealed to us, as a result consistent with the attributes of God. Then, from these same attributes, our reason attempts to show a similar result. Now how much is this case different from what we propose to do, at present? We start, not from any principles of mere human philosophy. We adopt, as the groundwork of our reasoning, the plainly recognised principles of the Scriptures. From these we undertake to show that the characters we attain to, in the present life, will, to some extent, affect our condition in the future. Now, compare these cases, one with the other. In the one, both the fact of immortality, and the condition of it which we attempt to prove, are plainly revealed. But, then, that condition is only revealed as the result of the same principles, (namely, the attributes of God,) upon which we conduct our reasoning. This, then, is the first case. The second case, which we now propose, is this: The fact of immortality is revealed; the condition of it which we attempt to prove may not be so clearly; but, as in the former case, the principles upon which we attempt that proof, are matters of distinct and unequivocal revelation.

We will here state those principles. They are, first, that spiritual growth is the measure of spiritual enjoyment;

second, that knowledge and virtue are acquired gradually. We suppose it can hardly be necessary to attempt a proof that these *are* principles recognised in the Scriptures; they are "known and read of all men."

But before we apply them, it is important to understand precisely what is the character of the work we propose to do with them. Be it known, then, that we do not propose to prove rewards and punishments in a future state of being, for certain individual actions, or sins, committed here. Our subject is, the effect of our present *character*, not conduct, on our future state. For, be it observed, every individual sin may here be justly punished, and yet, in the future, we may be losers on account of a sinful life. Indeed, here is a grand distinction, which sheds light on the whole subject. We are punished and rewarded in two ways, — for each individual act, and for a general state of moral character. This last principle will hold good forever; for, in truth, moral and intellectual character is always the measure of enjoyment.

If any say that, even in this case, there is a sense in which our present actions may follow us with their consequences in a future state, — as, in neglect to improve, the consequences of the overt act affect the formation of the character, &c. — be it so; I only mean that a murder, theft, lie, &c., and the immediate disposition that led to them, may not plague us in our future existence, though the character from which they proceeded, may, at least, lessen our enjoyments. Such is the nature of the work which we propose to accomplish with the principles aforesaid.

Let us now try them. But, while it is universally acknowledged that, all through *this* life, spiritual growth is the measure of spiritual enjoyment, we are reminded by some that we cannot connect, in this manner, the two states of the present and future existence, without adopting the principle of *analogy*, which, in reference to such a matter, is altogether imaginary, and unworthy of trust. And many have made themselves merry in exposing, as they thought, the consequences of a course of analogical reasoning, with reference to the future state. As an instance of this, see an article on the subject in the present work, (Quarterly for January, 1845.) In analogy, we are told, "We are brought to a full stop at our first setting out. This state of our

existence is mortal; and all who live here must see death. The next state of man's existence will be mortal; and all who live in that state must see death. Immortality is now out of the question; and our subject changes its aspect, having lost one of its principal elements. As we are now entirely free from all authority but analogy, we have just as wide a field in which to range as we please to make it. . . . . Keeping to our analogy, we may be satisfied that, in the future world, some will die in infancy, some in youth, some in middle age, and some in old age; all will sin and come short in duty; some will be more virtuous than others; the most virtuous will endure great afflictions, be persecuted by bigots; and, in short, all things there will analogically agree with all things here. . . . . People will marry; some be poor, some rich, some in prisons and alms-houses," &c., &c.

It ought, at least, to have been allowed that analogy must be restrained to certain limits,—that it does not require us to contradict the most explicit testimony of the Scriptures, —to believe that people marry in the future state, when the Scriptures say they do not,—that they die there, when the Scriptures assure us that they are immortal, and "die no more." Here, then, is the first restraint imposed upon analogy; namely, the explicit and unequivocal testimony of the Scriptures, sanctioned by our reason.

But, why reject analogy altogether? It seems to us that it may furnish, at least, some very probable grounds of reasoning. The ground which we assume, and to which we shall confine ourselves, in the present article, is this: That what takes place, now, in obedience to certain laws of the Creator and of nature, which appear to us unchangeable, we may rationally suppose will always take place, the same circumstances with reference to those laws being observed. For instance, it is a law, now, that virtue produces enjoyment. Is this law eternal and unchangeable? Then it will always be so. By the same law, if virtue ceases, or if it diminishes, so will enjoyment. Again; it is a law, now, that knowledge and virtue are acquired gradually; or, in other words, that the mind does not spring at once to its full stature, any more than does the body. It may make some sudden and surprising advancements, but it is sufficient for our purpose to say, that it does not jump

instantaneously from the lowest states of ignorance and depravity to the highest states of knowledge and virtue. In general, the process is exceedingly slow. And even the exceptions are not within measurable distance, not within sight, of the extreme conclusions we are opposing. Indeed, we all instantly recognise it as a law of nature, as unbending as fate, that knowledge and virtue *cannot* be thrust into a man, or made to expand in him, passively, as you would pour water into a receiver, or excite heat in a body of iron. Even in those instances where sudden advances, as we term them, are made among the immoral, they are the effect of a long train of thoughts and emotions, resolves and re-resolves, which, even though privately, have passed through the mind of the subjects. The successful determination, the open profession, the brilliant virtue, which first opens to the sight, are not, in reality, the *first* and *instantaneous* fruit of some stirring and electric impulse in the soul; or, absurder still, no fruit at all, but an instantaneous creation. In almost all such operations, there is the seed, the plant, the flower, and the fruit.

I have said, it is a law of nature that you cannot expand virtue in a man in a passive and instantaneous manner. I have not said that you cannot *quicken* it instantly. And here let us have no metaphysical confounding of distinct principles. The point we discuss is, not whether there ever is in nature a first virtuous impulse impressed upon the soul, nor whether, apparently, there are any sudden advances in absolute virtue; but whether such advances,—or, which would suit our purpose equally as well,—whether the most extensive advances, from low to high, take place instantly. We say they do not. Nature herself never did, and never will, admit of it. But stop, says one, that is the very point. Is this law which operates in nature now, *eternal* and *unchangeable?* If it is, then we can plainly see that analogy requires us to believe that the consequences of compliance or non-compliance never will be arrested, at death, or any other time. In reply to this question, I would ask, what are our general views with reference to the laws of nature? Does any one think that nature's ways are fickle and changeful, that her laws cannot be permanently relied on? Indeed, what are the laws of nature but the laws of God? And, if we say that nature is changeable, do we not implicate

her God? We feel, and it seems to me, that every reader must feel, that we are treading on very sure ground here. *This* we may say,—that the *circumstances* with reference to those laws may change, and, therefore, the laws entirely cease to affect certain individuals. How, then, shall we change those circumstances, in the future world, so as to arrest the operation of this law with man? By one summary and comprehensive conclusion: simply by supposing that, there, all improvement is brought to a stop; that no further knowledge or virtue is to be obtained; that man has reached the ultimatum of his spiritual expansion, grown to the utmost point of the scale allotted to him; and that there he must stand, in the midst of an unbounded universe, physical, intellectual, and moral, with even *imagination* measured and bounded, in obedience to the law, "thus far shalt thou go, and no further;" with intellect confined in an inclosure as tight and impassable as the tube which holds the mercury of a thermometer, prescribing, with equal exactness, its topmost height, and hermetically sealed there; virtue and veneration equally stayed in their progress upward; in short, all the powers of the mind limited and reined in; and man made to say, in the great school of the universe and of immortality—to say, even to his Creator and Master, "I have learnt out; I must stop!" Does the reader say this is an exaggerated representation? or else one in no way discouraging, if scope enough be allowed to human powers in the first place? I beg him to reconsider the matter; for, however ample you make the sphere of his expansion, if you limit it, there must come a time when the foregoing representation shall be literally realized. This is the consequence which would follow from changing the circumstances to arrest this law of nature. And, even here, we have not looked the absurdity directly in its face; for, to abolish all inequalities in that state which would result from the continued operation of this law, we must suppose the cessation of it to take place at the moment of each individual's death; that, then, all improvement is at an end, and knowledge and virtue can progress no further. And, now, I need not ask the reader to call up, in his imagination, all the infants and idiots, heathens and Christians, wise men and fools, saints and pirates, and suppose them, at the moment of death, to be deprived of all further oppor-

tunities of mental and moral expansion. If he could even entertain this thought, he would at once perceive that, even then, without the interposition of a miracle, by which all are instantly equalized, he has not proved that the consequences of our present characters do not follow us in the future state. He has, on the contrary, proved the greatest inequality imaginable, even that all human creatures will remain as they now are! We shall consider the probability of such a miracle in the proper place.

There is another way in which our argument may be evaded. One may say, that, in perfect consistency with the continued operation of this law of spiritual growth, by the continual increase of knowledge and virtue, the mind may, by a different change of circumstances in the future state, by the deliverance there experienced from the bondage of the flesh, by unobstructed powers, by the new scene of heavenly reality and glory which will there burst suddenly upon it,—one may say that, by these means, the mind may make more improvement there, in the time of one day, than it could here in a lifetime of seventy years. So it may; but then all will have this advantage, and reason assures us that the farthest advanced at the commencement of that state, will not be equalled by those who commence at the same time with powers unexpanded. Can any rational man suppose that an infant, a day old, will be equal to a Newton in the future state, should both die at the same moment? that the very moment of death will equalize them, intellectually and morally? To be sure, the infant may be brought to maturity very speedily; may even, in course of time, outstrip the Newton, in moral and intellectual attainments. But that is not the point. Will they be equal at death? will they *commence* the future state equal? Now, one may trace the process of growth and expansion as far *into* the future world as he may believe himself justified, and with whatever degrees of advancement and retardation with different individuals he may please to imagine; and he may indulge in that speculation, too, perfectly independently of any argument, or any representation of ours. But just let him remember what belongs to imagination, and what to argument.

As we have mentioned the infant here, as a case of illustration, we may be told that no one believes that the infant

mind will be equal in stature to other minds in a future state. But I would ask, why not? What single circumstance shall make the infant a less spirit than others, at the moment of death? Simply this: the laws of nature have not operated sufficiently with it, to expand its powers. Now, this is the precise ground upon which we place the whole race of man. And until the objector can show some other reason for dwarfing the infant in the future state, he must not object to our classing infants with the rest of human kind, in our general argument. We rest the whole subject upon this principle.

Do we now hear the objection, that it is a reflection upon God's impartiality, thus to allow to those who died before us, before the flood, even in the days of Adam, chances of improvement so much greater than to us and to those who are to come after? Is it even intimated that we can never come up with them? I answer, that may be, or may not be, for aught that we have said, or for any principle that we have laid down. But, is not the same consequence involved, so far as it reflects upon God's impartiality, by those who contend for no such inequalities hereafter, but simply maintain an immortality which survives the ravages of death? How much greater has been the happiness of Adam than of the last person that died! And even with those who deny such immortality, and contend for an unconscious state between death and a general resurrection, how much longer is that state with some than with others! What an annihilation of enjoyment! And with those, too, who maintain but an unconscious state between death and a *progressive* resurrection, how much larger amount of conscious, happy existence have they enjoyed who were born six thousand years before us! So that this reflection upon God's impartiality, if it be one, is not a difficulty which *we* alone are troubled with.

Our conclusion may now be evaded in a still different way. We have spoken of both knowledge and virtue being gradually acquired, according to the law of nature, and have therefore argued, that without the interposition of a miracle, there must be inequalities after death. Some, perhaps, will now suggest that knowledge in this world may be a very different thing from knowledge in the world to come. It may relate to different objects. And our pro-

ficiency here in the sciences pertaining to this world, may there be of no avail to us. Very true; in the sciences pertaining exclusively to this world. But does all the knowledge we acquire here pertain to this world alone? We will here make no consideration of the principles of several of those sciences which are in use in our present state, such as number, mathematics, natural philosophy, &c., in their relation to objects, space, &c.; how these, as acquired here, may be put in immediate application there. Those who wish to weigh the argument from this source, may consult Dick's "Philosophy of a Future State," where, in the midst of much that is imaginary and not worthy of the name of argument, he will find much, and that supported by the Scriptures, too, that commends itself to our rational conviction. Our business at present is with that kind of knowledge acquired here which *must* exist in a future state. Such is the knowledge of God, and of some of his ways. We need not particularize. If we know truly any thing of God, of his wisdom, power, goodness, justice, and their relation to what is immortal in moral beings like ourselves, it is indisputably true that thus much will belong to the kind of knowledge we shall have in the future state. Will our attainment of it in the present state avail us any thing in the future? Or will it be dashed out of our minds (pardon the expression) at the moment of death, and then dashed in again at the next moment, in a miraculous manner? Will the acquisition of it here, in a natural way, avail us nothing in the future? If you say it will, you admit the ground of our reasoning, and by consequence, that the non-acquisition of it here will so far lessen both our knowledge and enjoyment at the commencement of our future existence. If you say it will not, you are still depending on a miracle to equalize all men at death, or at the commencement of their future being; which miraculous interference shall be noticed in due time.

Again; there is the knowledge of Jesus Christ, and of his relation to our redemption and immortality. Can the faculty of *memory*, in this matter, be relied on? Shall we remember, when in the future world, "we shall be like him," and "shall see him as he is," that it was he who aided us, and saved us from our sins, taught us the knowledge of God, and made known to us his relation to our immortality? Shall we remember, when introduced

to him in that state, that this was the Saviour we adored through life, in all our troubles, trials and afflictions, and through whom we were trained to offer habitual praises to his God and our God? If we shall, then the acquirement or non-acquirement of this knowledge and benefit here, as it affects the commencement of our future state, and our attachment to that Saviour there, may be disposed of on the ground of the preceding argument.

And, besides all that can be said of the sameness in kind, of that knowledge we shall possess in the future, and that which we acquire in the present life, there is still the increase of the *power* to know. The more I increase in knowledge, the greater facility do I acquire with respect to subsequent increase. It is so, too, in virtue. Newton not only had more knowledge of the science of astronomy than I have, but the acquisition of this very knowledge gave him more *power* to know, than I have. The faculties themselves are strengthened by exercise. This is a law of our nature. The apparent exceptions to it, in the infirmity of old age, must be attributed to the body, not the mind. And, unless the operation of this law is arrested at death, and the supposed miracle equalizes, not only the knowledge but the power to know, — cuts off the strength acquired by exercise on the high things pertaining to God and heaven, and levels all human creatures, the cultivated and the uncultivated, the wise and the foolish, the full-grown mind and the infant, those who have toiled through a whole life for the expansion and exaltation of their natures, and those who have as signally neglected all improvement, — unless, I say, death levels all these, not only to the same amount of knowledge but to the same capacity, then we may expect our present characters to affect our condition in a future state.

We may push this argument even further. Increase of knowledge not only increases the power to know, in those particular branches which we cultivate, but in reference to any or all other departments of knowledge where the same faculties are required. Bacon and Newton were better able to prosecute the studies of those natural sciences they were *unacquainted* with, than I am. The same faculties had already been better exercised in other studies. I have more ability in this respect than my child, and for the same

reason. Now, therefore, even though the amount of the knowledge in the future world, which is of the same kind as that acquired in this, be but a very small proportion, yet, our faculties being the same and being strengthened by exercise in this present state, we are certainly better fitted to progress in the attainment of an entirely new information, from new objects of study, than if we had made no use at all of our faculties here. And so, to foreclose the argument for inequalities in that state, by making knowledge there a different thing, in many respects, from knowledge in this world, you must either annihilate or change the intellectual *faculties* of man, — which would be the next thing to putting him out of existence; or else you must give to this much-needed miracle the effect of a still more wonderful counteraction of the laws of the human mind. We shall, however, look after that supposed miracle, directly.

But, whatever may be said of the character of our knowledge, now and hereafter, none, I presume, will question the sameness of our *virtue* and *religion* here and in a future state. To be sure, the circumstances of temptation and bondage to the flesh may not there beset us, but these, in successful combat, only strengthen, they do not originate our virtue. And, whatever may be the circumstances by which we are there surrounded, which serve to *exercise* our virtue, none can doubt that the fundamental elements of our moral nature will there be the same; that a sense of uprightness and benevolence, or the law of love, will continue to pervade the celestial mansions, and make us the perfection of what we now are in part. Indeed, in our moral natures we now approximate the image of God. Our justice and benevolence are the same in nature, or in essence, as his. We are only able to *know* God through the medium of our moral nature in connection with our intellect. Shall not then these principles remain the same? But why any further reasoning? We may safely assume that the principles of our moral nature, (and when I speak thus, I limit them, for surety's sake, to what we now term justice and benevolence, not extending them to any principles which operate merely in the ties of consanguinity,) we may safely assume, I say, that these purely moral principles are eternal; unchanging as God himself. Their

relations, their objects, in some respects, may change, but not the principles themselves. Well now, shall not the cultivation of them, in the present state, avail us something for the future? I mean not in the way of reward there, for what we have not received but deserved here, but on the principle that spiritual growth is the measure of spiritual enjoyment, all through our being. For illustration: go out into a nursery of trees and select, for transplanting, some of one, some of three, some of five, and some of ten years' growth; convey them to a neighboring orchard, and, be that soil and atmosphere ever so much more exuberant, the farthest advanced will generally take the lead. It is the advantage of growth secured. No miracle, I apprehend, will at once equalize them, neither will the apple-trees yield pears, nor the nut-trees apples.

But once more. Our *religion* will be the same in the future state as here. By this I simply mean, that the same veneration for God, varying only in degree, the same love for his adorable perfections, the same nature of worship will exist there as here. And we may add to all this, as in the case of knowledge, the increase of *power* which the increase of virtue and religion carries with it, to attain yet more and more.

Now all these various kinds of mental and moral acquisition and force, many a man carries with him to the very door of death. Oftentimes he is stricken down by accident, in the full bloom of all his powers. So are the ignorant, the infantile, the lowest and the worst of men, stricken down with them. And *then*, will it be said, in a moment, quicker than thought, uprise the man who has never sought to improve his mental powers, the little child but a day old with the youth of sixteen, the idiot, the man of most groveling and debasing passions, who has breathed nothing but the atmosphere of moral pollution all his lifetime, and made crime his business, — uprise, in an instant, the whole of this promiscuous host, to stand, without gradation, on even scale with the Newtons and Shakspeares, the Howards and Fenelons of creation! As we have mentioned idiots, a class so unfortunate as to excite our instant pity, I would merely say here, as we pass, that I place them on the same ground with infants.

But we may not represent the views of all. Some

there are who hold that this work is not done at the moment of death, but who incline to suppose an unconscious state between death and the resurrection. Well, where nothing is done, nothing is done. The absurdity strikes us as forcibly, to have this wonder accomplished, in the same way precisely, but only after waiting a while — a lapse of nonentity — as to work it without having that nothing intervene. The thing itself is not in the least affected by this interposition of a mere blank.

This brings us at length to the point: Will this thing be done? Will God work this astounding miracle? In reply to this question, we would say, that there are two sources of evidence for or against this position; namely, reason and the Scriptures. In the first place, what does reason say? And first, the whole train of our former argument, in reference to the laws of nature, that knowledge and virtue must be acquired gradually; that no arrest of the operation of this law can be supposed to take place by a cessation of all improvement at death; that the change of circumstances, from the bondage of the flesh to unobstructed powers in a world of sudden light and glory, does not necessarily equalize all, and that knowledge and virtue in this life are the same, in much of their nature, with these attainments in the life to come, &c. &c., — the whole strength of this argument may now be said to require modification from certain untoward circumstances which are uncontrollable by those who are subject to them, and which render the supposition of a miracle of equalization, or of justice, altogether desirable and reasonable. What are these circumstances? Deprivation of privileges in the present life and different natural endowments. Here is one who, in the first place, was "*born* in sin and shapen in iniquity," and who, from his infancy, has breathed the atmosphere of pollution, surrounded with poverty, and the examples of wicked parents who have neglected his education, and suffered his mental and moral nature to run riot in ignorance and crime. These circumstances the child could not control. It was no fault of his. He has grown up and died under the influence of these unavoidable hindrances. Here is another who was born of virtuous parents; nursed in the lap of a pious and intelligent mother; surrounded, throughout his youth, with all the

influences which an abundant fortune, the most diligent care and virtuous affection could possibly bestow. These circumstances, too, the child could not control. It was no virtue of his. He has grown up and died under the influence of these unavoidable helps. Now, in the future world, or at death, do we seriously feel the need of perpetuating the inequalities which have resulted from such sources as these? Do we not rather feel the need and the justice of some miracle of equity by which the losses, so involuntarily incurred, shall be at least made up to us? Now there are thousands of such cases. Indeed, every individual of the race is more or less involved in this kind of circumstances.

In answer to the above queries, I reply, in the first place, these circumstances make no difference in *this* world. The higher the cultivation, morally and intellectually, the higher is the reward. The man who *could* not cultivate himself, and of whom we can say merely, that he would have done so if he had possessed the means and had so willed, is not nevertheless rewarded as if he had done the work. In other words, he is not rewarded for what *might* have been, had circumstances been otherwise. He is only rewarded for what he has actually accomplished. This you may say is a hard case; but the reader will please to remember that this is the real fact. Now what does reason propose to do? To fix upon a time when this course of things shall be altered. Very well. And where will it fix the point? At the moment of death. But why fix upon that moment rather than any other in the line of our existence? I beg reason to consider that *that* is the very question in debate. We talk of death as though it was the grand settler of all theological difficulties, the grand revolutionary point in God's government, and in all the laws and operations of the whole empire of human mind. And that it is a great change, no one disputes. That marvellous scenes will be opened to us at that moment, and wonderful advances made from that point with the whole race of man, may be all very compatible with revelation and reason. But that God will annul, at that moment, any law of his spiritual creation, and not suffer things to go on in the eternal and estab-

lished order which so harmonizes with all our ideas of Deity, is altogether a different proposition.

Truth to say, there is but one existence. We talk of two worlds, and of death as if it was a great breach or chasm in our being; but there is, after all, but one existence. And the doctrine we propose but recognises the continuation of what takes place all through this part of it, with such changes as death naturally makes. We enjoy here in proportion as we cultivate our higher powers, and we acquire only by degrees. At death, there is no stopping-place. The line of existence, so to speak, suddenly widens there, but it is not broken; it is continuous all along, even through eternity. We admit only such changes as reason warrants and the Scriptures suggest.

I say, why fix upon the moment of death to equalize men rather than upon any other moment in the whole line of our existence? Here is one who has lived to the age of twenty-five, had a certain amount of advantages, and made a certain amount of improvement. Here is another who has lived to the age of fifty, and had only the same amount of advantages, and made the same amount of improvement. They both die at the same moment. Now the hypothesis in question would require us to *un*-equalize these, for one has had twenty-five years more *time* than the other! Here, then, you have your inequalities. The argument proves too much for the objector, and would bring him over towards our side of the question.

We have one more very simple suggestion. If it is *necessary* for God to equalize all men at death, or at any future period, in so far as privileges and advantages are concerned, his omniscience can very easily strike the balance between that which is the result of our own improvement, and that which was the offspring of unavoidable circumstances, and appoint us our position accordingly. There will then be left all the inequalities imaginable. But why suppose it necessary? I repeat, this is fixing upon death an importance not warranted by any grounds of reason.

The same argument in general, which has been applied to the advantages of education and the like, may be applied to natural endowments. They make no difference in this respect in the present world. Those men are

rewarded the most who have them the most liberally—rewarded, I mean, in that particular direction: and why suppose that a great mind should shrink to a little one at death, or the smallest, even infants and Hottentots, suddenly start to the most capacious in intellect and virtue? But, says one, what objection to having all started at once and sent along with an equal expansion, infinitely surpassing the most gigantic attainments here? None at all. This is not a matter to be ascertained by feeling; only show us evidence of the miracle that will thus affect this law of nature; proof is what we want, not likings or dislikings. We will suppose all may then be suddenly expanded; and yet we should be cautious how much meaning we embody in that term, *sudden*. But even admitting that the *expansion* will be equal, this does not equalize the minds so variously diversified before.

Leaving now the consideration of the deprivation of privileges and different natural endowments, as a reason why the miracle in question may be wrought at death or any future period, we approach a topic which the reader may have thought the writer had forgotten, and which is frequently resorted to in the discussion of this subject. We refer to the miracle wrought on Saul of Tarsus. We have recognised it as a law of nature, as unbending as fate, that knowledge and virtue cannot be thrust into a man, or be made to expand in him passively. We may now be referred to St. Paul, as an instance of what *has* taken place, and, by inference, of what may take place again. But was there any miracle actually wrought in Saul's *mind?* We are accustomed to call this a miraculous conversion, but in what did the miracle consist? We answer, in the outward circumstances altogether. Let any one peruse the account of this matter, in the 9th, 22d, and 26th chapters of the Acts, and he will find mention of a light from heaven shining round about Paul and them which journeyed with him, and a voice speaking to him, and a blindness of three days, with the sudden cure of it. This is the sum of the whole miracle. These things wrought in Saul a *sudden* conversion. What was the amount of the conversion? He immediately expressed a willingness to do the will of the Lord, and was convinced of the divinity of Christ's mission. And after tarrying certain

days at Damascus, he set about preaching Christ, confounding his enemies who denied him, and proving that such and such things were verily so. Is there any miracle in all this *mental process?* Such a display, and such a voice, would convert me to almost any thing reasonable; but I should, undoubtedly, make the distinction between the outward miracle that convinced me, and the change wrought in my mind, in accordance with the natural laws thereof.

Now, the opening glories of the future world may have as sudden an effect on us. We have heretofore allowed this. But there may be the same distinction between the outward and, to us, miraculous display, and the effect produced in our minds in accordance with the natural laws thereof. But will this equalize us? The same scenes may be open to all. But will the highest and most cultivated minds derive no advantage over the feeblest and most neglected? How was it with Paul? This is a point of some importance. It is, indeed, *the* point in our whole argument. And as Paul's case is so frequently adduced in the discussion of this subject, it is well to consider it the more carefully. Paul met, then, with a sudden change; call it a *great* change. But the question we shall raise here, is, Had his former character no influence on his converted state? Was he the man after his conversion, that he would have been had he been greater or less in knowledge and goodness before? Call the conversion *itself* miraculous, if you please; did not his knowledge before acquired, help him in his converted state? Paul was a man of no mean attainments. His natural powers were vast, and his education extensive. Was he not able, by his scholarlike attainments, to do, in the kingdom of his Master, what the simple conversion which he met with, would not have enabled him to do? And is it likely that such a conversion alone *could* have thus furnished his mind? Was he not a greater and a happier man for doing this work before? View it also with respect to the question of goodness. Was even Paul as morally capacious as if he had not been Saul? I beseech the reader's solemn attention to this point. The fact is, every moral and immoral act leaves a lasting impression on the soul. Every thought does, I do not say in the nature of remorse, or pain,

or conscious approval; but it leaves its influence. We cannot *think* a thought, but it will run through eternity; not in the particular shape of that thought, but in its influence upon others. Annihilate or add, if it be possible, one particle of matter, and to some degree, its influence would be felt through "matter's whole domain." It is so in the mental, so in the moral universe. Or rather, perhaps I should say, it is so with every individual mind. And how often do we see it exemplified! One single impulse, one single thought, conceived in childhood, will affect and alter a whole life. But that thought was the product of a preceding one, and that still of another. Or, if the line is not direct and single, as it commonly is not, for any great length, yet, in a complex, and multiplied, and almost infinite diversity, one stir, even the least, of the vast ocean of mind, will be felt to its utmost borders, and through all time. You may call this philosophy, but it is fact nevertheless. It is like the facts in natural science, with which revelation must harmonize. Now, doubtless, it was so with Paul. Converted Paul, (and no matter *how* he was converted, nor how thoroughly,) had a close and characteristic connection with unconverted Saul. And surely, we are not at loss in discovering this connection in the perusal of his history. But we must now leave this case, as affording nothing against our general argument.

But, says one, Do you mean to deny that a miracle *can* be performed, of the nature we are considering? No, it is not for me to say what God can do, and what he cannot do. And all we have said of the impossibility of thrusting knowledge and virtue into a man, or causing it to expand within him, passively, has been said in connection with the supposed continued operation of a natural law. We say, it is a law of our nature that this cannot be done. What *miracle* God may perform, one may guess as well as another. Let it be remembered, however, that it deserves no better name than guessing, when applied to a future state. Miracles of inspiration, whereby knowledge has been imparted, it is admitted very generally, have been performed in the present life. And suppose virtue has been imparted by miracles; admit, for the argument's sake, the whole of it. How often need we say, that the question is not, what *may* be, but, what *will* be, in the future state,

or at death? and whether, even if knowledge and virtue *will* be thus imparted then, such a miracle will *equalize* all human beings? And reason, thus far, has been endeavoring to answer.

Perhaps it may be said, here, that we allow miracles to be wrought on matter, at the resurrection; why not on mind? We answer, the two things are totally different. Is not a miracle needed, at least something surpassing any laws of nature that we know of, to produce for us immortal and incorruptible bodies? But, do our minds so need to be infused with knowledge and virtue, and to be equalized, at any one moment? Besides, it is a plain matter of revelation that our bodies shall undergo this supernatural transformation, but the Scriptures are not thus clear with regard to this miracle of equalizing all minds.

This, however, brings us to the other source of evidence for or against this point: we refer to the sacred Scriptures. Reason having made her answer to the question, it is now exceedingly interesting to know the extent of Scriptural testimony on a subject so important. Let the question then, be fairly stated: What do the Scriptures say with regard to knowledge and virtue being imparted by a miracle wrought on the mind at death, or at any future period, and in an equal amount to all mankind? Answer: nothing. Not the most distant allusion is made to it in all the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. But, says one, Is there no mention made of a *sudden* enlargement? I answer, that is not the question. The opening scene of eternity may impress all minds, and speed them forth in a career that would be quite astonishing, and even overwhelming, could we conceive of it in the present state. But all will have this advantage, and the farthest advanced at the commencement of those scenes, reason has abundantly assured us, will not be in the background, or on even terms with others. But we now leave reason and consult the oracles of God's word. And the question is, Will a miracle be wrought, not in the outward circumstances, but on the mind, so that knowledge and virtue shall not only be imparted instantly, but equally, to all mankind? And I say, the Scriptures are utterly silent here. And this is the very point of our whole argument. Prove this, and we give it up; but until you prove it, let us hear no more

about equality at death, or at the resurrection. For this we want reason and Scripture; but the truth is, we have neither.

Let us not, however, be too fast. There are a few passages which are quoted as proof of what we here call in question. We are told, then, that in the resurrection, we shall be "equal unto angels." (Luke xx. 36.) But are the angels equal to one another? Suppose it should be said, the Americans are equal to the English. Would this prove the Americans all equal among themselves? Not till you had proved all Englishmen thus equal. But, observe we are explicitly informed, why, or in what respect, we shall be equal to the angels. The Saviour had been confronted on the question of marriage in the resurrection state. He assures the Sadducees, that in that state they do not marry, nor die, but are equal to the angels. In what respect? In the respect of immortality, which precludes death, and makes marriage unnecessary.

Again, we are told, that "when he (Christ) shall appear, we shall be *like him*, for we shall see him as he is." (1 John iii. 2.) Admitting this to have reference to his future appearing, in glory and immortality, is there any proof that John was speaking of intellectual and moral equality? Not in the least. The same truth is doubtless revealed here, that is spoken of in parallel passages: "When Christ who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." (Colossians iii. 4.) "For our conversation is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ; who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned *like unto his glorious body*, according to the working," &c. (Phil. iii. 20, 21.)

Again we are told, that "he that is dead is freed from sin." (Rom. vi. 7.) Admitting natural death to be referred to, which we question, it should be observed, that freeing two sinners from sin, does not equalize them, even in morals.

Again, we are referred to St. Paul's account of the resurrection, in the fifteenth chapter of 1st Corinthians. The subject here is simply a change "from corruption to incorruption, from dishonor to glory, from weakness to power, from a natural body to a spiritual body, from the image of the earthy to the image of the heavenly, from

mortality to immortality." May not all this be, and still there be degrees of glory? But, says one, it is written, "*as* is the heavenly, (that is, Christ,) *such* are they also that are heavenly"—that is, mankind. But does this prove that we are all to be precisely *equal* to Christ? It is also written, "*as* is the earthy, (that is, Adam,) *such* are they also that are earthy." Are we all precisely like Adam, and therefore equal to each other in the earthy state? We leave this account as containing nothing to the purpose.

We would here suggest that the parable of the laborers in the vineyard has no relation to our present subject. It refers to the calling of the Gentiles, who remained so long in ignorance of God, and to the rejection of the Jews, who had so long been his peculiar people. If those who had labored but one hour received as much as those who had borne the heat and burden of the day, this, I would have it understood, is only the supposed fact in the parable. "Parables do not run on all-fours." God's dealings with the Jews and Gentiles themselves, which is the subject here illustrated, were varied in each individual's case; and so far as the parable has any bearing on our present argument, it is altogether in favor of it. Here was no instant equalization, nor indeed any, but a process commenced which was to extend through ages. And it is surprising, how any can adduce the murmurs of the "laborers" as an illustration of the feelings of those who are told that "God will raise all men to *equal bliss* in the world to come!" I suspect that what many call Universalism is yet to be purified.

If there are other passages where a "likeness of Christ's resurrection" being "conformed to the image of his Son," &c. &c., are spoken of, the reader can readily see that none of these expressions prove an equality, any more than the declaration that Christ is "the image of God," and man his "likeness," prove that they are equal with God.

We have now examined those Scriptures which are the most relied on to prove an equality of all men at death, or at the resurrection; and we find no proof at all of the hypothesis. If there are other passages, let them be brought forth. Till then, we are forced to inquire, From whence did this doctrine spring? Certainly, not from the Scriptures; certainly, not from reason.

Let us here pause a few moments, and consider the nature and strength of our argument. The advocate for absolute equality in a future state may still be disposed to inquire what we have done. Suppose it be conceded that the Scriptures do not teach this equality; still, we may be told, they do not teach the inequality we speak of. And what, therefore, does our argument amount to? In reply to this question, we observe, that we have our own views of Scripture, and, in our opinion, there are passages which cannot be made to rest easily on any interpretation which does not recognise some consequences, in a future state, of our improvement and misimprovement here. But we have purposely avoided, and shall avoid, the introduction of them here, as, in the hands of a determined ingenuity, they *may* be susceptible of almost any interpretation. Granted, frankly. Let it be admitted, then, for the argument's sake, that while the Scriptures do not teach the doctrine of equality in a future state, they do not teach the inequality which we speak of; in other words, that they say nothing about the subject. We know not that the objector will admit thus much; still, our argument now drives us to that position. Yet, have we labored in vain? The state of the case seems now to be this: We take our principles from the Scriptures; we show, by the operation of natural laws which we have reason to believe will not cease at death, and which the Scriptures do not say shall cease, that the consequences of our present characters will attend us in the future state. Reason, then, upon principles which none can call in question, decidedly asserts the doctrine which we advocate. The Scriptures do not contradict it. This is the nature and strength of our argument. And here, I say, is a ground of faith to be relied on. Indeed, what arguments are the most common with the advocates of the contrary doctrine? They do not seem to rely chiefly on the Scriptures for proof of the universal equality hereafter. Reason is mainly resorted to. We have availed ourselves of that privilege, and are perfectly willing to have our arguments met by any from the same source. When the Scriptures are appealed to, we will follow the question thither.

We say, we are here presented with a ground of faith to be relied on. Indeed, shall we believe only in that pro-

portion that we find, without doubt, a truth recorded in the Scriptures? Then indeed will our faith be shorn greatly of its strength. Where will be all our natural theology? Do any pretend that the faith we derive from nature, in the existence of God, is unworthy of our entertainment, and even our practical confidence? The revelation of that truth does not make it certain; it only adds another degree of faith. And it is faith, great faith, which may be derived from reason, in the doctrine that our present characters will seriously affect our future state. Indeed, this may be called the natural theology of our future existence. We respect it, and would have all men respect and profit by it. At some future day, our eyes may be open to perceive it more readily in the Scriptures.

But before we pass to the second division of our subject, we wish to bring the principle of our general argument to bear upon a great scriptural fact; we allude to the salvation of all men by Christ. The Scriptures assure us that he is the *instrument* of our salvation, that all who sin by Adam shall receive life and righteousness by Jesus Christ. Now, millions on millions of the heathen go out of this world without so much as hearing of Christ—fifty thousand daily, and about twenty millions yearly, besides the immense number of Mahometans, Jews, infidels, together with infants and idiots; and this process, in its due proportion, through the whole reign of Christ upon the earth. This immense and incalculable host go out of this world with no knowledge and no experience of the salvation of Christ. Are they all saved instantaneously? have all the knowledge, experience, influence, virtue, suddenly kindled up within them? and this to an equal degree in all? It will not do to say that the resurrection will accomplish all this; for here we labor under the difficulty which we have pointed out, with reference to the laws of the mind. Nor can we see how any theory of unconsciousness, or denial of an intermediate state, at all relieves the real point of the difficulty. If the Scriptures say nothing on this subject, reason says much. Our natural theology here is strong. There is one thing, and only one thing, that we can do to avoid the conclusion we otherwise must admit: We may flee into ignorance with the question, and say we do not know but that God may accomplish this consistently with

some laws of the mind which we are unacquainted with, or that he may do it by miracle. But shall we reason from our ignorance or knowledge? "What can we reason, but from what we know?" And what do we know on this subject? We trust that our labors have not been altogether in vain, thus far, in answering this question. We know much. And besides, the Scriptures inform us, at least, that other orders of beings than man, in a future state, acquire their knowledge gradually; "which things (says Peter) the angels desire to look into." (1 Peter i. 12.) The apostle here represents the angels as *prying into*, or considering attentively, the subject of human redemption. The angels also make additions to their joy in view of a sinner's repentance. Now, if the angels in heaven are thus represented to come in possession of their knowledge gradually, by the exercise of their own powers, which, indeed, is the only rational idea of the progress of mind in any part of the universe, (excepting always the Omniscient,) can we rationally suppose that man, when admitted to the immortal state, shall be turned into such a machine, or that such a miracle as we have contemplated, will, even at the beginning of his future career, equalize the whole human race?

We have said there was but one way, and that just alluded to, in which to avoid the conclusion which we must otherwise admit. To be candid, and to present all objections, it may indeed be expected that we meet two theories, which have not yet been brought into notice. The first relates to the fact that all we know of mind in this world, is by its manifestation through material organs. And the singular notion is sometimes broached, that all the apparent differences in mind may depend on the different cerebral developments in individuals. Consequently, all *minds* may be alike and equal; their *manifestations* only differing, according to the different states of the organs through which alone the mind itself is able to act. Death destroys these organs, and it is supposed by some, that in this way equalization may take place. Our only reply is this: It is absolutely necessary that the mind be *exercised* on outward objects, and within itself, in order to its growth and strength. Infants and others have not this exercise in the degree of other men. The hypothesis, then, is of no power to move us from our former conclusions. The most

that can be said on this supposition, and that with large demands on our credulity, is, that the *original* and *natural* endowment of mind itself may be equal in all human beings, but its cultivation, its growth and strength, after all, depend on exercise. But, says one, It is the senses and brain only that may be exercised. Be it so. And do they impart knowledge and virtue to the mind? If you say yes, then I reply, some men have much more of this exercise than others; if you say no—but this cannot be said on any theory of a mind at all.

And this brings us to the last and only theory upon which it may be sought to evade our conclusions. It is that man has *no* mind, or spirit, in distinction from the bodily organization, and, consequently, that all we have said of its laws of expansion may be overthrown by a future life depending on a resurrection or re-formation of the body. All the reply we have for this, is, that thought and sentiment, and recognition and realization of identity—any or all of them, whether they depend on spirit or matter, so far as respects inequality, or consequences of our characters here on our future state, are subject to all the laws we have mentioned in our former argument. The materialist's theory affects not our subject. It changes not the laws of mental expansion, but simply the *substance* of mental activity. If there be a future state for us, I repeat, our argument holds the same with the spiritualist and the materialist.

Before we close our remarks on the subject of salvation by Christ, we cannot refrain from introducing here a couple of quotations from the editor of this work, which we have many times wished could have originally appeared nearer together. We allude to an article on "The New Testament Doctrine of Salvation," in the "Expositor and Universalist Review," (vol. iv., new series, pp. 42, 44.) "He knows little of our nature who imagines that faith and righteousness can be communicated to the mind, without any agency on our part, just as water may be poured into a vessel or passive receiver; for faith and righteousness are themselves but *exercises* of the understanding and affections. They are the results of active thought and feeling. And in the sense in which we can bring ourselves to think aright, and to feel aright, we can save ourselves, or effect

our salvation." . . . . . " Of course, it is never *perfected* in this world, since there is no perfect holiness nor perfect development of spirituality here. For these, we must look to the future world." The reader may make his own reflections.

We now proceed to the next division of our subject. We have thus far, it will be seen, labored only to establish certain inequalities in a future state, as the result of our improvement or misimprovement here. This does not necessarily involve sin, or absolute misery, in that state; at least, in the way we have considered the subject, it does not. The inequalities which reason thus leads us to expect, may be no more than different degrees of knowledge and virtue, consequently of enjoyment, without the admixture of sin or absolute evil. And they *may* be *more* than that. Whether so or not, depends upon the *origin* and *nature* of sin. We have therefore reserved this for a separate question. But be it remembered, however we decide this question, or whatever degree of strength or weakness may belong to our argument here, it cannot at all affect the first division of our subject. That we consider settled.

Let the question, then, be fairly stated: What does reason say of the existence of *sin* and *misery* in a future state of being? And, here, let it be frankly confessed that we have not the data to guide us in our reasoning, which we had in the first division of our subject, and we do not expect to produce that amount of conviction. Still, reason has something to say on this question; and we would inquire, first, From what, in our nature, does sin originate? Much depends on the answer. It is the theory of many that sin originates in what are sometimes called the animal passions, or fleshly lusts of the body, and that, when the body dies, the spiritual part, released from its connection, is of necessity free from corruption. To be sure, it is necessary for the intellect, (or rather the will,) to consent to the suggestions of the flesh before it can be denominated sin, and therefore, strictly speaking, *sin* originates in the higher nature. But the primary source of the evil is, according to this theory, in the lusts and passions. They stimulate and entice to evil; the intellect consents, conscience is violated, and sin is produced. They who are accustomed to divide

our nature into the moral, the intellectual, and the animal, find frequently no difficulty in thus accounting for sin, and seeing it all annihilated when death destroys the connection between the flesh and the spirit, or separates the animal from the moral and intellectual nature.

Now, we once used to reason so ourself. But the consideration of certain particular sins has saved us from this error. With certain sins this theory may hold good. Lewdness, theft, vicious gratification of such appetites, &c., &c.,—these are plainly the offspring of an animal nature. In a purely spiritual world, it is plain, they cannot exist. But how is it with impiety, irreverence, injustice with regard to other matters, &c.? Let us take, for instance, the sin of impiety. What propensity of the flesh does this proceed from? A late kind of philosophers tell us it proceeds from a want of veneration. But what is this better than tautology? Impiety, then, is a want of piety. Suppose it springs partly from pride. And what is pride? Why, self-esteem. And is this feeling so purely animal that nothing of the kind can exist in the future world? Imagine a creature of high moral and intellectual endowments without one particle of sense of his importance in God's creation! What would he be fit for, even in heaven? If such a sense exist there, it may be active. It may grow into abuse. Who can tell? Much as we love phrenology, sensible are we that it will not do to cut up a man's mental nature as you would cut a cabbage, apportioning out each part, and being so very sure as to what feelings will exist, and what will not, in a future world.

Again; take the sin of injustice, in some of its bearings. What propensity of the flesh, or of the animal nature, does this spring from? An inordinate disposition to acquire may produce it. But we acquire not only houses and lands, and that which we can call our visible property, but knowledge also. We shall have this disposition in the future world. How does reason know it will not run into abuse there? Conscience may restrain it. But how, if conscience is small? Many men leave this world with exceedingly small consciences; and, with impiety or a want of piety hereafter, with self-importance, with strong dispositions to acquire and compete, what assurance have we that there will be no excesses, no deviation from the

strict and inflexible standard of right,—that all will be perfect?

We may be told that our philosophy contradicts the doctrine of Paul, that all sin proceeds from the flesh, in contradistinction from the spirit. We answer: No sacred writer affirms that *all* sin proceeds from the flesh, or that man can be guilty of no unrighteous or irreligious act, save what is chargeable to the encumbrance of the body. "The works of the flesh," says one, "are manifest," and names them; but the Scriptures nowhere cover the whole ground of moral aberration, under this distinction.

But we will pursue the subject no further. We see nothing in reason *against* the supposition of sin and its consequences in a future state of being. Have we any thing in favor of it? Briefly and frankly, nothing but this: All men of moral responsibility leave this world more or less sinful. Some die, humanly speaking, desperately wicked. It is a law of nature, which the Scriptures do not affirm ceases at death, that knowledge and virtue are acquired gradually by the exercise of our own individual powers, with the help, sometimes, of outward circumstances. Those circumstances may be equal with all, at the commencement of a future being. If, then, *death* does not destroy the source of all sin, it may exist for a time in the world to come; though there is nothing in our subject which makes it unreasonable that the worst of men may be better off there than here.

We leave the conclusion for what it is worth; again reminding the reader that, stand or fall, it has no necessary connection with the first division of our subject, on account of the origin and nature of sin. This is a question of a metaphysical character, not susceptible of that clear proof which works conviction in the former subject.

But if sin be proved, or admitted, to exist in a future world, why not forever? Because reason and revelation both concur in fixing an end to it.

But, again; are not the Scriptures plainly opposed to the existence of sin in the future world? We know of but one passage which is much relied on in the affirmative: "He that is dead is freed from sin." (Rom. vi. 7.) Still, I do not see how the death of the body can be here referred to. The apostle is speaking of baptism—no matter what kind.

It is "baptism into Christ's death." Christians are said to be buried in this baptism. Connected with this baptism is "newness of life." Our death unto sin and burial in baptism are figuratively set forth by Christ's literal death; and Christ's literal resurrection is made a figure to represent our newness of spiritual life. "For, if we have been planted together in the *likeness* of his death, we shall be also in the *likeness* of his resurrection, knowing this, that our *old man* (old body of sin) is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For he that is dead is freed from sin." What can be plainer than that spiritual death is here meant? To be sure, we are told that we thus make the apostle employ a useless tautology—he that is dead to sin is dead to sin; but are the sacred writers always rhetorically exact? Are they even grammatically so? He would find an endless task who should attempt to make all the rhetoric of the Scriptures conform to modern rules. But, be it remembered, that it is we who fix this tautology upon the apostle's language. His language, fully carried out, would simply be—"He that is dead to sin is *freed* from sin." And what can the whole mean, but simply, he that has crucified his old man, had all his evil propensities subjected, is henceforth freed or delivered from their thraldom? Why multiply difficulties so unnecessarily?

It may now be said that in the *resurrection* all men are recognised as sinless. It may be; but to those who believe that death is not the annihilation of all consciousness, there is still space left for the process of purification.

But we prefer the argument used in the former division of our subject. This is not touched by any theory of a resurrection, or a denial of an intermediate state. The resurrection, general or progressive, does not necessarily *equalize* all human beings, with or without a preceding state of unconsciousness.

And now, as we have before alluded to an article in a late number of this work, for the purpose of explaining the principle on which our reasoning is built, and the lawful extent of analogy on this subject, we may be pardoned if we again allude to it for the same purpose. The writer there labors against the doctrine of inequality, as it is supposed to be sustained, on the principle of *recollection*,—

that we may remember, in the future world, the deeds we have committed here. And it is argued, that if our eyes are opened in that world to behold the sins of the present all overruled for man's good and God's glory, he that was the grievous sinner here will enjoy no less than he that was the saint,—the crucifiers of Jesus, for instance, no less than his faithful disciples. But, admitting all this, on the principle of recollection, it touches not our argument on the principle of the soul's gradual expansion. All, there, is said with reference to particular deeds; whereas, the true ground is the general character. In two individuals in the future world who may look back upon two courses of life in the present,—John, upon a life of faithfulness, and a murderer of Jesus upon a life of wickedness,—no doubt, as far as recollection may be concerned, in connection with a knowledge that Providence has overruled all for good, the enjoyment of the two might be equal. But how is it with regard to the growth of mind? The one schooled to the highest degree of virtue, the other undisciplined, unexercised in such attainments. No doubt they would be able together to say, We are equally glad that this has happened so; but one might also say to the other, Lead me up, I beseech thee, to the height of thy virtue! In short, this argument is nothing more than an attempt to prove all men equal from the simple fact that they see all things are for the best. All things are for the best now; but are all who believe this, equal? Equal, it may be, in respect to joy for that one thing, and nothing further. I mistake, even now. Those who have the largest moral and intellectual capacity must experience more joy, even for that one thing.

Again, it is asserted, in view of inequalities in a future state, that those disciples of Christ there "must love those who persecuted them as they love themselves, and, of course, must wish them as much happiness as they themselves enjoy. In the light of this spirit of love we see that, if what the enemies of Jesus did in this world affects them in the immortal state to their disadvantage, it will equally affect the disciples to their disadvantage." That is, it will lessen their happiness by wishing the others what cannot be imparted. And "there is no way to avoid this argument but by ridding ourselves of this spirit of love and meekness." But, by what rule of logic or just principle of

reasoning, must all things be so squared and equalled in the future state? Cannot the disciples, or any other beings in the immortal world, look upon others lower than themselves with feelings perfectly consistent with all that is revealed of heaven? Where, in the Scriptures, do we read of a heaven destitute of sympathy? The angels joy at a sinner's repentance. If sympathy dwells there, there must be degrees of emotion and happiness. Suppose we cannot escape this conclusion with regard to the disciples. Have we a scale of mathematical precision by which to press all the emotions of heaven into an absolute and undeviating equality of thought, feeling, and contemplation? Would it not be necessary, on the same principle, to equalize the universe —all the grades of intelligences through all its dominions? for it may not be consistent with perfect equality of happiness that one being should know that there is another beneath him! The fact is, the very happiness of heaven itself may depend more upon inequalities than on perfect equality. How is it in this world? How *would* it be, in any society, if all possessed a perfectly equal degree of knowledge, and stood equally high in all respects? Where would be all the pleasure of communication? One could not, in such a society, convey a thought or item of knowledge, or affect the other in any way in which he could not him, and the life of society would be, in fact, paralyzed. Bring all to a dead level, (say, if we please, a levelling upwards instead of down,) and though we might conceive of some who would enjoy more than they did before, yet other circumstances being equal, the general amount of happiness would be less than where inequalities prevail. Try it in the family. Try it anywhere in this world. But perhaps we may be told, It may not be so in the future state. And, we grant, it possibly may not. But what proof, that there, through all the hosts and myriads of the immortals, the sea of bliss must roll just so evenly; and that if, on its vast surface, one billow of emotion or of joy should for a moment show its swelling head above the rest, it cannot be consistent with the impartial government of God?

But we pass to one more general view of the subject. We find the question put to us, in the article alluded to, —"Does Christianity teach us that all men, who have sinned and come short of the glory of God, will be, on

account of sin, less happy in the immortal state, than they would have been if sin had never existed?" Here, we are told, "we have the whole subject before us. If we answer this question in the affirmative, we impeach both the wisdom and goodness of God. If we answer the question as we ought, in the negative, we necessarily repudiate the belief, that sin committed in this mortal state, will lessen the enjoyment of the immortal." But this question cannot be so summarily disposed of. We will, then, answer the question in the negative: Christianity does *not* teach us that all who have sinned will be less happy in the immortal state, than if sin had never existed. We will say that they will all be inconceivably better off for it, especially in the long run of eternity. But because all men are better off in the future state for having sinned here, does that prove that they will be all equal — that the very moment of death will equalize the whole human race? The proper question would be, not, Are all men less happy there for having sinned here? but, Are not some in a lower state than others? and this on account of ignorance and sin. We may answer the first question in the negative, and the latter in the affirmative. Or, plainer still, we may say that, by sin and imperfection here, the enjoyments of the immortal state are increased to all. On what principle? On the principle of memory and recollection, in connection with the knowledge that, there, all has eventuated in good. But there is another principle that operates in human nature; it is the culture and growth of the soul. On this principle, sin and misimprovement here may diminish our happiness in the world to come.

But, says one, will not the other principle, acting alone, outweigh this latter in the importance of its effects? For, do we not see men in this world, with simple enjoyment experienced in the deliverance from past sins and sufferings, with the partial realization, and the full faith, that all things will work together for the highest possible good, — do we not see such men enjoying more from this faith and realization alone, than from any mere difference which there may be in their moral and intellectual capacity and culture? In short, is not this faith greater than any other blessing? This brings us to the point. And we answer this question directly in the negative. Bad men may

have this faith. And how often is it, that you find men firm in the faith that all things are for the best, who are nevertheless exceedingly sinful? I affirm, and that without the fear of the charge of vanity, that a high moral and intellectual character, in connection with this religious faith, is the highest possible source of enjoyment. There is nothing like a noble conscience. The heart leaps with its inspirations. Here, then, we are brought to a conclusion; and the whole subject may be expressed thus: In the future world, all men may, or may not, recollect their past sins and sufferings, and enjoy more by the contrast. All men may there realize that all has been wrought together for the highest possible good. And yet with all the adoration for God's wonderful providence, and the rapture and the praise with which they may be filled, those will enjoy most whose moral and intellectual nature is most ample. Indeed, all other things being *equal*, the most capacious minds must enjoy the most. The very *ability* to comprehend the vast providence of God, is greatest in those whose religious, moral, and intellectual nature is most enlarged, schooled, and cultivated.

We now say, in conclusion, that our argument, if true, is not a piece of mere useless speculation. It is of a highly practical character. If you convince men that, at a certain time in their mortal existence, say at the age of twenty-one, they will be equal, in all points, to the highest minds of earth, whether they exert themselves or not, do you think they would be so likely to exert themselves for that attainment, as though they were made to believe it depended on their own efforts? Let us take a case for illustration. A scholar wishes to acquire a knowledge of the Greek and Hebrew languages. He is told that, at the age of twenty-one years, he will come to a knowledge of those languages in a sudden and miraculous manner. He need not trouble himself at all about it, for on the morning of his freedom-day, he will wake up, and find that he has got it all without cost. Do you think, with such a conviction, he would spend three years or more, of his previous life, in toiling through grammars and lexicons, consuming his flesh in the wearisome and crabbed work of decyphering the dead languages? Let it not be said that our comparison is faulty, as applied to virtue; for it is no trouble, no

painful task, to be virtuous. For, to be virtuous, *is* a work. To be sure, the reward is in the work itself, and it may be the full and abundant reward, a thousand times more weighty than all the labor of self-sacrifice, all the struggles against temptation or indolence. In one sense it may be called no painful task, because the labor itself is sweet, and *not* to labor in this way, would be misery. And so indeed, it may be said with reference to the case proposed for illustration, — the study of the dead languages. Suppose, says one, this study is felt to be necessary to the enjoyment of the student as he goes along. He may want this knowledge to apply immediately. Here, then, he would feel himself amply repaid for his labors in the acquisition of it, even though, without that labor, he could feel assured that he should come in possession of it at the time proposed. He cannot consent to undergo the privation and inconvenience till that time. Now, just so it is with virtue. Let men be convinced that they absolutely need it as they go along, and the work becomes a blessing by the way, — such a blessing as would not allow them to postpone the acquisition of it, even though we could persuade them that, at some future time, they would come in possession of it without an effort.

The reader may now think that, in a practical point of view, there is, when truly represented, no difference between the two doctrines; that the motives to exertion are equal. But I beg him to observe, that the whole difference has not yet appeared. This is not a difference merely between attaining knowledge and virtue at a certain time, with or without previous effort, but between attaining it and not attaining it *with that effort*. The fact is, the doctrine in question represents that we cannot, or do not, attain this eminence of future excellence by our efforts. For, it represents the superior knowledge and virtue of the future state as imparted by *miracle*, and that instantly, to all men! that it is not by any exertion of our faculties, but by the sovereign power of Almighty God, that, in the immortal world, all human creatures are at once elevated to an equality of moral and mental glory. Or, if this is not the doctrine, then there is no material difference between our views and those we oppose. Now, let the student in the dead languages be told the whole truth. Let him be assured that

however he may exert himself up to the age of twenty-one years, it is not possible for him to obtain so *thorough* and *complete* a knowledge of those languages, as he will then have imparted by miracle; and what will be the effect upon his mind? Do you suppose he would exert himself so much to attain that perfection, as he would, could he be made to believe it depended on his own efforts? we mean, in the sense in which other attainments depend on his efforts. Indeed, would he exert himself at all to attain that degree of perfection? He would not; he would act in consistency with his faith. He would believe, that, let him try ever so hard, the height of perfection did not depend on his efforts, and he would act accordingly.

Now, apply this to the future world. The fact is, this doctrine of equality absolutely denies that man does, or can, with his efforts, attain to that height in knowledge and virtue, which he shall be raised to at death or some time afterwards, by miracle, in a passive manner. The contrary doctrine asserts that he shall attain to it if he strives for it; but this asserts that he shall not, even if he does. Now, will he be so likely to strive for so high a condition? I say no. His aim will be lower, and his views of his own nature less noble, as a progressive creature, of never-failing, self-acting, unobstructed powers. This may be called a species of Transcendentalism; the other view may be said to be full enough for the comprehension and stimulation of common men; but we beg leave to dissent. The highest possible views must be the best for all men. Error in this matter, cannot be so good as truth, for any.

Nor let it be said, that we set aside the grace of God, and make all depend on human efforts — that we make salvation come of works. For, it is by the grace of God we have existence; it is by his grace we have reason, conscience, and the better affections; it is by his grace that we are furnished with the means of improvement; and it is by his grace that we are provided with a Saviour, and that we are saved. But does his grace operate alone? In all, or nearly all those passages where salvation is spoken of, as of grace and not of works, it is spoken of also as effected by moral agents. Take, for instance, Philippians ii. 12, 13, where the very fact that it is *God* who

worketh in us to save us, is set forth as a reason for us to "work out our own salvation, with fear and trembling." In short, the grace of God, or the agency of God, is no bar to the agency of man. *Where the two coalesce*, or where one stops and the other begins, it has been well said, "is the task, not of the moralist, nor of the theologian, but of the metaphysician, — a task, however, which he has never accomplished, and never will." See the whole excellent article on "The New Testament Doctrine of Salvation," in the fourth volume, new series, of the "Expositor and Universalist Review."

It may be said here, that the simple *conviction* that we shall be raised to a higher state of perfection in the immortal world than we can here possibly conceive of, whether by miracle or by our own efforts, will have a virtuous influence on us now. The simple belief that we must *come to it*, at some time, and in some way, must stimulate us now to virtue. So it must; but will not the conviction that it must be wrought out by our own efforts, with what outward helps may be granted, have the *greatest* influence on us? I may be told that twenty years hence, I shall come, in a miraculous manner, to a full mastery of the abstrusest mathematics. This, I allow, might have some influence over me to interest me in that study now. But if I am made to believe that I must obtain the mastery of this science by my own hard exertions, who can doubt but that this would interest and stimulate me still more strongly? It is so with reference to knowledge and virtue in a future state.

Our subject assumes again a high practical importance from another point of view. It gives us higher ideas of our whole existence as moral agents. Suppose I am told that, by the cultivation of my moral and intellectual powers, I shall reap an advantage for thirty years. Then the matter assumes a certain amount of importance. Suppose that I am then told that at the expiration of thirty years, I lose all this advantage, and take my place by miracle, on equal ground with all men. Then the matter assumes a less amount of importance. Suppose now, I am told that I shall reap the advantage of this culture for seventy years. It becomes more important. I am then told that I have now reached the point where all this cul-

however he may exert himself up to the age of twenty-one years, it is not possible for him to obtain so *thorough* and *complete* a knowledge of those languages, as he will then have imparted by miracle; and what will be the effect upon his mind? Do you suppose he would exert himself so much to attain that perfection, as he would, could he be made to believe it depended on his own efforts? we mean, in the sense in which other attainments depend on his efforts. Indeed, would he exert himself at all to attain that degree of perfection? He would not; he would act in consistency with his faith. He would believe, that, let him try ever so hard, the height of perfection did not depend on his efforts, and he would act accordingly.

Now, apply this to the future world. The fact is, this doctrine of equality absolutely denies that man does, or can, with his efforts, attain to that height in knowledge and virtue, which he shall be raised to at death or some time afterwards, by miracle, in a passive manner. The contrary doctrine asserts that he shall attain to it if he strives for it; but this asserts that he shall not, even if he does. Now, will he be so likely to strive for so high a condition? I say no. His aim will be lower, and his views of his own nature less noble, as a progressive creature, of never-failing, self-acting, unobstructed powers. This may be called a species of Transcendentalism; the other view may be said to be full enough for the comprehension and stimulation of common men; but we beg leave to dissent. The highest possible views must be the best for all men. Error in this matter, cannot be so good as truth, for any.

Nor let it be said, that we set aside the grace of God, and make all depend on human efforts — that we make salvation come of works. For, it is by the grace of God we have existence; it is by his grace we have reason, conscience, and the better affections; it is by his grace that we are furnished with the means of improvement; and it is by his grace that we are provided with a Saviour, and that we are saved. But does his grace operate alone? In all, or nearly all those passages where salvation is spoken of, as of grace and not of works, it is spoken of also as effected by moral agents. Take, for instance, Philippians ii. 12, 13, where the very fact that it is *God* who

worketh in us to save us, is set forth as a reason for us to "work out our own salvation, with fear and trembling." In short, the grace of God, or the agency of God, is no bar to the agency of man. *Where the two coalesce*, or where one stops and the other begins, it has been well said, "is the task, not of the moralist, nor of the theologian, but of the metaphysician, — a task, however, which he has never accomplished, and never will." See the whole excellent article on "The New Testament Doctrine of Salvation," in the fourth volume, new series, of the "Expositor and Universalist Review."

It may be said here, that the simple *conviction* that we shall be raised to a higher state of perfection in the immortal world than we can here possibly conceive of, whether by miracle or by our own efforts, will have a virtuous influence on us now. The simple belief that we must *come to it*, at some time, and in some way, must stimulate us now to virtue. So it must; but will not the conviction that it must be wrought out by our own efforts, with what outward helps may be granted, have the *greatest* influence on us? I may be told that twenty years hence, I shall come, in a miraculous manner, to a full mastery of the abstrusest mathematics. This, I allow, might have some influence over me to interest me in that study now. But if I am made to believe that I must obtain the mastery of this science by my own hard exertions, who can doubt but that this would interest and stimulate me still more strongly? It is so with reference to knowledge and virtue in a future state.

Our subject assumes again a high practical importance from another point of view. It gives us higher ideas of our whole existence as moral agents. Suppose I am told that, by the cultivation of my moral and intellectual powers, I shall reap an advantage for thirty years. Then the matter assumes a certain amount of importance. Suppose that I am then told that at the expiration of thirty years, I lose all this advantage, and take my place by miracle, on equal ground with all men. Then the matter assumes a less amount of importance. Suppose now, I am told that I shall reap the advantage of this culture for seventy years. It becomes more important. I am then told that I have now reached the point where all this cul-

ture and acquisition are of no more use to me than to one who never thought of spiritual culture; for we are all now to be equalized. This represents what some suppose will be the case with us at death. Truth now comes to me, and says, — Man immortal! you are to progress by your own individual powers, without cessation and without interruption, gaining only as you exert yourself, and with the aids you receive from without, through the spiritual ages of eternity! I say, this is the highest possible idea of human existence; and since men are always moved most by what appears to them of the most importance, this must be the strongest possible motive to the moral and intellectual nature.

But before we close our subject, it may be expected that we answer the question — If this is all true, and invested with so much importance, why has God not revealed it? In the first place, I answer, to my mind he has revealed it; but for the reasons aforesaid, I have chosen here to present but the *rationale* of the matter. In the next place, I answer, Is nothing true and morally important which is not revealed? The truths of the sciences, especially of mental science, are of moral advantage. Let it not be said here, that the Scriptures contain all that is morally useful to man. For this will annihilate the importance of all natural theology, moral philosophy, and of the whole world of science, which so unveils the Creator through his works, and lifts man up in more ardent gratitude and attachment to his throne. The true statement of the case is, that where nothing else is manifested to the mind, the Scriptures are a sufficient guide to holiness. But he who is able to read, devoutly and with intellectual eye, God's "elder Scriptures," or to place his feet upon the rock of human reason, and from thence draw truth like an electric power, from the moral heavens, has achieved a victory over the impediments and obstructions of knowledge in this world, which the verbal Scriptures of God's truth do not always, and were not in every case, intended to give. But let us remember, that if the doctrine of inequality in a future state, on account of our character here, is not revealed in the Scriptures, surely the doctrine of equality is not. Let us have a "thus saith the Lord" for a doctrine so peculiar. Show me the Scripture statement that

all shall be equal the moment they die, or at any time afterwards. If you cannot do this, will you object to my showing by reason that all will *not* be equal? Neither Scripture nor reason, we may say, asserts that all *will* be equal; suppose, then, that unsophisticated reason, based on principles purely scriptural, loudly and vigorously asserts the contrary. Shall I not bow to it? I will. W. M. F.

Art. XXIII.

Sir Philip Sydney.

1. The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia, written by Sir Philip Sidney, Knight. The thirteenth Edition. London, printed for George Calvert, at the Golden Ball in Little Britain. MDCLXXIV.
2. The Defence of Poesie, by Sir Philip Sidney, Knight.
3. Lord Brooke's Life of Sir Philip Sydney, with a Preface, &c. By Sir Egerton Brydges. Kent: Printed at the private press of Lee Priory. 1816.

We may select any period of time and call it a *transition-state*, inasmuch as it must form a medium through which the past runs into the future. But to the era of Elizabeth, so far as English history and our own are concerned, this term seems peculiarly appropriate. It lay between the middle and the modern age, but it did not merely touch the two. It blended the characteristics of them both. Elizabeth, with all the sanctity of divine right, and all the imperial dignity of the Tudor, ruled as much by affecting regard for the people, as she did by her sceptred authority. A few years before her reign, the sovereign was "every inch a king;" a few years after, the blood of Stuart sprinkled the popular scaffold. The Protestantism that in past reigns had said, "Why shall we not go loose?" was in turn questioned by men with stern faces, like our Puritan fathers, asking "Why do you seek to stop us?"

The age of torture had not gone by, but the age of free thought had dawned upon it, and heresy was now as active as bigotry. Thus, there was a constant mingling and shifting of the *old* and the *new*—the new passing to its

destined combinations, silently or with loud report, yet the old not dead. The wave of innovation was rolling forward, densely encumbered with forms of the past. The very antagonist principles that agitate society at the present day, were stirring then, but they appeared looming through a mist in which nothing assumed distinct shape or tendency. This juxtaposition and contrast, was exhibited in all departments of action. The age that produced Dr. Dee, produced Francis Bacon. The queen, whose coronation-day was carefully set by the advice of an astrologer, was honored with him for a subject who traced through the mazes of abstract philosophy the dominion of universal order; pursued the glittering thread of induction that links the fact in the atom with the fact in the star; and, upon the dispersed juggleries of scientific superstition, erected the *Novum Organum* of eternal truth. A spirit of ignorance and of narrow proscription, still reigned wide: yet, as Drake, and Frobisher, and Cavendish, burst into new regions, and girdled the world with the long sweep of their adventurous keels, so, some minds drifted out into new realms of mental discovery, and left their impress upon wider tracts of thought and time. The spirit of knight-errantry was not all gone, but now the stalwart hand that clenched the sword, likewise wielded the elegant pen of the scholar. The clear deep stream of English literature, bursting from the wellspring of nature, was now admitted into the light of a more genial sky — yet, still upon its waters the Gothic past projected the long shadows of its turrets, and over it glimmered the lances of chivalry. So full of promise and so full of memory, then — the romance of the *old* blending with the life of the *new;* the time of Elizabeth has been correctly designated. The clearer day of the coming epoch mingled with the quaint glories of antiquity, and thus those numerous forms of wisdom, and genius, and virtue, and bravery, are enwrapped in the mellow light of a "golden age."

A fit product of this age, and in many respects its fairest embodiment, was that friend of poets, himself a poet — that emulator of chivalry, himself the Bayard of his time — that lover of knowledge, himself a model of learning; the delight of princes, the admiration of scholars, the patron of Spenser, the author of the Arcadia, the hero of Zutphen — SIR PHILIP SYDNEY.

At Penshurst, in Kent, there stood, until about the middle of the last century, an oak tree, famous in song, and celebrated by Ben Jonson in lines like these:

> "Thou hast thy walks for health, as well as sport;
> Thy mount to which the Dryads do resort,
> Where Pan and Bacchus their high feasts have made,
> Beneath the broad beach and the chestnut shade;
> That taller tree which of a nut was set,
> At his great birth where all the muses met."

If the legend be true, then that tree was planted on the 19th of November, 1554 — for on that day, at Penshurst, he to whom the poet refers was born. Sir Henry Sydney, his father, was the honored and intimate friend of Edward VI., who breathed out his prayerful spirit in his arms. Although married to the eldest daughter of John, Duke of Northumberland, he escaped the punishment which fell upon that intriguing nobleman and the innocent victim of his ambition, Lady Jane Grey, and named his son after the husband of Queen Mary — *Philip*. The proud blood of the Dudleys had no cause to blush in the veins of this youthful scion of the race. His original biographer, Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke, who although he wrote from the indulgent memory of friendship, appears to have drawn from a truthful model, speaks thus of the earlier years of Philip Sydney: "I will report no other wonder but this; that though I lived with him, and knew him from a child, yet I never knew him other than a man: with such staidness of mind, lovely and familiar gravity, as carried grace and reverence above greater years. His talk ever of knowledge, and his very play tending to enrich his mind; so as even his teachers found something in him to observe and learn, above that which they had usually read or taught. Which eminence, by nature and industry, made his worthy father style Sir Philip in my hearing, (though I unseen,) '*Lumen familiæ suæ*,' '*the light of his family*.'" Two letters, one in Latin, and one in French, written by him at the age of twelve years, from school in Shrewsbury, to his father, then Lord President of the Marches of Wales, produced from Sir Henry, one of the most admirable epistles upon record. It is tenderly addressed to his "*little Philippe*," and contains a compendium of physical, intellectual, and moral instruction, judiciously imparted, with

broad and liberal views. The lustre of the son should not obscure that of the father. Sir Philip, in his Defence of the Earl of Leicester, made it his chief boast that he was a Dudley, "the duke's daughter's son." It is to be regretted that the pride of blood should appear to dim the discernment with which, no doubt, he appreciated the genuine nobility of his father. Indeed, he was thrice ennobled, by better distinctions than those of titled ancestry: in his *father*, whose worth and virtue were richer than royal blood; in *himself*, by that character and those accomplishments which were the admiration of his age; and in that descendant of his, whose name is illustrious in the archives of liberty, and who left the witness of his devotion to the "Old Cause," in his own best blood, sprinkled on the altar of tyrants — ALGERNON SYDNEY!

We have alluded thus particularly to this letter of Sir Henry Sydney, because of the influence it seems to have exerted upon the conduct of his son, and also because of its intrinsic value; for it is truly a golden epistle, as admirable in spirit as it is in matter. The effect of such instruction, impressed upon a young and plastic mind, cannot be easily overrated. The truth has again and again been declared, not merely by precept, but by many a sad experience, that the elements of genius need the controlling power of a still deeper life. A character of symmetrical greatness can be constructed by moral discipline only, sanctified by a spirit of manly piety that renders it beautiful indeed. Else, that which astonishes and dazzles the world, often burns by making wreck and fuel of those finer sensibilities and more eloquent passions, which separate the man of genius from the rest of his kind, and fit him to be their oracle! Sydney pursued his studies both at Oxford and at Cambridge. It certainly detracts nothing from an eminent man that he was not a prodigy in his youth, neither is extraordinary precocity sure evidence of future greatness. We find, however, that the college-days of Sydney, corresponded with the brilliance of his after life. We are told, that "he cultivated not one art, or one science, but the whole circle of arts and sciences; his capacious and comprehensive mind aspiring to pre-eminence in every part of knowledge attainable by human genius or industry." "Such," says Fuller, in his "*Worthies of England*,"

"such was his appetite for learning, that he could never be fed fast enough therewith, and so quick and strong his digestion, that he soon turned it into wholesome nourishment, and thrived healthfully thereon." An auspicious morning, this, of a life that was darkened and quenched ere the full glory of its noon!

Having completed his academical studies, Sydney obtained license to travel for two years. His uncle, the famous Earl of Leicester, and the favorite of Elizabeth, commended him to the care of Sir Francis Walsingham, then ambassador to the court of France, and afterwards his father-in-law. Upon his arrival there, he formed the friendship of Henry of Navarre, and readily won the more questionable favor of Charles IX., who created him gentleman ordinary of the royal chamber. He had been in this station but a few days when he was called upon to witness the awful massacre of St. Bartholomew's eve. He preserved his life in that scene of wholesale murder, with other Englishmen, by escaping to the house of Walsingham. Upon this occurrence, he was urged by the Earl of Leicester to return; but he continued his travels, and passed through Germany, Hungary, Italy and Belgium. At Frankfort, he formed one of the most important intimacies of his life, with the minister of the Elector of Saxony, the celebrated *Hubert Languet*—a man of vast political knowledge, an elegant scholar, a close friend of Melancthon's, a zealous Protestant, and, as it seems, a republican. A warm sympathy sprang up between the sage and the student. On the part of Sydney, this intimacy must have been of vital benefit in producing studious habits, and especially those sound and statesmanlike views, for which, even in his brief career, he began to be distinguished. Languet became his assiduous instructer. Upon their separation they kept up a correspondence, and in 1579, two years before his own death, Languet accompanied Prince Casimir into England, to gaze once more upon the face of one whom he loved, and had cherished with paternal tenderness. The old man was not forgotten by his pupil, who has feelingly commemorated him in one of the poems of the Arcadia. At Vienna, Sydney became skilled in horsemanship, tilting, tennis, music, and all those accomplishments that were deemed, in that age, so necessary to the perfection of a martial and

manly character. In 1574, he was in Venice, and studied at Padua the same year. Here it is said, though this is doubtful, that he became acquainted with a congenial spirit, now engaged upon his immortal work, and fast rising into the full-orbed splendor of his fame—the illustrious Tasso. After an absence of nearly three years, ripened in experience and various learning, he returned to England in the month of May, 1575.

He now became the cynosure of the brilliant court of Elizabeth—one of the brightest stars in that galaxy of chivalry and renown. The queen, it is said, called him *her* Philip, in contrast with Philip of Spain, the husband of her sister, Mary. "His homebred qualities," says Fuller, "travel perfected, and a sweet nature set a gloss upon both. He was so essential in the English court, that it seemed maimed without his company, being a compleat master of matter and language."

Some idea of the manners and amusements of that court in which Sydney was such an attractive ornament, and of those expensive pageants that accompanied the *progresses* of Elizabeth, may be derived from the following description of the entertainment of the queen at Kenilworth Castle, the seat of the Earl of Leicester: Upon her arrival, "six giants stood ready to receive her at the outer gate, apparently blowing trumpets, which were in reality sounded by persons placed behind them, while the porter, representing Hercules, addressed her in a metrical speech, 'proclaiming open gates and free passage to all, and yielding to her, on his knees, his clubs, keys, and office.'" "Upon the queen's first entrance," says the account in the Sydney papers, "appeared a floating island on the large pool there, bright blazing with torches, on which were, clad in silks, the Lady of the Lake, and two nymphs waiting on her, who made a speech to the queen, in metre, of the antiquity and owners of that castle, which was closed with cornets, and other loud music. Within the base court was a noble bridge set up, of twenty feet wide and seventy feet long, over which the queen passed; on each side whereof, on posts erected, were presents on them to her by the gods; namely, a cage of wild-fowl by *Silvanus*; divers sorts of fruits by *Pomona;* of corn by *Ceres;* of wine by *Bacchus;* of sea-fish by *Neptune;* of all habiliments of war by *Mars;*

and musical instruments by *Phœbus.*" "On Sunday evening, she beheld a grand display of fireworks. 'After a warning piece or two,' says Laneham, 'was a blaze of burning darts flying to and fro, beams of stars coruscant, streams and hail of fire-sparks, lightnings of wild-fire on the water; and on the land, flight and shot of thunderbolts, all with such continuance, terror, and vehemence, the heavens thundered, the waters surged, and the earth shook.'" Among other entertainments, upon one of the days of her visit, was "*a pageant on the water*, exhibiting, among other spectacles, Arion, seated upon a dolphin twenty-four feet in length, and singing a song, accompanied by the music of six performers, who were snugly lodged" inside "the fish." Thus, with a magnificence unequalled in modern times, did the nobles of Elizabeth purchase a costly favoritism. Thus, too, were genius employed and art nourished into a purer taste and for a more intellectual mastery. It was at Wanstead, in Essex, some two or three years later, that Sydney produced his masque entitled the "Lady of May," for a similar occasion. And in scenes like these, and as a probable spectator of this very pageant, was developed the mind of one even more illustrious than Sydney, who used the outward drapery but as the wardrobe of creative power; in whom language was subservient to truth and passion; who caused all dramatic trappings to grow dim in the presence of intense and mighty thought, and made the name of the wool-worker of Stratford—the deer-stalker of Fulbroke Park, greater than all the Dudleys—SHAKSPEARE!

But it was not the disposition of Sydney to be an idler, even at court, and he entered upon public life as ambassador to the court of Vienna, in 1576. This mission was, ostensibly, one of condolence with the Emperor Rodolph, upon the death of his father, Maximilian II. But the politic and intriguing spirit of the times lurked in this embassy, and it was really an endeavor on the part of England to secure a union of the Protestant princes against the bigotry of Rome and the power of Spain. Although Elizabeth, in her appointments, is said to have considered not only the talents but the figure and person of her favorites, and although the position which Sydney occupied as nephew to Leicester may have aided him in securing this honor,

yet the results of his embassy proved that it had been committed to one who, even thus early, began to manifest the skill of profound statesmanship. He was commended by Burleigh, (no partial witness,) and warmly eulogized by Walsingham. But, although he discharged this mission with great credit, he was not advanced at the court of Elizabeth, and for some time held only the office of royal cup-bearer. About this time, he was called upon to defend his father, then Lord Deputy of Ireland, from the aspersions of some who had misrepresented his official conduct to the queen. His advocacy was successful, and Sir Henry was restored to the royal favor. Engaged in this duty, he declined the invitation of Count Casimir to join his army against the Spaniards, and it is a noble tribute to his character, that, although he was nearly involved in a quarrel with the Earl of Ormond, he wrung from his opponent a testimony of admiration for his filial virtue.

The anxiety and excitement that prevailed during the first portion of Elizabeth's reign, respecting her marriage, form a prominent part of its history. One cause of this feeling was the unsettled state of religion — the most critical and vital question of the time. The parties that had been called out by the great Reformation had not yet settled down into the limits which they now occupy, but were still dubiously contending for *territorial* conquest. Elizabeth ascended the throne of a kingdom that was strewn with the ashes and drenched with the blood of Protestants, and that held a powerful party viewing with no quiet mind her accession, and ready, upon her opposition to papacy, to dispute her legitimacy. Lawful, and as some may have thought, more lawful claimants to the throne were all around her. To this we must add the foreign religious and political machinations, so rife in that age, besides that inert majority whose religion always wore the livery of the court. In this unsettled state of things it seemed, at least to the more zealous of the Protestant party, that the hope of their cause rested with Elizabeth, and that in case of her death without issue, the kingdom would be thrown into a ferment, in which the stability of that cause would be endangered, and a change might ensue similar to that which followed the death of Edward VI. But besides this reason, why the scheme of matrimony occupied such a prominence among

grave state affairs, there was, perhaps, another. Elizabeth was a woman; and although, in many respects, a great-minded, every body knows she was a very vain and artful one; fond of flattery, and delighting no less in the plots and intrigues of formal courtship, than in those of state. The first part of her reign, therefore, was full of offers of marriage, negotiations and refusals. It is, perhaps, difficult to determine whether in any one of these she was in earnest. She had emphatically declared that she would live and die a maiden-queen, and that declaration seemed sincere; but her princely suitors thought, no doubt, that other declarations, inconsistent with this, were equally sincere. However, after coquetting with the Archduke Charles, Count Casimir, and even with her sister's former husband, Philip of Spain, matters seemed, in the year 1580, closely approaching a matrimonial crisis between her and the Duke of Anjou, the youngest son of the royal house of France. In this instance it would seem that "the fair vestal throned in the west" was not left entirely "fancy-free." Anjou made a sudden and romantic visit; there was much private cooing; the marriage was seriously discussed by her council, who, although divided in their opinions, thought best to acquiesce, for Elizabeth, when her will was set, had much of the Tudor in her. "And this also I present as a known observation," says Naunton, "that she was, though very capable of counsel, absolute enough in her own resolution." But the idea was not likely to be a popular one. The treachery of France was more than suspicious, and it did not seem fitting that they whose hands had bathed in Coligni's blood, and beckoned on the beagles to Huguenot slaughter, should now, so soon, clasp the golden band of alliance with her who was esteemed the bulwark of the Protestant cause. Disdaining the servility of a courtier, or a timid silence when duty called, Philip Sydney addressed her majesty, in a letter respectful yet firm, decided, argumentative, in which all the reasons against the match were condensed and boldly urged. It has justly won the commendation of Strype and Hume, and must excite the admiration of every reader, for the manly honesty and the patriotic zeal of him who penned it. It was received by her as candor and truth are often received; she knew that it came from a loyal heart, and he

lost no favor by it. Poor John Stubbs, however, who had written a book entitled "The discoverie of the gaping gulph, whereinto England is like to be swallowed by a French marriage," &c., and one Page, who printed it, did not fare so well as Sydney. Their right hands were stricken off. When the ghastly member fell—"There," says Page, "lies the hand of a true Englishman." And Stubbs, with his mutilated and bleeding wrist, waved his hat with his left hand, exclaiming "God save the queen!" After some strange vacillations, the marriage was broken off;—although Anjou said, at parting with her, that he would return, and we are told that Elizabeth, upon taking leave of him at Canterbury, "wept like an amorous girl." Yet this "amorous girl" was nearly fifty years old!

Fulke Greville records, very graphically, a quarrel which took place, about this time, between Sydney and the Earl of Oxford, in a tennis-court. It is important to allude to it only from the fact that Sydney appears to have sustained the energy and independence of a free commoner against the arrogant authority of a proud nobleman; and when reminded by the queen, who took the adjustment of the matter into her own hands, of the difference in ranks, he replied with a noble answer, containing this truth: that "place was never intended for privilege to wrong." But this quarrel led to one important result, for, in order to regain composure, it is said, Sydney retired to Wilton, the seat of his brother-in-law, the Earl of Pembroke, where he planned the design of the ARCADIA—to which we shall refer more particularly in another place. However, we soon find him engaged in active life again, sitting in parliament as one of the knights for the county of Kent. We also find him, in company with the Earl of Arundel, Lord Windsor, and Fulke Greville, challenging all comers at a tournament given in honor of the French embassy, sent over to plead the suit of the Duke of Anjou. For a gorgeous description of this tournament, with its spectacles and gallant doings, and its apparel of engraved armor, velvet caps, gold and silver bands and Venetian hose, we must refer to the pages of Hollinshed, and hasten to close the mere biographical account of Sydney. After accompanying the Duke of Anjou, upon his departure from England, as far as An-

twerp, he appears to have engaged himself more exclusively in literary pursuits, and produced in his retirement his best work, "*The Defence of Poesy*," to which, also, we shall refer again. Propositions had been for some time discussed for the marriage of Sydney with Penelope, daughter of the Earl of Essex. She was married, however, to Robert, Lord Rich. But the attachment, on the part of Sydney, appears never to have been quenched. She was the poet's love — the *Stella* of his sonnets, and the *Philoclea* of the *Arcadia*. Mr. Hallam seems to imply that this poetical love was not absolutely Platonic, but there appears no evidence to the contrary, and it is painful to have even the shadow of a suspicion dim a character of so much moral lustre. In 1583, he married Frances, only daughter of Sir Francis Walsingham, and in the same year received the honor of knighthood at the hands of the queen. In 1584, there appeared a tract called, from the name of its supposed author, and the color of its cover, "*Father Parson's Green Coat*." Parsons was a Jesuit, and is said to have disowned the authorship of the book, which was an attack upon the Earl of Leicester, and afterwards entitled "*Leicester's Commonwealth*." Against this work Sydney took up the pen, and wrote his "*Defence of the Earl of Leicester*," probably the most unsatisfactory of his productions. Instead of meeting the various charges alleged against the earl, it is principally devoted to a vindication of the noble blood of the Dudleys, and concludes with a challenge against his anonymous accuser, which, though doubtless emanating from a magnanimous spirit, and quite characteristic of the age, has in it more of chivalry than argument. The character of Leicester does not appear very well beside that of his nephew, and it is probable that an honest advocate would find it hard to devise a covering for all his deeds.

Sydney had petitioned, in vain, to be joined in office with his uncle, the Earl of Warwick. It is said also that he was selected as a candidate for the crown of Poland — but this is probably apocryphal. At all events, he was naturally weary of a life of comparative inaction. It was an age full of excitements well calculated to stir the youthful blood, and inflame the spirit of chivalrous adventure to participate in the enterprises which had been opened by the success

and daring of those great voyagers whose names illuminate the pages of English maratime history. It is said that, in conjunction with his friend Fulke Greville, he entered into a secret plan with Drake to accompany him on a voyage of adventure to America. The secret, however, was revealed, and the enterprise was prohibited by royal command. But a new field was at length opened to him, which was to be for him a field of glory, and, alas! of death. Having entered into a Protestant alliance with the Netherlands against Spain, Elizabeth received as pledges, in return for her military succor, several towns in Holland. Accordingly, Sir Philip Sydney, now a privy counsellor, was appointed Governor of Flushing, one of the most important ports in the Netherlands. Arrived there, on the 18th of November, 1585, he was immediately appointed colonel of all the Dutch regiments, and captain of a band of English soldiers. By the Earl of Leicester, who was sent to the provinces as commander of the English auxiliary forces, he was made general of the horse. Leicester, in his military administration in the Low Countries, dissatisfied his nephew, and met with a sharp rebuke from his queen. Sydney entered upon a scene of active military duty. Accompanied by Prince Maurice, he captured Axell, without the loss of a man, in July, 1586. An attempt to take Steenburg failed, owing to a sudden thaw. An attack upon Graveling, through treachery, proved unfortunate. On the 22d of September, 1586, was fought the memorable battle of *Zutphen*. The English gained the victory, but with the loss of Sir Philip Sydney. Suddenly encountering the enemy, beneath the walls of the fortress, and under a veil of mist, they were exposed to a sweeping fire. Sydney had set out completely equipped, but meeting the marshal of the camp, lightly armed, and determined not to be outdone in military daring, with that kind of rashness which we hesitate to censure or admire, he threw off the panoply that covered his thighs. Three times he charged the enemy. One horse was shot under him, and he mounted another. Observing Lord Willoughby in imminent danger, he rushed to his succor, which he achieved. But now he himself was mortally wounded, it has been conjectured, by a poisoned ball, in that part of his body which he had left defenceless. "A musket-shot," says a chronicler, "a little above the left

knee, so brake and rifted the bone, and so entered the thigh upward towards the body, as the bullet could not be found before the body was opened." "The horse he rode upon," says his friend, "was rather furiously choleric, than bravely proud, and so forced him to forsake the field, but not his back, as the noblest and fittest bier to carry a martial commander to his grave." As he was thus borne along, drooping and wounded, that incident occurred which is familiar to children, which our great artist has selected as the subject of one of his grand historical pictures, and the moral beauty and pathos of which cannot be so forcibly presented, in any high-wrought description, as in the simple account of Lord Brooke. "In which sad progress," says he, "passing along by the rest of the army, where his uncle, the general was, and being thirsty with excess of bleeding, he called for drink, which was presently brought him; but, as he was putting the bottle to his mouth, he saw a poor soldier carried along, who had eaten his last at the same feast, ghastly casting up his eyes at the bottle; which Sir Philip perceiving, took it from his head before he drank, and delivered it to the poor man with these words: *Thy necessity is yet greater than mine!*" Here broke forth the true greatness of Sydney; a gleam of that excellence of disposition which wins our love and admiration—a proof that, below all the shows of circumstance, he had in him a good and noble heart. Brighter than all accomplishments or genius, brighter than all the honors plucked on the embattled field, is the hallowed light which this simple deed of charity has shed over the vanishing life of the poet and the hero!

The last hours of Sydney were the most interesting of his life. Indeed, it must always be so, when the young and the hopeful die, and die triumphantly. We have known them but a little while, and excellences of character that have lain in the hidden depths of the soul, concealed by circumstances or by modesty, break out upon us in the emotion of the hour, and bind us to that young spirit stronger than ever. There, too, are often concentrated the beauty, and the power that would else have been diffused through the channels of a long life. But the most affecting thing of all, it is, when the veil of its earthly splendor is dropping away, and its human hopes

are crushed, to see that that spirit knows how to estimate these worldly vanities, is able to rebuke us for our weakness and our tears, to dissipate that sad thought of unaccomplished greatness by the promise of an immortal growth, and to speak its last farewell in tones of holiness and heaven. Of this kind was the death of Philip Sydney. After he had come from the field, lying in his tent, he lifted up his eyes, devoutly referring the stroke that had smitten him to the direction of God. He calmly bade his surgeons "use their art with freedom, while his strength was yet entire, his body free from fever, and his mind able to endure;" and composed an ode upon his wound. Lingering for many days, in a suffering and emaciated condition, he was the first to perceive the futility of the hopes that had been entertained of his recovery, and, in full conviction that he was infected with the taint of death, combatted the sanguine arguments of his attendants. He then called around him the ministers of religion, and led them in devout prayer, interrupted by their sighs and tears. After this, he entered into a serene and philosophical discussion of the immortality of the soul—"Not," says Lord Brooke, "that he wanted instruction or assurance; but because this fixing of a lover's thoughts upon those external beauties, was not only a cheering up of his decaying spirits, but, as it were, a taking possession of that immortal inheritance, which was given unto him by his brotherhood in Christ." With an exquisite sensibility, he summoned music into his death-chamber, that his departing spirit might be softened, and wrapped in harmony. Then came the bitter trial of separation with the near and the loved. He called his brother to his bedside, and mingled with efforts of consolation, these words of wisdom: "Love my memory; cherish my friends; their faith to me may assure you they are honest. But, above all, govern your will and affections by the will and word of your Creator; in me beholding the end of this world with all its vanities." A solemn and mournful truth was there in these latter words—for the sun has not often shone upon more that was humanly attractive, and scarce ever was there a more impressive lesson read of the uncertainty and frailty of these things, withering thus in the rising light of promise, and at the very vestibule of hope. But he had learned to esti-

mate them at their true value. One who has recorded the closing scene of his life, has left us an account of his humility, his penitence, his prayerfulness, his deep religious experiences and exercises. "I would not change my joy," said he, "for the empire of the world." Thus, in the apartment still filled with the echoes of philosophy, music, affection, and hallowed by the breathings of prayer, characteristically died Sir Philip Sydney — thus went out his spirit with a lambent light, at the close of a beautiful life — thus, at the age of thirty-two, perished one, of whom it has been said, that "he trod from his cradle to his grave, amid incense and flowers, and died in a dream of glory." His death was the occasion of universal mourning. Seldom, if ever, for any private person, has there been exhibited more public or individual sorrow — which extended even to Philip of Spain. Spenser poured forth his grief for his friend and patron, the universities published three volumes of elegiac poetry upon the event, and "no gentleman for many months appeared in a gay and gaudy dress either in the city or in the court." It was the earnest wish of the States of Holland, to bury him at the public expense, offering to erect for him "as fair a monument as any prince had in christendom, though it should cost half a ton of gold the building," but their petition was rejected by Elizabeth. Accordingly, his body was embarked from Flushing, on the first of November, 1586, about one year from his arrival there, and landed at Tower Hill, in London, on the fifth. It lay in state at the Minories until the sixteenth of February following, when being, it is said, the first English subject honored with a public funeral, and with circumstances of great pomp, his remains were entombed in St. Paul's."[1]

[1] In the choir of St. Paul's was formerly a tablet, bearing the following inscription, which, it will be perceived, is more eulogistic than poetical.

"England, Netherlands, the heavens, and the arts,
The soldiers, and the world have made six parts
Of the noble Sydney; for none will suppose,
That a small heap of ashes can Sydney enclose.
His body hath England, for she it bred;
Netherlands his blood, in her defence shed;
The heavens have his soul, the arts his fame,
All soldiers the grief, the world his good name."

There is only brief space left for remark upon the genius and character of Sydney, but to omit this altogether, would be doing injustice to one who attracts us more by what he *was* than by what he *did.* We perceive, at once, that he was a man of various accomplishments — a kind of Admirable Crichton — the courtier, the poet, the statesman, the soldier. Old Fuller, in his "Worthies of England," calls him "a ubiquity, one that may be appropriately ranked among soldiers, and scholars, and statesmen, and lawyers." "They have a quaint and facetious conceit of him," says Naunton, in his Fragmenta Regalia, "that Mars and Mercury fell at variance whose servant he should be; and there is an epigrammatist that saith, that art and nature had spent their excellencies in his fashioning, and fearing that they could not end what they had begun, they bestowed him on fortune." This admirable versatility, blended with a strange sweetness and nobility of disposition, threw a dazzling fascination over his brief life, and made him at once the delight of different classes of men, and the bright ornament of different stations — the court, the closet, the camp. But Sydney was not a man of mere accomplishments. He merits a high place as a man of genius, and ranks among the best writers of his age. He is styled by Mr. Hallam, no mean judge, "the first good English prose-writer in any positive sense of the word." Passing by his minor pieces, and his poetry, a large portion of which goes under the title of "*Astrophel and Stella,*" and which certainly does not furnish his highest claim to a literary reputation, his chief fame as an author, rests upon his "Arcadia," and his "Defence of Poesie." The first-named work is a romance of some five hundred pages, of a heroic and pastoral character. It was written on loose sheets of paper, mostly in the presence of his sister, to whom it is dedicated, who collected the scattered manuscripts, and revised them with her own pen — from which circumstance it has received the name of the "*Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia.*" It was not published until after the death of Sydney, and received no polish from his supervision. We are told that he intended to arrange the whole work anew, and it is said, on the authority of Ben Jonson, that he meant to change the subject, by celebrating the adventures of Prince

Arthur. It was the first draught of the artist, incomplete and undefined. He does not appear to have set much value upon it, but to have regarded it as the light offspring of idle hours. "Here now have you," says he, in his dedication to his sister, "this idle work of mine: which I fear, (like the spider's web,) will be thought fitter to be swept away, than worn to any other purpose." It is said, also, that, on his death-bed, he requested that it might be burned. It passed, however, through fourteen editions, and "was translated into the French, the Dutch, and other European languages." It was received with warm delight in his own age — it was pored over by Waller, and Milton, and Shakspeare — it has drawn from Sir William Temple, praise of Sydney as a great poet — Cowper has styled him "the warbler of poetic prose" — and Dr. Young has called his book, "the charm of ages." And though now but little known, by those who love the style and spirit of old English literature it is read with a glow of rapturous, if not exaggerated enthusiasm. But Sydney has not escaped censure, perhaps as unjust as his praise has been sometimes overstrained. Horace Walpole calls the Arcadia, "a tedious, lamentable, pedantic, pastoral romance, which the patience of a young virgin in love cannot now wade through;" and Hazlitt, perhaps more honest, confesses that he cannot acquire a taste for it. As far as Walpole's criticism is concerned, we can the better estimate it when we consider the character of the critic. He confesses himself to have "led a very dissipated life, in all the hurry of the world and pleasure," and to "scarce ever have read, except at the conclusion of a day spent in vain and frivolous occupations."[2] Macauley says of him that he was "the most eccentric, the most artificial, the most fastidious, the most capricious of men — his mind was a bundle of inconsistent whims and affectations."[3] From such a man, who said "that he would rather have written the most absurd lines in Lee, than Thomson's Seasons," we can hardly look for a just estimate of the genius of Sydney. The fact is, Hazlitt, has placed

[2] Walpole is quoted thus by Zouch.

[3] Macauley has been accused of injustice in his notice of Walpole by a writer in the Democratic Review.

the mode of judging the Arcadia, upon the right ground, although his notion of it is perhaps as far out of the way on one side, as that of a writer in the Retrospective Review is on the other. But, as he suggests, it is a matter of taste. We must remember, before we sit down to read it, some things that we must expect. It was not then the age of Pope and Addison. Nay, Bacon had not written, nor Hooker, nor Shakspeare. It was an age when prose literature, according to Mr. Hallam, taken generally, was very mean. Let us remember this, and let us remember the circumstances, already mentioned, under which it was written. We shall find it tainted with the faults of the time — stiffness, conceits, extravagances, tedious episodes, and long strings of verse, and indeed on the whole somewhat tiresome to wade through; still, we shall glean from it much that is tender, noble, and beautiful — we shall feel that the air of genius breathes through it; and, above all, that we are communing with a generous and excellent spirit — one, to use his own words, with "thoughts high erected in a heart of courtesy." Indeed, we suspect that the work owes its chief charm to this — that in its noble and chivalric portraits it mirrors the spirit of Sydney himself, and that it is read with more delight, from the fact that we know who and what the author was. Under these circumstances, let us not judge rigidly or coldly of one, who was cut off ere the mature development of his powers, and who wrote from his own full heart, in the light of sympathizing affection, in that formal and quaint age, and not for the sharp scrutiny of modern criticism; and let us say in the words of old Harvey: "Live ever, sweet book, the silver image of his gentle wit, and the golden pillar of his noble courage."

"*The Defence of Poetry*," has lately been re-published among us. It is much better calculated to suit a modern taste than the "Arcadia." It is learned, ingenious, and argumentative; and, moreover, a defence of the art of poetry written with a poet's spirit. "As an essay on the nature, objects and effects of poetry, as an art," says a writer in the Retrospective Review, "it is, beyond comparison, the most complete work of the kind which we possess, even up to the present day. The truth is, that the Defence of Poesy has formed the staple of all the thousand

and one dissertations on that art, with which our magazines and reviews have teemed during the last twenty years." Sydney, then, honored as a statesman and a soldier, ranks deservedly high as a writer. His was a splendid career—his has been a splendid fame. Yet how diverse are the fortunes of men of genius! Sydney owes much to circumstances—lives in the centre of a dazzling homage, and when he dies, over his tomb, streaming through heraldic devices and blushing trophies, mantles the light of an undying glory. Poor Robert Greene, a cotemporary of his, died in poverty and neglect, yet with the true thirst he petitioned that laurels might be laid upon his coffin, and now he sleeps close to the shadows of oblivion. While Burns, struggling with adversity and bent to toil, is not overcome by circumstances, but rises above them, by the freshness and force of his own genius, and shall live in memory and in song, until the heart of the common humanity is still, and the wind no more blows across the heather.

But after all, it is the *life*—it is the *character* of Sydney—that renders him illustrious. We read that life, and we feel, perhaps, we scarce know why, that we love him. "The truth is," says Lord Brooke, "that his end was not writing, even while he wrote; nor his knowledge moulded for tables or schools; but both his wit and understanding bent upon his heart to make himself and others, not in words or opinion, but in life and action, good and great." "On the whole," says Miss Aikin, "though justice claims the admission that the character of Sydney was not entirely free from the faults most incident to his age and station, and that neither as a writer, a scholar, a soldier, or a statesman,—in all which characters, during the course of his short life, he appeared, and appeared with distinction,—is he yet entitled to the highest rank; it may, however, be firmly maintained that, as a *man*, an accomplished and high-souled man, he had among his cotemporary countrymen neither equal nor competitor." As a genial man—one who possessed the faculty of drawing out talent in others—one who sympathized with and cherished the finer traits of genius—Sydney stands in an eminent light. He was the friend and the patron of Spenser, and probably incited him to undertake his *Fairy Queen*. Even in college, we find him encouraging the celebrated antiquary, Camden. "In-

deed," says Lord Brooke again, "he was withal such a lover of mankind and goodness, that whosoever had any real parts, in him found comfort, participation, and protection, to the uttermost of his power; like Zephyrus, he giving life where he blew. The universities abroad and at home accounted him a general Macænas of learning; dedicated their books to him; and communicated every invention or improvement of knowledge with him. Soldiers honored him, and were so honored by him, as no man thought he marched under the true banner of Mars, who had not Sir Philip Sydney's approbation. . . . . But what speak I of these," says he, "with whom his own ways and ends did concur? since, to descend, his heart and capacity were so large, that there was not a cunning painter, a skilful musician, or any other artificer of extraordinary fame, that made not himself known to this famous spirit, and found him his true friend without hire, and the common rendezvous of worth in his time."

We have not the means of viewing Sydney as a complete character; his life was but a fragment. As Campbell has beautifully said, "It was poetry put in action," and it was only a brief portion of a noble epic. But in the little that we see of him, gleam out, here and there, passages of virtue and splendor. He was quick, ardent, ambitious, nay, rash. But in him shone the light of the domestic affections—the sanctity of filial piety. In him throbbed the highest daring, and yet the gentlest courtesy. He wore the staid gravity of the scholar and statesman, but also the polished amenities of social life. He resisted wrong, but he aided suffering. He linked the noble forms of the old knight-errant with the graces of the modern gentleman. He could glitter in the galaxies of courts; he could adorn the train of beauty; he could blaze on the field of battle. He could unravel the perplexing mazes of statesmanship; he delighted in the calm retirement of study. And amid the cowardly fears of politicians, and the rotten obsequiousness of courtiers, he bore witness to an honest and manly patriotism. Thus brave, and generous, and courteous, and gifted, there runs through his life the purity of a high moral conduct, and there lingers around his death the blessedness of a Christian profession.

Thus much of the character of Sydney we catch in

glimpses, but for the proof of its excellence we rely chiefly upon the general testimony and feeling of his cotemporaries. He evidently earned what is far better than the phrases of courtly compliment — the admiration and love of grateful and sympathizing spirits. Oldys, the antiquarian, says that he could muster up two hundred authors who wrote in praise of Sir Philip Sydney. It is true, he lived in an age of extravagant compliments, and he was the heir of the favorite of Elizabeth, which may account for some adulation. But he evidently won the esteem of men's hearts — men of all conditions and characters — the bigoted Philip, the haughty Don John, the learned Languet, the gifted Spenser. Thornton had it recorded upon his tomb that he was the tutor of Philip Sydney. Fulke Greville, retiring from the cares of the world, and communing with the excellence of past times and with the worthy dead, calls up the image and embalms the memory of his friend, and directs this be written on his monument: "Fulke Greville, — servant to Queen Elizabeth, councillor to King James, and friend to Sir Philip Sydney." Evidently, Sydney attracted his cotemporaries as he attracts us, by a certain perfection and sweetness, by a certain lustre of character, which makes one great in what he is, while his deeds are comparatively meagre and inadequate to account for his fame. In this way only, by intrinsic and genuine excellence, by a harmonious union of genius and high sentiment and amiability, can we account for the diverse and universal admiration of which he was the object.

We have thus thrown open the doors of an antique and golden age, and looked in upon its dusk and mellow associations, where group the illustrious forms of prince and poet, philosopher and hero. We have suffered our eyes to rest upon one, in many respects, the most brilliant of that group, but who quickly passed away like a bright dream of romance. We have followed him to his grave, over which waves the laurel of genius, wet with the young blood of bravery. Let us now turn away to discard what we may see in him of pride or error, but carrying with us the lesson to so blend a good manner with good matter, worthy accomplishments with intrinsic virtue, as to live beloved of men and approved of God. "Rest, then," says old Camden, "rest, then, in peace, oh Sydney! . . . . . We will

which Saul experienced, duly weigh the question, whether he was the author of this change, or whether circumstances, over which he had no control, produced it?

We may consider the merits of the subject now under examination, by turning our attention to another prominent individual, who, according to the New Testament account, was, at different times, possessed of different minds. When Peter saw the vessel which contained all manner of beasts and fowls, clean and unclean, and was commanded to "arise, slay, and eat," he possessed a mind, which induced him to say, "Not so, Lord; for not any thing common or unclean hath at any time entered into my mouth." How came Peter by this mind? Was it not the production of the habits and customs in which he had lived, as a Jew? If he had been born and brought up a Greek, or a Roman, is there the least probability that he would have made for himself, this mind? Instructed by this vision, he went to the Gentiles with a different mind, and told them that God had showed him, that he should call no man common or unclean. Did Peter make *this* mind himself, or was it given him by the instructions which he rightly attributed to God?

If the examples of the two individuals above presented, be allowed to set forth the divine economy, whereby men's minds are formed in accordance with the spirit of truth and grace, the Christian will say with Paul, "By the grace of God, I am what I am."

The minds which, according to the position we are examining, we are to carry with us into the future state, are our "present minds such as we make them." Having considered the subject of our making our own minds, and offered as much on it as may satisfy the Christian reader, some thoughts may be suggested with regard to what the author meant by our *present* minds. As men are constantly subject to have their minds changed, and as such changes are often taking place, if we are to carry into the future state all the various minds which we have had in this life, an individual may there be possessed of legions. But the learned Doctor had no such meaning. Still, what did he mean? Here we are in want of light. "Our *present* minds!" Why, there is no man among us, who can *settle it as a sure fact*, that he will carry his *present* mind into

which needs no proof, we must take the liberty to suggest some queries respecting it. We ask, then, is it true of any man, that he is the maker of his own mind? But, by what process of reasoning can we arrive at a correct solution of this question? Perhaps some light may be brought on this subject, by asking a few questions: Is there any man who is destitute of a mind? Is every man necessarily possessed of a mind? If there is no one without a mind, and if every one is necessarily possessed of a mind, is it not, at least, a questionable hypothesis, that every man makes his own mind? Does the tender infant make its own weak mind? Does the sprightly youth make his own mind, which has more strength? At what age do we make our minds? We may, moreover, ask whether we are capable of having no minds by choosing to have none? If the foregoing queries seem rather perplexing, we think they must, at least, raise some doubts as to the truth of the hypothesis under consideration.

Suppose we take an individual of whom we have considerable information in the New Testament, and examine how he came by different minds at different times. When Saul of Tarsus, was a Pharisee at Jerusalem, he was possessed of the mind of a Pharisee; and that mind was opposed to Christ, to the doctrine of Christ, and to all who professed to be the disciples of Christ; and this mind was zealous in the cause of persecuting and wasting the church. Now, let us candidly consider all the circumstances of this individual, from his childhood to the time he was employed in the work of persecution, and carefully weigh the question, whether Saul was the maker of this mind, or was this mind produced by the combination of all the incidents of his education? Possessed of this mind, which was evidently produced by those causes just mentioned, he proceeded, with letters of authority from the high priest of his nation, to Damascus, to arrest all whom he could find of the disciples of Jesus, that they might be punished according to the desire of that mind of which he was possessed. But we find, that before he arrived at that city, he was entirely dispossessed of the mind he had had, and was of a mind which was all submission to the mind and will of Jesus. Now let the candid Christian, who is familiar with the New Testament account of the change

which Saul experienced, duly weigh the question, whether he was the author of this change, or whether circumstances, over which he had no control, produced it?

We may consider the merits of the subject now under examination, by turning our attention to another prominent individual, who, according to the New Testament account, was, at different times, possessed of different minds. When Peter saw the vessel which contained all manner of beasts and fowls, clean and unclean, and was commanded to "arise, slay, and eat," he possessed a mind, which induced him to say, "Not so, Lord; for not any thing common or unclean hath at any time entered into my mouth." How came Peter by this mind? Was it not the production of the habits and customs in which he had lived, as a Jew? If he had been born and brought up a Greek, or a Roman, is there the least probability that he would have made for himself, this mind? Instructed by this vision, he went to the Gentiles with a different mind, and told them that God had showed him, that he should call no man common or unclean. Did Peter make *this* mind himself, or was it given him by the instructions which he rightly attributed to God?

If the examples of the two individuals above presented, be allowed to set forth the divine economy, whereby men's minds are formed in accordance with the spirit of truth and grace, the Christian will say with Paul, "By the grace of God, I am what I am."

The minds which, according to the position we are examining, we are to carry with us into the future state, are our "present minds such as we make them." Having considered the subject of our making our own minds, and offered as much on it as may satisfy the Christian reader, some thoughts may be suggested with regard to what the author meant by our *present* minds. As men are constantly subject to have their minds changed, and as such changes are often taking place, if we are to carry into the future state all the various minds which we have had in this life, an individual may there be possessed of legions. But the learned Doctor had no such meaning. Still, what did he mean? Here we are in want of light. "Our *present* minds!" Why, there is no man among us, who can *settle it as a sure fact*, that he will carry his *present* mind into

the next week, even if it be true that he is to live years. There is no man living that is certain that he will remain another day of the same mind he at present has. If we make our own minds, as the Doctor supposes, we do not know, when we have made one, that we can keep it a single hour. If we are not certain that we can carry our present minds into another day or hour, how can we be sure that we shall carry them into the future immortal world? Even if we were ever so confident that we could do this, would not such confidence be most presumptuous?

But suppose we have the power to make our own minds, and that we do make them, could the Doctor mean that we have the power and means of carrying them with us into the future state? Does any rational person believe that we have any agency in getting ourselves into the immortal world? Surely no one can believe what is so grossly absurd. Now, if we are entirely dependent on our Heavenly Father for our future existence, are we not equally dependent on him for every circumstance of that state of being? And as to our minds, we know that circumstances and events, over which we have no control, are daily changing them while we live in the flesh; circumstances and events too, which, when compared with our resurrection into the immortal state, are small in the extreme. If our small and trifling changes of condition here, are continually varying our minds, our purposes, and designs, and even our desires, may not that mysterious, that wonderful, and to us, utterly incomprehensible change, our resurrection into an immortal state, be attended with a change of our minds corresponding with all its incomprehensible wonders? In such a resurrection-state as Jesus described, and as is set forth by St. Paul, is it certain that we shall have just such minds as we have here, as unstable and as various? In a state, in which men will be equal unto the angels, will be the children of God, being the children of the resurrection, and not subject to die any more; in a resurrection-state, in which that which was sown in dishonor, is raised in glory; that which was sown in weakness is raised in power; that which was sown a natural body, is raised a spiritual body, is it certain that men will have just such minds, just such purposes, just such desires, just such habits, as they have in flesh and blood?

But let us go a little further on the supposition that we make our own minds and carry them with us into the future state; shall we not still possess the power of making our own minds? If we have this power here, and God should deprive us of it when we enter into the future life, this would be an essential change, as to the moral agency of man. Such a change as this, the learned Doctor surely would not allow. Well then, we are, after all, to have the power in that state, to go on making our own minds as we please. If we are not suited with such minds as we make here, after we carry them into the future world, we may cast them away and make others, and after we have made them, if they do not please us, we shall not be obliged to keep them; but on the contrary, if those minds which we here make, and which we shall carry with us into the future life, are such as we shall there choose to retain, we shall, doubtless, retain them.

But we are assured, in the declaration we are examining, that in the future state we shall reap good, or ill, according to the improvement or corruption of the minds we here make, and carry with us into that state. It must be granted, that if our minds, in the future state, are pure, good, and holy, they will be joyful and happy; and that if they are morally corrupt, they will be correspondingly miserable; this all men experience in this world. But, as we have seen, if men make their own minds, and make them as they please, and after they have made them find themselves uncomfortable with them, they can make such alterations in them, as circumstances, in their judgment, may require.

We come now to consider all those acts, which in this world affect men's characters. All those acts, in their influence, are to "reach beyond the grave, and have a bearing on our future weal or woe." Now it must be allowed that all our acts in this world, which are of a moral nature, affect our characters. It follows then, of course, that every virtuous act which men perform during their whole lives, while in flesh and blood, will, in its influence, reach beyond the grave, and be productive of good to the moral agent. And on the contrary, every vicious act which men commit during their whole lives, in this world, will, in its influence, reach beyond the grave, and be pro-

ductive of woe to the moral agent. Our learned Doctor does not inform us whether all the weal and all the woe, which we shall enjoy or suffer in the future state, will be derived from acts performed in this world; nor does he inform us that such weal and woe in the future world, as will be derived from our acts in this, will be of a long or of a short duration. If a belief in what is stated in the passage we are examining, is to exert any important influence on men in this world, it seems necessary that we should have some information on these particulars, about which nothing is said. If we are to depend on a belief in a reward in the future world for our virtues here, in order to induce us to be virtuous, it really seems that we ought to be informed of the amount of such reward. The supposition that we need this belief for the purpose specified, is founded on the fact that the reward of virtue in the present life is not a sufficient inducement for us to practise it. So, on the other hand, we want to know the amount of woe, which our vices practised in this life, will yield us in the future state, if we depend upon a belief in such retribution, to deter us from the commission of wrong. The supposition that we need the influence of this belief for the purpose set forth, is a tacit acknowledgment that the evils of vice, experienced in sinful ways, are not a sufficient reason why we should discontinue them. And there is another very important omission in the information given us in the statement we are examining. This is in relation to what the weal and the woe of the future state is to consist of. Let it be kept in mind, that we are now proceeding on the supposition that virtue does not sufficiently reward the virtuous, in this life; and that vice does not here bring an adequate recompense of woe. The question, then, which we want answered, is, In what will the weal and the woe of the future state consist, which is there to reward and recompense the virtues and vices of this life? If virtue and vice do not here adequately recompense those who practise them, there seems no good reason for supposing that they will pay their own cost any better hereafter. What is to make up this deficiency? We must have this question answered.

Let us now consider two points of doctrine which are prominently set forth, as we have seen, in the sentence we

have endeavored to investigate. First; that the true Christian, who possesses the mind of Christ, did really make for himself this pure and blessed mind. Though this point is not expressed in these words, the reader will surely perceive that if we make our own minds, the Christian makes his. What has been said respecting the means, by which Paul and Peter came into possession of their Christian minds, seems sufficient to satisfy the candid reader that these minds were the workmanship of divine grace. But a passage or two from the divine word respecting this subject, cannot be deemed improper. Eph. ii. 4, 5: "But God who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ." Verses 8–10: "For by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." Titus iii. 3–6: "For we ourselves also were sometimes foolish, disobedient, deceived, serving divers lusts and pleasures, living in malice and envy, hateful and hating one another. But after that the kindness and love of God our Saviour toward man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost; which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour." These passages clearly express what the Scriptures teach on this subject; and we feel confident that every true Christian heart will acknowledge that they express his own experience.

The other particular point which we propose to consider, is, that every virtuous act, and every vicious act, which men do in this world, will, in their influence, reach beyond the grave, and have a bearing on our future weal or woe. If this doctrine be true, it necessarily follows, that if a man, for a season, is virtuous, and does that which is right, he cannot, by becoming vicious, and doing that which is wrong, prevent the influence of his former virtuous acts from reaching beyond the grave, nor from having a bearing on his future weal. And, on the other hand, if one who has been vicious, and done that which is wrong, shall turn

from his wicked ways and do that which is right, his good conduct and virtuous deeds cannot prevent his former evil acts from reaching, in their influence, beyond the grave, nor from having a bearing on his future woe. As a direct and complete refutation of this point of doctrine, we here present the word of God. Ezekiel xviii. 21–24: "But if the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed, and keep all my statutes, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die. All his transgressions that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him: in his righteousness that he hath done he shall live. Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die? saith the Lord God; and not that he should return from his ways and live? But when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, and doeth according to all the abominations that the wicked man doeth, shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath done, shall not be mentioned: in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." To make it more clear, that the foregoing Scripture is a full refutation of the doctrine in question, by any comment, is impossible. The apostle Paul, quoting from Jeremiah xxxii. furnishes plenary proof, that the gospel covenant contains none of this doctrine, which makes the subjects of its grace the authors of their deliverance from sin, and which teaches that sin is to be carried beyond that deliverance. Hebrews viii. 10–12: "For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel, after those days, saith the Lord; I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people: and they shall not teach every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for all shall know me, from the least to the greatest. For I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and their iniquities will I remember no more."

The points of doctrine which have been considered, are those which constitute and mark the difference between Unitarianism, and what we believe the unadulterated gospel of Jesus Christ teaches. And it is desirable that this radical difference should be clearly understood; and that all lovers of truth should be engaged in the work of inves-

tigating this momentous subject; not for the purpose of keeping those who entertain different views on it from becoming united; but for the purpose of bringing them to understand alike, and to be united in the truth as it is in Jesus. In dissenting from the views of learned and good men, we do not mean to disparage any of their commendable qualities, nor impugn their motives or their sincerity. Dr. Channing himself has set us an example worthy of all praise. Few men of our times have brought more moral courage into the work of theological investigation. This surely will not be denied by the learned doctors who have spared no pains to put his courage to the test. But this justly esteemed Doctor of the church directed his efforts more especially against what he considered erroneous dogmas, which had been long established, and superstitiously venerated, than to inquire into the merits of a doctrine, which was, and is, far in advance of theological schools. Yet, in the contest in which he acted as a good and successful debater, he made most valuable discoveries, with which he has enriched his writings. With a passage from that excellent sermon which he delivered at the ordination of the Rev. Jared Sparks, to the pastoral care of the First Independent Church, in Baltimore, we will close this article: "We believe that God is infinitely good, kind, benevolent, in the proper sense of these words; good in disposition, as well as in act; good, not to a few, but to all; good to every individual, as well as to the general system." H. B.

Art. XXV.

Literary Notices.

1. The Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D. D., late Head Master of Rugby School, and Regius Professor of Modern History, in the University of Oxford. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of University College, Oxford. First American, from the third English Edition. The two Volumes complete in one. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 200 Broadway, &c. 1845. 12mo. pp. 516.

One can hardly mention the nameof Dr. Arnold, without joining in the homage it has received from the almost unanimous

voice of the periodical press, and indeed from the literary community at large. It is not that kind of homage which is paid merely to extraordinary genius, distinguished talents, or eminent scholarship; in his case, the pure, noble, Christian excellences of his heart command so much of our admiration, that we are perhaps in danger of overlooking those other endowments, which he nevertheless possessed in a very high degree. As a writer and professor of history, he labored to introduce a new feature into the regular historical department of English literature; we mean "the reproduction of past events, in the colors of life, and with all the complexity and bustle of a real scene;" such as that most eccentric but unequalled genius, Carlyle, has given us in his nondescript works, "The French Revolution," and "Past and Present." In other departments of science and literature, Dr. Arnold has obtained distinguished reputation. We have no room to describe the moral and religious qualities of his character, unless we say, by way of comparison, that he was what Oberlin might have been, if a highly cultivated scholar, and if he had directed his philanthropic enterprises to the reform of such an empire as the British, instead of confining them to a secluded parish like that of the Ban de la Roche. In his public relations, Dr. Arnold was a moderate but persevering advocate of almost all the reforms that have been undertaken in the English church and state; a zealous clergyman of the Establishment, yet an earnest defender of the ecclesiastical and civil rights of the Dissenters; very liberal, and, though a Trinitarian, for the most part rational in his religious views, yet maintaining the childlike simplicity and all-pervading piety of a Tholuck; equally remote from the unbelief of the Rationalists on the one hand, and the narrow bigotry of the self-styled Evangelicals on the other.

His views of the inspiration of the Scriptures are described by one of his pupils and admirers, in the following extract. It may serve at least to suggest some ideas that will be useful on the subject.

"First of all he approached the human side of the Bible in the same real historical spirit, with the same methods, rules, and principles, as he did Thucydides. He recognised in the writers of the Scriptures, the use of a human instrument — language; and this he would ascertain and fix, as in any other authors, by the same philological rules. Further, too, the Bible presents an assemblage of historical events; it announces an historical religion; and the historical element Arnold judged of historically, by the established rules of history, substantiating the general veracity of Scripture, even amidst occasional inaccuracies of detail, and proposing to himself, for his special end here, the reproduction, in the language and forms belonging to our own age and therefore familiar to us, of the exact mode of thinking, feeling, and acting, which prevailed in the days gone by.

"But was this all? Is the Bible but a common book, recording, indeed, more remarkable occurrences, but in itself possessed of no higher authority than a faithful and trust-worthy historian like Thucydides? Nothing could be farther from Dr. Arnold's feeling. In the Bible, he found and acknowledged an oracle of God — a positive and supernatural revelation made to man, an immediate inspiration of the spirit. No conviction was more deeply seated in his nature; and this conviction placed an impassable gulf between him and all rationalizing divines. Only it is very important to observe how this fact, in respect of scientific order, presented itself to his mind. He came upon it historically; he did not start with any preconceived theory of inspiration; but rather in studying the writings of those who were commissioned of God to preach his gospel to the world, he met with the fact that they claimed to be sent from God, to have a message from Him, to be filled with His spirit. Any accurate, precise, and sharply-defined theory of inspiration, to the best of my knowledge, Arnold had not; and, if he had been asked to give one, I think he would have answered that the subject did not admit of one. I think he would have been content to realize the feelings of those who heard the apostles; he would have been sure, on one side, that there was a voice of God in them; whilst on the other, he would have believed that probably no one in the apostolic age could have defined the exact limits of that inspiration. And this I am sure I may affirm with certainty, that never did a student feel his positive faith, his sure confidence that the Bible was the word of God, more indestructible than in Arnold's hands. He was conscious, that, whilst Arnold interpreted Scripture as a scholar, an antiquarian, and an historian, and that in the spirit and with the development of modern science, he had also placed the supernatural inspiration of the sacred writers on an imperishable historical basis; a basis that would be proof against any attack which the most refined modern learning could direct against it. Those only who are fully aware of the importance of harmonizing the progress of knowledge with Christianity, or rather of asserting amidst every possible form of civilization, the objective truths of Christianity and its life-giving power, can duly appreciate the value of the confidence inspired by the firm faith of a man, at once liberal, unprejudiced, and, in the estimation of even the most worldly men, possessed of high historical ability." — pp. 134–5.

Dr. Arnold was born at West-Clowes, in the Isle of Wight, 1795; graduated at Oxford, and soon afterwards, in 1819, settled at Laleham, with the charge of a few pupils; was elected Head-Master of Rugby School, 1827; and appointed Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, in 1841. He died, 1842, aged 47 years.

The volume named at the head of this notice, is a rich treasury of religious, political, and literary suggestions. The letters of such a man as Dr. Arnold, of which we here find a very large selection, cannot be otherwise than instructive on a vast range of topics.

2. Symbolism: or, Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences between

Catholics and Protestants, as evidenced by their Symbolical Writings, by John Adam Moehler, D. D., Dean of Wurzburg, and late Professor of Theology at the University of Munich. Translated from the German, with a Memoir of the Author, preceded by an Historical Sketch of the state of Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany, for the last hundred years. By James Burton Robertson, Esq., Translator of Schlegel's Philosophy of History. Two volumes of the London Edition in one. New York: published by Edward Dunigan, No. 151 Fulton street. 1844. 8vo. pp. 575.

We have neither time nor ability to do justice to the profound and acute analysis, which is here given, of the peculiar "Doctrines of the Reformation," compared with those of the Roman Catholic Church. It is said to be by far the ablest work that has ever been published on these subjects. Though we have read the larger part of it, we should not feel prepared to enter into a critical account of its execution, without a second and more careful perusal. We shall therefore only mention the principal topics it discusses, as they were treated by the Reformers on the one hand, and as they are resolved by the Catholics on the other: The Primitive State of Man, and the Origin of Evil; Original Sin, and its Consequences; Justification; Justifying Faith; Good Works; Doctrine of the Sacraments; and Doctrine concerning the Church. Of these several points, the Protestant reader will find a very thorough, and for the most part candid, examination and development, both historical and logical; and though he doubtless will not feel compelled to adopt the Catholic conclusions of the author, he will see many errors of the Reformers traced back to their origin, and onwards to their results. The translator informs us, that, on the publication of the original, in 1832, "the sensation it produced throughout all Germany, Protestants as well as Catholics, was prodigious; perhaps unparelleled in the history of modern theological literature. Hailed by Catholics with joy and exultation, its transcendent merits were openly acknowledged by the most eminent and estimable Protestants. The celebrated Protestant theologian and philosopher, Schleiermacher, declared it to be the severest blow ever given to Protestantism. Another very distinguished Protestant professor of Philosophy at Bonn, candidly confessed that none of the Protestant replies at all came up to it in force of reasoning." Making allowance for the warmth of coloring, which we might expect from so zealous a partizan as the translator, this account of the first reception of the work does not seem improbable, when we consider the extraordinary ability with which Dr. Moehler has performed his task.

3. Orthodoxy as it is; or, its Mental Influence and Practical Ineffi-

ciency and Effects, illustrated by Philosophy and Facts. By R. Tomlinson and D. P. Livermore. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Boston: published by A. Tompkins, 38 Cornhill. 1845. 18mo. pp. 234.

EVERY unprejudiced and well-informed person, who has marked the character of most of the Orthodox attacks on Universalism, in this country, must have been struck, not merely with the grossness of their misrepresentations and slanders, but at the hardihood with which charges of absurdity and immoral influence are urged. Witness the books of Rev. Messrs. M'Clure, Hatfield, M. H. Smith, &c.; witness the language of the Orthodox newspapers, on the subject. Absurdity and immoral influence! gravely alleged by advocates of a system of doctrines more inconsistent, whose history has been more signalized by jesuitry, vice, and crime, than any other form of Christianity, except the Roman Catholic! The mother of abominations accusing her neighbors of licentiousness! Perhaps the only way to bring a forehead of such effrontery to any degree of feeling, is to brand it; this may, at least, excite the natural circulation, even should it fail to call up the blush of shame.

We think the little volume, entitled "Orthodoxy as it is," will answer this purpose, besides suggesting trains of serious reflection. Though it stamps, on Orthodoxy, the record of flagitiousness and outrage, in pretty legible characters, its spirit is not of the sour and morose kind. Its facts give it a tone of more asperity, than appears in its comments.

4. Speech of Josiah Quincy, President of Harvard University, before the Board of Overseers of that Institution, February 25, 1845, on the Minority Report of the Committee of Visitation, presented to that Board by George Bancroft, Esq., February 6, 1845. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown. 1845. 8vo. pp. 64.

A MOVEMENT has lately been made to shift the actual government of Harvard College, and also to introduce into its management certain changes of another sort. The former of these objects, especially, ought to be understood by the community at large, for on the people does it ultimately depend, whether it shall be prevented or accomplished.

It is well known that this College, after being under the control of the Orthodox, so called, for a century and a half, passed into the hands of Unitarians, about forty years ago. The ostensible object, now, is, to take it from them, by filling such vacancies as may occur in the permanent part of the Board of Overseers, with candidates from other religious denominations; but the end which some of the managers of the new movement evidently aim

at, is, to restore the institution to the control of the Orthodox, when once the Unitarians shall have been dispossessed of it.

This, however, can at present be effected only by getting the vote of what may be called the floating part of the Board. The Board of Overseers consists of eighty-two members, in two classes, as follows: 1st. Thirty permanent, or elected members, half of them laymen, and half clergymen; of whom, four are now Orthodox, twenty-five Unitarian, and one Universalist. 2d. Fifty-two members *ex-officio*, who are liable to be changed, every year, by the political elections of the State, namely, the Governor and Lieut. Governor of the Commonwealth, the Senators, Councillors, and Speaker of the House of Representatives. Thus, it will be seen, that the *ex-officio* members are a large majority; and, therefore, that they determine the character of the Board, and have the control of its measures and elections. The attempt, now making, is, to induce these members, some by political combinations, and others by sectarian prejudices, to give their votes for candidates from some of the Orthodox sects; and when an Orthodox majority shall thus have been once secured in the permanent part of the Board, it will require the coöperation of but one half of the other part, to fix the College in the same grasp which already holds in its clutches every other Institution of the kind, and, indeed, every academy and school of much repute, in New England.

Another and more laudable attempt has been (we think very unfortunately,) connected with this, and involved in the same movement, so that it may be difficult, at present, to disentangle the two from each other; we mean, the attempt to reduce the expense of education at Harvard. The two objects ought certainly to have been kept separate; but they have been purposely combined, and the latter has been so used as to give a degree of favor to the former, in the eyes of many who would start at the naked proposal to open the way for Orthodox ascendency in the only University in the Eastern States, which is out from under its control. With respect to the College expenses, at Cambridge, we had entertained the impression, which we suppose is common, that they were greater than was necessary; nor are we, as yet, wholly convinced of the contrary. But we must confess, that the facts given in President Quincy's speech, put a different aspect on the matter, and show that some of the opinions which have prevailed on the subject are mistakes. On this point he enters into minute details, which will be of much interest to every person concerned, and especially to such as would avail themselves of certain aids and accommodations provided for all who need them. Still, if any arrangement can be made for a reduction, if

there be any retrenchment practicable to lessen the cost of the collegiate course, it ought to be done, heartily, thoroughly. "Now is the accepted time, now is the day of salvation." If any thing of the kind is possible, it ought to be commenced by the Corporation, immediately, at whatsoever sacrifice of personal preferences. We do not say this in the spirit of distrust; and, we hope, not in the way of offence. No other body of men can be so deeply interested in making such an improvement, as they who now have the Institution in their charge. We are persuaded that any extravagant outlay, even if it add a desirable splendor to the character of their University, any unnecessary profusion, any neglect of the strictest economy, will be regarded as an offence, and be used as a lever to turn the wheel of revolution against them.

In the present state of our sects, such a revolution would be manifestly disastrous to the cause of religious freedom. We say, in the words of President Quincy,

"Let the people of Massachustets understand that the attempt now making by leading Calvinists in Boston and its vicinity, is not merely to get Unitarianism out of Harvard College, but to put Calvinism in possession of it; that this has been their purpose and struggle for these forty years past; and unless their projects be counteracted and defeated by the vigilance and spirit of the community, they will ultimately be successful, though it cost a struggle of forty years more.— My argument, then, is this — that Calvinists have at this day, in Massachusetts, more worldly power and influence than any other sect, and probably than all other sects put together; that they have enough colleges and theological seminaries at their command for the safety and permanence of religious freedom; and therefore, whatever sect it may be deemed advisable to place in possession of Harvard College, let it not be the Calvinistic." — pp. 64, 66.

We could have wished that one thing, in this speech, had been omitted, — the plea that Unitarians are, from the nature of their faith, so free from all sectarianism that they cannot, in any of their relations, be actuated by it. Howsoever we define this term, the argument will convince no one that they have not, like other sects, peculiar interests, peculiar policy, and peculiar attachments, as a body. The plea is therefore fruitless, in this case; and even worse; for it goes to mix up a question respecting the abstract excellences of Unitarians, with the purely practical question respecting their actual management of the University. It was enough to show that they had never aimed to exert a sectarian influence on the scholars at Cambridge. This was all that the public was concerned to know, in the premises. And so much as this, in their favor, was frankly admitted in the Board of Overseers, even by those Orthodox members who had been educated

at that Institution. There was no complaint on this ground. Here, then, we have the whole case reduced to the following simple form: We have tried the Unitarians, for forty years, in their conduct of the College, and found the result to be such as has just been mentioned; we have also tried the Orthodox, for two hundred years, in their control of this and other colleges, and found them invariably exerting all the sectarian influence they could bring to bear on their scholars. *Which*, now, shall be entrusted with the charge of Harvard University?

5. Richard III. as Duke of Gloucester and King of England. By Catharine A. Halsted, author of the "Life of Margaret Beaufort," and "Obligations of Literature to the Mothers of England," &c., &c. Complete in one volume. Philadelphia: Carey & Hart. 1844. 8vo. pp. 472.

Late investigations into English history have led to a reversal of many decisions that were once regarded as established beyond all doubts. How different an aspect, than formerly, do the characters of the unfortunate Mary Stuart, and even of "Bloody Mary" herself, and of Cromwell, now wear! and, on the other hand, how much rottenness and deformity were found underneath the gilded representations, that once passed current, of such personages as Queen Elizabeth, Cranmer, &c.! It appears that English history has generally been written in the spirit of thorough-going faction, and that the successful parties, in the state and church, have made their own distorted and blackened figures of their oppnnents the standards whence all popular writers of their age were obliged to draw.

Richard III., the last of the Plantaganets, from whom the crown was wrested by the house of Lancaster, has suffered much injustice from this cause. The author of the volume before us seems to have succeeded in redeeming his memory from the deepest and most damning stains which have rested upon it, now, for more than three centuries, and which the genius of Shakspeare contributed to perpetuate. It is true, she still leaves him faults enough, in common with the heroes of his age, to justify a strong condemnation. They are human faults, however; not the diabolical atrocities imputed to him by the courtiers of the succeeding Tudor dynasty. In many respects, he was of a noble disposition, faithful and even magnanimous; but ambitious and violent, like the rest of his race.

This book is not well written. The author perpetually returns to her arguments, repeats and reiterates her exculpatory pleas, and becomes very tedious by her extreme anxiety to guard the reader from prejudice against her hero.

6. A Commentary on the New Testament. By Lucius R. Paige. Volume II. Luke, John, &c. Boston: Benjamin B. Mussey, 29 Cornhill, &c., &c. 1845. 12mo. pp. 414.

We take this opportunity to congratulate our brethren on the progress of this long-desired commentary, and to gratify them by announcing the appearance of the second volume, completing the gospels. It is but just out of the press. We have therefore had little time to peruse it. But from an examination of the notes on such as we consider test-passages, we are confident that it will fully sustain the reputation the first volume has acquired, even with some denominations besides our own, for learning, good sense, moderation, seriousness of spirit, and reverence for the scriptures. We see everywhere evinced the same well-balanced judgment, penetration, and sacred regard for the precise meaning of the text. In the method of its execution, we are inclined to prefer the present to the former volume, as more systematic in the details. At least, this feature has more forcibly struck us in the course of our reading. The former volume, we are told, has had a sale equal to the sanguine expectations of the publisher; and we think the present will even increase the circulation.

7. Biography of Rev. W. H. Griswold. By H. B. Soule. Utica: A. Walker, 30 Genesee street. 1845. 18mo. pp. 102.

There was much to be admired and loved in the character of Mr. Griswold, and much to claim our deepest sympathy in the complicated misfortunes he endured. With a body deformed and literally broken down by the tasks of his early youth, he still exerted an unusual vigor of mind, and maintained a resolute activity under difficulties that would have crushed the spirit of most men. At length, a small competence, which he thought he had secured for his last days, suddenly "took to itself wings;" he found himself unexpectedly involved, by the transactions of others, in debts and in law-suits; and the consequent distress to a mind so scrupulous as his, and the efforts he made to redeem his liabilities, together with his manifold diseases, wore him out, at the age of 30. Long be his memory cherished! Hallowed to us be his example of cheerful piety and steadfast confidence amidst suffering and discouragement! His retiring disposition and his want of brisk animal spirits prevented the admiration of the multitude; but not the less valued, on that account, should be the spiritual gift that God lent us for a season.

We earnestly commend this little biographical sketch to all who love unassuming worth and Christian excellence.

Art. XXVI.

Thom's Divine Inversion.

Divine Inversion; or a View of the Character of God as in all Respects opposed to the Character of Man. By David Thom, Minister of the Bold street Chapel, Liverpool. London, 1842. 8vo. pp. 300.

With the life, character, and theological opinions of the Rev. Mr. Thom, the Universalists of this country are already somewhat familiar. But if there be any who are not, they may gratify a reasonable curiosity on the subject, by consulting an article on Universalism in Great Britain and Ireland, which appeared in the Expositor and Universalist Review of 1840. The work whose title is given above has been published since that period, and though already two or three years before the public, has hitherto received, on this side of the Atlantic, nothing more, we believe, than a passing notice in some of our weekly religious journals.

The "Divine Inversion," it must be conceded, is a remarkable book. Not that we regard it as by any means true or useful; on the contrary, it seems to us a remarkable waste of learning and talent. In point of style it is, if we mistake not, the best of all our author's writings, which though often carelessly composed, have occasional passages of great power and beauty. The mode of thought is here peculiarly Mr. Thom's, while the doctrine set forth, and which the author regards as supremely important as well as novel, appears to us, we must confess, to have an infinitely better claim to antiquity, than to either novelty or truth. In a single word, we cannot but regard it as a new, ingenious, and most elaborate form of an old, and we could have hoped, obsolete error.

But what is the doctrine of *Divine Inversion?* It is set forth by the author himself on the very title-page of the volume before us. Mr. Thom believes and attempts to prove that "the character of God is in all respects opposed to the character of man." He maintains that there is "a

complete opposition of man to God, and of God to man." Hence "there exists also, as a matter of course, a mutual and complete opposition between the things of God and the things of man. And, as a corollary from this, it is obvious that we never have and never can have, a full, accurate and scriptural view of any one divine doctrine, without being obliged at the same time to perceive it contradicting some doctrine current and reduced to practice among men." Nay, according to our author, "the doctrine of divine inversion will be found actually to contradict popular religion in every one of its almost endless varieties." Our readers will not be surprised, therefore, to learn that "whatever, in regard to religious subjects, may be the judgments and actings of man, to these the judgments and actings of God always stand in an order exactly the inverse or opposite."

This, then, is divine inversion; intelligible certainly, and to us, we frankly acknowledge, as preposterous and absurd as it is intelligible. According to this theory God and man are perfect antipodes, direct opposites. If man thinks thus or thus, in matters of religion, we may know infallibly, if divine inversion is true, that God thinks just the reverse. If man acts in a certain manner, God acts under the same circumstances precisely in an opposite manner. Thus man inverted is God, and God inverted is man! If, then, you can determine what man is, and what his opinions respecting the things of religion are, you need have no difficulty in solving every problem of truth; for God and truth are just the reverse of man and man's notions! This, we believe, is the only *practical* use of divine inversion.

But did it not occur to Mr. Thom, that his "discovery" is, after all, nothing more nor less, we mean in its grounds, than a new form of that old abomination, *total depravity?* The creeds teach that man is "utterly indisposed, disabled and made opposite to all good and inclined to all evil." This being conceded, does it require any marvellous depth of penetration to see that the doctrine of divine inversion is true, and that "the character of God is in all respects opposed to the character of man?" Thus far, then, the doctrine of our author is no novelty, but is as old as the age of Augustine. But here a question arises of far

greater importance than that relating to the novelty of the doctrine. We would inquire whether it is true. Is it not, on the contrary, a monstrous libel on human nature, and, by implication, on the author of that nature? — a nature, let us add, which, perverse as it may be, the Son of God did not shrink from assuming, and in which we hope, if we entertain any Christian hopes at all, to be immortalized and "made like unto the angels."

It is a judicious remark of Bishop Butler, that "men may speak of the degeneracy and corruption of the world according to the experience they have had of it; but human nature, considered as the divine workmanship, should, methinks, be treated as sacred; for *in the image of God made he man.*" Now we would respectfully inquire of Mr. Thom, what proof he has that in matters of religion God and man are, in all things, directly opposed to each other? If man is unfortunately in so deplorable a condition, it is *a fact* which it becomes the world to know. For ourselves, we deny that it is a fact. We believe with Tholuck, that "it is impossible that a spirit created in God's likeness should become entirely evil; for if all he has of God should be taken away, he would no longer be the same being." A far more logical thinker than Tholuck, we mean Coleridge, has said that "to talk of man's being utterly lost to good, is absurd, for then he would be a devil at once." And what better than a devil, allow us to inquire, does our author make man? Can "the prince of devils" himself, be more opposed to God than, according to divine inversion, man is?

We hold it to be a clear scriptural truth, that man was made in the divine image, and is, still, after all his degeneracy, the offspring of God, and must, therefore, partake in some degree of a similar nature. How such a being can be wholly corrupt, and diametrically opposed to God, we must leave as a problem, for our author and those of like faith to solve as best they may. That man is weak and temptible, erring and sinful; nay, that he is oftentimes desperately wicked, is a fact to which both the Scriptures and history bear testimony. But this falls very far short of the *total depravity* of the creeds, or the diametrical opposition in all respects of divine inversion. Such a depravity or opposition, appears to us equally unscriptural and ab-

surd; and would, if it existed, render salvation absolutely impossible, inasmuch as it must completely destroy man's moral nature, and leave nothing worthy or even capable of being loved or saved.

After expressing so strongly our dissent from the doctrine of divine inversion, let us proceed to a brief examination of the proofs which Mr. Thom adduces in its favor. And we cannot but feel that our author has by no means sustained the broad, high ground he assumed, and for the confirmation of which the work before us was expressly written. By consulting this volume, it will be seen that "divine inversion" sometimes means an *inversion of order;* sometimes nothing more than a *dissimilarity* between things human and divine; sometimes again, a *superiority* of one over the other; at other times it means a *partial*, and at others still a *total opposition.* And yet, by what seems to us a singular oversight, or misapprehension, all these forms are taken as hints, instances, or illustrations of what our author calls "the grand principle" of divine inversion.

In the first section of his work, our author presents several passages containing hints or suggestions of the inversion for which he contends. Among these stands foremost the prophecy of Isaiah lv. 8, 9, "*My thoughts are not your thoughts*," etc. "By these words we are expressly taught," says Mr. Thom, "that God's ways and thoughts are at once different from, and superior to, the ways and thoughts of mere human beings. Nay, am I not warranted in going further, and stating it to be the import of the language quoted, that the ways and thoughts of God stand in diametrical opposition to those of man?" If we are permitted to answer this question, we reply in a most emphatic negative. Superior, and consequently better, the ways of God unquestionably are; and this the passage before us strikingly and beautifully sets forth; but of "diametrical opposition" it certainly says nothing, and we must strongly protest against its being assumed, even to prove the doctrine of divine inversion.

Take another instance furnished by Luke xvi. 15. "*That which is highly esteemed among men, is abomination in the sight of God.*" "What can be more obvious," says Mr. Thom, "than that here is conveyed a significant hint of the principles upon which the judgments of God are founded,

being entirely opposed to those which are adopted and acted upon by men." To us this is not obvious at all; so far from it indeed, we believe a just exposition of the passage would directly contradict the doctrine which our author attempts to draw from it. Were this a universal proposition; did our Saviour mean that *every thing* highly esteemed among men is abomination with God, then would our author's inference be just. But this is not the case. The connection in which the words stand, limits their application, and forbids our taking them as a universal truth. The Pharisees, — for of them was our Saviour speaking, — by their outside piety imposed on *men*, and were highly esteemed for their religion; but *God*, who knew their hearts, held them, on account of their covetousness and hypocrisy, as abominable. Men esteem the same qualities in their fellow-creatures, as God approves; but they can be deceived by the mere show of them, while God is beyond the reach of all imposture. Had the Pharisees been honored by their fellow-men on account of their vices, instead of the virtues which they affected, the words of our Saviour would furnish one fact in favor of Mr. Thom's divine inversion. But it was not so. Much less can it be pretended that our Saviour spoke in universal terms, for that would contradict the clearest truth. If there be any thing which all men highly esteem, it is truth, justice, temperance, charity, and the like virtues; for even those who are guilty of their violation, would gladly be thought to possess and honor them. Are such virtues abomination in the sight of God?

Again; 1 Sam. xvi. 7.—"*The Lord seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart.*" "This passage," says Mr. Thom, "speaks for itself." Very true; but what does it speak for the doctrine of divine inversion? It represents God as more knowing and wiser infinitely than man; but does it thence follow that man's knowledge is opposed to that of God? With as much propriety might we reason that the multiplication table of the schoolboy and a Newton are opposed to one another. Mere difference in degrees of knowledge, carry it how far soever, can never produce "diametrical opposition." But take one instance more. "Hints as to the thorough difference, or rather opposition

subsisting between human mind and divine mind," says our author, "are furnished by such texts as the *carnal mind*, or mind of flesh, *is enmity against God*," etc., etc. Rom. viii. 7. By what principles of exegesis, let us ask, does Mr. Thom make *human* mind and *carnal* mind synonymous terms? We cannot misapprehend the apostle, we think, in understanding him to speak of the carnal mind as one phasis of man's character, one state of the human mind, and one too not forced upon us in our creation, but formed by ourselves, and for which, therefore, we are responsible. Otherwise it may be our misfortune, but not our fault.

Such are some of our author's hints from Scripture in favor of his doctrine of divine inversion. If they furnish even a hint of his theory, we acknowledge ourselves unable to see it. They certainly say nothing of diametrical opposition between God and man; nor do they exhibit "the creature and the Creator as standing to each other in the attitude of enemies."

From hints, Mr. Thom proceeds to show, as he thinks, that the doctrine of divine inversion was clearly stated by Christ himself. For this purpose, he introduces the question, "What think ye of Christ? whose son is he?"—Matt. xxii. 41–46. In the statement of the fact that Christ was "the son of David," and at the same time was called *David's Lord*, Mr. Thom finds a puzzle, which nothing but divine inversion can solve. But here there is no diametrical opposition, but merely an inversion of order, exhibited by our author himself thus: "The *natural* relation in which David stands to the Messiah is exactly and completely, nay, even necessarily, the inverse or opposite of the *spiritual* relation which he bears to him. When looked at *naturally*, the Messiah follows David as his son or inferior; when looked at *spiritually*, the Messiah precedes David as his Lord and superior." Or to make the mystery more manifest thus:

> "Naturally.—David, first; Messiah, second.
> Spiritually.—Messiah, first; David, second."

Ingenious and amusing this surely is; but we must confess that we see nothing in it of grave importance, and least of all, any that favors the grand principle of divine inversion. Nor do Mr. Thom's scriptural facts, embodying

the doctrine he contends for, appear to us of much greater weight. The cases of Cain and Abel, of Ishmael and Isaac, of Esau and Jacob, the younger of whom took precedence of the elder, are instances that, with the exception of the latter, have no bearing upon the subject; and the latter itself, as St. Paul explains it, is to be resolved into an act of divine sovereignty alone. If Abel was preferred to Cain, it was not because he was younger or inferior, but because his conduct was acceptable to God. If Isaac took precedence of Ishmael, it happened simply because Ishmael was the son of a bondwoman, and could not exclude the heir from his inheritance. How many facts of this kind would it not require to establish the doctrine of divine inversion? But Mr. Thom finds them everywhere. If a handful of Jews, by the miraculous agency of God, defeated a host of Amalekites, it is divine inversion. If Abraham obeyed God, and was about to sacrifice his own son, it was divine inversion. If Rahab, the harlot, favored the enemies of her country, it was again divine inversion. If Christ came to call not the righteous, but sinners, it is divine inversion once more. "In short," says he, "where Jesus of Nazareth is concerned, every thing is *inversion.*" "To sum up," he says, in conclusion of this part of his work, "Let every instance in which God is represented in Scripture as speaking and acting in the teeth of human maxims, human anticipations, and human reasonings, be searched out, — and such instances positively fill the sacred volume, — and I think that a mass of facts will be collected, sufficient to show, that in asserting what is divine to be exactly and in all respects the opposite of what is human, upon the authority of God's word, I have at least not spoken unadvisedly."

It is easy to see that there are facts enough of such a character as Mr. Thom adduces from the Scriptures; but what do they prove? That God acts with an infinitely higher wisdom than man most certainly; but by no means what Mr. Thom assumes as the doctrine of divine inversion, a complete opposition between God and man, and between things human and things divine.

The greater part of the volume before us, is filled with what Mr. Thom calls specimens of inversion; that is, treatises on several subjects, as the following: Divine

revelation, *versus* human reason;—the will of man the opposite of the will of God, and *vice versa;*—the wide gate and the strait gate;—is eternal life conditionally or unconditionally bestowed?—The world and the church, or natural order, the world in the first place, and the church in the second; spiritual order, the church in the first place, and the world in the second;—man attempts to overcome good with evil; God actually overcomes evil with good. The remainder of the volume is occupied with a conclusion and an appendix.

The various topics treated under the heads given above, would furnish ample scope for extended remarks, had we time and space. As exhibited by Mr. Thom, they for the most part wear an unusual aspect, and discover a vast deal of ingenuity in the author. In any other hands, divine inversion would prove but a dry subject for a book; but Mr. Thom possesses so much energy, he enters so wholly into the business in hand, and attaches such immense importance to ingenious trifles, that our soberer judgment is half persuaded into the opinion that there must be *something*, though we cannot tell exactly what, at the bottom of all this, which our author sees most clearly, while to our dull eyes it is nothing but "darkness visible."

To human reason Mr. Thom concedes the whole domain of human things, but denies it the slightest power in that of the divine. "A barrier," he tells us, "is interposed between human reason and divine revelation, which it is absolutely impossible for the former ever to overstep. And whence does this impossibility arise? From the essential difference subsisting between divine mind and human mind; rather, from the necessary antagonism or opposition of the one to the other." Mr. Thom seems aware that in thus speaking he exposes himself to the charge of making revelation unreasonable, and wards it off as well as possible. But who knows that revelation is unreasonable? Not man certainly, whose reason knows nothing of it good or bad. By what faculties Mr. Thom *understands* divine revelation, we do not comprehend, but suppose he must have some *new* ones conferred upon him for that specific purpose.

Thoroughly Calvinistic is our author on the subject of the human will. He grants man a "*shadowy* free will,"

if you will accept his phraseology, but denies it any actual freedom. "To man himself as by nature knowing no superior, his own will *must appear* to be free and independent of foreign influence." Yet this appearance is but an illusion, for our author tells us, "it is impossible that such a will can be free. Man's will is the perfect slave of his nature, and of necessity therefore executes all its behests." Quite shadowy enough! It is seriously to be hoped that so unfortunate a being will not be held responsible for his conduct.

In the judgment of Mr. Thom, "none of God's purposes are earthly. They are heavenly and heavenly only. In making known the everlasting gospel, what he aims at is not the improvement and well-being of man in flesh. This he leaves to human beings themselves as a matter entirely within the scope of their own abilities, and capable of being accomplished by mere creature expedients. Besides, man in flesh is the subject of divine condemnation, not of divine approval. God's aim is to make all persons and things new, through his Son: not in flesh, but in another and a higher state of being." What Mr. Thom understands by all the prophecies relating to the improvement of our world's affairs, improvements to be effected by the influence of the gospel, we know not; but it seems to us very clear that in aiming at the everlasting felicity of mankind, God has not been unmindful of that which is temporal and earthly. So peculiar, however, is Mr. Thom's religion, that its general diffusion in the earth would, so far from being a blessing, prove but a measureless calamity. It is a sad mistake, he tells us, to fancy "that God would confer a temporal benefit upon mankind, by saving upon earth the whole or the greater portion of them." The reason he finds in the fact that human enjoyments can only be relished, and human affairs can only be carried on, under the influence of human motives, passions, and principles. "Does not this suggest," he asks, "some little idea of the mischiefs and confusion which would inevitably follow, were all human beings while in flesh to become partakers of the earnest of the divine nature?" Cannot Mr. Thom see that this is only adopting the French infidel objection that Christianity is unfitted for the world, and would prove destructive of

human interests and happiness, if generally received and protected here on earth?

But let us pass to something that merits our approbation. His chapter on the unconditionality of eternal life is worth more than all that we have now been considering, though here there is much in which we cannot second his opinions. In his chapter on good and evil, or on the manner in which God overcomes evil with good, we find much to admire. Here we have some able arguments, clear and forceful in favor of the divine goodness ultimately overcoming by annihilating evil, and introducing a state of pure, lasting and universal happiness. On subjects like these Mr. Thom seems to me to exhibit himself to advantage. He may call it divine inversion if he will, and put it in any inverted forms he pleases, but in fact it is good substantial common sense, and we could quote page after page from this part of his work with pleasure. When reading this chapter we almost forgave him for writing so much that excited no interest, and brought us no real instruction, in some of the chapters preceding, and we were ready to exclaim with the governor of the feast at Cana in Galilee, "Thou hast kept the good wine until now."

Mr. Thom has fine talents, a good education, extensive reading, vast ingenuity, and is industrious in a most commendable degree; he has no fear of the world, and would not swerve from the truth, or what he believes to be truth, for his right hand; yet we cannot avoid the conviction that, much as he is doing for the great cause of Universalism, he is doing little in comparison with what is quite possible for him. His theory of religion is most unwieldly, and, from its very nature, can never make any considerable progress. And what renders the case the more discouraging, if not hopeless, is the fact that it is a part of this theory, that it is never to make any considerable conquests, never to be believed by more than a mere handful of men! This indeed is one token of its divinity. If it were fitted for the world, he could take it for granted that it was but a "fleshly" scheme directly opposed to God and God's truth. What makes the matter still worse, is the fact, that this theory is divinely imparted to Mr. Thom, and is therefore a part and parcel of a special revelation. And as we feel well convinced that he was never *reasoned*

into it, so we fear he will never be *reasoned* out of it. A few glorious truths he indeed has, and he values them well, and urges them strongly; but they are cumbered and pressed into the dust by a mass of speculations, half metaphysical, half mystical, which forbid their ever performing the great mission which they would otherwise easily accomplish. We regret this. With his talents and learning and industry, what might not Mr. Thom effect in Great Britain if he were in possession of a simple gospel theory, which would commend itself to the understanding and conscience of men, and might be easily defended against all the attacks which could be made upon it?

We have spoken plainly but in no unkindness of feeling. Mr. Thom knows that we differ from him no more widely than he does from us. We think his system as a whole altogether unsuited to the human mind, and incapable therefore of working out any considerable good. But he must not condemn us for not receiving and approving it. He may think us "fleshly minded," and therefore incompetent to understand what he regards as divine truth. Be it so; but though without any miraculous gifts to comprehend the truth and beauty of divine inversion and several other doctrines of his system, we will venture to prophecy, that if fewness of believers and disciples be a proof of the truth and divinity of his theory, he may regard it as demonstrated beyond future question.

T. J. S.

Art. XXVII.

"*Whosoever liveth, and believeth on me, shall never die.*" *

The dread, gray shadow mounts to cheek and brow,
And the pale lip sends forth a languid sigh;
Faint, faint, we reel beneath our burdens now!
There is *no hope;* our worshipped one must die!

We would give worlds to buy one fleeting hour,—
Aye, to prolong one little moment's breath!
Heaven only knows what pangs of crushing power
Smite down the heart that strives to cope with death!

* St. John xi. 26.

Vain, vain this frenzied agony, to throw
  One life-like gleam within yon hazy eye;
But hush! a sweet voice whispers, soft and low,
  "He who believes in me, shall never die."

Shall never die! No, though the cheek grow pale,
  Though the lip falter in the last stern strife,
'Tis God's own hand withdraws the mortal veil,
  That shuts the spirit from its better life.

It is not death, to drop the fettering clay;
  It is not death, to tread the bournless skies;
Through fields all flooded with celestial day,
  The meek believer's opening pathway lies.

How can *he* die! He stays not at the tomb,
  In cold, unconscious, unawakening sleep:
Far o'er those worlds that break the midnight gloom,
  He sees eternity around him sweep.

But look! that closing eye is flashing light,
  Life's noonday intellect has never known!
And on that lip a smile is glowing bright,—
  That wan, cold lip, whence breath has almost flown!

Kneel we in awe, for lo! the tongues of flame
  Descend, that speak the Holy Spirit near;
Prophetic raptures thrill that voiceless frame,—
  The blissful preludes of a higher sphere.

That soul grows lofty, and its griefs expire;
  It has no utterance for the things of time;
Glory to God, who wakes yon tuneless lyre,
  With the revealings of its life sublime!

Thou sinless one, thou hast believed on HIM,
  And death's dread bitterness has swept thee by;
Thou hast no doubt thy visioned eye to dim;
  Thine is a change of home; thou dost not *die!*

And now, we bow our souls in child-like trust,
  And weep that thankfulness we may not speak,
That He, the wise, the omnipotent, the just,
  Has come in mercy to the poor and weak.

And calm we stand beside life's parting bed,
  Nor wish to chain the spirit from the sky;
Since death itself, the gloom, the pang, has fled,
  At this pre-vision of the bliss on high. L. J. B. C.

Art. XXVIII.

Forgiveness.

We are taught to pray, "Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors;" and the assurance is added, "If ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you; but if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses." (Matt. vi. 12, 14, 15.) Hence it is evident, that we need the divine forgiveness, and that we are required to forgive each other. So much, I believe, is acknowledged by all Christians. But, while all admit the importance and necessity of forgiveness, its nature is variously understood. I do not propose, in this article, to enter into a full and thorough examination of the subject; but only to offer a brief outline of my own opinion, and a few of the reasons on which that opinion is founded. If some more competent person shall thus be stimulated to investigate the matter more fully, and settle the long-vexed question in regard to the true nature of forgiveness, my object will be accomplished.

As it seems to me, forgiveness does not consist in the remission of just punishment, nor in the exercise of a spirit of kindness and love; neither does it consist in the taking away of sin, or cleansing the sinner from unrighteousness. Although, in the divine economy, the last-named process is intimately connected with forgiveness, yet, I apprehend, a distinction should be made between the two. By taking away the sin of men, God prepares them for forgiveness, or makes them worthy to receive it; but the preparation is one thing, and the bestowment of the blessing is another and a different thing. To prevent misapprehension, I add, that, the taking away of sins should not be understood to mean the removal of crimes, as acts, or as "actual beings or entities;" but the removal of sinfulness. I understand the language of John the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world," (John i. 29,) to be equivalent to that of the angel, "He shall save his people from their sins." (Matt. i. 21.) But this taking

away of sin, or salvation from sin, should be regarded rather as a preparation for forgiveness, than as forgiveness itself.

Affirmatively, I consider forgiveness to consist essentially in reinstating the transgressor in his former position; in other words, in regarding and treating him as if he had never sinned. In support of this opinion, the following remarks are submitted.

In the law regulating vows, it was required, "If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word; he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth." Nevertheless, this provision was added: — if a damsel in her father's house, or a married female, should make such a vow, and the father or husband should disallow it on the day when it came to his knowledge, the vow should not be binding, and God would forgive the person making such vow. (Numb. xxx. 2 — 8.) In what did forgiveness consist, under such circumstances? Not in the remission of just punishment, for none was deserved; nor in the removal of guilt, for none was contracted. The female did not become guilty, by failing to perform her vow, because she was subject to the control of her father or husband, who had full power, according to the divine commandment, to annul the vow. Nor, indeed, did she contract guilt, by making the vow without the express consent of her father or husband; because this was permitted by the law itself. As no guilt was contracted, no punishment was incurred; hence, in this case, forgiveness had relation neither to punishment nor to guilt. Nor can it be said, with strict propriety, that forgiveness was a release of the female from the obligations imposed by her vow; for, in point of fact, all such obligations were entirely annulled by the disallowance of the father or husband, and made "of none effect." Indeed, according to the provision of the law, it may be doubted whether any obligation could exist, until the vow was made known to the father or husband, and confirmed by his assent, or, at least, by his silence. Yet God promised to forgive the female, under such circumstances. And in what did the forgiveness consist? Simply, as it seems to me, in regarding her as if she had not made the vow. She was under no obligation

to perform it, being forbidden by one thereunto authorized by divine commandment. God would forgive her, therefore, by considering her in precisely the same position which she occupied before making the vow.

At the dedication of the temple, Solomon besought earnestly that God would forgive his people, who should sin, be punished, and afterwards repent. Of the several cases specified, one may suffice as a sample: "If they sin against thee, (for there is no man that sinneth not,) and thou be angry with them, and deliver them to the enemy, so that they carry them away captives unto the land of the enemy, far or near; yet, if they shall bethink themselves in the land whither they were carried captives, and repent, and make supplication unto thee in the land of them that carried them captives, saying, We have sinned, and have done perversely, we have committed wickedness; and so return unto thee with all their heart, and with all their soul, in the land of their enemies, which led them away captive, and pray unto thee toward their land, which thou gavest unto their fathers, the city which thou hast chosen, and the house which I have built for thy name: then hear thou their prayer and their supplication in heaven thy dwelling-place, and maintain their cause, and forgive thy people that have sinned against thee, and all their transgressions wherein they have transgressed against thee, and give them compassion before them who carried them captive, that they may have compassion on them," (1 Kings viii. 46—50.) In this case, we cannot understand forgiveness to be the remission of punishment; for its infliction is distinctly recognized, and its nature described. Nor can it be understood as the removal of sin or sinfulness, because forgiveness is craved on the express condition, that the people should have previously repented, confessed their fault, and returned unto the Lord with all their heart and all their soul. Their sinfulness, in this respect, was to cease before forgiveness was extended. Forgiveness, therefore, seems here to denote the reinstatement of men in their former position, the regarding and treating of them as if they had not transgressed. To the same effect it is written, "If I shut up heaven that there be no rain, or if I command the locusts to devour the land, or if I send pestilence among my people; if my people, which are called by my name, shall

humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land." (2 Chron. vii. 13, 14.) The people sin; divine judgments are inflicted; men humble themselves, repent, pray, seek God, and abandon their wickedness; this being done, and not before, God forgives them; that is, he regards them no longer as transgressors, and restores them to their former position.

This idea of forgiveness is more distinctly defined by the prophet: "This shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel; After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts, and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord: for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more," (Jer. xxxi. 33, 34; see also Heb. viii. 10—12.) This is an instance of what is termed parallelism, so frequently found in the Hebrew writers, where the same idea is repeated in different terms. To put the divine law in the inward parts of men, and to write it in their hearts, are equivalent terms; so also, "I will be their God, and they shall be my people;" in like manner, substantially the same idea is expressed in the two forms, I will forgive their iniquities, and I will remember their sins no more. The same idea is expressed, by another prophet, in still different terms; and, as the two passages mutually serve to explain each other, they may be considered together. "If the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed, and keep all my statutes, and do that which is lawful and right, he shall surely live, he shall not die. All his transgressions that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him: in his righteousness that he hath done he shall live," (Ezek. xviii. 21, 22.) The word forgiveness is not here used; yet, so far as I recollect, it is not disputed that the idea is embraced. And how do these prophets, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, describe forgiveness? Not as the remission of punishment, because it is represented as inflicted while

the wickedness continues; nor as the removal of sinfulness, because the wicked must first turn from his sins, obey the divine commandments, and do that which is lawful and right; after he has thus forsaken his sins, his former transgressions shall not be mentioned unto him, and his sin shall be remembered no more. Of course, we are not to understand that God actually forgets, or ceases to remember, the sins of men. The idea manifestly is, he will cease to remember them to the disadvantage of the penitent; he will not mention them any more, by way of rebuke; in short, he will reinstate the penitent and reformed transgressor in his former position, and, burying his past offences in oblivion, will regard him as if he had not sinned. See also Ps. xxxii. 1, 2, and lxxxv. 2; where, in Hebrew parallels, the forgiveness of iniquity and the covering of sin are represented as identical. To the same general purpose, the apostle testifies, that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them," (2 Cor. v. 19.) That is, having turned men from sin to holiness, having removed the enmity of their hearts, and fixed their affections on himself, God will no longer regard them as transgressors, nor upbraid them with their former sinfulness; he will not mention their sins to them, and will remember their iniquities no more to their disadvantage.

Of essentially similar character is human forgiveness, or the forgiveness of man by man. It consists not in the remission of punishment, for this is often beyond human control; either the punishment may have been inflicted before the transgressor becomes worthy of forgiveness, or it may be of such a nature that man cannot prevent its infliction; nevertheless, we are commanded to forgive the offender, when he repents; forgiveness, therefore, must be something else than remission of punishment, unless God requires of us the performance of impossibilities. Nor is forgiveness the removal of sinfulness; for the sinfulness of others is beyond our control, equally with their punishment; moreover, their sinfulness must be considered as removed, when they truly repent; until which time, we are not required to forgive them. Neither should human forgiveness be confounded with the exercise of a spirit of love and kindness, because we are required always to love all

men, even our most unrelenting enemies; but we are not required to forgive offenders until they repent. The rule, given by our Saviour, is very plain: "If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him. And if he trespass against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent, thou shalt forgive him." (Luke xvii. 3, 4.) Forgiveness is to be extended only to the penitent; but love is required towards all, the impenitent as well as others, even as God loves all and is kind to the unthankful and the evil.

For an illustration of the subject, take the first case in which the word *forgive* occurs in the Bible: "And when Joseph's brethren saw that their father was dead, they said, Joseph will peradventure hate us, and will certainly requite us all the evil which we did unto him. And they sent a messenger unto Joseph, saying, Thy father did command before he died, saying, so shall ye say unto Joseph, Forgive, I pray thee now, the trespass of thy brethren, and their sin; for they did unto thee evil: and now, we pray thee, forgive the trespass of the servants of the God of thy father. And Joseph wept when they spake unto him," (Gen. l. 15—17.) How could Joseph forgive his brethren, in this case? Not by remitting their punishment, for they had already endured it, as the history of previous events abundantly proves; nor by the exercise of love towards them, for this he had long and uniformly manifested; nor by removing their guilt, for it does not appear that, at this time, they entertained any criminal or guilty intention towards him; they had formerly been guilty, in this respect, but they had repented, had ceased to hate him, and now loved him, and were grateful for his many kindnesses. How then could he forgive them, except by regarding them as if they had never trespassed against him? It was this act of oblivion which they desired,—that he should look upon them only as brethren, and remember their sins and iniquities no more. To be sure, he had thus forgiven them, already; but they had not full assurance of the fact, and their recollection of their own guilt was so vivid, that they feared that he still cherished resentment. Hence, he assured them they had no cause for fear; though their intentions were evil, all had resulted in his favor; he was satisfied that

their repentance was sincere and their reformation actual; and he was so far from regarding them as transgressors now, or remembering their sins to their disadvantage, that he "wept when they spake unto him."

A similar idea is embraced in the parable recorded in Matt. xviii. 23—35. A debtor humbled himself and professed inability to pay; the creditor forgave him the debt; not, however, by relinquishing the demand, for he could not then have legally renewed it; nor by remitting the penalty, for he could not then have subsequently exacted it; nor by removing the indebtedness, which here stands in the place of guilt, for he could not then have reimposed it; — but by regarding him as if he had never contracted the debt. When, therefore, the debtor manifested his unworthiness to be forgiven, by his cónduct to his fellow-servant, the creditor might both legally and properly regard him again as indebted for the original sum, and mete out to him the measure which he measured to others. He that enforces the law must also abide its enforcement.

Omitting other recorded examples, let it be inquired of the parent, In what does your forgiveness to a repentant child consist? Is it less or more than this; — the child has been disobedient; he has suffered for his fault; perhaps at your hand, perhaps not; but he has suffered, as is unavoidable; you believe he is now penitent, that he regrets his past misconduct, and is disposed, henceforth, to perform his duty. What remains for you to do, in forgiving him, but to overlook his past offences, and to regard him precisely as if he had never been disobedient? Your confidence in him is renewed; you believe him to be as obedient, in intention, as any other of your children; you therefore restore him to his former position, and no more remember his past fault as a bar to the most affectionate and confidential intercourse. Thus doing, you forgive; or, this is forgiveness. So, likewise, of forgiveness generally, between man and man. An enemy, perhaps hitherto inveterate and injurious, repents, turns from the evil of his ways, becomes disposed to do that which is lawful and right, and asks forgiveness. How do we forgive? Not by loving him, because this we have done while he was an enemy, if we have obeyed the divine law; nor by remitting his punishment, because he has already been punished, and repent-

ance is one of the results; nor by removing the wickedness of his heart, because this change has already been wrought, if he is truly penitent and worthy of forgiveness. But we forgive, by restoring him to our confidence, regarding and treating him as a friend, overlooking the past, and remembering it no more to his disadvantage. Any thing short of this, though it may be called forgiveness, scarcely deserves the name. It avails little to refrain from vengeance, upon an offending child or man, if we continue to cherish a vivid and unpleasant remembrance of past faults, and nurse a spirit of estrangement and ill-will towards the offender.

Some notice of one prominent objection may be expected. It is often alleged, with much apparent confidence, that a part, or the whole of the penalty, is remitted to a convict, when he is forgiven or pardoned by the civil power; and, therefore, by analogy, the same holds true of divine forgiveness, and of human forgiveness also, so far as it resembles the divine. But this supposed analogy has a material defect; or perhaps, rather, it does not exist. Human laws are, necessarily, imperfect. Men cannot devise a code of statutes, which shall so nicely adjust penalties to crimes, that the operation shall, in all cases, be perfectly just and equitable. Hence, and for this reason alone, it is usual to vest a pardoning power in a proper officer, who is to exercise it, when the strict execution of the laws would be unjust, or would produce more harm than benefit. Not so with the divine law, or with its administration. That law is perfect, and fully adapted to every case which can occur. The all-seeing God can perceive the precise degree of guilt, and can apportion precisely the needful amount of correction. He has no occasion, therefore, to interpose this kind of pardoning power, to prevent the injurious operation of his law; or, more plainly, he has no occasion to stay the proceedings of his own justice, to prevent it from operating unjustly. The exercise of such power, necessarily implies the imperfection of the law under which it is exercised. And it is an abuse of analogy, to argue from the imperfection of human laws, to the perfection of the divine law; that is, to insist that God remits just punishment, because human tribunals remit that which is unjust.

That plausible objections may be urged against the theory, thus imperfectly sketched, I do not deny; never-

theless, I believe it more fully harmonizes with the divine testimony, and is encumbered with fewer actual difficulties, than any other; and, with this belief, I commend it to the serious and careful consideration of the reader.

L. R. P.

Art. XXIX.

Geology and Scripture.

In the January number of the "Review," is an article entled, "Geology; its facts and inferences," in which the author endeavors to harmonize the facts developed by that science, with the creation of the world, about six thousand years ago, in six literal days. The general aim of that article, and the conclusions to which the writer arrives, are different from those of geologists; and we think it but justice to give a concise arrangement of the *facts*, on which geologists base their opinion as to the antiquity of the world. My main object shall be to present undeniable *facts;* occasionally deducing from these, such conclusions as seem unavoidable; and, finally, showing their perfect harmony with the Mosaic history. To our task, then, we proceed, without farther preface.

The earth's crust is composed of rocks, of different characters, and formed of different mineral ingredients. They are distinguished, by geologists, as, 1. Primary, (stratified, and unstratified;) 2. Transition; 3. Secondary; 4. Tertiary; 5. Diluvial; and, 6. Alluvial. Perhaps no single locality presents us with an example of all the rocks, regularly arranged; but they are found so overlapped, and connected together, in different localities,—the various links, in the great chain of formations, being recognized by their peculiar organic remains,—as to enable the geologist to re-construct, with approximate exactness, a perfect section of the earth's crust. In such a section, the primary unstratified rocks would occupy the lowest position. Above these, we should find the primary stratified, transition, secondary, &c., in the order in which they are above named, the formations now going on being the highest in the series.

The primary rocks are distinguished by the absence of all organic remains, and are supposed to have been formed before the world was inhabited by living beings. The rocks above them, however, frequently abound with the remains of animals and plants. The transition rocks are so called, from having been formed when the earth was in a state of transition from an uninhabitable state, to one that was inhabited by *terrestrial* animals and plants. The secondary, and tertiary, are distinguished from each other, and from the transition, by peculiar groups of fossils, contained in each. The diluvial formation is so called, from the supposition that it resulted from a deluge; and the alluvial, which is now going on, derives its name from *alluvio*, an inundation of water.

The manner in which the stratified rocks were formed, may be explained, by supposing a deposition of their materials from water. Mud, and sand, combined with organic matter, and sometimes with materials, chemically precipitated from the water, are, even now, depositing at the bottom of existing lakes and seas. These take the form of regular parallel strata, or layers; and only dessication and consolidation are necessary, to convert them into regular stratified fossiliferous rocks, which, if we except the difference in the character of the fossils, would precisely resemble those of either of the great geological formations. In all stratified rocks, except those supposed to have been subjected to the powerful agency of fire after their deposition, the particles are found to be arranged precisely as they would be, supposing them to have been deposited from water; and on the surfaces of the laminæ of many of them, the very ripple-marks are distinctly apparent. The opinion of all geologists, that the stratified rocks were formed in this way, is therefore strictly philosophical.

These rocks, both of the primary and fossiliferous series, are of great aggregate thickness. The thickness of the primary series has not been very carefully estimated; but their up-turned edges not unfrequently show a thickness of fifteen or twenty miles, and sometimes much more, perpendicular to the plane of stratification.[1]

The fossiliferous rocks have been much more studied,

[1] Hitchcock's Geology, p. 69; Lyell's Geology, vol. 1, p. 457.

and their thickness can be estimated with much less difficulty; first, because they have not been subjected to so much disturbance as the rocks beneath them; and, secondly, because the different organic remains, peculiar to different series, enable the geologist to assign to each system of rocks its appropriate place, and to connect them all together, as one would regularly connect the marked and numbered links of a broken chain. Professor Rogers has ascertained the rocks, even of the transition series, in Pennsylvania, to be no less than forty thousand feet, or more than seven and a half miles, in thickness. Dr. Buckland, in his Bridgewater Treatise, which was published several years ago, estimated the total thickness of all the stratified rocks in Europe, to be, at least, ten miles; but the most recent admeasurements in England, according to Dr. John Pye Smith, give the rocks above the primary an aggregate thickness of more than twenty-seven miles.[2]

By ascertaining the perpendicular thickness of the upturned strata, which we have the certain means of knowing are adjacent to each other, in the order of geological superposition, there is much less difficulty in determining their approximate thickness, than at first would be imagined. But, making allowance for all *possible* mistakes in these estimates, the total thickness of all the fossiliferous rocks, cannot be much less than fifteen or twenty miles, and it may be much more. And to these, the primary stratified are still to be added, to make up the complement of those, the loose materials of which were originally deposited from water.

As to the time in which these vast deposites could have formed, we can, of course, make but a remote approximation to correctness in our calculations. Conglomerates, and other coarse and indistinctly stratified rocks, may, in some instances, have been deposited with comparative rapidity. The periods of their origin, must have been when devastation and ruin prevailed upon the surface of the earth. Older rocks were, probably, disintegrated, by the combined agency of heat and water, and ground to fragments by volcanic and marine agitation; and, by the immense currents which then prevailed, they were carried

[2] Hitchcock's Geology, p. 87. See also table facing p. 42.

to lower levels; and, in the violence of the operation, thick deposites may have sometimes been formed, in comparatively short periods. Yet, by far the greater portion of the rocks, presents decided evidence of having been deposited in quiet waters. And these deposites could not, in general, have accumulated much more rapidly, than similar ones that are going on at the present day. Now, it is said that the lakes of Scotland shoal only at the rate of about six inches in a century.[3] At this rate, it would require an almost inconceivable period for accumulations to form even a single mile in thickness, even supposing them to proceed without interruption. At the mouths of existing rivers, it is true, matter is accumulating with comparative rapidity, which, in process of time, will, undoubtedly, form solid rocks; and similar forces have, probably, acted in ancient times. But this should have but little influence upon our estimate of time, as formations only in limited areas could have taken place in this way.

That immense periods were consumed in the deposition particularly of rocks above the primary, is also evident, from the fact, that beds of rock of great thickness, and sometimes whole mountains, many thousand feet high, are made up almost entirely of organic matter. Indeed, deposites, hundreds of feet in thickness, and extending over large areas, as in Auvergne, in France, are described as composed essentially of the shells of animalcula, so small that thousands of them may have sported in a single drop of water. These, with the larger animals and plants, must, for the most part, "have lived and died, (says Professor Hitchcock,) on or near the spot where they are found; while it was only now and then, that there was current enough to drift them any considerable distance, or break them into fragments. As they died, they sank to the bottom of the waters, and became enveloped in mud, and then the process of consolidation and petrifaction went slowly on until completed. So quietly did the deposition of the fossiliferous rocks proceed, in some instances, that the skeletons and indusi of microscopic animals, which the very slightest disturbance must have crushed, are preserved uninjured; and frequently, all the shells found in a layer of

[3] Hitchcock's Geology, p. 163.

rock, lie in the same position which similar shells now assume upon the bottom of ponds, lakes, and the ocean; that is, with a particular part of the shell uppermost."[4] For these vast beds to have accumulated thus quietly, it must have required a period nearly as long as for a similar work to be accomplished by the slow processes now in operation, at the bottom of the waters. And yet, these immense layers form but so many links in the great chain of geological formations.

The present positions of the various stratified rocks, indicate great changes since their original formation, and changes which could not, without a direct miracle, have been accomplished, except in long periods of time. Their original deposition at the bottom of the ocean, must have taken place on a surface nearly or quite horizontal. Since then, however, the strata, especially of the older rocks, have been broken, and tilted up at all angles. Sometimes, they are found standing on their edges; sometimes, entirely turned upside-down, and not unfrequently they are twisted and contorted into every possible shape. In all ages, they have been liable to be thrown out of place by earthquakes and the like convulsions; and, exactly as might have been expected, the older rocks seem to have been subjected to the most, and the newer ones to the least, disturbance. To illustrate as well as we can without diagrams, let the reader suppose a series of strata, of the older rocks, standing on their edges, or in a vertical position. Superimposed upon these, or leaning against, and partially overlapping them, is a series of other rocks, composed, for the most part, of the comminuted fragments of the former, and whose laminæ are inclined at a less angle. Upon these, in like manner, are still others, having a still less inclination; and so on, till we come to the rocks most recently formed, which, in general, still maintain the horizontal position. And each one of these different series of rocks is characterized by different fossils, and is composed of the fragments of older rocks, more or less comminuted. This hypothetical section would represent, nearly enough for our present purpose, conditions actually existing in many places.

[4] Hitchcock's Geology, pp. 88—90. Also, Silliman's Appendix to Bakewell's Geology, p. 544.

Now, be it observed, 1. That each one of these series of rocks must be newer than the series which it overlaps, and of whose fragments it is composed. 2. That after the lowest series was deposited upon a horizontal surface, and consolidated, or, perhaps, while this process was still going on, and before the formation immediately above could have commenced, it was more or less turned up by the action of some subterranean force. 3. After this, it appears, in many cases, to have been subjected to extensive denudations, by which its surface was ground off, and, not unfrequently, deep grooves and basins were formed, which operation itself must naturally have required many ages. Then the rocks immediately above commenced their horizontal formation. After a slow process of deposition had brought them to a thickness of many hundreds, and sometimes thousands of feet, these were, in their turn, elevated and thrown out of their original position, by the action of some subterranean force; this force, at the same time, necessarily acting equally upon the rocks beneath them, and adding to *their* former disturbance. As soon as the form of the surface, and the overflow of the waters will admit, another formation goes on, which, when completed, is also in its turn subjected to disturbing forces; and so on throughout the earth's crust. And, as every convulsion which acts upon the highest series of rocks, must necessarily act equally upon all the rocks beneath them, the greater number of convulsions to which the older rocks have necessarily been exposed, rationally accounts for the greater disturbance which their strata indicate.

Mr. Lyell has shown that the Alps, Apennine, and Pyrenees mountains, have attained their present elevation by a number of successive upward movements, separated from each other by the intervention of long periods. He gives a cut, illustrating a section of the Apennines, whose main strata are inclined at an angle of seventy or eighty degrees, and are flanked on either side by the "subapennine hills." These latter, which are partially composed of water-worn fragments of the neighboring and older rocks, rise nearly to a thousand feet above the present level of the sea, and are made up of tertiary strata, lying horizontally, and, *geologically* speaking, are of recent origin, as is proved by the fact, that *some* of the remains of shell-fish, which they

contain, are of species still living, and identical with those now inhabiting the neighboring seas. It is agreed that these subapennine beds were formed (of course, at the bottom of the sea,) after the original mountain, against whose declivities they rest, had received its superior elevation above them, and that they were subsequently carried upward, in common with the *main* mountain, to their present elevation, by a force acting perpendicularly from beneath.

"The same phenomena," says Mr. Lyell, "are exhibited in the Alps on a much grander scale; those mountains being composed, in some of their higher regions, of newer secondary formations, while they are encircled by a great zone of tertiary rocks of different ages. . . . . This tertiary zone marks the position of former seas and gulfs, like the Adriatic, which were many thousand feet deep, and wherein masses of strata accumulated, some *single groups* of which seem scarcely inferior in thickness to the whole of our secondary formation in England. These marine tertiary strata have been raised to the height of from two thousand to four thousand feet, and consist of formations of different ages, characterized by different assemblages of organized fossils. The older tertiary groups generally rise to the greatest heights, and form interior zones nearest to the central ridges of the Alps."[5] To dispute that all this must have been the work of inconceivably long periods, would be to set analogy at defiance.

Other arguments for the antiquity of the globe, will be brought into view, when we consider what must have been the *causes* of disturbance to which the earth's crust appears to have been subjected, since its original formation.

In cases accessible to observation, where the stratified rocks have been up-heaved or thrown into an inclined position, the disturbance seems to have been caused by the primary unstratified rocks crowding upwards from beneath them. Thus the central masses of many large mountains, (doubtless of *all* of them, if the fact could be known,) are composed of granite, or some other of the unstratified class of rocks, while the stratified rocks mantle around them,

[5] Lyell's Geology, vol. 1, pp. 138, 139. For a description of a remarkable deposition, excavation, re-deposition, and re-excavation, on the Rhine, in Switzerland, see also Bakewell's Geology, pp. 294, 295.

dipping outward from the axis of elevation. It would, therefore, appear that the stratified rocks have been elevated and thrown out of their original horizontal position at the bottom of the sea, by the violent upward motion of the subjacent mass. And this accounts for the bent and contorted state in which we often find the strata, contiguous to the primary rock.

Now the rock last mentioned, at the time of its protrusion, must have been in *a fluid state.* Not only has it flowed upward, as it were, in conical and hemispherical forms, but it has filled up the smallest crevices and fissures of the contiguous rocks, frequently bursting through them in various directions, forming "dykes," and veins with numerous branches, from an inch to hundreds of feet in diameter; and, coming up frequently through the entire thickness of the strata, it has flowed over the top. Numerous magnificent examples may be seen in the greenstone ("trap") rock, protruded through the red sandstone of the Connecticut valley. And what confirms, beyond the possibility of a doubt, the original fluidity and upward protrusion of these rocks, is the fact, that the dykes often contain imbedded fragments of the rocks through which they have passed. The Fall River granite presents numerous examples. There can be no doubt that these fragments were forcibly broken off from the rocks to which they belonged, and surrounded by a *fluid*, which subsequently became solid, as we now see it.

This original fluidity of the primary unstratified rocks, must have been the result of intense heat. At the time of their protrusion, they were, in fact, in a state of molten lava. On this point, I believe all modern writers on Geology, of any eminence, are perfectly agreed. Some of the proofs alleged, are as follows: 1. The crystalline character of some of these rocks is such, as could have been produced only by heat. 2. The chemical effects produced upon the stratified rocks, by the contact of the unstratified ones, are similar to those produced by dykes of recent lava. 3. The different unstratified rocks insensibly pass into each other, and indeed, into modern lavas. 4. The demonstrated original fluidity of the unstratified rocks, could not have been the result of *water*. The mineral composition of the rocks, as well as the form and position of the dykes, forbid

such a conclusion; and, therefore, to explain the phenomena, we can have recourse only to heat. For further proofs, as well as for a more extended development of these, we must refer to the books.

But, as the rocks of which we have been speaking, are *primary* rocks, out of the fragments of which all other rocks, soils, &c., were either directly or indirectly formed, there must have been a time when none other than these primary rocks were in existence; and, admitting that these were originally in a state of fusion by heat, it would be natural to conclude, that the whole globe, composed as it was of primary rock, was once in the same state; that it was one vast ball of molten lava! This is now the general opinion of geologists, and is further confirmed by the following, among other considerations:—

1. The earth is not a perfect globe, but an oblate spheroid, flattened at the poles,—the polar diameter being about twenty-six miles shorter than the equatorial; and this is the form which it would have assumed, supposing it to have commenced revolving on its axis when in a fluid state. But, if it was ever in a fluid state, this must have been due to heat, as no other known agent would have been equal to the result.

2. This theory is confirmed by the abundant reason there exists for the belief, that the body of the earth, at no very great depth beneath the surface, is still in a state of igneous fusion. From careful observations that have been made during a number of years, on the temperature of mines, and the waters of Artesian wells, in various parts of the world, it is found that, after descending beyond the reach of solar influence, the temperature *invariably increases in all places*, at the average ratio of about one degree Fahrenheit, for every forty-five or fifty feet of descent. This rule holds good to the greatest depths to which the earth has been penetrated. The Parisians have taken advantage of this law in supplying their *warm baths* by water, procured in boring to a great depth!

Now, assuming fifty degrees as the average temperature of the surface, and taking the mean ratio of increase at one degree for every fifty feet of descent, we should reach two hundred and twelve degrees, the point at which water boils, at about eight thousand feet, or a mile and a half beneath

the surface; and, at a little more than sixty-five miles, we should reach a heat of seven thousand degrees, sufficient to melt all known rocks! Some geologists, indeed, suppose that fusion commences at a much shorter distance below the surface, and that, downwards, the heat increases in geometrical progression.

Admitting this doctrine of internal fusion, we have a more perfect account for the phenomena of earthquakes and volcanoes, than can be given in any other way. Earthquakes are described as consisting in tremblings, oscillations, and undulatory motions of the earth, as though immense waves were heaving and rolling with great velocity, under the surface. The sea rolls, in fearful billows; channels are either shoaled or deepened; the earth is permanently elevated in some places, and depressed in others; old fountains are sealed up, and new ones are opened; mountains are torn from their bases, and, by their scattered ruins, rivers are dammed up and diverted from their channels. Frequently, the subterranean forces follow a particular direction; sometimes moving, it is said, at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per minute, and felt over a vast extent of country. It is said that the great earthquake, which destroyed a part of Lisbon in 1755, "extended from Greenland and Iceland to Norway, Sweden, Germany, Britain, Switzerland, France, Spain, Morocco, Salee, Fez, Teutan, and even to the West Indies, and to Lake Ontario in North America."[6]

Now, should we suppose an unbroken extension of *solid* matter, from every point of the earth's surface to the centre, of course these violent agitations of the surface would not be possible. If, however, we suppose the interior of the earth to be heated to fusion, various substances would be volatilized, and gases would be generated; and especially in case water should percolate through the fissures of the superincumbent rock upon the heated mass, *steam* would be formed. These elastic vapors, pent up in caverns, would accumulate and be heated more and more, until the force of expansion would be sufficient either to rend the earth's crust, producing all the phenomena of the earthquake, or to crowd the contiguous melted matter through the crater of a volcano.

[6] Encyclopedia of Geography, vol. 1, p. 223.

And, in this connection, it should be stated, that earthquakes most frequently happen in volcanic regions. Eruptions of lava are almost always preceded by earthquakes, of more or less violence, and the shocks always cease after the eruption takes place. This sufficiently demonstrates a connection between the two, and shows that both phenomena result from the same general cause. And, when we consider that, besides the numerous *extinct* volcanoes, there are about three hundred *active* ones in existence, and distributed in the four quarters of the globe, and that the quantity of molten matter sometimes erupted from a mountain, at a single paroxysm, is many times as great as the whole mass of the mountain itself;[7] and, when we reflect that there is scarcely any part of the globe in which earthquakes have not been felt, showing, that every where, the surface rests upon a yielding and elastic foundation; and, when we add to all these considerations, the facts already mentioned respecting the *primordial* character of granite, which is, unquestionably, an igneous rock; the temperature of deep mines, and Artesian wells, and especially, the spheroidal figure of the earth; we think the sublime though fearful conclusion can scarcely be doubted, that there was a time when this whole globe was one vast ball of molten lava, and that this is still its condition at no very great depth beneath the surface.

Another fact may here be introduced, which, while it serves to confirm the doctrine of the original incandescence of the globe, stands, when considered in *another* aspect, as an irrefragable argument for its high antiquity. I allude to the evident high temperature of ancient climates, and their uniformity in all latitudes. Thus, plants, resembling those which now grow only in tropical climates, abound in ancient fossiliferous rocks, and particularly those of the carboniferous formation. These grew to an enormous size, much larger than their living representatives; and they are found in the rocks as far north as Melville Island, seventy-five degrees north latitude, under circumstances which show that they could not have been drifted from the south. Corals, such as are now produced only in tropical seas, are also found fossilized in all latitudes. During the deposition of the secondary and tertiary rocks, however, the

[7] Hitchcock's Geology, p. 232.

temperature of the climate seems to have gradually sunk, and approximated more nearly to its present state. Still, the bones of animals now confined almost entirely to the tropics, such as the lion, hyæna, hippopotamus, rhinoceros, elephant, &c. are found in the most recent tertiary deposites in the northern parts of Europe, where the climate, during the *historical* period, has been much too cold for animals of these tribes. At the close of the tertiary period, however, there appears to have been a sudden and remarkable fall of temperature, from causes not yet satisfactorily explained; and, during the diluvial period which followed, the climate must have been intensely cold. At the latter part of the tertiary period, mammoths and the rhinoceros abounded in Siberia. These, which must have required a mild climate, appear to have been destroyed by a sudden change of temperature; and, in at least two instances, their entire carcasses, with all the softer parts, encased in the frozen diluvial mud and sand of that region, have been preserved until quite recently. In the museum at St. Petersburg, is the skeleton of a mammoth, whose flesh was so perfectly preserved, in the eternal frosts of Siberia, that when found, at the beginning of the present century, the natives fed their dogs upon it! and in 1771, the entire carcass of a rhinoceros was found in the ice and frozen gravel of the same country.[8]

Admitting the original incandescence of the globe, the high temperature of ancient climates is perfectly accounted for; and its gradual reduction through succeeding ages, is explained on the principle of *radiation*. A temperature arising from internal causes, would also be more uniform all over the earth, than one depending upon the solar rays; and this shows why a tropical climate anciently prevailed in the arctic, as well as the equatorial regions.

But so great a change of climate, as all geologists acknowledge to have taken place, could not have been accomplished by the slow radiation of internal heat, except in a period too vast for the mind properly to conceive.

Allowing that the original state of the globe was such as has been described, and supposing it to have cooled by the

[8] Hitchcock's Geology, pp. 106, 107, 84, 145, 216. See, also, Lyell's extended remarks on Climate, in the first volume of his "Principles of Geology."

natural process of radiation, many thousands of years must have been required for the attainment of those conditions, admitting the existence of the first races of organized beings. During the prevalence of the intense heat, the water must have all been dispersed in the atmosphere, in the form of vapor. As, in the process of cooling, the crust formed on the surface, this gradually descended, and the first seas were formed. Beneath the heated waters of these, the primary stratified, or non-fossiliferous rocks, such as gneiss, mica slate, hornblend slate, &c. seem to have been deposited. These, as we have already seen, are of great thickness, and could not have been formed except in long periods.

When the waters became habitable, marine animals, of a *low organization*, were created, preceded, as we may presume, by vegetables for them to subsist upon, though few traces of vegetables are found in the older fossiliferous rocks, probably owing to their perishable nature. The first races of animals that seem to have been brought into existence, were annelides, or sea-worms; encrinites, (zoöphitic, or vegetable-like animals;) trilobites, (crustaceous or crab-like animals, with three longitudinal lobes, whence their name;) and shell-fish of various kinds, the most remarkable of which, perhaps, were the ammonites and orthocera, carnivorous molluscs of the sepia tribe, with chambered shells like the nautilus; and some of which grew to a gigantic size. After materials, forming rocks several miles in thickness, had been quietly deposited, entombing the remains of these creatures, *vertebral fishes* were introduced, in the upper part of the silurian rocks, so called. These, frequently and sometimes suddenly changing their species and genera, have continued through all the subsequent geological formations, down to the present time.

With the subsequent deposition of the old red sandstone and the mountain limestone, measuring together, according to the books, from twelve thousand to fifteen thousand feet in thickness, the transition period closed. Then *terrestrial* vegetation seems to have fairly commenced in the plants of the *great coal formation*. Previously to this period, the vegetation consisted almost wholly of marine plants; and there is good reason to believe, that, until that period, the ocean prevailed over almost the entire surface

of the earth. Even then, a large portion of the land seems to have been but slightly elevated above the surface of the water, and was frequently covered by it. On the low marshy plains, vegetation seems to have sprung up in the utmost luxuriance. The plants consisted, for the most part, of gigantic ferns and equiseta, interspersed with palms and other arborescent plants, whose genera are now, for the most part, extinct. The matter of this vegetation, appears to have accumulated in a manner somewhat analogous to that of modern peat. From the perfect preservation of the forms of the plants, and from the fact that they are sometimes found erect, Mr. Bakewell infers, "that they grew near the place where they occur," and that they could not have been drifted.[9] Vegetable accumulations thus formed, and varying from a foot to sixty or seventy feet in thickness, appear to have been submerged beneath the waters, and covered with layers of mud and sand, of different thicknesses. The whole being then again elevated to the surface, another stratum of vegetation was formed, which, in its turn, was also submerged and covered, as before described; and so on throughout the whole formation. These coverings have allowed the vegetable matter to ferment and become carbonized; and subsequent consolidation having given them the form of shale and sandstone, they have formed convenient coffers, in which the coal has been locked up for the future use of man, for which it was unquestionably designed. The whole coal formation, with its alternating beds of coal shale and sandstone, has been estimated at a thickness of about three thousand feet. In some places, there are no less than sixty or seventy thick beds of coal interspersed in the series of strata. The deposites sometimes extend over thousands of square miles; and the quantities hid in the earth, in all parts of the world, are probably sufficient to supply the human race for more than a hundred thousand years![10] Who can reflect upon the influence of coal on civilization and human happiness, and contemplate these vast deposites, without being impressed with a deep sense of the wisdom and goodness of that Being, by whose almighty hand they were stored up in the earth for our use and comfort!

[9] Bakewell's Geology, p. 126. [10] See Hitchcock's Geology, p. 330.

With the plants of the coal formation, we have thus seen that *terrestrial* vegetation commenced; but, before the completion of this formation, we find in the rocks not the slightest trace of the remains of any *air-breathing* or *terrestrial* animal! Animated existence was previously confined entirely to the ocean. There was no animal provided with lungs, or that had a voice. No bird winged the air, or twittered in the branches; no beast prowled through the forests, or lowed upon the meadows; and, except the rolling of the waves, and the plashing of the finny tribes, and the occasional rumbling of the earthquake, and bellowing of the volcano, the most profound and gloomy silence reigned over the face of the globe.

There is the best reason to believe that, previously to the formation of the coal, the air was totally unfit for respiration. Carbon, as well as all other elementary bodies, has probably existed from the beginning, in the same quantity in which it now exists. This, when heated, has a powerful affinity for *oxygen;* an affinity so strong, as to abstract it from almost all other bodies. During the prevalence of the intense heat of primitive times, the greater portion of this must have combined with oxygen, forming an immense quantity of carbonic acid gas, which is well known to be irrespirable. This, of course, must have been diffused in the air, whilst the quantity of *free* oxygen must have been much smaller than at present. Under these circumstances, no animal, dependent upon pure air, could have existed.

But, by the well known laws of vegetable nutrition, an immense quantity of carbonic acid must have been decomposed, during the profuse vegetation of the coal period; the carbon going to form the fibre of the plant, and the oxygen being set free. Thus, a condition of the atmosphere, incompatible with the existence of the higher orders of *animals*, was eminently promotive of *vegetable* life. In the process of the coal vegetation, the atmosphere must have been drained of most of its carbonic acid. The carbon, by a beneficent provision of the Creator, being laid up in store to supply the future race of mankind, and the oxygen being returned to the air, the air was thus gradually prepared for the existence of air-breathing animals. Accordingly, immediately after the completion of the coal formation, such animals appear to have been created. In the new red

sandstone, whose geological position is immediately above the coal, perfectly defined tracks of birds are found. These occur in several different places, but especially in the new red sandstone of the Connecticut valley. Though some of these are very small, others are of enormous size, the track being seventeen inches long, and the length of the step from four to six feet.[11] Fine specimens may be seen in the cabinet of Yale College. Those birds appear to have wandered along the shores of an ocean, impressing their footprints upon the sand at low water, which were, subsequently, covered by layers of sand and mud, brought in by the swelling tide. They probably belonged to the order of waders, and, in their habits, formed a connecting link between marine and land animals, being themselves not exclusively either. In the same rock formation, are also found the tracks of tortoises, and other singular quadruped tracks, somewhat resembling the impressions of a human hand; and which a late discovery of bones has proved to have been made by gigantic *frogs*, some of which grew to the size of the bull!

In the same formation, the race of *saurians*, or lizards, also commenced. The remains of these animals have excited great astonishment. The ichthyosaurus, or fish-lizard, is described as being sometimes more than thirty feet long; and as having the snout of a porpoise, the teeth of a crocodile, and very numerous, the head of a lizard, the vertebræ of a fish, and the paddles of a whale. Its eyes were enormously large, the orbital cavity in one of the species, sometimes measuring fourteen inches in its longest direction. They were carnivorous, as were all the aquatic animals of that tribe, and, during the deposition of rock, several thousand feet in thickness, they seem to have ruled the ocean. During the deposition of the "oölitic" and "wealden" rocks, geologically from two thousand to more than three thousand feet above the coal formation, the number of saurians was very great. The most singular animal of the saurian tribe, and perhaps the strangest of all creatures, whether extinct or living, was the *pterodactyle*, or flying lizard. This is described as having "the head and

[11] To Professor Hitchcock mainly belongs the credit of bringing these facts before the scientific world. On the whole subject of fossil footmarks, see his Geology, pp. 151—153.

neck of a bird, the mouth of a reptile, the wings of a bat, and the body and tail of a mammifer." Fingers, with claws, projected from the outer and anterior corners of its wings, which are thought to have enabled it to creep, climb, and cling to the rocks. It is also thought, that the animal could walk on two feet, when its wings were folded, and that it could probably swim. When this animal was first discovered, "some anatomists pronounced it a bird, some a reptile, and some a bat. But Cuvier at last developed its true characters, and proved it to be a beautiful example of the wisdom which adapts creatures to peculiar and varied modes of existence." [12]

In the English "wealden" rocks, a fresh-water formation, Dr. Mantell discovered the remains of a huge *terrestrial* and herbivorous saurian, which he has called the Iguanodon. It was from forty to fifty feet long, and a femoral bone in the cabinet of Yale College shows that it must have stood from ten to twelve feet in height.

In this brief sketch, we have, necessarily, omitted mentioning even the names of most of the saurians, whose remains are found. Suffice it to say, that, during the deposition of the "secondary rocks," from immediately above the coal to the top of the chalk formation, (rocks estimated at between five and six thousand feet in thickness,) reptiles, such as land and amphibious saurians, frogs, tortoises, &c. were, with birds, almost the only forms of *terrestrial* animals that prevailed. With one single exception, the animals, anterior to the commencement of the tertiary formation, were all *oviparous;* their young were not born alive, but hatched from eggs. The exception referred to is a small animal, analogous to the opossum, found in England in the Stonesfield slate, a member of the oölitic system of rocks, which lies beneath the chalk formation. It was provided with a pouch like the opossum, in which its young, whose organs were, probably, at first very imperfectly developed, were nourished and shielded from the external air, until they were fitted to bear exposure. Thus, as Professor Silliman, in a recent lecture, remarked, the young of this animal, though born alive, were only *half* born, so to speak; and the creature may be

[12] Hitchcock's Geology, pp. 140, 141.

considered as presenting a connecting link between the oviparous and viviparous races, showing the gradual approach of a condition suited to the existence of the higher orders of terrestrial animals.

With the exception of this quadruped, and perhaps also, of the birds that have left their footprints on the red sandstone, there have been no remains of any warm-blooded animal found in any of the formations below the tertiary. In the formations anterior to the latter, the prevailing animal remains are of the families of molluscs, fishes, or reptiles, whose respiratory organs were imperfect, and whose blood, consequently, was nearly of the temperature of the medium by which they were surrounded. From the peculiar structure of the organs of circulation in reptiles, the heart having but one ventricle, and the blood not needing perfect decarbonization, they have the power even of suspending respiration for a considerable time, and also of enduring an abstinence from food, that would be fatal to any warm-blooded animals. They live chiefly in dark, damp, and swampy places, and many of them can live as well in the water as in the air.[13] The terrestrial animals of the secondary period, being mainly of this class, were thus comparatively indifferent to the purity of the elements, and were fitted to live in circumstances that would have been unhealthy, if not fatal, to animals of a higher organization.

But at the commencement of the tertiary formation, immediately above the chalk, the character of organic life underwent a remarkable change, and assumed decidedly more analogy to existing types. Warm-blooded and viviparous animals here began to prevail. In the older tertiary strata, on which the city of Paris stands, Cuvier brought to light more than forty kinds of extinct quadrupeds, among which the "Paleotherium" may be considered the most remarkable. It is described as a thick, clumsy animal, of the size of a horse, and probably had a proboscis.

In strata somewhat newer, the "Dinotherium," a genus of animals between the tapir and mastodon, is found. Of all the mammiferous quadrupeds that ever have tenanted the earth, this seems to have been the most gigantic. It

[13] See Encyclopedia Americana, Art. Reptiles.

was eighteen feet long, and from ten to twelve feet high. From its general structure, it is thought to have lived mainly in the water, like the hippopotamus. It had a proboscis, and two large tusks proceeded from its under jaw, which were curved downward like those of the walrus. This contrivance is thought to have enabled it to rake up the roots of aquatic plants, on which the structure of its teeth shows it probably to have fed, and also, during its hours of repose, to hook fast to the bank of the lake or river, to keep its head out of water, whilst its body floated in the stream.

Nearly at the same period, the rhinoceros, and the mastodon, and, a little later than these, the elephant, (mammoth,) and the horse, roamed through the forests, and browsed upon the luxuriant vegetation. Soon after these, the "Megatherium," and other animals of its general type, were introduced. This quadruped is described as larger than the rhinoceros, and possessing characters allying it both to the sloth and the ant-eater. Its body, exclusive of the tail, was twelve feet long, and of colossal thickness. Its fore-feet were a yard in length, and armed with enormous claws, enabling it to dig into the earth and tear up the roots of trees and plants, which seem to have formed its chief article of food. The ox, the deer, the hyæna, the bear, the monkey, &c. &c. were brought into being, as these and subsequent strata were deposited; and the higher we ascend in the strata, the more nearly do the remains, both of terrestrial and marine animals, assimilate to existing species. Lyell, who, perhaps, has examined the subject more thoroughly than any other man, informs us that in the older tertiary, the shell-fish now in existence, bear the proportion of only about five to one hundred of those that are extinct; while in the more recent members of the same general group of deposites, the proportions are reversed, and about ninety-five existing species are found to only five that have become extinct.

The *vegetable* kingdom seems to have undergone a similar progression. Anterior to the great coal formation, vegetation, as before stated, was almost exclusively marine. The terrestrial vegetation, which formed the coal, consisted, for the most part, of plants of a loose and succulent nature, which were generally flowerless. The principal arborescent

plants which then prevailed, were of the families of ferns, pines, palms, and two or three other families, now entirely extinct. As we ascend in the strata above the coal system, flowering and arborescent vegetation prevails in continually increasing proportions; and in the upper part of the tertiary, the remains of willows, poplars, elms, sycamores, chestnuts, and many other genera and species identical with modern, are found.

Thus, from the earliest times, there has been a gradual progression, both in the animal and vegetable creation, towards the various genera and species now in existence, until, finally, there was an actual "shading off" into existing races! And, if we admit that, from the earliest geological epoch, changes have been gradually going on upon the surface of the globe, by which it has been brought nearer and nearer to its present condition, we have a most beautiful and powerful illustration of the wisdom and goodness of God, in the successive creation of such beings as were best adapted to the circumstances of their particular geological age. No *habitable* condition of the globe has been suffered to lie unemployed for the purposes of happiness. "Gather up the fragments, that nothing be lost," is the principle on which the Creator has operated from the beginning of time. Even that condition which was capable of supporting in health and enjoyment only the lowest classes of organized beings, was not suffered to lie waste, but was tenanted by just such beings as it would support. And when, in the progress of change, a race of animals was no longer suited to the condition of the globe, it was swept out of existence, and other races, generally of a higher order, and better suited to the improving circumstances, were introduced. And this remark will apply to all geological ages, down to the historical time.

We are now prepared for the statement of a most remarkable fact. It is that, throughout all these vast groups of deposites, abounding with the remains of other animals, not the slightest trace of the remains of *man*, or any of his works, have been found! Neither his bones, his fabrics, his utensils, his weapons, or any thing which indicates his presence, have yet been discovered in any formations, except those of the most recent date, and of a kind now going on. The creation of man was reserved for the last

act of divine power and skill. During untold and inconceivable periods, tribe after tribe of fishes had silently sported in the brine, huge reptiles had lurked in the swamps and marshes, and fearful quadrupeds had prowled through the dismal forests; but the sound of the woodman's axe, the dashing of the hunter's steed, or the hum of the crowded city, was not yet heard. No burning incense arose to heaven, and no altar yet smoked with sacrifices to the great Creator. *Man did not yet exist!*

After the close of the tertiary period, and still before man was created, a remarkable catastrophe seems to have occurred, by which that deposite was formed, known under the name of diluvium or drift. This is spread over nearly the whole northern hemisphere, and varies from a few inches to hundreds of feet in thickness. It consists of clay, sand, pebbles, and water-worn stones, sometimes perfectly stratified, but often confusedly intermingled, with scarcely any marks of stratification. Sometimes it contains enormous boulder-rocks, weighing many tons. The matter of this deposite seems to have been invariably transported from the north; and boulders have been identified with rocks "*in place*," to which they must have originally belonged, from a few hundred yards to hundreds of miles from where they are found. Sometimes boulders of great magnitude have been carried over steep and high mountains, and are not unfrequently found on their summits and southern declivities; and the long-continued passage of detritus has worn scratches, and sometimes deep grooves, in the mountain rock, all of which have the same general direction, from north to south.

The common and most rational theory, ascribes these results to the combined agency of water and ice. The land which shows traces of diluvial action, must have been overflown by an ocean abounding in icebergs. These, reaching to the bottom of the sea, have torn fragments of rock from their original beds, and pushed them along before them, the friction rounding off their angles, and reducing many of them to sand and pebbles. Sometimes large masses of rock would get wedged in between, or thrown upon the top of, blocks of ice, and be floated to great distances, and scattered over the country; and by the continued attrition of these materials over the

naked mountain rock, it is supposed the grooves and scratches, before referred to, were produced.

By these extensive abrasions, rugged escarpments were reduced; deep hollows were filled up; the quantity of soil was increased, and the earth was, in every way, better fitted for the reception of *man.* Accordingly, at the close of this period, when the waters had subsided, and all things were in readiness, man was created, in God's own moral image, as the crowning excellency of all the Creator's works;—a being distinguished from all other earthly creatures, by the capacity of knowing the *author* of his existence, and of ruling and directing, by his intelligence, the inferior orders of living creatures!

I have thus briefly glanced at some of the main facts and inferences of the science of geology. In the narrow limits of a short essay, one cannot be expected to render complete justice to a subject, which would require volumes. My chief aim has been to present general principles, without entering much into details. The limited information I possess on the subject, is drawn almost entirely from books, being confirmed only by such observations as attention to professional duties have permitted me to make during the last four or five years; and the reader will perceive, that I have not been particular always to refer to *chapter and verse* of the authorities on which the statements of this essay have been made. The reason is, the facts stated are notorious to all geologists, and may be found in all geological works deserving the name. The acknowledgment is due, however, that, in the preparation of this essay, I have derived essential assistance from a course of nearly thirty lectures, with illustrations, recently delivered by that accomplished philosopher, Professor Silliman, as also from a study of the specimens in the cabinet of Yale College.

As I have written mainly on the testimony of geologists, it will, perhaps, be expected that I say something respecting the discrepancy of their opinions, which has been alleged against the validity of their authority.[14] Discrepancies there are, indeed; but in the present advanced state of the science, these are very few; and, being confined to points unessential to the great principles of the science, they do

[14] See Universalist Quarterly, Vol. 2, Art. 1.

not at all affect either the question as to the world's antiquity, or any other of the more important inferences of geology. As to the very high antiquity of the globe, there is not a single dissenting voice among all the well-informed geologists of the day; and respecting the essential facts of the science, they are also perfectly agreed. In my judgment, decidedly the most important difference in opinion between geologists, is this: Mr. Lyell, in opposition to almost all other geologists, denies the doctrine of the original entire, and present internal igneous fluidity of the earth. He explains earthquakes and volcanoes by heat, which he supposes may be produced by chemical decompositions and recompositions going on beneath the earth's surface. He contends, that causes of geological change have not only been the same, but that they have operated with the same intensity, in all ages; and he explains the change of climate by which the tropical temperature, universally acknowledged to have prevailed in early times all over the earth, — not by a supposed secular refrigeration, as do other geologists, but by the slow and gradual change of the relative position of land and water. If his opinion on this point is true, it proves nothing, except that the earth is probably *much older* than other geologists have supposed it to be.

As to the mode in which granite and other primary rocks were formed, there have also been different theories. Some have contended that these were merely sedimentary rocks, altered by heat; while others, without positively denying the possibility of this mode of formation, have simply contended for the high *probability*, that the class of rocks referred to are truly primitive. Geologists have also differed slightly in their mode of reconciling the facts of the science with the Mosaic history. Besides these, I know of no other discrepancies in their opinions that deserve to be noticed.

But differences of opinion respecting these minor points, and which, perhaps, are not within the province of the science to decide to a mathematical certainty, no more invalidate the demonstrated and universally received facts and inferences of the science, than the dissensions among astronomers, respecting the nebular theory of La Place, throw doubt upon the doctrines of the Copernican system;

or the question as to the truth of Catholicism, Calvinism, or Universalism, sets aside the essential and universally acknowledged truths of the Bible.

We will conclude this essay with some remarks respecting the bearings of geology on the Mosaic history of the creation. Many theologians are still extremely reluctant to admit the facts and natural inferences of geology, believing that these conflict with the book of Genesis. And some, not willing to abandon or modify the *common* interpretation of the first chapter, have contended that the various fossils found in the earth, were created in the rocks, *just as they are*, during *six literal days*. It is admitted that this would have been possible to Omnipotence; but it is no more probable that they were thus created, than that Pompeii and Herculaneum were created in the earth, or that the Egyptian mummies were created in their tombs. But it can be of little avail to offer a formal refutation of a theory formed in utter defiance of all analogy and common sense.

Others have argued that light, the atmosphere, all the forms of animal and vegetable life, &c. &c. were created in six literal days, and that all the fossiliferous rocks were deposited afterwards.[15]

Now let us look at facts: We have already stated that the rocks below the coal in Pennsylvania, comprising the transition formation, measure, as ascertained by Professor Rogers, no less than forty thousand feet, or more than seven and a half miles in perpendicular thickness. In England, according to the most recent and careful measurements, they are about one hundred and thirty thousand feet, or more than twenty-four miles thick.[16] Now, allowing all it is reasonable to allow, for any possible mistakes in the measurement of these rocks, the result cannot be altered to the amount of a dozen miles at most; and we must, in reason, allow them a thickness which would indicate the lapse of more than sixteen hundred, or even sixteen thousand years, during their quiet deposition.

Besides, the theory under review supposes that none of these rocks were deposited until after the creation of all the *existing* races of animals and plants, and also of man.

[15] See Universalist Review, for January, 1845, pp. 18, 19.
[16] See Hitchcock's Geology, p. 87.

How does it come, then, that, in all these vast deposites of rocks, some of which are made up almost entirely of organic remains, not one single trace of any *existing* species of animal or plant is found? How does it come, that the fossils of these rocks are, without exception, of *extinct* species, and that they never contain the remains of man, of quadrupeds, or indeed of any *land* animals, as do the more recent deposites? Reason, exercised upon these premises, confidently asserts that the rocks in question were deposited anterior to the existence of the present races of animals and plants, and when the earth was inhabited by entirely different types of organized beings.

It has been argued by some, that, after the completion of the transition deposites, "came the deluge..... The rushing of the waters, with awful power, must have swept away the soils and forests of the ancient lands, torn up vast masses of primary rocks, which together with the remains of the animal kingdom, afforded ample materials for the carboniferous, secondary, and tertiary formations."[17] But the same objection we have urged against the proposition above considered, will apply with equal force to this. The duration and probable force of the deluge, were inadequate to the extent of the deposites; and we have already shown that none of the existing species of animals and plants are found in any of these formations, except a few of them in the most *recent* tertiary. Besides, the deluge, in order to have formed deposites thousands of feet in thickness during the short period of its prevalence, must have been tumultuous beyond all conception. Rocks, soil, plants, animals, &c., must, in the violence of the action, have been scattered pell-mell, and deposited in one heterogeneous mass, without any order or stratification. The fossils of the carboniferous, secondary, and tertiary periods, would have been confusedly intermingled; and the bones of the antediluvians, whom the flood was intended to destroy, would have been of frequent occurrence. On the contrary, the deposites of these periods seem to have generally gone on in the most quiet and orderly manner. The slates, shales, sandstone, chalk, limestone, &c. of these formations, are as perfectly homogeneous, and as

[17] See Universalist Review, for January, 1845.

entirely distinct from each other, as the rocks of any other formations. The ferns and equiseta, of which the coal is mainly composed, seem, as already shown, to have been quietly entombed on or near the spot where they grew and died; and several of the groups of rocks have fossils peculiar to themselves, and which never mingle with those of others. The ichthyosaurus and plesiosaurus are never found below the new red sandstone or above the chalk; the mammalia of the tertiary are never found among the reptiles of the secondary; and the remains of man and his works are never found, except in formations of a kind now going on. If these facts are duly regarded, the theory under review must be considered as entirely out of the question.

That there is no real discrepancy between these facts and inferences of geology, and the Mosaic history, but that, on the other hand, they are mutually confirmatory of each other, when the latter is properly understood, we think can be clearly shown. It may be proper here to mention a few of the remarkable and undeniable coincidences between the two.

In the first place, both geology and Moses concur in teaching that the earth in its present form, and all the beings that have ever inhabited it, were *created*, and that they did not exist from eternity. Geology positively asserts, that there was a time when none of the various races of animals and plants known to man, living or extinct, had an existence upon the earth; and with almost equal clearness it shows that there was a time anterior to *all* organic life.

In the second place, both geology and Moses concur in teaching that creation was a *progressive* work, beginning with inanimate matter, and proceeding with the simplest, and ending with the most perfect forms of organic life. Moreover, geology demonstrates the falsity of the atheistical hypothesis of Lamarck, which supposes that there has been a transmutation of species into others, from the lowest to the highest forms of life, the last condition of man preceding his present, being that of the *monkey*. It shows that the shell-fish was always shell-fish; that the quadruped was always quadruped; that the monkey was always monkey; and that man was always man. There is no

example, in the rocks, of the insensible gradation of one class of beings into another; and consequently, as the Bible asserts, the creation of each class and species must have required a separate exertion of Divine Power.

In the third place, there is a perfect concurrence between geology and Moses in teaching that man was among the last beings created, and that the epoch when he was placed upon the globe was comparatively recent.

Various theories have been propounded by geologists, to reconcile other facts of the science with other features of the Mosaic history; but we will present only the essential principles of that which is now most generally received, and which if true, not only settles the whole difficulty, but even shows the seeming discrepancies in the light of remarkable coincidences. That the reader's mind may be prepared for this, we will first briefly consider the circumstances under which the Mosaic account was written, and the condition and wants of the people to whom it was originally addressed.

The author of this account was the leader and instructer of the Israelites. For upwards of two centuries that people had worn the yoke of slavery; and they were now sunk into the mental degradation consequent on tyranny and oppression. Physical science was yet unborn; and their knowledge scarcely extended beyond the natural objects by which they were immediately surrounded. They were in a state bordering on barbarism. Their imperfect habits of thought were influenced by intercourse with their masters, and even their crude and physical conceptions of a divinity wore an Egyptian tinge.

But the current of their habits and conceptions was to be changed. They were to be erected into an independent nation, and to be taught the worship of the God of the universe, in contradistinction to the gross physical gods of the surrounding heathens. And to teach them (as well as succeeding generations) the unity, power, and wisdom of Jehovah, and to impress it upon their minds, that He alone of all gods was to be obeyed and worshipped, a history of the exertion of the divine power in the creation of all things was evidently indispensable. This history formed the proper starting-point of all the religious instruction that was to be given them. It was accordingly, by divine direction, written by Moses.

But if this history was necessary to them, it was equally necessary that, in its essential features, it should be adapted to their comprehension. Now, suppose Moses had written a minute and scientific account of creation, bringing into view the countless ages that elapsed during its progress, and presenting all the facts and details that are given in geology;—could the Israelites, in the undeveloped state of their minds, have received it? Would they have been profited or instructed by it? Speak to any unlettered and grossly ignorant person of our own day, of the details of creation as unfolded by geology, and he will gape and stare with utter inanity, showing that this class of facts is as much beyond the sphere of his conceptions, as the propositions of Euclid would be to a new-born babe. If Moses, then, had written *geologically* of the creation, it is evident that, for many centuries, his writings would have been only as so much blank parchment.

But there was need of a history on this subject that would be immediately available; and there was no other alternative, than to present truth in that familiar costume, and under those cramped and restricted forms of representation, which every one could comprehend, taking care, however, that the language employed should not necessarily convey impressions positively erroneous, as we shall see the language of Moses does not. We may add, that the Bible was not intended as a revelation of physical science, or of any class of truths which may be attained by unaided reason. Nor does the Bible use the technical and accurate language of science, but the popular and more indefinite phraseology of common life; and hence, the ideas even of astronomy, which the *literal* interpreter would most naturally derive from the sacred pages, would be altogether different from those of Copernicus and Galileo. Even religion itself, in the Mosaic age, was shrouded in a variety of physical and sensible imagery, and thus wisely adapted to capacities which could not have received the refined and *spiritual* conceptions conveyed in the gospel.

Now that there actually is much in the Mosaic account, given in the first two or three chapters of Genesis, that will not bear a strictly literal interpretation, we presume few, if any, will deny. The garden, the tree of life, and of knowledge, the fruit of the tree, the serpent, the cherubim

and flaming sword, the Lord walking out in the garden in the cool of the day, &c., may be regarded as the mere *costume* in which deep and abstruse truths are clothed, to adapt them to the capacities of minds incapable of receiving ideas in the abstract. Keeping this law of adaptation in mind, we shall be prepared for an easy interpretation of the history of creation in harmony with the facts and unavoidable inferences of geology.

In the first chapter of Genesis, the whole process of creation, or at least all except the creation of primordial matter, is represented as having been accomplished in *six days*. Now we contend that these days are mere *costume*, in which the sacred writer clothes six indefinite periods of time, and that they are not literal days of twenty-four hours. That the word *day* is used in the account of the creation in an indefinite sense, and to represent a period longer than a literal day, may be seen by consulting Gen. ii. 4, 5. "These are the generations of the heavens and of the earth when they were created, *in the day* that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, and every plant of the field," &c. Here the work of the six days is represented as having been accomplished in one single day. Nothing can be plainer than that the word day is here used to express an indefinite period of time. Numerous examples may be found in the Scriptures of a similar usage of the term. Let the following suffice: "And in that *day* there shall be a root of Jesse which shall stand as an ensign of the people; to it shall the Gentiles seek: and his rest shall be glorious. And it shall come to pass in that *day*, that the Lord shall set his hand again a second time to recover the remnant of his people." (Isa. xi. 10, 11.) Again: "And it shall come to pass in that *day*, that the mountains shall drop down new wine, and the hills shall flow with milk." (Joel iii. 18.) And the Saviour says, "Abraham rejoiced to see my *day;* and he saw it and was glad." (John viii. 56.) In these passages the word day is not restricted in its meaning to twenty-four hours, but evidently signifies the period of the reign of the Messiah, without defining its duration. There can be no valid objection to an application of a similar sense to each of the six days of creation.

Understanding these as expressing so many indefinite

periods, let us turn to the account, and see if it contains any thing in the least respect contradictory of the facts of geology.

The first declaration of Moses, (Gen. i. 1,) we conceive relates to the creation of the *matter* of the earth, having nothing to do with its systematic arrangement: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Whether the fifty-five elementary bodies known in chemistry were created in their simple state, and whether their combustion and chemical combination originated the intense heat of primitive times, we do not at present pretend to say; this question, though a proper subject of speculation, is immaterial to our argument.

After the earth was thus created, it was, as we are told, "without form and void, (uninhabited,) and darkness was upon the face of the deep." This, probably, was designed to describe the condition of the earth a long time after the creation of primitive matter,—the historian passing over the intervening period in silence. For it should be borne constantly in mind, that thousands, and even millions of years, are nothing to a being who has eternity at his command. However this may have been, at the epoch referred to, "darkness was upon the face of the deep." Whilst the surface of the earth was heated to incandescence, the water and many other substances must have all floated in the atmosphere in the form of vapor. Under those circumstances, it would of course have been impossible for the sun's rays to have reached the earth even *indirectly;* (for I must believe that the sun was created at least as soon as the earth, though it was not yet *appointed* to rule the day.) There are instances on record even of volcanic eruptions, so loading the atmosphere with vapor as to produce midnight darkness at noon-day; and what must have been the state of things when the whole surface of the earth was one glowing volcano? In process of cooling, however, a crust was formed upon the surface. Vast quantities of aqueous vapor condensed and descended, and thus, as before remarked, the first seas were formed. These, both according to geology and Moses, originally covered the entire, or almost the entire, surface of the earth. Still the veil of mist was not yet sufficiently cleared from the atmosphere to allow the passage of light. Hence the darkness that prevailed "over the face of the deep."

The next work of Omnipotence was the *illumination* of the surface of the globe. "And God said, Let there be light: and there was light." Theological geologists, I believe, have generally understood this as implying the creation of light diffused in the atmosphere, independent of the sun. This may be true, but to us the hypothesis seems unnecessary. A precipitation of such dark-colored vapors (analogous to smoke) as absorb the sun's rays, or any other arrangements in the atmosphere that would permit the light of the sun to descend to the earth, would, in our judgment, sufficiently explain the text. But the sun did not yet shine *directly* upon the earth, but only *indirectly*, and perhaps faintly, by an illumination of the translucent vapor of the atmosphere. What adds to the probability of this explanation is, the fact that light then, as now, alternated with darkness; "and God called the light day, (in its *common* acceptation,) and the darkness he called night." This seems to point us to a revolution of the earth on its axis, and the successive illumination of its sides by the sun. Thus the work of the first day, or period, was finished. And here we may remark, once for all, that the phrase "the evening and the morning," seems to stand for the beginning and close of the different periods; and in the absence of a more appropriate expression, from the meagre language in which Moses wrote, was used simply as a familiar and convenient method of summing up the lapse of time.

The next work seems to have consisted of farther arrangements and regulations in the atmosphere, by which a more distinct line of demarkation was established between the waters intended to be suspended in the air, and those designed to preserve a more condensed form upon the surface. "And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters," &c. (vs. 6—8.) During the high temperature of the earth's crust, there may have been every intermediate gradation between condensed water and the most expanded steam; and this would render such a provision highly necessary. The making of the firmament to divide the waters above from those below, constituted the work of the second period or day.

Some time after the illumination of the earth, the first

and lowest forms of living beings seem to have been brought into existence, which were wholly confined to the ocean. The *eyes* of the trilobite, (which was among the animals first created,) show that light prevailed during the period of its existence. The creation of these animals is, however, passed over in entire silence by the sacred historian; which, considering the brevity of his account, and the comparative unimportance of the subject to the object he had in view, needs not excite our surprise. After the creation of these animals, the long period elapsed during which the transition rocks containing their remains were deposited. All this appears to have been included in the second day; and during this whole period, the ocean still prevailed over nearly the entire surface of the earth, as is proved by the fact that the rocks containing these fossils are found in every quarter of the globe, and at all latitudes.

The third day's work consisted in the elevation of the land and the creation of terrestrial vegetation. "And God said, Let the waters under the heaven be gathered together in one place, and let the dry land appear: and it was so. ..... And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself upon the earth; and it was so. And the earth brought forth grass," &c.—"And the evening and the morning were the third day." (vs. 9—13.) In this there is a surprising agreement with the events of the period of the great coal formation. We have seen that, previously to that time, the earth was mostly covered by the ocean, as the language of Moses implies, and that very little if any land vegetation existed. At that epoch, however, large areas of land were slightly elevated above the surface of the waters, and were covered by a profuse vegetation designed to be converted into coal for the future use of man.

But the sun was still *invisible;* it had not yet shone *directly* upon the earth, but only through the translucent vapor and clouds with which, owing to the heat of the earth, the atmosphere was still loaded. Still, with the prevalence of a universal tropical, if not ultra-tropical climate, the year round, as well as an abundant supply of moisture and carbonic acid gas, vegetation greatly flourished, notwithstand-

ing the deficiency of solar influence. This condition, however, would not have been compatible with the comfort of land animals, and accordingly, neither the Bible nor geology tells us they yet existed.

The next exercise of Divine Power is described as follows: "And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven to divide the day from the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years. ..... And God made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; he made the stars also. And God set them in the firmament to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night..... And the evening and the morning were the fourth day." (vs. 14—19.)

On this passage it is proper to remark, that if it presents any difficulty to the geologist, that difficulty bears with equal weight against the interpretation which supposes that the days in this account mean *literal* days. But let us inquire, is it reasonable, even on any interpretation, to suppose that the sun, moon, and stars were literally not *created* until after three days had elapsed? If six days, in any sense of the term, were occupied in the creation of the earth and its inhabitants, does analogy countenance the supposition that the sun, which is more than thirteen hundred thousand times as large as the earth, the moon, the planets, and the millions of fixed stars which there can scarcely be a doubt shine as suns to other systems,—were all, or any number of them, created in one single day, and that, too, apparently for the mere accommodation of this comparatively insignificant globe? This is absurd in the extreme. In this instance, as when he speaks of the sun *rising* and *setting*, Moses evidently adapted his language to the common and ordinary apprehensions of men, and described things as they would have appeared to a spectator then placed upon the earth. And the only idea the Holy Spirit, speaking through him, intended to convey, was that the sun, moon, and stars were *made visible* upon the earth on the fourth day or period. Critics tell us that the passage in the original does not necessarily imply that the heavenly bodies were actually not *created* until the fourth day. Professor Hitchcock, who is a learned theologian as well as geologist, says, "If it be objected, that

according to Moses the sun, moon, and stars were not created till the fourth day, it may be replied that a more just interpretation of his language shows his meaning to be, not that the heavenly bodies were created on the fourth day, but that they were then first appointed to serve their present offices; and that they might have been in existence through countless ages." [18]

The sun thus being made *visible* upon the earth, which we may suppose to have taken place through a farther purification of the atmosphere, the earth became habitable to a higher order of animated creatures. Accordingly, the next work of the Almighty is thus described: "And God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth in the open firmament of heaven. And God created great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the waters brought forth abundantly after their kind, and every winged fowl after his kind..... And the evening and the morning were the fifth day." (vs. 20—23.)

Thus, according to Moses, air-breathing animals were not brought into existence until after the creation of terrestrial vegetation; and the account seems to imply that the first of these were in some way connected with the water. "God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature, and *fowl*," &c. With this, again, geology perfectly agrees. We have already seen that no relics of any air-breathing animal are found beneath the rocks that were formed after the coal vegetation. In the new red sandstone immediately above the coal, however, we find the tracks of birds, which must have been impressed upon the sandy shores of an ocean at low tide; and this shows, that in their habits the birds were probably dependent upon the water. There can be but little doubt that these were the very "fowl" of which Moses speaks.

The other part of this day's work, according to the common translation, consisted in the creation of "great whales," &c. This, admitting our definition of "day," forms the only *apparent* discrepancy between geology and Moses; for whales do not appear to have existed before a somewhat advanced stage of the tertiary formation, and a

[18] Hitchcock's Geology, p. 288.

very long period after this time. But criticism resolves even this apparent discrepancy into a surprising harmony. The original word does not necessarily mean whales. The current French Bible, now before me, renders the passage, "God then created great fishes," ("les grands poissons;") and Dr. Clarke remarks, on the expression in the passage, "Though this is generally understood by the different versions as signifying whales, yet the original must be understood rather as a *general* than a *particular* term, comprising all great aquatic animals." Now the marine saurians were great aquatic animals. These, with terrestrial reptiles of enormous size, came in during the deposition of the new red sandstone above the coal, and extensively characterized the whole secondary period. Thus, even this part of the account is perfectly and most admirably verified.

These animals, both according to geology and the Bible, *preceded* the more perfect land animals, the mammalia, on the stage of existence. These latter were reserved for the first part of the next, which was the sixth day's work, and which is thus described: "And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind; cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so. And God made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind," &c. This no doubt refers to the creation of the various families of quadrupeds, &c., whose remains, described above, are found in the rocks of the tertiary period,—and also of the existing races of animals. And the work of this day or period, both according to geology and Moses, was finished by the creation of *man*,—since which there is no evidence that any other animal has been created. The Creator then rested from his labors; and the present period may be considered as His great *sabbath-day!*

We hesitate not to say, then, that the general principles, and, so far as facts are known, the very details of the two great revelations, the Mosaic and the geological, perfectly coincide. When properly understood, there is not, from beginning to end, the slightest discrepancy between them; but throughout, they are mutually confirmatory. And enough is now known of geology to justify the confident belief that future discoveries will not essentially modify

these results. Though the science is yet in its infancy, and many new discoveries as to its details may yet be expected, its general principles may be considered as already fixed.

I beg the reader to observe that here has been no torturing of Scripture testimony on the one hand, or forging of geological facts on the other, to make out an agreement between the two. If we simply admit that the word day stands for indefinite period, a sense in which it is used in scores of instances in the Bible, the correspondence between the two accounts is striking and natural; and no work of the imagination is required to identify with each other the facts which they mutually set forth.

And now let us inquire, Is it probable that all these surprising coincidences are the mere work of chance? If the Mosaic account is the offspring of human invention, in a dark and semi-barbarous age, how comes it that, when considered in the light of the foregoing just interpretation, the numerous geological facts, so far from contradicting it, all conspire to confirm it, in each of the particulars on which they both treat? To believe that Moses, respecting so occult a subject as the creation of the world, could have accidentally stumbled upon facts so marvellously in accordance with the future developments of science, would seem too much for the wildest credulity. The inspiration of God alone, in those times of ignorance, could have enabled him to write a history which subsequent discoveries have proved so accurate.

Let not the lover of the Bible, then, shrink from the strongest blaze of geological light. All truth is God's truth, and must be consistent with itself; and if the Bible is true, as we firmly believe it is, there is no danger that any discoveries in the rocks will prove it false. Let geology, then, be cultivated, especially by the theologian. Let the revelations of this, as well as of all other natural sciences, be collated with those of Holy Writ; and the light which they mutually throw upon each other, and upon the works and ways of the Creator, will be found to elevate our views respecting the power, wisdom, goodness, and overruling providence of the Almighty. W. F.

Art. XXX.

Festus.

Festus: a Poem, by Philip James Bailey, Barrister at Law. First American Edition. Boston: B. B. Mussey. 1845. 16mo. pp. 416.

Such is the title of a work published about six years since in England, but unknown, except to a very few, in this country, until the appearance of this reprint from the house of Mr. Mussey. We are heartily glad that it has been introduced among us, and that it has been issued in a style worthy of its intrinsic merits. As far as mechanical execution is concerned, the volume reflects credit upon the American press. Having thus paid our respects to the publisher, we propose to devote a few pages to an examination of the work itself.

It is unfortunate that the critic of a poem like "Festus" should be entirely ignorant of the personal character and history of the author. The life of every true poet is the best commentary on his works. It opens to view the relation between his poetry and his heart, and shows the influence of his daily experience in moulding and directing the elements of his genius. Homer's blindness, and Dante's poverty, and Milton's persecution, are not trivial circumstances of biography; they are important facts in the history of literature. They suggest to us the interesting truth that the three great epics of the world were not created in quiet, amid the luxury of ease and the smiles of favor, but were the fruits of imagination inspired by sorrow and goaded by distress. The miseries of "poor, proud Byron," the struggles of the noble-minded Schiller, the sick-room discipline of Miss Barrett, if they do not add any thing to the absolute value of their poetry, supply a bond of personal sympathy at least, which is almost indispensable to a perfect appreciation of the works of genius. We question, moreover, whether the pleasure experienced from the study of a poet's work be not heightened by an undefined and mysterious association of its beauties with the features of his face. The poet and the poem will not be separated. There is a secret correspondence and subtile affinity which,

in our imagination, connects the beauty of "Christabel" with the dreamy, half-shut eyes of Coleridge, which makes "Alastor" continually suggest the intense, spiritual gaze of Shelley, and which continually reminds us, in the "Faust" and "Tasso," of the expressions of refined selfishness and dignified repose that are so happily blended in the countenance of Goethe. But, whatever may be the circumstances or the personal history of Mr. Bailey, there can be no doubt that the poetry of "Festus" had its root in his nature and his experience. Throughout, it bears evidence of the intense activity of mind and the glowing fervor of feeling which give to every work the impress of reality.

The design of the poem is borrowed from the story of Dr. Faust, a German physician in the early part of the sixteenth century, who, dissatisfied with the narrow circle of honest, ordinary knowledge, plunged into the mysteries of magic, and, at last, bargained with Satan for a full supply of earthly pleasures and worldly power by the sacrifice of his soul. The tradition, no doubt, sprang from the circumstances and the tendencies of the times, and became deeply rooted in the heart of Europe. Its richness in the elements of tragic power has, very naturally, made it the subject of many dramatic works. Marlowe's Festus, in English literature, was, we believe, the first regular drama and the only one of any note founded upon it; but, in Germany, the appearance of the great work of Goethe gave rise to a considerable number of attempts and imitations among poets of a minor class. There is, however, a marked peculiarity of method and treatment that distinguishes the Festus of our author from any of its predecessors. There is scarcely any thing in common between them, except the name and the bare outline of the story. It is difficult to state definitely the precise object and aim of the work as a whole. Innumerable eddies play upon the stream and distract the attention from its regular and onward flow. "It has a plan but no plot." The general design, however, seems to be to exhibit

> "the mind of youth
> In strengths and failings, in its overcomings
> And in its short comings.
> Its love of power, heed not how had, although
> With surety of self-ruin at the end.
> * * * * * *

All passions, and all pleasures, and all powers
Of man's heart, are brought in, and mind and frame.
"It aims to mark
The various beliefs as well as doubts
Which hold or search by turns the mind of youth
Unresting anywhere."

In the execution, the work is faithful to this mighty breadth of purpose. The opening scene is laid in heaven, and the work commences with a sublime chant from the cherubim and seraphim before the throne of God. Lucifer then appears, and, after an address to the Deity filled with the subdued eloquence of humility and sorrow, makes known the purpose of his visit.

God.

What wouldst thou, Lucifer?

Lucifer.

There is a youth
Among the sons of men I fain would have
Given up wholly to me.

God.

He is thine
To tempt.

Lucifer.

I thank thee, Lord.

God.

Upon his soul
Thou hast no power. *All souls are mine for aye.*
And I do give thee leave to this that he
May know my love is more than all his sin,
And prove unto himself that nought but God
Can satisfy the soul he maketh great.

* * * * *

Lucifer.

In him of whom I ask, I seek once more
To tempt the living world and then depart.

The Holy Ghost.

And I will hallow him to the ends of heaven,
That though he plunge his soul in sin like a sword
In water, it shall nowise cling to him.
He is of heaven. All things are known in heaven,
Ere aimed at upon earth. The child is chosen.

Thus we have, in the outset, a definite statement of the theology of the work. It is that of the final reconciliation of all souls.

"They who read not in the blest belief
That all souls may be saved, read to no end."

We perceive here, then, "a divided duty." It is our intention to examine, in the first place, the influence of this theological creed, as it is developed by the author, upon the character of the poem, leaving the question as to the poetry itself for after consideration. The grounds, upon which the doctrine of ultimate salvation is based, are those of Trinitarianism and Calvinism.

"All creatures being faulty by their nature,
And by God made all liable to sin,
God only could atone — and unto none
Except himself — for universal sin.
It is thus that God did sacrifice to God,
Himself unto himself, in the great way
Of Triune mystery."

The moral system of the work, of course, is fatalism.

"Free will is but necessity in play."

* * * * *

"However contrary man set his heart
To God, he is but working out his will;
And, at an infinite angle, more or less
Obeying his own soul's necessity."

* * * * *

"The soul is but an organ, and it hath
No power of good and evil in itself,
More than the eye hath power of light and dark."

This theory is the key-note to "Festus," the strain of its commencement and its close. It has been generally stated that the philosophy of the work is to show the mission of evil as a purifier. If such be its intention, we must consider the poem a complete but splendid failure. This is not shown, and, from the premises on which its theology reposes, can never be. Our poet believes that "we were made to be saved;" that the final cause of human nature is the bliss of heaven; that evil is an agent *appointed by the Almighty* for securing this ultimate design. With him,

"God's salvation waiteth not
On man's weak will or ministry."
"God makes,
Destroys, remakes, for his own pleasure, all."

His view of the final consummation, shows us man *made* "as high above temptation as ever sun o'er sea."

The legions of the lost return to heaven "transformed by the *bare behest of God* to the purest form of seraph brightness;" and, "seraph, cherub, angel, saint, man, fiend," are "*made pure* and unbelievably uplift above their present state." Such a theory of salvation, (and it is also held by many among us, though divested of its sole charm of poetic imagery,) does not solve the question of the *mission* of evil. It shows merely its *permission*, and its permission for no conceivable purpose but the arbitrary pleasure of the Deity. The philosophy, on which this theology is founded, and which it involves, throws no light on the mystery of our earthly existence. We live here to no purpose, for the lines of our present being will be severed at the grave. The problem of our earthly trials, and sufferings, and temptations, can never be resolved, for this world has no relation to the future. The earth is a useless intermediate stepping-stone between the darkness of nonentity and the splendors of the future world. We are to enter immediately at death upon our final spiritual condition; to become re-created beings with no moral history and no moral future, unbenefited and uninfluenced by the discipline of the past. This whole scheme of ultra theology and philosophy is founded on a radically erroneous conception of the nature and destiny of man. We were not "made to be saved." Our destiny is higher than mere bliss, though it be the bliss of a local heaven. The end of our being is the development of our nature, the full expansion of our highest spiritual faculties. Difficulty, and struggles, and trials, and temptations are the inevitable conditions of this growth, and these conditions imply the freedom of the will. This freedom need not, necessarily, be an absolute freedom, for man is not entirely self-dependent, but it is a freedom that requires the possibility of sin and suffering. Evil, then, so far as God is concerned, is not a positive institution; it is the necessary condition of a moral creation, a corollary of free agency, the central point from which the circle of a moral being is described, the shadow thrown from a self-determining spirit in presence of the light of a moral law. The mystery of evil, then, is merely the mystery of a moral nature, and it is solved when we feel the dignity of virtue and enjoy the peace that comes from spiritual strength. We need not

wait for a final consummation of all things in eternity to justify the character of God. No *final* consummation can ever come. The word final applies not to the affairs of the soul. Its life has no relations with time nor place, and death can effect no change in its relations to the moral law or to its destiny. It lives for progress, for progress whose condition is temptation, for progress not to be interrupted by the grave, but to be continued, under higher influences, perhaps, in heaven and through eternity. We can trace very clearly the results of the author's faith in the character he has given to Festus, and which, no doubt, is intended as a transcript of his own feelings and experience. We cannot better describe Festus than by saying that there is in him an immense quantity of being, and an intense capacity of feeling. His nature is impetuous and impulsive. The warp and woof of his constitution is imagination; and this, if it stimulates his intellect to unwonted activity, sustains his passions in a continual flame. He is not, however, sensual nor skeptical. He never "doubts, save tremblingly." Spiritual truths continually address his soul through the medium of beauty. The grandeur of the universe and an overpowering sense of God possess and fill his soul. Such a character cannot but be religious, but it may fall, from a wrong religious tendency. None needs more the continual check of a practical and healthy faith. The soul of Festus is ever chafed and fretted by the disproportion here between our powers and our will, and his imagination is fired by the promised glories of the future world. He sees no value in the present life, no dignity in his strife, no meaning in his discipline. He shows his faith by a longing and restless gaze towards heaven, and is impatient to slake his burning thirst for beauty in the revelations of eternity.

> "The sphinx-like heart,
> Consistent in his inconsistency,
> Loathes life the moment that life's riddle is read:
> The knot of our existence is untied,
> And we lie loose and useless. Life is had;
> And then we sigh and say, can this be all?
> It is not what we thought — It is very well —
> But we want something more — there is but death."

"Life's riddle" is never read except by earnest, steady

action, and we much doubt whether the "riddle" of the future life will be solved by moral inactivity and the passive satisfaction of bliss. At all events, it is continual action and the sense of progress alone that can explain the problem of our earthly being, and tame the imagination into a healthy and useful service from its riotous and feverish excess. But, with Festus, there is no expansiveness for our higher faculties afforded by our worldly condition. "Here there is nor ground nor light enough to live." He does not see that life is filled with plastic materials of character which must be moulded by our own will in order to fit us for eternity. Every thing is sharply defined by fate, and crystallized by the will of God. But the world offers full satisfaction to the senses, and Festus yields to the temptations which beset his passions, with the plea that,

> "Not yet can we o'ercome our nature here,
> Would we. If therefore passion strike the heart,
> Let it have length of line and plenteous play.
> The safety of superior principles
> Lies in exhaustion of the lower ones
> However vast or violent. Men and angels
> Obey the order of existence."

Thus in his own language, "the worm of the world had eaten out his heart." Death alone was the mad world's asylum. He waited for it,

> "Even as the boat lies rocking on the beach,
> Waiting the one white wave to float it free;"

and at last, sickened by the meagreness of misapprehended life, and tortured by the false glories of a wrongly-founded faith, he bowed his head at going out, and

> "Entered straight
> Another golden chamber of the king's,
> Larger than that he left and lovelier."

If Mr. Bailey's theory of evil be untrue in its philosophy, and disheartening as unfolded in the character of Festus, it certainly will be found to be unpoetical in his delineation of Lucifer. We, surely, should not complain of a system that would effectually banish Satan from the universe; but we do complain when he is left, shorn of his greatness and his glory. Leave to us, at least, a poetical appreciation of his

dignity and poetical sympathy with his woe. But the philosophy of "Festus" divests Lucifer of his whole nobility of character. He is not the fallen angel, as we knew him in "Paradise Lost." Milton's Satan is full of materials for poetry. He is a conscious rebel, the impersonation of deliberate, wilful sin. Mr. Bailey's Lucifer is a tool, an instrument of God, baited on the hook of an iron necessity, and writhing in the tortures of a nature which he cannot change. Milton's Satan acts from his own centre; his ruinous ambition is his glory, his will is his only law. Lucifer is entirely destitute of this moral strength; he feels that he is a slave, and moans for the lost glory of his former state. We are acquainted with the person of Milton's great archangel; we see that majestic form rising from the Stygian flood by its "own recovered strength;" we figure to ourselves the expression of that mind which gathered "resolution from despair," to whom, "ever to do ill was sole delight," and "out of good still to find means of evil;" we picture in our mind's eye those awful brows on which sat "dauntless courage" and the serenity of hate, that "faded cheek" blighted with care, that face "deep scars of thunder had intrenched," and we feel in his presence struggling emotions of respect and awe. He rises sublime before us like a mountain with its bare and blasted summit still threatening the clouds; he stands to us for a noble and perfect incarnation of evil; the perversion of a mighty will. But Lucifer has none of this engaging dignity of character, nor definiteness of person. He is but the shadowy outline of a metaphysical principle. There are in him, no depths of hate, no heights of pride. His soul is not in his work, but he goes blindly on his appointed path as the "arrow knoweth not its end and aim." The depth of his nature is sounded in his eloquent complaint:—

> "I know
> Nor joy nor sorrow; but a changeless tone
> Of sadness, like the nightwind's, is the strain
> Of what I have of feeling. I am not
> As other spirits—but a solitude,
> Even to myself; I the sole spirit, sole."

Mr. Bailey is true to his theory of evil in the delineation of Lucifer, and it is not, of course, his fault that he could

not mould him into a more powerful and dramatic form. No poet, probably, would succeed better, who should attempt to embody a conscious unconsciousness and a personal impersonality. Miss Barrett's Lucifer, in the "Drama of Exile," is a logical devil. He will not be conjured except in the strictest form of ratiocination; he prides himself on the skill of his postulates, and loves a match with Gabriel at dialectics. His nature is not deep. Memories of paradise disturb him. He relieves his fate by a petty wrath at Adam, and derives consolation for his self-esteem from the superior dignity of his woe. Neither Mr. Bailey nor Miss Barrett have made any approach to Goethe in his conception of the great arch-fiend; Mr. Bailey, from a false view of evil, Miss Barrett from a lack of poetic power. Mephistophiles, as a creation, may rank with Satan. But he is a devil of a different class, less imposing to the imagination, but more dreadful to the thought. The essence of his being is depravity. He is the true Ahriman; evil raised to its highest power, self conscious and self satisfied. He has every feature of the true devil of the nineteenth century. His soul is intellect, divested of all feeling and all imagination. The presence of God cannot warm him into pathos. Love is blighted in his presence, and innocence cannot pray. His piercing glance cuts through all the shells of appearance, and reaches and reveals in every thing a core of rottenness. Satan's temperament is a mixture of the sanguine and the bilious; Mephistophiles is wholly nervous. He does not waste his time in a fruitless contest with Omnipotence, to gratify offended pride. He is a greater master of his art. The force of the Titan is not his strength; his business is where weakness affords an entrance, and where craft may insure success. He knows "nothing in the world more insipid than a devil that despairs." We second the sentiment of Mephistophiles. We have a poetical, if not a religious, faith in Satan; and when he is raised by a poetic charm, we prefer that he should not come in the form of an agreeable acquaintance, but with all the graces and horrors of the lord of hell. It is to be regretted, therefore, that a false metaphysical creed should have fettered Mr. Bailey's genius, and prevented him from giving us a picture of the great fiend that would have done credit to his poetic pow-

ers, and that might have been symbolically true as a representation of the nature of evil.

But it is time that we turn to a consideration of the poetry of Festus. This will be to us a more grateful task; and, if a sense of duty has compelled us to speak with plainness of the theology of the book, we will endeavor with equal freedom to express our admiration of the genius it everywhere displays. We cannot call to mind a single poem of which the plan could, *a priori*, give less flattering promise of success. The author's philosophical theory is wholly unfavorable to the development of force of character, for it cuts away from Lucifer, who must, of course, be the centre of dramatic interest, every element of dramatic strength. He rejects, too, all the horrors with which the popular faith of the time invested the missionaries of hell, and all the poetic wealth of the Rosicrucian machinery, of which Goethe so admirably availed himself in his grandly finished work. Mr. Bailey seizes the spiritual element alone. And yet, never have we read a poem or a drama which, by the pure vigor of imagination, so holds the mind enchained from the very first, by a continual and unbroken charm. His genius is superior to all the difficulties of his plan. Dramatic interest and artistic arrangement are forgotten, while we are upborne upon this mighty, heaving sea of imagination. We do not stop to ask, in the elevation of our feelings and the intoxication of the senses, whether his splendid passages be metaphysically true or false; whether they come from the mouth of Lucifer, or Clara, or Festus, or an angel; and we care not, for the moment, if the scene be a midnight revel, or space, or heaven, or the "fire-crypts of the world." Whether this kind of poetry be the most enduring, we shall not, now, stop to inquire; but the appearance of a work like Festus, at the present time, suggests an interesting question as to the laws of poetry, which we cannot refrain from alluding to in passing.

It has been a favorite theory with some critics, that poetry necessarily declines with the progress of refinement. Poetry is founded on the imagination; and they contend that the imagination produces its most powerful illusions, and holds its greatest sway, in an age of ignorance and darkness. They distinguish, however, between poetry as a mental act,

and poetry as a species of composition; between the power and the expression; and contend that the former may decline while the latter is improving. This is accounted for by the influence of language. In a barbarous age, when the poetic faculty is in its prime, language, too loose and vague, may be inadequate as a medium of communication. Language and imagination continually react upon each other, and scientific cultivation always tends to the perfection of the instrument of thought by making it more sharp, and simple, and defined. It is, therefore, at that precise period of progress, when language is refined enough to be definite, without having lost its flexibility, and, when imagination, though less brilliant, has not yielded to the dominion of science, that the great masterpieces of poetry are produced. It is a sublime and fleeting period in the history of human culture, enduring only while this delicate and trembling balance is sustained. Then comes the period of criticism, the period when language has become too abstract for the imagination; the period of science, and reflection, and philosophy. Then poetry inevitably declines; and, if there come a moment of revival, it is but an Indian summer, that brings not the bloom and sap of life, — out of season, leafless, blossomless, and barren. Macaulay has developed, at some length, this theory of poetic progress and decline; and, as might be expected from his masterhand, has wrought it out with all the precision of logic, and supported it by a plentiful store of illustration, and a rapid view of the history of the arts. We never read a finer specimen of polished and seemingly impartial criticism. Yet we are satisfied that the theory is founded on an error. We are not convinced that the imagination is *absolutely* more developed in an age of barbarism. It may be, and probably is, relatively stronger, on account of the weakness of the reasoning powers. Besides, poetry we believe to be an essential element in human nature, and we should be careful how we admit that any essential element is degraded by civilization. The poetic feeling of an ignorant age is not purer because it produces the most palpable outward effects, any more than its faith is purer because it is manifested in bloody rites and savage forms. The simple fact is this, that both poetry and faith reflect the general cultivation and attainment. Undoubtedly,

there is a peculiarity which marks all early poetry. "It has the unstudied movement and unconscious charm of childhood. It fills the mind with a sense of the golden light and dewy freshness of morning." It does not follow, however, that this peculiarity is the essence and idea of poetry. The poetry and faith of childhood are beautiful, but they are superficial, nevertheless, and founded on appearance. This theory, too, seemingly resting on a broad induction from facts in poetic history, is vitiated by wrongly estimating the most important fact: the nature of poetry itself. Poetry rests on beauty, as philosophy is founded on truth, or as religion rests on love. "It lifts the veil from the hidden beauty of the world." Surely, the perception of beauty is not cultivated by ignorance, nor refined by barbarism. Less enlightened times are generally captivated by one element merely, and that, the most superficial and the lowest element: the poetry of the senses; a gaudy splendor, an exaggerated sublimity. The theory we are considering should, logically, accept this element as the highest form of beauty. True beauty, however, is myriad-sided, and cultivation tends to reconcile its different elements, to reveal its orbed perfection, that it may chasten, and elevate, and satisfy every faculty of the soul. Who will say that Christianity has not revealed a higher idea of beauty than is enveloped in any previous religion, and, that its influence on civilization does not continually tend to unfold it in a purer form? Yet Mr. Macaulay must prefer Judaism, for its elements of force and physical grandeur. Who believes that science, to a spiritual mind, has not invested nature with a more engaging loveliness and a purer charm? But Mr. Macaulay, to be consistent, should mourn for Jupiter departed, and the naiads charmed away, and the disbanded beauty of the rainbow, and the lost eloquence of thunder. The direction of human culture is always towards spiritualism; and this tendency, if it soften the wilder features of imagination, refines the poetic power by opening to it, more and more, the infinite depths of beauty that are closed to the grosser eye of sense. The perception of the delicate relations that connect the outer and the inner world, the refined sensibility to which nature presents itself as a symbol of the mind, the mastery of those nice associations that refer all things to a higher

law of beauty, and make every feature of the material universe suggestive of qualities which they do not exhaust, — all these are purified and deepened by the progress of science, refinement, and religion. And this brings us to the question as to the influence of language. We cannot admit that language, as it improves, becomes unfitted for the purposes of poetry. If it be true that beauty, in proportion as it is truly appreciated, is seen to be more subtile and spiritual, the scientific cultivation of language, by giving it more keenness and a finer polish, improves it rather as an instrument for the poet's use. A more delicate medium of expression is absolutely necessary to seize and convey the fleeting shades of beauty that flit across the poet's soul. The same law, therefore, by which, at any stage of cultivation, language becomes more capable of poetic expression, will hold good for every degree of precision to which refinement may extend. The genius of a great poet does not depend, for its manifestation, on the accident of language. No doubt, in the twilight of civilization, language is indefinite and vague; unfit for the highest purposes of poetry. It is so, because it reflects the general cultivation of the time. But the imagination also is developed under the conditions of this culture, and could not use a finer instrument until itself had become more spiritual and pure. The theory we are considering, will not hold good for any period of cultivation. The difference between Æschylus, who frightened people into fits, and Sophocles, whose tragedies have a sharper outline and finer finish, cannot be accounted for by an essential change in the Attic dialect. Unfortunately, these two great poets were contemporaries and rivals. The characteristics of their genius were different, and they represented with brilliant success opposite, but equally important, phases of poetic beauty. Two other instances occur to us, which cannot, by any possibility, consist with this principle of the despotism of words. Plato, certainly, was thorough master of a language polished to the utmost degree of precision; he possessed an acuteness of intellect equal to any shade of discrimination and all the intricacies of dialectics, and yet, no man will affirm that it was *in spite* of the perfection of the instruments of thought, that he threw around the dryness of metaphysics that witching grace, and sketched with

such delicacy of touch the finest elements of beauty, thus securing to himself a rank, secondary as a poet, only because he is unrivalled as a philosopher. We draw the other instance from our own country and our very midst. No one acquainted with the writings of Mr. Emerson, can have failed to remark his marvellous skill in language, and the philological exactness of his style. His words are polished steel, and the sharpness of his periods pierces to the core of obscurity. But we can produce, from his orations, passages that, for the highest qualities of poetic beauty, cannot be exceeded in any literature. It is no objection to the force of these illustrations that they are drawn from writers of prose. Verse is the beautiful vesture, not the soul, of poetry; and leaving out of view the capacity of both for the "toil divine," the force of the theory we are criticising, must lie against the possibility, not the form, of poetic excellence. But we are convinced that the theory itself was suggested by a laudable desire to explain the mystery attending the appearance of the great masters of poetry. This, however, it does not and cannot do. It cannot be entirely accounted for, by all the circumstances of their time. Many of the elements of their success, may, undoubtedly, be detected in the state of cultivation, in the condition of language, and in the relations which connect them with the theatre in which they act; but their genius is a mystery to themselves. They flow from the hidden heart of nature. We believe that they are providential. We know no reason why literature, which exercises such a powerful sway over the happiness and destiny of men, should not be an agent of God's providence, and enjoy his protecting care. And we cannot doubt that there is a secret, only to be dispelled by a religious view of history, in the appearance of every genius who comes to refresh the heart of the world and quicken its pulses with a freer flow of life. Thus, in Shakspeare, the many rays of beauty were collected, and thrown in a burning stream of light upon the English mind. There was, in him, the unconsciousness of necessity, and a charming ignorance of the greatness of his mission. His is not the cold effulgence of reflected light; he reposes motionless on the axis of his being, upheld by the hand of God, and dispensing his liberal heat from its exhaustless

stores. After these periods of spontaneous development, comes criticism, which dissects the complex mystery, and divulges to the world the secret of its composition. Then begins a different tendency, equally important and equally valid; the tendency to poetry of artistic excellence and beauty of form. Cultivation, and the consequent refinement of language, assist this tendency. Former poetry, the poetry of inspired genius, sprang from the spontaneousness of necessity and ignorance; the problem now is, to rise to the spontaneousness of art. The ruling qualities in the productions of genius are vigor and strength; the new tendency requires also sweetness and grace and polish. We might, if time and room permitted, examine the instances of this artistic tendency in the poetry of Goethe and Schiller. Goethe, to us, is the purest specimen of the unconsciousness of art.

But we must hasten on. The latter schools of English poetry have travelled in this direction. One same striving for the simplicity of art and beauty of form, may be discovered in poets of, otherwise, very different schools. It is seen in Scott and Coleridge and Wordsworth and Shelley; it is less marked in Byron, who wrote more from passion, and was confessedly false to his poetic creed. They have endeavored, unconsciously, in a great measure, to infuse and work up into poetry, through the medium of art, neglected elements that are essential to perfection. The highest ideal of poetry is the colorlessness of light, a pure transparent medium of beauty; but, there are few minds, whose diamond texture can throw back the complex simplicity of its beam. And modern poets, though they have not sacrificed imagination to the other qualities of their style, may, perhaps, have refined too much its vigor and dissipated its strength. If, so, we may safely say, that in Mr. Bailey, the imagination has reasserted its power and re-claimed its rights. He is a knotty problem for the believers in the theory of poetic progress and decline. Many of his prominent characteristics are those of the greater bards; the same spontaneous flow, the same lofty, inspired strength. There are scarcely any relations connecting him with the latter schools of poetry. He has over eaped the forming influences of cultivation. He comes whole from the depths of nature. An absence of

nearly all the elements that distinguish modern poetry, is observable in his work. He is no artist. Feeling gushes forth to a natural expression with resistless force. So that words be adequate to his strength of passion, beauty of form is disregarded and unsought. He is the great apostle of the imagination. His brain throbs with it, and his pulses beat. By it,

> "The viewless arrows of his thoughts are headed
> And winged with flame."

Nature is clothed with higher forms of beauty, and language heated and tempered pliant to his will. We have, before, spoken of the lack of dramatic qualities and interest in Festus. The poem is rather lyric and didactic. There is no working up of character, no subordination of the scene to the exhibition of the person, no nice discrimination and delicate finish of the finer traits that make up an individual being, and distinguish a concrete reality from an ideal quality. Mr. Bailey's characters are merely names, mouthpieces for the convenient utterance of his changing feelings. His dialogue, so far from being dramatic, is hardly conversational. There is seldom any clash of thought, any chafing of different mental peculiarities to provoke an intellectual flame, which is the true idea of conversation. It is the poet, always, who speaks in didactic eloquence or lyric passion, baring his secret thought and the yearnings and tortures of his soul. Artistic merit and formal beauty, the coördination and symmetry of parts, that imply a definite conception of plan towards which the poet labors, and to which he bends all the powers of his mind, must not be sought in Festus. We are sorry these are absent, but the reason, we think, is clear. It is found in the character and strength of the author's imagination. Imagination is the creative faculty of the mind. It fuses the elements of our actual experience, recasts them in purer shapes, and clothes them in ideal forms. But the manner in which it displays itself, depends upon the other mental faculties with which it is associated. To create an ideal character by a new combination of qualities which we have never seen actually conjoined, to unfold it with complete consistency and show its workings in all circumstances and under all conditions, is one of the most

difficult tasks imposed on human genius. And it is difficult, not so much from the power of imagination that it requires, as from the cultivation of the intellectual and reasoning faculties that is necessary to direct the imagination, control its fire, and sustain it in a proper equilibrium. From this union and this balance, sprang Macbeth and Hamlet and Lear and Falstaff; from it, also, the horrors of Pandemonium, Prospero's enchanted isle, and the witch night-scene of Faust. Mr. Bailey's mind is not thus happily organized. His imagination is developed somewhat at the expense of his reason. He has all the enthusiasm and vigor, but not enough practical ability, for a poet of enduring fame. His wealth is scattered with "royal lavishment;" would that he had been, not less bounteous, but more prudent in its display. A diamond upon the finger, a jewel upon the breast, exhibit a brighter lustre and show to more advantage, than twenty scattered at random upon the floor. We do not mean that the poetry of Festus is deficient in thought. We hope to convince our readers, shortly, that its ideas, as well as imagery, can stir the blood and elevate the mind. But, had half the poetic power carelessly lavished on every page, been concentrated and worked into the characters and the plan of the piece, it would rank higher for artistic skill without having its claims as a work of genius weakened or impaired.

But it is time that we relieve the tediousness of criticism by some passages from the work itself. Let us remark, however, in passing, that we see no justice in the charge of irreverence, which we have heard intimated against Mr. Bailey, because he sometimes uses the name of God "in all its awful brevity." The instances which probably gave rise to the remark, occur in the opening chant of the cherubim in heaven, and we regret that our limits will not allow us to publish it entire. We agree, however, with the author in his defence, that,

> "The man who sees
> Irreverence in that name, must have been used
> To take that name in vain; and the same man
> Would see obscenity in pure white statues."

The opening scenes of Festus, bear, to us, a different character from those of the middle and the close. There

are, in them, more calmness and self-possession, and, particularly in the tempting scene, more finish of dialogue and less interruption in the order of thought. We cannot better introduce to the reader the qualities of Mr. Bailey's style, than by transferring the address of Lucifer to the angel of earth, upon the destiny of our planet.

> "'T is earth shall lead destruction; she shall end.
> The stars shall wonder why she comes no more
> On her accustomed orbit, and the sun
> Miss one of his eleven of light; the moon,
> An orphan orb, shall seek for earth for aye
> Through time's untrodden depths, and find her not;
> No more shall morn out of the holy east,
> Stream o'er the amber air her level light;
> Nor evening, with the spectral fingers, draw
> Her star-sprent curtain round the head of earth;
> Her footsteps never thence again shall grace
> The blue sublime of heaven. Her grave is dug.
> I see the stars, night-clad, all gathering
> In long and dark procession. Death's at work.
> And, one by one, shall all yon wandering worlds,
> Whether in orbed path they roll, *or trail,*
> *In an inestimable length of light,*
> *Their golden train of tresses after them,*
> *Cease*, and the sun, centre and sire of light,
> The keystone of the world-built arch of heaven,
> Be left in burning solitude. The stars
> Which stand as thick as dew-drops on the fields
> Of heaven, and all they comprehend, shall pass.
> The spirits of all worlds shall all depart
> To their great destinies; and thou and I,
> Greater in grief than worlds, shall live as now."

The beauty of this passage will not be lessened, for the readers of Milton and Collins, from the fact that two of the lines suggest two of the finest passages in Comus and in the Ode to Evening. Mr. Bailey's love of beauty is a continual, unsatisfied, ever-burning thirst. Like every true poet, he has an intimate sympathy with the outward universe in all its forms. He is the child of nature, and to her "he turns heart, arm, and brain." We subscribe to one element, at least, of his religious creed:

> "Some souls lose all things but the love of beauty,
> And by that love they are redeemable;
> For in love and beauty they acknowledge good."

And again, who has not felt the truth of this inquiry, —

> "How can the beauty of material things
> So win the heart, and work upon the mind
> Unless like-natured with them? *Are great* things
> And thoughts of the same blood? They have like effect."

There is deep meaning in the earnest question of these last two lines. Never, at least, have we so felt a conviction of the highest truths that address themselves to the inmost soul, the existence of God, the beauty of Christian faith, the dignity of human nature, the truth and meaning of immortality, as when, by some inexplicable association they have been suggested by the quiet serenity of nature, the solemn stillness of the forest, the impressive silence of the mountain summit, the reflective beauty of the moon-lit lake. If there be mystery in this, there is equal mystery in that ordinance of nature, by which the poet's imagination outruns the capacity of reason, and reaches, by a spontaneous bound, truths that defy the creeping pace of logic. Every great poet furnishes illustrations of this fact, and Festus is full of instances in point. How finely has Mr. Bailey expressed a subtile feeling, to which the experience of every sensitive mind responds, that

> "There are points from which we can command our life;
> When the soul sweeps the future like a glass;
> And coming things, full freighted with our fate,
> Jut out, dark, on the offing of the mind."

Again, how true is it, that

> "Night brings out stars as sorrow shows us truths,
> Though many, yet they help not; bright they light not.
> They are too late to serve us; and sad things
> Are, aye, too true. We never see the stars
> Till we can see nought but them. So with truth."

But the finest instance in the whole poem of this grasp of truth by the imagination, occurs in one of the dialogues between Lucifer and Festus.

> *Lucifer.*
>
> Why love mankind?
> The affections are thy system's weaknesses,
> The wasteful outlets of self-maintenance.
>
> *Festus.*
>
> The wild flower's tendril proof of feebleness,
> Proves strength; and so we fling our feelings out,
> The tendrils of the heart, to bear us up.

Never was stoicism more nobly stated; never have we seen it refuted with such cutting keenness of logic disguised in the drapery of beauty. Intimately connected with this poetic temperament is a susceptibility to love. There is, we confess, a mystery to us in Festus' sudden changes of attachment. No reason is assigned for them, nor can we see that the poet intended to trace any clear connection between the character of those to whom he is successively attached, and any downward tendency of Festus' mind. But there is one picture of his earliest love, which, for purity of feeling and beauty of description, we are tempted to transfer to our pages.

"I loved her for that she was beautiful,
And that to me she seemed to be all nature,
And all varieties of things in one;
Would set at night in clouds of tears, and rise
All light and laughter in the morning; yea
And that she never schooled within her breast
One thought or feeling, but gave holiday
To all; and that she made all, even mine
In the communion of love.

* * * * * *

"She whom I once loved died;
The lightning loathes its cloud — the soul its clay;
Can I forget that hand I took in mine,
Pale as pale violets; that eye, where mind
And matter met alike divine? Ah, no;
May God that moment judge me when I do!
Oh! she was fair; her nature once all spring,
And deadly beauty like a maiden sword:
Startlingly beautiful. I see her now!
Whatever thou art, thy soul is in my mind;
Thy shadow hourly lengthens o'er my brain,
And peoples all its pictures with thyself."

We have called attention to Mr. Bailey's sympathy with nature. It is different, however, from that of every other poet with whom we are acquainted. His appreciation of the beautiful is not the voluptuous sense of Keats, nor the unrealizing faculty of Shelley. He does not repose with quiet satisfaction on the bosom of nature like Wordsworth, neither does he possess the power to paint a scene with the ethereal finish, nor draw over the outward world a misty veil of beauty, that makes Tennyson unrivalled. His sympathies are with nature in her grander scenes and the moments of her sublimer strength; and here, all other poets must yield the palm to him. He loves

"To walk earth's woods when the storm bends his bow,
And volleys all his arrows off at once;
* * * * * to scale the cloud-clad hills,
While thunders murmur in his very ear;
To leap the lair of the live cataract,
And pray its foaming pardon for the insult."

But, especially is his genius fired by the glories of the heavens. Earth is too meagre for the breadth of his imagination. His noblest imagery is drawn from the upper world. Poets, like Wordsworth and Tennyson, shine, in different degrees of splendor, amid the poetic firmament, with the fixed and steady glory of the stars. Mr. Bailey's mind is not thus constituted. He goes from the hand of nature, impressed with more centrifugal than centripetal force, and flies on his eccentric path, now catching the very blaze of the great "sire of light," and, ere long, plunging beyond the round of "six moon'd Uranus," and searching the darkness of the confines of creation. We can hardly imagine any thing more brilliant than the following apostrophe to the heavens:

"O Heaven, I love thee ever! Sole and whole,
Living and comprehensive of all life;
Thee, agy world, thee, universal Heaven,
And heavenly universe! thee, sacred seat
Of intellective time, the throned stars
And old oracular night; by night or day
To me thou canst not but be beautiful,
Boundless, all central, universal sphere.
Whether the sun all light thee, or the moon,
Embayed in clouds, mid starry islands round,
With mighty beauty inundate the air;
Or when one star, *like a great drop of light,*
From her full flowing urn hangs tremulous —
Yea, like a tear from her the eye of night
Let fall o'er nature's volume as she reads —
Or when in radiant thousands each star reigns
In imparticipable royalty,
* * * * * * * * * *
more and more
I love thee, *thinking on the splendid calm*
Which bounds the deadly fever of these days."

For freshness of language, and sustained vigor of imagination, and the noble tribute it offers to the immortality of genius, we look upon the following passage as equal to any thing in English poetry:

"Yes; there was a time
When tomes of ancient song held eye and heart —
Were the sole lore I recked of; the great bards
Of Greece, of Rome, and mine own master land,
And they who in the holy book are deathless —
Men who have vulgarized sublimity,
And bought up truth for the nations; parted it
As soldiers lotted once the garb of God, —
Men who have forged gods — uttered — made them pass;
In whose words, to be read with many a heaving
Of the heart, is a power, like wind in rain."

* * * * * *

"Whose thoughts, like bars of sunshine in shut rooms,
Mid gloom, all glory, win the world to light —
Who make their very follies like their souls:
And, like the young moon with a ragged edge,
Still in their imperfection, beautiful."

* * * * * *

"Men whose great thoughts possess us like a passion
Through every limb and the whole heart; whose words
Haunt us as eagles haunt the mountain air;
Thoughts which command all coming times and minds
As from a tower, a warden — fix themselves
Deep in the heart as meteor stones in earth,
Dropped from some higher sphere."

* * * * * *

"Men who walk up to fame as to a friend
Of their own house, which from the wrongful heir
They have wrested, from the world's hard hand and gripe —
Men who, like death, all bone, but all unarmed,
Have ta'en the giant world by the throat and thrown him;
And made him swear to maintain their name and fame
At peril of his life — who shed great thoughts
As easily as an oak looseneth its golden leaves,
In a kindly largess to the soil it grew on —
Whose names are ever on the world's broad tongue
Like sound upon the falling of a force —
Who play upon the heart as on a harp,
And make our eyes bright as we speak of them —
Whose hearts have a look southwards, and are open
To the whole noon of nature — these I have waked
And wept o'er, night by night; oft pondering thus:
Homer is gone; and where is Jove? and where
The rival cities seven? His song outlives
Time, tower, and god — all that then was save heaven."

A beautiful specimen of thought, pointed and chastened by imagination, comes from the lips of an angel in a dialogue with Festus. Its philosophy is worthy of the intellect of a purified spirit.

"Pain overgot gives peace, as death does heaven.
All things that speak of heaven speak of peace.
Peace hath more might than war. High brows are calm.
Great thoughts are still as stars; and truths, like suns,
Stir not; though many systems tend round them.
Mind's step is still as death's; and all great things,
Which cannot be controlled, whose end is good."

We are glad that Mr. Bailey has clothed his angels with higher qualities than wings and simple innocence. The society of one whom he has described suggests to us a noble idea of the intellectual pleasures of the future world.

"His thoughts all great and solemn and serene,
Like the immensest features of an orb,
Whose eyes are blue seas, and whose clear, broad brow
Some cultured continent, came ever round,
From truth to truth, day bringing as they came.
He was to me an all-explaining spirit,
Teaching divine things by analogy
With mortal and material."

* * * * * *

"However bright or beautiful itself,
The theme he touched, he made it more so by
His own light, like a fire-fly on a flower."

We have marked an exquisite passage, illustrating our poet's symbolical method of interpreting nature, which it would be selfish to withhold.

"O Earth! why, why art thou
Thus glorious, and 't were not to sate the soul,
And chide us for the senseless dream of heaven?
The still strong stream sweeps onward to its end,
Like one of the great purposes of God;
Or like, may be, a soul like mine to Him.
Along yon deep blue vein upon thy bosom,
Earth! I could float for ever. See it there —
Winding among its green and smiling isles,
Like charity amidst her children dear;
Or peace, rejoicing in her olive wreaths,
And gladdening as she glides along the lands."

A strong imagination is never conservative. Nothing actual or present satisfies it. The same force which makes it seek an ideal beauty, compels it to anticipate the course of time and to support the cause of the "world's better future." Mr. Bailey is another example of a truth supported, at least, by the history of Dante and Milton and Shelley. Hear his lesson to monarchs:

"Let them remember they are set on thrones,
As representatives, not substitutes,
Of nations, to implead with God and man.
Let tyrants who hate truth, or fear the free,
Know that to rule in slavery and error,
For the mere ends of personal pomp and power,
Is such a sin as doth deserve a hell
To itself sole. Let both remember, Lord!
They are but things like-natured with all nations;
That mountains issue out of plains, and not
Plains out of mountains, and so likewise kings
Are of the people, not the people of kings."

We hardly imagine that Mr. Bailey will ever arrive to the dignity of poet laureate; at least, not till age has tempered his radicalism, and thrown around the church establishment a greater charm. He dares to pray

"That orders be distinguished, not by wealth,
But piety and power of teaching souls.
Equalize labor, Lord! and recompense.
Let not a hundred humble pastors starve,
In this, or any land of Christendom,
While one or two impalaced, mitred, throned
And banqueted, *burlesque, if not blasphemo*
The holy penury of the Son of God;
The fastings, the footwanderings, and the preachings
Of Christ and his first followers."

One of the great excellences of the poetry of Festus, is, the multitude of finely-wrought figures drawn from the outward world to express and illustrate moral and spiritual truths. It is quite remarkable, that the imagination of a young writer should keep itself so entirely free from mixed metaphors and half-formed analogies, that, too often, spring up like noxious weeds, from an excessive richness of the soil. The following, taken at random, are fair examples of a crowd which we might select.

"Hast ever seen
A drowning dragon-fly floating down a brook
Topping the sunny ripples as they rise,
Till in some ambushed eddy it is sucked down
By something underneath? Thus with the rich,
Their gilding makes their death conspicuous."

"The world hath much that's great, and but one sea,
Which is her spirit; and to her it stands
As the mad monarch passion of the heart —
Fathomless, overwhelming, which receives

The rivers of all feeling; in whose depths
Lie wrecked the riches of all nature."

"A few fair deeds
Bedeck my life, like gilded cherubs on
A tomb, beneath which lie dust, decay, and darkness."

A volume of the beauties of Shakspeare having been shown to Charles Lamb, he asked, "Where are the other eleven?" Any one attempting to collect the beauties of Festus would be puzzled to settle the conflicting claims of almost every page to a place in the selection. We shall only rob the work of one more gem with which to adorn our pages. It is a diamond of the purest water.

"Oh! love is like the rose,
And a month it may not see,
Ere it withers where it grows —
Rosalie!

"I loved thee from afar;
Oh! my heart was lift to thee,
Like a glass up to a star —
Rosalie!

"Thine eye was glassed in mine,
As the moon is in the sea,
And its shine was on the brine —
Rosalie!

"The rose hath lost its red,
And the star is in the sea,
And the briny tear is shed —
Rosalie!"

We have thus attempted to give an impartial sketch of this great poem; to exhibit candidly its merits and defects. We have endeavored to prove that both have a common cause: the vigor and richness and strength of the author's imagination. It is these that make him inferior to Wordsworth and Keats and Tennyson, in continuity of plan, in softness of coloring, and in finish of execution; it is these that make him superior to all, in grandeur of thought, in boldness of imagery, and in vigorous, impassioned style. For pure power of imagination, Festus should be classed with the Iliad and Macbeth and Paradise Lost. Mr. Bailey's book is full of promise for the prospects of poetry. It is a noble refutation of the theory that the tendencies of

culture are unfavorable to its growth. But, especially does it prove, that the experience and discipline of the human soul offer, of themselves, an inexhaustible mine of materials for the purposes of the imagination. Every thing, in the history of poetry, points to the coming of a greater master who shall combine all the excellences of every class, of the classic, romantic, and sentimental schools, and enlarge, still more, the sphere of poetry, by unfolding more clearly, in every thing, the great elements on which it rests. Science and philosophy are preparing his path by piercing below the outward appearances of nature, the apparent confusion of history, and the seeming discord of the moral world, and showing, in the charming simplicity of the laws that govern the hidden life of the universe, and in the noble plan which all things are seen to strengthen, and to which all things tend, that the inspiration of the poet need not depend on ignorance, but that, everywhere, beauty is one with truth. And Christianity, as it throws more interest around human nature, and elevates and sanctifies every relation of life, offers to his use, in addition to the spheres of science and philosophy, the yet unsounded depths of the human heart. The great Christian poet has not yet come. Whatever might be Mr. Bailey's other qualifications, his view of human life, his theory of evil, and of the connection between this world and the future, would not warrant any faith that he is called to this great office. But, if the promise of universal education, contained in Christianity, be not deceptive, such a poet will surely come. The greatness and genius of the poets who have gone before him, will not be the measure of his genius and his greatness. "Works of the intellect are great only by comparison with each other, but nothing is great — not mighty Homer and Milton — beside the infinite reason." So Shakspeare and Wordsworth and Goethe and Coleridge do not exhaust the sources of beauty that perpetually spring up and flow from nature, religion, and the soul. Poetry is not dead, nor dying; it has scarce chanted its first song. When the inspired poet of Christianity shall come; when the meaning of this existence, the mystery of evil, the strife with temptation, the connection between the outward world and the human soul, shall be the themes of a great drama, worked up by

an imagination that will be guided by reason and softened by Christian love, then the world will see that "the richest romance — the noblest fiction that was ever woven — the heart and soul of beauty — lies inclosed in human life."

T. S. K.

Art. XXXI.

The Flesh, Body, &c., as the Cause of Sin.

In the New Testament, we find the terms flesh, flesh and blood, body, &c., used in various senses. Besides the proper meaning, which it is unnecessary to illustrate, they have several of a metaphorical kind, some of which are nearly related to the literal idea, and some but remotely connected with it. "Flesh and blood," sometimes denotes men living in this world. Thus, when Peter confessed that Jesus was "the Christ, the Son of the living God," our Saviour replied, "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven;" that is, Peter had not received this truth from men, but from God. St. Paul says, when alluding to his own conversion, "Immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood, neither went I up to Jerusalem, to them which were apostles before me;" meaning that he sought counsel of no man. "We wrestle not," says he again, "with flesh and blood, but with principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world:" we contend not bodily against the physical strength of men, as do the wrestlers in the Grecian games, but against evil authorities and influences. In a similar sense, the single term flesh is sometimes used, as a generalization, for living men. Said Christ, with reference to the destruction of the Jewish state, "except those days be shortened, there shall no flesh be saved;" that is, no people will otherwise survive. "All flesh shall see the salvation of God;" all the world shall behold it. "By the deeds of the law," says St. Paul, "shall no flesh be justified," or no living person. Of husband and wife, it is frequently said, "they twain shall be one flesh," or one person in the relations of the present life.

But we find, in the New Testament, another metaphorical usage of these and similar terms, which is of a more remarkable character, since it involves a moral element. The flesh, the body, or its members, often denote sinful affections, or rather the immediate impulses that lead to sin. Every careful reader of the New Testament must have observed how frequent and favorite a representation it is, that the flesh, the body, its members, &c., are of sinful influence, and that whatsoever is done by these is morally corrupt. St. Paul says, "I know that in me, that is in my flesh, is no good thing." And again: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other." All sin is thus attributed to the flesh; and this, not only when it is of such a kind that we can trace some natural connection between it and the body, as in the case of lewdness and other corporeal excesses, but also when the sin is such as appears to belong solely to the mind, as envy, pride, impiety, false religion, superstition, &c. It is said, "the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these: adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, *idolatry*, *witchcraft*, *hatred*, *variance*, *emulations*, *wrath*, *strife*, seditions, *heresies*, *envyings*, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like." On the other hand, the mind or spirit of man, contrasted with the flesh or body, is sometimes represented as pure, and as according thoroughly with the law of God, at the same time that the latter is striving to maintain the dominion of sin. Says the apostle, "I delight in the law of God after the inward man, [*that is*, the mind;] but I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin. . . . . So then, with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of sin." Nor is this manner of representation confined to a few insulated texts, as if it were accidental; it fills a large space in the New Testament, occurs in a great variety of forms, and appears to be of familiar use, so that it must be underlaid by some general principle.

We think, however, that the meaning has been frequently misunderstood, by taking the language in too literal a sense, and by overlooking other considerations that manifestly belong to the subject. We think, too, that the

mistake has led to some wrong conclusions, which affect our view of the nature of sin and righteousness, and that obscure the relations we hold as moral agents. We therefore venture on the subject, with the hope of contributing somewhat towards clearing it up, though we do not expect to bring out, into perfect light, every thing that belongs to it. Even should we mistake on some points, the error may serve to set others on exploring the field, and lead them to complete what we here begin.

The first thing to be observed, is, that the representation spoken of, as occupying so large a space in the New Testament, is, nevertheless, peculiar to St. Paul's writings. Nowhere else do we meet with any clear and unquestionable instance of it, under whatever form, though there are a few expressions in the other writers, that might, perhaps, be referred, if necessary, to the same general signification. Thus, St. John says, when speaking of those who first believed in Christ, that "they were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God;" where, however, the meaning probably is, that their new birth was not by physical agency, by "the will of the flesh," like the first, nor indeed by those influences that prevailed among men, but by the spirit of God. Christ also says to Nicodemus, who had just affected to take the new birth literally, as but a repetition of the natural birth,—"that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the spirit is spirit." But here it is doubtful whether he means more than that such a new birth, as Nicodemus had just suggested, would be only a corporeal one, like the first, and that the spirit of God alone could transform us into spiritual men. In his agony at Gethsemane, he told his drowsy disciples to watch and pray, lest they should fall into temptation; "the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak;" evidently alluding to that corporeal sensitiveness which would give rise to animal fear, or fear of corporeal suffering. On another occasion, he told the Jews, "Ye judge according to the flesh;" that is, according to outward appearances; on which ground they denied that he was "the light of the world," as the context intimates. Were Christ accustomed, like St. Paul, to use the term flesh to designate the impulses

to sin, we might suppose that he did so in this text, and that the meaning was, "Ye judge according to your sinful propensities;" but the passage quite as naturally admits the sense we have given it, and we do not find the other usage in our Saviour's phraseology. St. Peter seems to have come nearer than the rest of the inspired writers, to St. Paul's idea of the flesh. "I beseech you," says he, "as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul." It is not improbable, however, that, by fleshly lusts, he meant only those which obviously proceed from bodily appetites, such as we commonly call lusts, and not sin in general. But in another place, he says, "forasmuch as Christ hath suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves likewise with the same mind; for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin,"—where, it would seem, he means, hath ceased from sin in general; thus connecting all kinds of sin with the flesh, in such a way that crucifying this would prevent them. Except St. Paul's writings, this is the only passage in which such a connection appears to be recognized between the body and sin *in general*, as distinguished from those particular vices which spring directly from the corporeal appetites. And even here, it is questionable whether St. Peter did not refer specially to the latter, instead of having all the varieties of sin distinctly in his view: "he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin, that he should no longer live the rest of his time in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God. For the time past of our lives may suffice us to have wrought the will of the Gentiles, when we walked in *lasciviousness*, *lust*, *excess of wine*, *revellings*, *banquetings*, and *abominable idolatries*," in which the most shameful indulgences were practised. It is evidently to these that he refers, in other expressions of the kind, as in the following: "The Lord knoweth how . . . . . to reserve the unjust unto the day of judgment to be punished; but chiefly them that walk after the flesh in *the lust of concupiscence*, and despise government;" where those who walk after the flesh, are one particular class of offenders. "For when they speak great swelling words of vanity, they allure through the lusts of the flesh, through *much wantonness*," or lasciviousness. So, too, Jude says, "Likewise, also, these dreamers defile the flesh,

[practise obscenity,] despise dominion," &c. He exhorts his brethren to save some of these with fear, "pulling them out of the fire, hating even the garment spotted by the flesh." In these latter examples, the reference plainly is to excessive indulgence of what are properly called bodily appetites.

Such is the manner in which the terms in question are employed in all parts of the New Testament, except the writings of St. Paul. But when we pass into these, we find the phraseology habitually used in a new sense. According to him, all sin is the work of the flesh, and in the flesh there is nothing good. To be carnal, or fleshly, is to be opposed to God. He contrasts the mind, or the inner man, with the body, or the flesh; and speaks of the one as pure in all its exercises, and the other as always corrupt. All this representation, and all such phraseology, are confined to him. We may, therefore, suspect that they grew out of some peculiar formula of a philosophic kind, which he alone, among the writers of the New Testament, had, from his more extensive learning, been familiar with. And this conjecture will be strengthened, if we shall find that the distinction between him and them, is rather verbal or rhetorical, than real. It will indicate that he but borrowed the language of certain speculative hypotheses, to express a meaning that was common to all the apostles.

In proceeding, now, to a closer observation of his real doctrine, we will begin by showing that, notwithstanding the seeming purport of his language in many places, he does not mean that sin is confined to the body exclusively. He regards the mind of man, and even the spirit of man, as the seat of moral corruption, equally with the body. Writing to the Ephesians, he reminds them that formerly they "walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the *spirit* that now worketh in the children of disobedience; among whom we all had our conversation, in times past, in the lusts of the flesh, and of the *mind*." Again, he says to the Corinthians, "Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and of the *spirit*." Here, the lusts of the mind and the filthiness of the spirit, are placed on the same ground with those of the flesh. Other instances from St.

Paul's writings, are the following: "As they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind," or an impure, adulterated mind. To the Ephesians he says, "Walk not as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their mind." To the Colossians he speaks of one who is "vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind." He warns Timothy, repeatedly, of "men of corrupt minds," and mentions "seducing spirits." To Titus he says, "Unto them that are defiled and unbelieving, is nothing pure; but even their mind and conscience is defiled." He frequently exhorts us to "be renewed in our minds," and "in the spirit of our minds;" implying, of course, that our minds and the spirit of them were wrong.

From all this, we see how gross a mistake it would be to suppose that St. Paul confines sin to the body alone, or regards the mind, the spirit, of man as incorrupt. He means nothing of this kind, even when he says that he delights in the law of God after the inward man, while the law in his members wars against the law of his mind, bringing him into captivity to the law of sin. Indeed, the mere body, or flesh, strictly speaking, can never sin, though it may work temptations. When taken by itself, it is neither intelligent nor conscious, and is as incapable of moral transgression as any other unintelligent mass of matter. And even when united with mind, as it is in every rational person, it is the mind which feels, knows, and acts through the body as its instrument. It is the mind which recognizes motives, controls impulses, or yields to them; it is the mind which forms within itself the purpose, whether good or bad, and then executes it in overt acts, by means of the body. The mind is the real agent; and it is the mind alone that is guilty and condemned, in the case of sin. If it should be said that this contradicts St. Paul's assertion, that with the mind he served the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin, — we will, for the argument's sake, grant, what is not strictly true, that there is a contradiction in words; but is there any in the meaning? Will any one contend, seriously, that, in serving the law of sin, the mind takes no part, neither premeditates, nor desires, nor balances motives, nor comes to a determination, nor wills, nor puts forth the effort; but that all this is done by about a hundred or two

pounds of mere bone, flesh and blood, without any coöperation of the mental power? The utter absurdity of the supposition ought, of itself, to be a sufficient guard against such a misapprehension of the passages referred to. But if this be not enough to satisfy every one, the matter will be put at rest by appealing to St. Paul's habitual recognition of corrupt, defiled, lustful, reprobate, filthy, vain, unrenewed minds and spirit in man. The other writers of the New Testament agree with St. Paul on this point. St. James says, "The *spirit* that dwelleth within us, lusteth to envy." How often do we read, in the gospels, of "unclean spirits!"—an expression which, though borrowed from the popular notion of demons, could hardly have been retained by the evangelists, had they held the absolute and inevitable purity of all spirits. St. John says, "Believe not every spirit; but try the spirits, whether they be of God."

We have said that, properly speaking, the body never sins; for, of itself, it is not intelligent to take cognizance of any moral law. For the same reason, neither can the blind appetites and propensities of the body sin. The farthest they can go in this direction, is, to operate on the mind as impulses or incitements to wrong. If the mind does not consent to an improper indulgence of them, there is no sin, how strongly soever they rage; if it does consent, there is sin, how slightly soever they be felt. It is the determination of the mind that gives the act a moral character; and without such determination, there can be neither sin nor righteousness, let the body or the appetites do what they may.

We have seen representations, especially in some phrenological writers, that seemed at least to imply that sin is confined to the lower propensities, leaving our higher powers always pure and guiltless. They begin by personifying, unconsciously perhaps, the several affections, faculties and operations of our nature, as they are said to be manifested by the respective organs; and then they treat each of these as a separate agent, complete in itself, having a will, judgment, and responsibility of its own,—as if every single man were but a community of individuals, some of which are scoundrels, and some angels; each, however, acting by itself, and answerable for itself. Thus, to use the phrenological nomenclature, our alimentiveness

sins, by passing over the proper limits of its office into intemperance; our destructiveness, combativeness, self-esteem, amativeness, &c., in a similar way, or by misdirection. But here let us ask, Is it alimentiveness, &c., that is guilty, in these cases? or is it the man himself as an intelligent being? is it the blind propensity, say of destructiveness, or of amativeness, that is conscience-smitten, struck with remorse, made wretched, and that sometimes repents? or is it the person, he who indulged these impulses unlawfully? Which of the two is it that commits the sin, and suffers the consequences? and then, on the other hand, is it the abstract tendencies to benevolence, reverence, conscientiousness, &c., that are self-approved and blessed? or is it he who purposely exerts and directs them? Which of the two is the conscious agent, who thus serves the law of God, and receives the reward? In all these cases, it is not the impulses that are either good or bad, except as means. There must be an intelligent person to whom they belong, and whose mind, whose will, directs them, before they can have any moral character; and he alone is either the agent, or the responsible subject. Witness the case of brutes, which have many of these impulses in full vigor. Nor must St. Paul be understood to contradict this conclusion, self-evident as it is. Even when he speaks of serving the law of God with his mind, and the law of sin with his flesh, he still recognizes the fact that it is he himself who is the agent in both cases: "So then, with the mind, *I myself* serve the law of God; but with the flesh, the law of sin."

Another thing must be observed here. Whatever be the verbal form of the expression which St. Paul sometimes adopts, he does not mean that the body of flesh is *necessarily* of corrupt influence, so that it cannot be made the medium of righteousness, or that there is any thing in it which may not be used for good. He means that all this depends immediately on the person himself, on his will, on the determination of his mind; and, accordingly, he brings exhortations to bear on these faculties. Says he, "Let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal bodies;" of course, his brethren might prevent this, by a right exercise of the mind. Again: "If the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also

quicken your mortal bodies, by his spirit that dwelleth in you;" that is, shall make your bodies the outward organs of the internal spiritual life; for the context shows that he means their sanctification in the present mortal state. To the Romans he says, referring to their former condition while unconverted, "As ye have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and to iniquity, unto iniquity; even so now yield your members servants to righteousness, unto holiness." Again: "Neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin; but yield yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God." Of course, he held that "the members," or the body, might be devoted to sin or to righteousness, just according to the mind of the man. "I beseech you, therefore, brethren, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God." Other expressions of the same general import, are the following: "Now, the body is not for fornication, but for the Lord." (Here mark, that the latter is its legitimate, normal use; the other is but a perversion.) "Your bodies," says he, "are the members of Christ." "Your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, which is in you." "Therefore, glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are his." "I pray God, that your whole spirit, soul, and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord." He speaks of the unmarried woman, who "careth for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy both in body and in spirit." Referring to the incessant persecutions they endured, he says, "We are always delivered unto death for Jesus's sake, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh." Nothing can be plainer, than that the apostle recognized the flesh, the body, its members, &c., as the instruments of righteousness, if they were properly used; and that he makes it depend on the person's will, or faculty of determining, whether they should be employed in this way, or in sin. In this one respect, the body was merely an unconscious instrument, subject to the use and direction of the mind.

At this stage, it may be well to sum up what we have already ascertained of the apostle's real doctrine on the general subject: 1. That the mind, the spirit of man,

becomes itself corrupt; and, if common sense may be trusted, that here only is the seat of sin, in any sense that includes moral guilt, self-condemnation, remorse, repentance, &c. 2. That though an impulse towards sin is attributed to the body, yet the body may, nevertheless, be used to serve God, just as well as it may be used to transgress. And, 3. That whether it shall be made to act for evil, or for good, depends not on itself, but on the person, the moral agent, who determines the whole so far as respects the immediate cause. We think it will be seen at once, that this, the real meaning of St. Paul, is the same with that of the other inspired writers, on the subject; and that he differs from them only in the manner of expressing it, by a more frequent and extensive use of the term flesh, as a metaphor.

We may now advance to another consideration. From the foregoing facts, it will be readily perceived, that whenever St. Paul speaks of the flesh, the body, or its members, as the seat of sin, he does not use those terms in their simple and proper sense, as denoting the physical constitution. He means something else; say, the influence that is exerted on the mind by the bodily appetites and senses; or, which amounts to the same thing, the propensity of the person to submit to their control over the mind. This may be clearly exemplified by his language in many passages. Speaking of a vicious person in the Corinthian church, he advises "to deliver such an one unto Satan, for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus;" where it would be absurd to suppose it his meaning, to destroy the flesh literally, that is, to put the offender to death, or to maim him. It was, to correct the vicious habit and disposition he had formed, — to make him break his mental thraldom to sensual gratification. Again: alluding to the unconverted state in which his brethren had formerly been, the apostle says, "When we were in the flesh, the motions [*literally* passions] of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death;" where he implies that, though still living in the body, they were no longer in what he here calls the flesh, that is, in a moral state of subjection to the senses. "So, then," he says, "they that are in the flesh cannot please God; but ye are not in the flesh, but in the

spirit, if so be that the spirit of God dwell in you,"—asserting what was implied in the former quotation, that while they were still in the flesh, literally speaking, they were not in the flesh as he uses the term. "And if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin;" not, however, the physical body, for *that* would retain all its properties; but the affections prompted by it. "O wretched man that I am," exclaims he; "who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" not that his wish was to die, to be delivered from this physical body; for this was to be employed in the service of God; and, moreover, he immediately adds that the deliverance he sought was to be obtained "through the Lord Jesus Christ," or through faith in him. In all these cases, it is evident that, by the flesh, the body, its members, &c., he means the domination of the senses, in the mind, to the neglect of the spiritual development of our nature.

And now, as to the nature of that connection, which is thus recognized, between sin and the body, (using this latter term, here, in its proper signification,) what is it when drawn out in detail, and stated in direct language? Evidently, nothing more than the following:—The senses, so far as respects their outward organization, belong to the body; for without the body we should, of course, have no organs of seeing, hearing, tasting, &c., nor any animal feeling, whether of animal pleasure to entice us, or of animal suffering to deter. These senses always lie in contact with the mind, with the will; and they communicate to it impulses, which must be either controlled or yielded to, by some exertion of the mental power. If we mistake not, it is these impulsive influences which St. Paul, in the passages referred to, calls the flesh, body, members, &c., because, in most cases at least, they proceed from the flesh. Up to this point, however, there is no sin in the case. But now, if the person voluntarily follows these impulses too far, or neglects to restrain them within their proper limits, then sin begins, and not till then,—begins and continues in his will, or governing faculty. To walk according to these impulses, is what St. Paul means by walking according to the flesh; to live in them, is to live in the flesh, as he uses this term; to have our minds subjected to them, is to be carnally or fleshly minded; to overcome their predominating influence, is to destroy the body, or to crucify

the flesh; the affections and acts in which they result when not controlled, are the works of the flesh, in his language.

If we look back, it will be seen that the several views, which we have found so clearly presented in his general doctrine on the subject, do not admit of any closer connection than this, between the physical and moral elements of the case. He holds that the mind becomes corrupt, and needs to be renewed; that the body may be used in the service of God, or in sin, just accordingly as the mind is disposed; and whenever he speaks of the flesh, the body, or its members, as the agent of sin, the terms are highly metaphorical. The occasion of his using these terms in so remote a sense, was, probably, that they were suggested by some of the forms of Oriental Philosophy, which prevailed among the learned, in his age and country. According to this, all evil was confined to matter, and all human sin to the flesh, simply as matter, which was supposed to be intrinsically corrupt. Nothing good could come of it, be it used in what way soever; and our duty, with respect to it, was, to macerate and mortify the body itself, instead of attempting the impracticable task of making it the instrument of righteousness. The apostle, however, was very far from adopting that doctrine, as we have seen, though he borrowed some of its phraseology. This it was natural that he should do, accustomed as he must have been to hear its language employed on such subjects, in the circle in which he moved.

A question may arise, whether, as matter of fact, every species of sin is necessarily connected with the physical body, either in this way, or in any other. Many kinds of sin are, indeed, obviously so connected, at least in the outward form in which they are manifested; while they still have their ultimate ground in some infirmity of the moral nature. Such are intemperance and all excessive indulgence of the corporeal appetites; and, it is worthy of remark, that these are represented as sins of the flesh, lusts of the flesh, &c., by other inspired writers, as well as by St. Paul, and indeed by mankind in all ages. Then, there are the sins of overweening devotion to worldly objects, as the means of gratifying our senses; and these may be brought into a remoter connection of the same kind. But it would be difficult, perhaps, to trace out any such rela-

tion, in the case of certain other sins, that lie deep in the human mind. What part, for instance, does the body appear to have in prompting the feelings, say, of pride, envy, selfishness, irreverence, &c.? We will not deny that, in some way unknown, it may have an influence to excite them; but, so far as we can see, they affect the individual only as a conscious, intelligent being, in his relations to other beings, no matter whether clothed in flesh, or not. It would seem that he must be capable of these feelings in any condition in which self-esteem and self-love may become excessive. It may be objected, that St. Paul expressly names envy and other feelings of the same class, among the works of the flesh. But considering in how remote a sense he unquestionably uses this term, here, we confess we have doubts whether he distinctly meant to assert that all those affections arose in the mind simply from its connection with the body. As the most obvious and striking sins were occasioned by that circumstance, is it unnatural to suppose that he might, in popular discourse, and for convenience' sake, rank all the rest together in the same category, according to the technical phraseology to which he had been accustomed? We will not, however, insist on this. If a phrenologist should plead that all those feelings are manifested through certain bodily organs, it would be sufficient to remind him that so, too, are benevolence, conscientiousness, reverence, &c., according to his science; and that, if the former class are, *therefore*, sins of the flesh, the latter are virtues of the flesh. The question is not, whether all these affections have peculiar organs by which they are manifested; nor, how they are manifested; but, whence do they arise? It should always be remembered, in inquiries of this kind, that phrenology, whether true or false, deals only with circumstantials. It is but skull-deep, and does not reach down into the internal operations of mind.

Having thus endeavored to bring together St. Paul's general doctrine on the subject, and to define, consistently with it, the connection he recognizes between sin and the body, we will conclude with some observations on a passage, which, of all others in his writings, contains the most remarkable specimen of the phraseology under consideration. It will be convenient, however, to put these remarks

into a form different from that which we have hitherto employed; and we therefore give them in a separate article, which follows. H. B.[2d].

Art. XXXII.

The Seventh Chapter of Romans; with Notes.

Prefatory Observations. Our chief aim, now, is confined to what the apostle here says of the flesh, &c., as the seat of sin. Other topics which occur, we shall pass over more slightly.

The character of this chapter is in the highest degree rhetorical, as distinguished from scientific preciseness. The language throughout is figurative, without any aim even at consistency, so far as respects the form of expression. We shall find the figures frequently broken, and shifted from subject to subject; the same word or phrase is sometimes used in opposite senses; every thing is personified, such as the law, sin, righteousness, &c.; and the personification assumes different shapes in different parts of the discourse. We must, therefore, be careful to draw out the main thread from its rhetorical entanglements, and to follow it through, without being turned aside by mere tropes and metonymies.

The idea, with which the chapter opens, is, that believers are delivered from subjection to law, that is, from servitude and thraldom under it, as merely a catalogue of commands. Their moral life is not developed by slavish, mechanical observance of the letter, — so much to be done, because so much is exacted, — but by a freer method, and by a higher principle, namely, by the spirit itself of righteousness, or as the apostle elsewhere calls it, by faith, which leads them spontaneously in the way of obedience. He begins by pleading that his brethren in Christ were dead to law, that is, when it is taken in the formal sense just mentioned.

1. Know ye not, brethren, (for I speak to them that know the law,) *how* that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he

Ver. 1–4. As a woman is released from the law of her marriage, when her husband is dead, so we, who

liveth? 2. For the woman which hath a husband, is bound by the law to *her* husband, so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of *her* husband. 3. So then, if, while *her* husband liveth, she be *married* to another man, she shall be called an adulteress; but if *her* husband be dead, she is free from the law, so that she is no adulteress, though she be *married* to another man. 4. Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law, by the body of Christ, that ye should be *married* to another, *even* to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God. 5. For when we were in the flesh, the motions [*literally*, passions, *or* emotions,] of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death; 6. but now we are delivered from the law, that being dead [*Griesbach*, being dead to that] wherein we were held; that we should serve in newness of spirit and not *in* the oldness of the letter.

believe, are become dead to mere law (in the sense mentioned above,) by the corporeal death of Christ, which we professed to take upon ourselves when we were buried in baptism — as is explained in ch. vi. 3–6. [Mark the striking want of precision in the form of the simile, here, and in its application: At first, it is said that the law hath dominion (*literally*, lords it) over a person only so long as that person lives; then, that when the person dies, not he, but another, namely, his wife, is loosed from the law; and lastly, this is made to illustrate the point that, as believers have taken Christ's death upon themselves in a symbolical way, they themselves (not others,) are dead to the law, or loosed from its despotism. We must be careful not to be misled by such shiftings of the figure.]

5, 6. —*were in the flesh*,] not literally, for in that sense they were still in the flesh; but when we lived under the domination of our senses. —*the passions*, or *emotions of sins, which were by the law.*] Sin is personified. Its emotions are said to be occasioned by the law, because the strife it raises within us is caused by our consciousness of its being unlawful, prohibited, — as the apostle explains in the 7th verse. —*did work in our members*,] or in our sensitive nature; for the members of our body are not themselves *directly* affected by the prohibitions of moral law. —*to bring forth fruit unto death*,] or unto guilt, self-condemnation. But now, being dead to the law, (as before

7. What shall we say, then? *Is* the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin, but by the law; for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. 8. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law, sin *was* dead. 9. For I was alive without the law, once; but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died; 10. and the commandment which *was ordained* to life, I found *to be* unto death; 11. for sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it slew *me.* 12. Wherefore, the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good.

13. Was, then, that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin [*was made death unto me,*] working death in me by that which is good; that sin, by the command-

explained,) we serve God in a new way, by the *spirit* of righteousness, and not in the old way, by a mechanical observance of the mere letter of the commands.

7. Because the law exasperates our sinful inclinations, by its prohibition, does it follow that it is itself sinful? No, indeed; for we should not have known sin, as such, but for the prohibition, which thwarts it, and makes it to be transgression. —*lust*] here means wrong desire in general. We should not have known it, *as wrong*, but for our consciousness that it is unlawful.

8–11. When we were unconscious of any law against such desires, they were not accompanied with guilt, or moral death; and we were then alive, in this sense,—that is, we had no self-condemnation. (He evidently uses the term death, here, for guilt.) But when the command, or prohibition, was brought home to our minds, it made these desires become sin,—gave sin its life, that is, its guilt. And so, the command, which enjoined hearty obedience, or moral life, produced guilt or moral death in us, by our breaking it.

12. That the law is holy and good, is seen from the very fact that it forbids sin and requires holiness of us.

13. He recurs to what he had said in verses 8–11. Was it, however, the law itself, strictly speaking, that produced death, or guilt, in us? No; the guilt was caused by those desires which transgressed the law; and the command, which forbade them, only brought out into light their real character as sin. If there had been no law, those

ment, might become exceeding sinful. 14. For, we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin; 15. for that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I. 16. If, then, I do that which I would not, I consent unto the law that *it is* good. 17. Now, then, it is no more I that do it, but sin, that dwelleth in me. 18. For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good *thing;* for to will is present with me, but *how* to perform that which is good, I find not. 19. For the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do. 20. Now if I do that [*which*] I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.

desires would have existed still, but without rebuke; the law showed their malignity.

14. —*the law is spiritual*] in its requisitions, that is, demands spiritual obedience; but our minds, enslaved by the senses, run counter to it; and this causes the guilt. [In other places, the apostle argues that the law, as mere command, cannot give us the *spirit* necessary to obey it.]

15. That there is such a slavery of the mind appears from the fact, that we do what we cannot but condemn, and neglect what we cannot but approve as right. [Of course, the apostle does not here mean what he literally says. He trusts to the self-evident character of the case to guard against such a misapprehension, and freely indulges in rhetorical language which cannot be interpreted in any way, on the supposition that it is logical. Every body knows that, in moral acts, we always do just what we on the whole *will* to do; and that when we do what we condemn, it is not because we hate it, but because we on the whole love it. No act can be a moral act any further than it agrees with the *will* of the agent.]

16. Now, if we in our conscience condemn the wrong which the law forbids, we ourselves bear testimony, even when we disobey the law, that it is good; according to verse 12.

17. This verse is merely a rhetorical expression, intended only for effect,—namely, to set out, in the very strongest light, the domineering force of sinful habits of mind. To use a common figure, which is almost as strong,— *They lead us captive.*

18–20. —*in me, (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing.*] How does this agree with what he elsewhere

21. I find then a law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me. 22. For I delight in the law of God, after the inward man; 23. but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members. 24. O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? 25. I thank God, [*this deliverance is*] through Jesus Christ our Lord. So, then, with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.

teaches, that our "body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, which dwelleth in us?" or, that we should "present our bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God?" &c. There may be a contradiction in the words, but none in the meaning. Manifestly, by the flesh, he here means, as in other places, the *condition* of the mind when subject to the senses; or, as he sometimes calls it, carnal mind. —*to will is present with me; but to perform that which is good, I find not,*] when in this condition. He feels bound in conscience to do good; but his inclinations and will are opposed to it. Here and in what follows, the language is of the same unguarded rhetorical character as in verses 15, 17. [It is important to mark the bold license of expression in this passage and in the verses referred to. There is, indeed, no danger of mistaking it, here; but it may put us on our guard against pressing the apostle's language too closely in other places where he treats of this subject.]

21. —*I find, then, a law,*] or rule. Our experience shows it to be a rule that, while we are conscious of our obligation to do good, evil tendencies within us interfere.

22. He proceeds in this and the following verse, to exemplify the foregoing. —*I delight in the law of God after the inward man;*] that is, I approve it in my conscience, and feel the obligation to obey it. [He does not mean, of course, that his mind, on the whole, accords with the law of God, save when he actually obeys; for such accordance of his mind would be the very obedience that the law requires.]

23. —*another law in my members;*] another tendency within me, namely, that of the sensual affections. —*warring against the law of my mind;*] against the law recognized by my conscience.

24. —*deliver me from the body of this death,*] an Hebra-

ism, for *this deadly body;* that is, this body which occasions death or guilt. The apostle, however, does not mean the physical body as such; for he was not speaking of deliverance from this, as appears by the next sentence, but of deliverance from the domination of the sensual affections. — *through Jesus Christ our Lord;*] that is, I thank God there is deliverance therefrom through Christ; or by faith in him; as the apostle argues at large in the next chapter. — *So then,*] referring to what he had said in verses 22, 23. — *with my mind I serve the law of God;*] in my conscience I approve it; as he had before shown. — *with the flesh the law of sin;*] the sensual affections of his mind, when predominant, made him the slave of sin. H. B.[2d.]

Art. XXXIII.

Literary Notices.

1. Travels in North America, in the Years 1841-2; with Geological Observations on the United States, Canada, and Nova Scotia. By Charles Lyell, Esq., F. R. S., Author of the Principles of Geology. In two Volumes. New York: Wiley and Putnam, 161 Broadway. 1845.

The chief value of this work, as was to be expected, lies in the helps which it affords for the successful study of American geology; and these, we think, are of great merit. How much of original and valuable discovery the author has added to the hard-earned stores of his predecessors, in this great but half-cultivated field, it becomes not us to say. We are of the opinion, however, that his labors in this respect, are entitled to our sincere thanks. We think we might confidently refer, in evidence of this, to his investigations at the Falls of Niagara, in the coal-measures of Blossberg, in the structure and age of the Apalachian mountain-chain, with its accompanying enormous coal-field, in the tertiary strata of Martha's Vineyard, and in the coal-beds of Nova Scotia; not to mention his many observations with regard to northern drift and the traces of glacial action, so abundant all over the northern part of this continent. The greater portion of the work, however, is made up of a well-arranged collection of materials, which had been furnished to his hand, by our own American geologists, and whose merit he is free to acknowledge. From a review of their labors, especially of the reports of our

State surveys, he has constructed a most intelligible geological map of the United States, Canada, &c., which, with the author's description, must be of great utility to the student of the geology of this country. The other plates and ideal sections in the work, particularly those illustrating the district of Niagara, will be acknowledged also as valuable aids. It were useless to add our conviction, that this eminent expositor of this noble and fascinating science, has placed us under new obligations to him for the present addition to his labors, and that the students of American geology will find much in this work to render them assistance and encouragement.

But the work before us is not wholly scientific in its interest; and it is pleasant to perceive, in reading its closely-pruned pages, that, while the author acknowledges the New World to be richer than the Old in geological treasures, there being, as he says, "no other country in which the ancient strata are developed on a grander scale, or more plentifully charged with fossils," he recognizes the working of principles, movements, and institutions, on this side of the Atlantic, tending to raise us to an unparalleled degree of intellectual and moral greatness. It is easy, however, to detect his attachment to the doctrines of hereditary monarchy. He fears that a democratic form of government, guaranteeing to all the right of suffrage, has not sufficient power in it to check and govern the passions of the populace. Still, he acknowledges that the experiment, in connection with our institutions, has worked well; and he has the manliness and honesty to defend us, in a very clear and straightforward manner, against some of the charges of our European assailants, particularly on the subject of repudiation. Of American manners and morals, he speaks in high praise. "I am bound to say," says he, "that in the two most glaring instances of vulgar familiarity which we experienced here, we found out that both the offenders had crossed the Atlantic only ten years before, and had risen rapidly from a humble station. Whatever of good breeding exists here in the middle classes, is certainly not of foreign importation; and John Bull, in particular, when out of humor with the manners of the Americans, is often unconsciously beholding his own image in the mirror, or comparing one class of society in the United States with another in his own country, which ought, from superior affluence and leisure, to exhibit a higher standard of refinement and intelligence." In surveying the subject of our Southern slavery, our author seems to betray the same mental coolness as he had previously done in gazing upon the foaming cataract of Niagara,—his reason and judgment preceding his fancy and enthusiasm. Many an abolitionist, in reading his reflections on

this vexed and vexing question, will doubtless regard him as wanting in philanthropy, and suspect that he has been influenced, in some of his conclusions, by the planters themselves. Though he cannot believe in the utility of immediate and violent emancipation, he considers the "peculiar institution" an enormous evil and curse; and while he argues that the decreasing productiveness of slave plantations would, itself, in connection with the necessity of employing free labor, lead to its abolition in something like half a century, he hopes that the slaveholder will not wait for such a remote and easy death of the evil, but lose no time in applying himself to the education of the slaves, and encouraging private manumission to prepare the way for general emancipation. Of the state of education in this country, especially in New England, Mr. Lyell expresses his highest admiration, and he even seems at a loss to account for the manner in which it has reached the extent and degree which it has attained among us. He is also highly pleased with the operation of the voluntary principle, in connection with religion, contending that we have gained at least two great advantages by its adoption: first, that the ministers are in no danger of going to sleep; and, secondly, that they concern themselves much less with politics than is the case on his side of the Atlantic.

2. Endless Punishment; its Origin and Grounds examined; with other Discourses. By T. J. Sawyer, Minister of the Orchard street (Universalist) Church, New York. New York: C. L. Stickney, 140 Fulton street, &c. 1845. 16mo. pp. 252.

THIS little work, written in popular form, and free, unlabored style, is, nevertheless, one of the most thorough examinations of the doctrine of endless punishment that we have seen, — so far at least as the character and grounds of that doctrine are concerned. The Scripture arguments, used in its support, are not so largely entered into; as it was thought, perhaps, that these had been more adequately discussed in the numerous publications current among us. The author sets the doctrine forth in all the various forms it has assumed, from that of literal hell-fire for the large majority of mankind, down to an eternal consciousness of guilt in a small remnant of our race; and he then passes under review all the grounds, or general principles, on which it has been advocated. The reader will find many historical allusions, of curious interest, to the origin and successive changes of the doctrine, and many examples of the rhetoric and logic that have been employed in its behalf. Indeed, we may trace out in these pages, the general course which human speculation has held on the subject, from the earliest ages to the present. We would

earnestly recommend the work to the attention of all thinkers, did not the name of the author render such an introduction to notice unnecessary.

3. The Rose of Sharon: a Religious Souvenir, for MDCCCXLVI. Edited by Miss S. C. Edgarton. Boston: A. Tompkins and B. B. Mussey. 1846. 12mo. pp. 304.

THE present volume of our favorite Annual has won the praise, from all our editors, of being the best of the series, both in its general literary merits, and in its typography, as well as in its artistical embellishments. To this judgment, we subscribe, without hesitation. It is not our practice to venture on the responsibility of distinguishing the merits of the different writers; otherwise, we would mention several pieces which we think excel, and point out a manifest improvement, in some of the authors, with respect to chasteness of style and clearness of thought.

4. An Essay on the Treatment of Compound Fractures, being the Annual Address before the Massachusetts Medical Society, May 28, 1845. By William J. Walker, M. D., Fellow of the Society, &c. &c. Boston: Press of Crocker & Brewster. 1845. 8vo. pp. 44. lvi.

NOTWITHSTANDING our ignorance of the subject here treated of, we mention this pamphlet for the sake of those who can avail themselves of the information it offers, so important to the preservation of human life. The well-known reputation of one of the first surgeons in our country, gives it the highest authority with the profession; and the cases, which are described with great clearness in the appendix, seem to demonstrate the principles laid down, so far as the nature of the subject admits of demonstration.

JUN 9 1968